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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation handles the poetics of Philodemus of Gadara, a first century BCE 
Epicurean philosopher and poet. His views are recoverable from several of his treatises, which 
are primarily polemical and without positive exposition. However, his views are recoverable 
from careful readings of the debates, rare direct evidence, and attention to his commitments, 
which as a loyal member of the school, he could not contradict. 
 The first, introductory, chapter treats Philodemus' biography, the history of scholarship 
on the topic, and introduces some technical matters (often editorial) and conventions. 
 The second chapter treats the history of the Garden's engagement with poetics. Epicurus 
did not write an On Poems but Metrodorus did. Other early Epicureans, as well as Zeno of Sidon, 
Demetrius Laco, and Siro and other Epicureans are examined as well. 
 In chapter three, “The Prolepsis of the Poem,” I discuss what counts as a poem for 
Epicureans. Philodemus indicates that there were prolepseis of “poetry” and “poem;” the 
Epicureans meant basically what we mean by the terms.  
 In chapter four, “Poetry as Techne and the Uses of Poetry,” I argue that poetry counts as 
an art for the Epicureans, but not a useful one. 
 In my fifth chapter, “The Form, Content, Judgment, and Purpose of Poems,” I examine 
Philodemus' views as what form and content are, and the ways in which they interact. They are 
interdependent: the content depends on the words used to describe it, but there cannot be
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flanguage without a topic. He values form above content in judging poems. The poem has an 
strange effect: it produces “additional thoughts” in the audience, by which they are entertained. It 
seems clear that Philodemus expected good poets to arrange form and content suggestively, so 
that the poems could exert a lasting pull on the minds of the audience.  
 My sixth chapter collects a miscellany of topics which Philodemus handles but which do 
not fit neatly into another chapter. I discuss his views on genre, mimesis, “appropriateness,” 
utility, and various technical terms. 
 The seventh chapter contains a concluding summary. 
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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
§1 Orientation 
 It is perhaps a measure of how poetry-focused Classics, or at least the Hellenic half of it, 
is that Philodemus' On Poems is the best studied work from Herculaneum, beating out even 
Epicurus' On Nature, which one would reasonably have guessed would win the lion's share of 
attention. There are a few causes; obvious among them are lack of specialist training in the 
several fields required and, before air travel, difficulty of access to the material. Philodemus' 
epigrams provide another motive, as does his interest for students of the poetics of Aristotle and 
Horace. 
 This dissertation continues the trend of neglecting Epicurus in favor of his epigonos, 
Philodemus of Gadara. The bulk of it is dedicated to explaining Philodemus' poetics and 
situating them generally in the realm of Epicurean philosophy. This can finally be done with 
some security, since the texts are well edited and unlikely to cause seismic disturbances under 
the feet of future scholars. But just because they are well edited does not mean that they are 
straightforward or easy to read. On the contrary, Philodemus' prose is not simple at the best of 
times and he does not honor modern scholarly conventions of citation and clarity in 
argumentation, which makes simply sorting out who claimed what a good deal of work for the 
modern reader. It is here that I hope to make my main contribution: to put future students of 
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Philodemus' poetics on a reasonably solid footing by putting forward a complete, coherent 
picture of his views. If along the way I can say something of interest to students of ancient 
literary criticism, Epicurean philosophy, or ancient poetry, all the better. 
 The rest of this introduction will be taken up with more detailed discussions of several 
topics: a thumb-nail biographical sketch of Philodemus (§2), a discussion of the modern 
scholarship on the topic (§3), a general introduction to his aesthetic works (§4), the structure of 
the On Poems (§5), the difficulty of reconstructing Philodemus' positions (§6), the sources used 
(§7) and some more technical introductions about the editions used and conventions for printing 
Greek (§§8-11). 
 
§2 Biographical Sketch 
 Philodemus was born probably c. 110 BCE1 in what is now Umm Qais, Jordan.2 Across 
the Yarmouk Valley, in the modern Hammat Geder, Israel (ancient Emmatha or Amatha, not to 
be confused with Amathūs, which is further south in Jordan), is a naturally occurring hot spring 
with a building complex that dates back to the second century CE. 
 Gadara seems to be a semitic name, cf. Hebrew רדג, (gadār) “to build a wall of stones” 
or, as a noun (géder),  “stone wall,” possibly referring either to terrace farming or fortification 
                                                            
1 Our dates for Philodemus' lifetime depend on references in Cicero's In Pisonem and in his own works, especially 
the De Signis. Cicero presents him as somewhat older than Piso, who was consul in 58, ergo 42 or 43 in that 
year, so born in 100 or 101. If Philodemus were much older than Piso, Cicero probably would have used that fact 
in his polemic. At De Signis 2.15-18, Philodemus mentions pygmies which Antony brought from Hyria (ἐξ 
Ὑρίαϲ). Antony was in Hyria in 40. If the sequence of letters is interpreted to mean ἐκ Ϲυρίαϲ, the event took 
place in either 54 or 40. In any event, it was in the quite recent past when Philodemus wrote, since he says νῦν ... 
ἐκοµίϲατο. 40 BCE (trusting the orthography of the papyrus) is a reasonable terminus post quem; Philodemus 
would have been about 70. He probably did not pass 80, since that is the age at which [Lucian] in the Makrobioi 
considers someone old enough to be worth recording. Sider (1997: 3-12) has a full discussion. 
2 The site was excavated under the auspices of the Deutsches Archäologische Institüt. The Arabic name is 
variously transliterated: Um(m) Qais, Qays, and Qes are most common. The Hebrew name sometimes lacks one 
m. An excellent summary with bibliography can be found in Fitzgerald (2004), on whom my account relies, and 
see also Hoffmann and Bührig (2013). The first volume of the site report is Weber (2002). 
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walls. Aramaic has the same words, but additionally הרידג (gadīráh) meaning “harvest” (possibly 
specifically of dates). The name Geder is used in the Talmud to refer to this city and its 
associated hot springs, the latter still known today asרגד תמח (Hammat Geder, “Hot Springs of 
Geder”). A “High Place” for Semitic-style sacrifice has been found just north of the city, but 
there are, as of yet, no certainly pre-Hellenistic finds that indicate settlement. The cult place may 
have been used by nomads.3 Stephanus of Byzantium and George Syncellus are probably 
mistaken to record that it was a Macedonian settlement, unless they mean that it was founded by 
descendants of Macedonians. It seems to be a Ptolemaic (re)foundation.4 Stephanus also records 
that it was called Antiochia, which may date to the period of Seleucid domination.5 
 Finds from the late third century BCE indicate a fairly wealthy, but small, town; 
according to Polybius (V.71.3), it was well fortified and close to the Ptolemaic Skythopolis (Beit 
Shean, Israel), and could have been garrisoned from there.6 This is probably to be connected with 
the Fourth Syrian War or its aftermath. 
 After a period of passing back and forth between Seleucid and Ptolemaic control, Gadara 
passed definitively to the Seleucids in 195 as a result of the Fifth Syrian War; this may mark the 
beginning of intensive Hellenization of the populace, which seems to increase through the 
second century, as a matter of Seleucid policy.7 A peristyle court which may (or may not) have 
served as a palaestra has been found at the site, to the west of the city, and a theater which is 
                                                            
3 Hoffmann (8-9). 
4 See Fitzgerald (2004 : 350-1 n. 31) 
5 Hoffman (17) records an inscription which he takes to support this opinion; see Fitzgerald in the previous note 
for a more cautious view. 
6 Hoffman (9). 
7 Fitzgerald (2004) is a clear summary of what is and is not known about Gadara. 
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probably of  early imperial date (a second theater is much later, probably 2nd or 3rd century CE).8 
A late inscription mentioning a ξυϲτάρχηϲ exists, indicating the existence of a gymnasium, but 
the building itself has not been found, and there is no trace of an ephebeion.9 Additionally, there 
are two theaters (though only one would have been standing in Philodemus' day), a hippodrome, 
and several Greek-style temples.10 The impression is that the city was thoroughly hellenized and 
probably had good educational facilities. Further excavations may reveal more hellenistic 
buildings, however.  
 The city, as Josephus and Stephanus relate, was conquered by Alexander Jannaeus 
(Yannai), possibly as early as 100 but perhaps as late as 82.11 Josephus seems to overstate the 
damage done to the city, as a Greek temple, probably dedicated to Zeus, survived the Jewish 
fundamentalist's reign apparently undamaged. The city walls were damaged in two phases, 
which may indicate that Alexander Jannaeus had to retake the city from rebels at some point. 
Hasmonean policy was to make life as uncomfortable as possible for pagans by land 
confiscations and other means, thereby encouraging them to flee. Pompey's conquest of the city 
in 64/3 ended Hasmonean rule and, in his honor, the dating system was reformed and new 
coinage issued. 
 The city already had several famous sons by the time of Philodemus' birth; most famous 
to us are Menippus, founder of the brand of satire which bears his name, and the epigrammatist 
and anthologist Meleager, an older contemporary of Philodemus, who shows off his facility in 
                                                            
8 Palaestra: Weber (2002: 146-8, possibly associated with a bath complex, discussed on 144-5); theater: Weber 
(2002: 134). 
9 Weber (2002: 138 with n. 1068, 141-2). The inscription is from the “mittlere oder späte Kaiserzeit,” but the 
institution may have been older. 
10 Weber (2002: 133-139, 110-124). 
11 There is debate over which of two Gadaras is meant by Josephus: this one, of the Decapolis, or one further south 
near Pella and Amathus. I agree with Fitzgerald (2004: 360-363) that ours is meant. Fitzgerald follows the earlier 
date; Hoffman (17) the later one.  
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three languages (Greek, Phoenician and “Syrian”12) in an epigram (AP vii.419). Meleager and 
Philodemus' family may have fled, along with many other Greek inhabitants, as a result of 
Alexander Jannaeus' conquest of the city. If so, he (and his family?) may have gone to Athens, 
where Philodemus certainly received training in the Garden under Zeno of Sidon. It is possible 
that Philodemus was raised Epicurean; the philosophical sect was popular in Syria and its 
founder's name survives in the form סורוקיפא (epikoros) as a Hebrew word for heretic.13 
Maimonides, in the 12th century, was to define it more specifically as one who denies the 
existence of prophecy, divine revelation, or divine knowledge of human affairs.14 This bears 
obvious similarities to some of the more notorious doctrines of the Epicureans. 
 Athens may also have been where Philodemus met a young Gaius Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus, whose house-philosopher he eventually became. They are intimately linked by 
Cicero in his speech In Pisonem, and Philodemus dedicated at least one treatise to Piso, as well 
as an elegant epigram inviting him to an Epicurean dinner. Philodemus may have accompanied 
him to the provinces in the early 50s BCE. Association with Piso at the highest ranks of Roman 
government guaranteed him his living, which Cicero (In Pisonem §§68-72) travesties, though it 
was surely luxurious. 
 He seems to have worked in the area of Naples on three grounds: (i) a very fragmentary 
Herculaneum papyrus (PHerc. 31215) seems to mention Siro, who is located in Naples by the 
                                                            
12 Probably either Aramaic or one of the dialects that make up the Canaanite group of Northwest Semitic (Hebrew 
is the most famous, Phoenician/Punic is another). 
13 On Epicureans in Syria, see generally Crönert (1907). The Talmud Yerushalmi (Sanhendrin 10:1, 27d) and, 
following it, Jastrow (s.v.) connect the Hebrew usage to the Aramaic wordרקפ (p'kār) "to break out,” or in the 
passive “to be abandoned,” but this etymology is not generally accepted. 
14 Yad, Teshuvah 3.8. 
15 The only edition of this papyrus is Crönert (1906: 125-7). 
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testimonia related to Vergil,16 (ii) his books were found nearby, in Herculaneum, and (iii) there 
are some mentions of Parthenope in the Oxyrhynchus incipit list (POxy. LIV 3724) and Naples 
was thought to be founded on the place where the Siren of that name drowned herself in grief 
over Odysseus. Philodemus is more securely associated with Vergil, to whom (along with Plotius 
Tucca, Varius Rufus, and Quintilius Varus) he dedicated the work contained in PHerc. Paris 2 
(probably On Flattery, Περὶ κολακείαϲ).17 Incidentally, Philodemus can be associated with Siro 
through Vergil. 
 It is commonly assumed that Philodemus lived in Herculaneum, more precisely in the 
Villa dei papiri, because this is where so many papyri of his authorship were found. But there are 
reasons for caution: Fourth Style frescos are found in the peristyle of the villa, putting its date 
after Philodemus' probable death, i.e. after c. 40 BCE (though of course this could be 
remodeling). We should note that nothing other than the papyri connects the villa to the Piso 
family. Additionally, the collection of papyri contains mostly Philodemus' own works. Rare 
indeed is the scholar whose library is made up mostly of books she herself wrote. At the same 
time, works that appear in draft and clean copy indicate that the library really does descend, at 
least in part, from Philodemus' own books. Other explanations are possible; for example, a 
collector wanted Philodemus' own books and got an odd miscellany in addition, or the Villa 
collection is descended from Philodemus' own books but Caesoninus' descendants only 
systematically kept Philodemus' books while getting rid of the others. We must remember also 
the nearly 120 years between Philodemus' death and the eruption of Vesuvius. 
 Philodemus seems to have been reasonably well known outside Epicurean circles. Cicero 
                                                            
16 Crucial are Catalepton 5 and 8, in which Siro is mentioned; additionally, Servius mentions him twice, in his 
comments to Ecl. 6.13 and Aen. 6.264. 
17 See Gigante (2004) for fuller discussion of the reading and the topic. 
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mentions him as a familiaris in his De Finibus (II.119) and tells us that his epigrams circulated in 
Rome and were well regarded there; they were anthologized by Philip some time later, and an 
Oxyrhychus papyrus (POxy. LIV 3724) has a list with many certain Philodemean incipits. A 
papyrus from Soknopaiou Nesos mentioned both Philodemus and Seneca, but unfortunately it 
was destroyed before it could be edited and published.18 Diogenes Laertius cites him as an 
authority on the history of philosophy.19 
  
§3 Modern Scholarship 
 Scholarly engagement with ancient philosophers', especially Hellenistic philosophers', 
views on poetry, rhetoric, and music has been limited both by the paucity of ancient evidence 
and by modern interest in different topics. Nonetheless, good, interesting work has been done on 
Stoic rhetoric (Atherton 20 ), Epicurean and Stoic musicology (Delattre 21 ), and especially 
Epicurean rhetoric (Blank22 and Longo Auricchio23). Pride of place has long belonged to 
Epicurean poetics, however, in large part because so much of Philodemus' treatise On Poems 
survives in the Herculaneum papyri. The problems presented by the papyri are well known by 
now,24 but for the On Poems, at least, an end in within sight: Richard Janko has published 
editions of three of the five books (1, 3, and 4); a fourth is nearing completion (2), and the fifth 
book, already available in a reliable edition, is being reedited with the aid of infrared 
                                                            
18 Capasso (1996). Most of the papyri found there are dated to the 1st  CE; none are later than Hadrian, according to 
the dig diary of Zucker (who was assisted by Schubart), cited by Capasso in his article.. 
19 Diogenes Laertius 10.3 cites the tenth book of his Syntaxis of Philosophers. 
20 Atherton (1988). 
21 Delattre (2007) discusses both. 
22 Blank (2003) and (2007); we await his editions of several books of Philodemus' On Rhetoric. 
23 Longo Auricchio (1977) is an edition of the the first two books of the treatise; among her many other 
contributions, see especially (1985), (1990) and (2009). 
24 See the introduction to almost any edition of a Herculaneum text for details; Janko (2003) is particularly detailed 
and widely available. 
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photography and new techniques for arranging fragments. The newly achieved textual security 
allows certain opinions to be firmly rejected and others to take their place in the debate. 
 The usual sources for the debate over Epicurean poetics, until recently, were a passage of 
Cicero's De Finibus, which I discuss again in the next chapter, Diogenes Laertius' comments in 
book ten of his work, and Lucretius' practice in writing his poem. Philodemus' texts were 
unavailable or poorly edited, and there were worries about his orthodoxy until 1928 (and 
sporadically thereafter),25 and so he only played a supporting role in the debate. It seems as if the 
evidence from Diogenes Laertius, who was understood to deny the possibility of Epicureans 
writing poetry, and that from Lucretius, who wrote it, were felt to balance each other out and it 
was left to Cicero to decide between them. Consequently, much of the debate on the continent 
was over the interpretation of Cicero and took place in the context of debates over Lucretius. 
Following Jensen's epoch-making edition of On Poems V in 1923, some new life was injected 
into the debate, but trends in Lucretian scholarship moved away from Epicureanism, and 
Philodemus' On Poems was often studied more for the fragmentary remains of earlier critics than 
for Philodemus' own views,26 so work on the problem was never particularly intense. Scholars 
have identified a variety of positions and attitudes as belonging to Epicurus and his followers. 
 Crönert (1906: 8) thought that early Epicureans tried to turn their students away from 
study of the poets; later Epicureans permitted it under the influence of Stoics.27  At least as far as 
                                                            
25 Castaldi (1928) argues strongly in favor of Philodemus' loyalty. Sedley (1997), e.g., argues for a faithfulness 
which did not exclude doctrinal innovations. 
26 Jensen led the way here; none of his appendices treat Philodemus' own views, only those of his opponents, and 
he dismisses Philodemus' contributions: “Nichts ist so erbärmlich und töricht wie die Wortklauberei diese 
Graeculus, der die Anschauungen anderer aus zweiter Quelle übernimmt und sie verhöhnt und lächerlich zu 
machen sucht, weil sie nicht in sein enges Schulsystem hineinpassen” (1923: 121).  
27 Crönert (1906: 8): “Daß aber weder er (i.e. Kolotes) noch Metrodoros in den Schriften des Demetrios und 
Philodemos Περὶ ποιηµάτων erscheinen, erklärt sich daraus, daß der spätere Epikureismus unter dem Einfluß 
der Stoa seine ablehnende Stellung in vielen Punkten aufgab.” 
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our sources inform us, there is indeed a change in focus from the earlier Epicureans (Epicurus, 
Metrodorus, Colotes) and the later ones (Zeno, Demetrius, and Philodemus). Too little is known, 
however, both about later Epicureans' approaches to education and about earlier Epicureans' 
actual views about poetry to reveal how much this is real or just a mirage, and there is no 
evidence that it is due to Stoic influence specifically. 
 Tescari (1935 and 1939) concluded that Epicurus had completely banned poetry but later 
followers relaxed the rule and allowed light, pleasant poetry, and that the original condemnation 
was on the basis that every poem treats mythology, which leads to mental disturbance and 
confusion.28 Schmid (1944: 12-15) in his review of Tescari (1939) suggested that any poetry 
which served ἡδονή or ἀταραξία was acceptable.29 Giuffrida in turn modified Tescari's views; 
in his view, Epicurus issued only a limited ban and allowed light poetry with the goal of 
pleasure.30  
 Tescari (1939) and later Giancotti (1959: 52) were of the view that Epicurus' remark (fr. 
20, cf. fr. 593), that the sage can watch Dionysiac spectacles was to test their own impassivity 
rather than because they really did enjoy them and derive pleasure from them, which is what the 
fragment actually says. Similarly, Giancotti held the strange view that only entertaining poetry 
was banned, but that which was useful was permitted. Ronconi, in his criticism of Giancotti, 
developed the view that Epicurus condemned poetry tout court and admits that later Epicureans 
were inconsistent with this view under the compulsion of History (quasi-personified) as a force: 
“[c]hi doveva sentire più vivo il disagio di una posizione teorica fuori della storia, doveva essere, 
abbiamo già detto, un Romano. Questo romano fu Lucrezio...” He says much the same about 
                                                            
28 Tescari (1935: 69-82), which is reprinted with modifications and omissions in Tescari (1939: 47-64). 
29 Schmid (1940: 14). 
30 Giuffrida (1940: i 20-21). 
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Philodemus as well (1963: 17).  
 Boyancé (1963: 57-68), attributes a great deal, like Giancotti, to Lucretius' historical 
setting and thinks that poetry is, for Lucretius, light and charm (lumière et charme), i.e. fully 
capable of argumentative clarity (even better than prose!) and of providing real hedone which 
attracts our non-rational parts. Waszink thought that simple poetry by early men, of the sort 
described by Lucretius at V.1379-1411, was acceptable, but not ambitious poetry (e.g. of 
Lucretius), because the pleasure from it is “too complicated to be the truly Epicurean ἡδονή” 
(1954: 2, and n.b. Lucretius V.1412-1435). Despite this bizarre view, he did make some 
perceptive comments about Lucretius, which will be discussed below. 
 Philip and Estelle De Lacy (1941: 140) take Colotes to be following Epicurus' position, 
which they take to be a total ban on poetry, because poetic language is unclear and confusing, 
and therefore ill-suited to expressing philosophical argumentation. Later (1978: 190), they 
changed their minds and claim that Colotes objects to the use of the phrase “good poet” at Lysis 
206b8 because it is an opinion and not evident (κατὰ δοξαζόµενον, and not κατὰ τὸ ἐναργέϲ). 
 Robert Philippson (RE s.v. Philodemos 2479) points out that Epicurus' line ποιήµατα δ’ 
ἐνεργείαι οὐκ ἂν ποιῆϲαι is not a total ban, and thinks that Epicurus thought that the sage 
simply had more important things to do. Classen (1968: 110-1) summarized the debate and 
pointed out the difference between study of poetry as part of the ἐγκύκλιοϲ παιδεία and its 
enjoyment as part of the pleasant life, and its use to publicize or publish Epicurean doctrine. 
 Now we turn specifically to Philodemus, rather than Epicurean views generally. Augusto 
Rostagni31 deserves credit for being one of the first to be interested in Philodemus' own views 
and for making a variety of perceptive comments. Unfortunately, and despite perceptive editions 
                                                            
31 The relevant papers are collected in Rostagni (1955, esp. chapters 6 and 8). 
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and commentaries on Aristotle's Poetics, Horace's Ars Poetica, Suetonius' De poetis, and the On 
the Sublime, his project was vitiated by his dedication to finding a Crocean aesthetics of intuition 
in Philodemus.32 He did correctly understand Philodemus' position about the utility of poetry, 
and was right to emphasize that what makes poetry is not the contents, but the form.  
 Nathan Greenberg's dissertation (Harvard 1955, under Werner Jaeger) should have been a 
milestone, but unfortunately it ended as a goal, nearly out of reach, that, with one exception, was 
not attained again until the 1990's. He first turned the study of Philodemus' On Poems to 
Philodemus' own views, and prosecuted the task without bringing in evidence from other ancient 
literary theorists or philosophers. He systematically analyzed the texts, beginning with those 
most firmly ascribable to Philodemus and in the best condition, and working from there 
outwards. His judgment was sober, and he was aware that his texts can only be pressed so far, 
and he translated all the texts he used, which amounts, inter alia, to nearly a complete translation 
of book V and would have rendered the material more accessible. Unfortunately, his dissertation 
languished unpublished until 1990, nearly unread outside specialist circles (G. M. E. Grube is the 
exception), and it was not able to exert the influence it ought to have.33 
 Greenberg proceeds by investigating the papyri in Crönert's hands alpha, beta, and 
                                                            
32 Croce's views on art are complicated and heavily dependent on his broader commitments. The most important 
part for our purposes is as follows: in short, an intuition (i.e. a mental representation, but one without any added 
judgments) is complete in itself and is provoked by a perception. Intuitions are handled by the aesthetic (here 
“perceptual”) part of the mind. Every intuition has some of the qualities of a work of art, since for him, intuition 
is expression; the difference between a “normal” intuition and an “artistic” one is of degree, not kind. The 
physical instantiation of the work of art (e.g. the painting or written copy of a poem) comes after, and is 
dependent on, the intuition of the artist. When the audience perceives the (so-called) “work of art,” they recreate 
it in their minds, according to their own perceptions of it. The work of art only really exists in the minds of the 
artist and the audience. Accordingly, there is no content apart from the form of a piece of art. The last statement 
is deeply reminiscent of a view of Philodemus', which provoked Rostagni's attempt to find an antecedent for 
Croce in Philodemus..  
33 There were two spin-off articles (Greenberg [1958], on metathesis in Greek literary criticism, and [1961], on 
Neoptolemus' use of the terms poema and poesis) and the dissertation was summarized in the unsigned 
“Summaries of Dissertations for the Degree of Ph. D. 1954 and 1955” published in HSCP in 1957. 
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gamma;34 hand alpha contains the best preserved sections (book V) which are also the most 
securely attested. Hand gamma contains what we now know to be much of book II and is in the 
correct order. Hand beta contains disorganized fragments and was treated last. He used the 
clearer and better studied material to illuminate the more fragmentary and less well studied texts. 
 In their general outlines, his conclusions about the contents all stand.35 He found that 
Philodemus' approach to poetry was intellectual, i.e. that he assigned the judgment of poetry and 
its parts and aspects to the mind rather than the senses, that form and content are closely 
interrelated and exert mutual influence (and he correctly, in my view, based this opinion in 
Epicurean positions about language), and the Kritikoi's views, that language and/or sound alone 
matter, are misguided. Poetic form is the job of the poet, but intelligent thought of some sort is 
also required. Poetry is judged with reference to a preconception (which Greenberg calls an 
ennoia but which is the prolepsis by a different name).36 Poetry need not be useful, and the rigid 
division of poetry into genres is discarded in favor of a more holistic judgment. 
 Grube (1965:192-206 on Philodemus generally, 195-199 on poetics specifically) worked 
primarily as a summarizer of Greenberg. Beyond the points mentioned above, however, he 
correctly recognized that utility was only secondary to poetry, and accordingly detailed 
knowledge of the realia of the subject matter is not required of the poet, who has free choice of 
his topics. The discounting of utility and detailed knowledge show that Philodemus was not 
interested in doctrinal poetry like that of Lucretius. He recognized the close relationship of form 
and content, a position which Grube attributed to the poet in Philodemus, rather than the 
                                                            
34 The labels are now out of date, but were used by Croenert to differentiate between hands that seemed to have 
written parts of the On Poems. See individual editions for discussion of the paleography and Cavallo (1983) for 
an overview of all the hands in the library. 
35 His hypotheses about the organization of the work have been vindicated in a few particulars. 
36 For discussion of these terms, see the beginning of chapter three. 
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philosopher. This position, Grube thinks, Philodemus maintained against the Stoic and 
Peripatetic traditions, as well as the euphonists and the Kritikoi.37 Philodemus also ridiculed 
views that good poetry was an imitation of earlier poets. Grube's over-all judgment is notably 
positive:  
 All this, and much else, is doubtful, but we have enough definite evidence of the critical 
 theories discussed above to show that Philodemus was a critic of considerable originality 
 and of  highly unorthodox views … [t]his criticism is found nowhere else in extant 
 sources; practically no notice was taken of it; his contemporaries, Cicero, Dionysius, and 
 Horace, contradict him at every turn and expound the orthodox views without mentioning 
 him. This is no way diminishes his importance. 
 
 Nicola Pace made the most recent major contribution to our understanding of 
Philodemus' poetics with his 1995 dissertation, published as a lengthy article in Cronache 
Ercolanesi. He worked in the wake of Greenberg, and so treated mostly topics that Greenberg 
had not covered. However, the editorial situation of of the texts had not greatly improved—
Mangoni had published her edition of book V (1993) which was an improvement over Jensen 
(1923), and some work of more limited scope on the other books of the On Poetry and other 
works had been done. Heidmann (1971) on (what we now know is) book II and Janko's first 
attempt at book IV (1991) are the major editorial achievements other than Mangoni.. 
 Pace's dissertation is divided into eleven sections, some of which do not focus on 
Philodemus directly. His focus is on larger issues, relationships between positions rather than 
single topics, and shows admirable methodological caution. Accordingly, he often limits himself 
to noting points of difficulty that other scholars had overlooked or ruling out proposed solutions. 
Unfortunately, many of his discussions are vitiated by a misunderstanding of the terms poema 
                                                            
37 A consensus now seems to have emerged that the Kritikoi and the euphonist critics are the same group, but this 
was not clear when Grube wrote. They held a constellation of views that privileged, to varying degrees, the 
sound of poetry over its meaning or content. Janko (2003: 120-189, with corrections in [forthcoming]) gives a 
detailed overview of individuals and their particular doctrines. 
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and poesis, and poorly edited texts cause other problems as well.38 
 Pace correctly found that the ethical content of poetry is irrelevant to its quality as poetry. 
According to Pace, Philodemus thought that meter was a source of pleasure in poetry, and that it 
only pleased the hearing, but that the primary source of pleasure was the thoughts and plot and 
their connection with the language. He found that working out the plot was prior to the language, 
but that these are not easy to separate: language is the instrument by which the plot is related, so 
the plot cannot be understood without the language. 
 He also expands on Greenberg's recognition that form and content are deeply intertwined 
with each other, and correctly notes that the content is valued less than the form. The ἴδιον, 
“particularity,” “defining feature,” of the poet lies in synthesis, i.e. literary form.39 However, the 
thought is not to be discounted, though it is to be of middling quality. The “conceptual 
component (i.e. thoughts and their organization) are fundamental for both the poetic expression 
and the effect of poetry (i.e. psychagogia), but it is only in fusion with the language that the 
conceptual component can have this effect. 
 Despite a great deal of initial involvement and interest in the Herculaneum papyri on the 
part of a few British scholars, British and American scholars did not really engage with the 
papyri and questions of Epicurean poetics until about the 1970's. Philip and Estelle De Lacy, Eric 
Turner, and David Sedley deserve credit for turning Anglo-American eyes back to the papyri. 
Greenberg (1955) and in his wake Grube (1965) deserve credit for anticipating the trend. 
 Epicurean distaste for poetry had, by 1995, become an almost unquestioned doctrine 
                                                            
38 The difficulties of these terms, which Neoptolemus of Parium (not Philodemus) used, and Philodemus', 
discussion of them have still not been completely sorted out; Neoptolemus may mean something like “the formal 
aspect of a poem” for poema and the “contents-related aspect” for poesis, but this is not clear. Philodemus does 
not use them as strictly defined technical terms. See chapter five, §6 for discussion. Pace also misunderstands 
Philodemus' demand for originality, however—another mistake due to poorly edited texts. 
39 However, due to the bad state of his texts, he misattributes many views of the Kritikoi to Philodemus. 
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among English language scholars.40 Lucretius was a marvel: how could an Epicurean write 
poetry? Philodemus was generally ignored (epigram was considered a trivial genre and not worth 
consideration, and his prose output is still not well-known), but his poetic output was a cause for 
confusion as well.41 The answer is that the doctrine that Epicureans had nothing to do with 
poetry actually had no basis in genuine, Epicurean sources; we had absorbed not only the actual 
anti-Epicurean polemics written by Cicero and Plutarch, but internalized them to the point of 
misreading authentic Epicurean sources. The qualification ἐνεργείαι in Epicurus' dictum was 
forgotten and the fragment understood to say “the sage will not write poetry (at all).” So the 
matter stood for two millennia. 
 In 1995, the volume Philodemus & Poetry marked a thaw, especially Elizabeth Asmis' 
contribution. It came at a critical moment: work on Philodemus' On Poems had advanced far 
enough that the evidence of serious Epicurean engagement in the field of literary criticism had 
become unavoidable, at least to those who cared to track down Jensen's 1923 edition or 
Mangoni's 1993 edition of book V.42  In 1997, David Sider published a commentary on 
Philodemus' epigrams notable not only for its philological rigor and literary taste, but also for its 
concerted attempt to link Philodemus' poetry to his philosophy. The attempt is not always 
successful: Sider was working before most of the editing of the On Poems and of other relevant 
                                                            
40 The attitude lived on even after Asmis: e.g. Sedley 1998 notes “[t]here has been much debate about Lucretius' 
orthodoxy or heterodoxy as an Epicurean choosing to write poetry” (66), Rengakos in his review of Arrighetti 
2006 “As is well known, Epicurus himself urged the wise man to eschew poetic composition” 
(http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2007/2007-12-20.html), Arrighetti had written, inter alia, that Epicurus had “una 
particolare avversione” (315), and for a popular audience, Woolerton in The Guardian comments that “Epicurus 
didn't like poetry” (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/mar/18/lucretius-part-9-calculating-
poet). 
41 Wilkinson's attitude is indicative: “Philodemus, though an ardent Epicurean, was not insensible to the charms of 
the Muses” (1933: 144, cf. Phld. Ep. 27, where he describes himself as µουϲοφίληϲ). 
42 It must be said that the On Poems has received the lion's share of editorial and interpretive work. The Rhetoric 
and On Music have received some, but not nearly as much. Even so, students of Philodemus' aesthetic theories 
are at a comparative advantage over students of his ethics, since most of the ethical works have not received 
more than a single edition from 1800 on (the On Death is a notable exception). 
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texts had been done, and not all of his ideas are borne out in the texts as they now stand. 
 New, better founded, editions have brought Philodemus to a wider audience, and interest 
has grown. The best editions draw on generations of scholarly work, and each generation of 
scholars has new techniques and equipment to help them: Jensen was the first editor of Book 5 to 
examine the papyri in Naples; Mangoni's edition has the advantage of microscopes over Jensen's 
edition. The forthcoming edition of Philodemus' On Poems V of Fish, Armstrong, and Porter 
uses infrared photographs and benefits from our understanding of the complicated stratigraphy of 
the papyri. There was earlier work, most of which was based on the unreliable lithographs 
published in the Neapolitan Collectiones43 or occasionally from the 18th and 19th century 
sketches (disegni) preserved at Oxford and in Naples. The growth in understanding, as well as 
textual reliability, is clear to see. 
 Now Philodemus, as a literary theorist, has finally made it to the banks of the mainstream 
(as a poet, he was always well-esteemed, for an epigrammatist). Fantuzzi and Hunter,44 Müller,45 
Halliwell,46 and Bartsch47 for instance all discuss him in general works dedicated to literary 
interpretation. In some cases they synthesize others' work; in others, they present their own 
interpretations, but no recent work has yet gone thoroughly through Philodemus' texts to 
establish his own positions on such questions as “is poetry a techne?,” “how is poetry to be 
judged?,” and “how does poetry affect the audience?” These questions have occasionally been 
treated incidentally or piecemeal but the whole is greater than its parts and, by considering them 
together, we can recover an understudied branch of Epicurean and literary-critical thought and 
                                                            
43 The collectio prior included copperplates of the Neapolitan disegni, faced by an edited text, Latin translation, 
and commentary. The collectio altera contained solely copperplates. 
44 2004: 449-461. 
45 Passim, see his index s.v. Philodemos. 
46 2002: 249-59 and 280-6; 2012: 304-327. 
47 Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, s.v. Classical Poetics. 
   17 
gain a firm landmark in the gulf between Aristotle and Horace in the history of literary criticism. 
 
§4 General Introduction to Philodemus and his Aesthetic Works48 
 Philodemus' surviving philosophical works are primarily ethical, of two sorts. The first is 
theoretical or protreptic, on how to make correct decisions generally, e.g. “[On Choices and 
Avoidances]” (PHerc. 1251);49 the second practical, focused on removing vices and replacing 
them with virtues.  Here the ten book series “On Vices and their Corresponding Virtues” is the 
major work. Voula Tsouna has explored Philodemus' ethics at length in her 2007 book “The 
Ethics of Philodemus.” He wrote several books on epistemology (the On Signs in multiple 
books50 and the [On Sensations]), the history of the Epicurean school (On Epicurus in at least 
two books and the “Pragmateiai” or “Memorie epicuree”) and a general history of philosophy 
(the Syntaxis mentioned by Diogenes Laertius at X.15, of which several books survive). 
Additionally, he wrote extensively on aesthetic topics: On Poems, On Music, On Rhetoric. Of 
these, the On Poems will be the primary focus, but many other works will be mentioned and 
discussed in the course of the investigation. 
 The aesthetic works are about beliefs and attitudes towards their topics rather than 
technical manuals. For example, among the topics under discussion in the On Music are the 
definition of music, which is separated from the lyrics of a song, the role of hearing in the 
                                                            
48 See Asmis (2000) for a broader view. 
49 The square brackets indicate that the title is a restoration; it does not survive on the papyrus, but seems likely. 
We know that Philodemus wrote a book by this title and it describes the contents accurately. It was edited most 
recently by Tsouna and Indelli, and is often called the Comparetti Ethics (or L'etica Comparetti), since 
Domenico Comparetti was the first to edit it. 
50 PHerc. 1065, the work edited by De Lacy and De Lacy (19782) under the title “Philodemus: On Methods of 
Inference” turns out to be book III; Delattre successfully read the subscription and so we now know the title was 
“On Signs and Sign-Inferences” and that this was book three. Fragments probably belonging to book IV have 
now also been published. 
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experience of music, whether music is educational, and whether it adds to the experience of 
divine worship. Nowhere are instructions for writing music given, and it is not Philodemus' 
intent to give them (nor, as Delattre [2007: 11] points out, was it the purpose of Diogenes of 
Babylon, Philodemus' Stoic opponent, either).51 Similarly, the On Poems contains discussions of 
rhythm and meter, but no listing of meters nor any discussion of how to write metrically. 
Examples are used from time to time to illustrate points. 
 Philodemus' On Poems almost certainly consisted of five books, of which much survives 
(three books quite substantially and some remains of the other two).52  The work is a polemical 
refutation of other theoreticians of poetry and poetics. Philodemus proceeds by summarizing his 
opponents' positions, then systematically refuting their arguments in a variety of ways. The 
larger organization of the work is not clear; it is not chronological (see below for more details).53 
Opponents include the Kritikoi, or euphonic theorists (Megaclides of Athens, Andromenides, 
Heracleodorus, and Pausimachus, as well as Crates of Mallos to a certain extent), who thought 
that good sound was the sole criterion of good poetry, and come under attack in books one and 
two. Books three and four are poorly preserved, but Aristotle's lost dialogue On Poets is 
apparently the object of part of the surviving section of book IV and Crates reappears in book III. 
Book V evidently contains a miscellany; opponents included Heraclides of Pontos, Crates again, 
an anonymous Stoic (his name does not survive; formerly he was thought to be Ariston), 
Neoptolemus of Parium (possible source for Horace's Ars Poetica) and brief doxographies 
collected by an unknown Philomelus and a Zeno, perhaps Zeno of Sidon, Philodemus' teacher 
and head of the Garden in Athens. 
                                                            
51 See Delattre (2007: 1-20) for a summary of Diogenes' views. 
52 The initial reconstruction was laid out in Janko 1991 (see also Janko [1995]); it has been continuously updated. 
See the introductions to the various editions for details. 
53 A theory is mooted below. 
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 Evidently similar was Philodemus' On Music, of which only book IV survives. It is a 
rebuttal of the opinions of Diogenes of Babylon, an early Stoic who theorized about the 
importance and benefits of music. Originally, the term mousike included both music and poetry. 
Philodemus draws a distinction between the instrumental music and the “lyrics” of a song, in the 
modern sense of that term. He also denies, in accordance with Epicurean physics and 
epistemology, the ability of the irrational hearing to judge what it hears. Both physics and 
epistemology are fundamental for his theory of poetry, since they contribute to his definition if 
poetry and his discussion of how best poetry is to be judged. 
 The On Rhetoric, of which a great deal survives,54 started from a discussion of the 
technicity of rhetoric, that is, the questions “What is rhetoric?” and “Is rhetoric a techne?” 
Philodemus' discussion of the question is very interesting from a methodological point of view, 
especially since he links poetics and rhetoric quite closely; hence this work will be discussed as 
well. Additionally, his attitudes towards rhetoric provide a useful and interesting set of 
comparanda for his views on poetry, since, for him, technical rhetoric is limited to sophistike, 
that is, the art of writing well and giving speeches successfully, and does not include persuasion 
(which is the duty of philosophical argument). 
 Many other works come under consideration as well.  The On Household Management is 
valuable generally as a treatment of Epicurean economics and a discussion of the role of money 
in the life of the sage, but specifically for its discussion of techne, which supplements and 
expands, for our purposes, on that in the On Rhetoric. The poem of Lucretius and the inscription 
of Diogenes of Oenoanda are also cited at times; for discussion of them, see below. 
                                                            
54 The ensemble has been variously reconstructed and we do not know the total number of books I-IV and VIII are 
firmly attested (books II-IV in multiple copies) and several additional books survive. 
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 Philodemus' argumentative strategy is now reasonably well understood.55  It is clear 
enough from the reconstructed works that he first summarized the views of an opponent or 
opponents, then refuted them; there may have been a transitional passage, perhaps a resume, 
between them. It is safe to assume that the opponent and his treatise were clearly identified at the 
beginning of the summary; no such indication survives, however.56  In his refutations, he accuses 
opponents of making errors of fact or logic, as well as misunderstanding or misrepresenting real 
phenomena. Furthermore, he makes some objections based on Epicurean standards. Once he has 
refuted one part of an opponent's argument, further aspects which depend on that first part may 
also come in for mockery. Further, for Philodemus, because of the Epicurean doctrine of 
prolepsis, the statement “this is not what people mean when they say X,” if true, is a valid 
refutation of any argument or assertion, since it reveals that the opponent is discussing something 
imaginary or off-topic.  
 Generally, there is a very brief concluding section at the end of each book; these are 
usually less than a single column in length. It may be absent when the discussion continues 
across the book boundary. In some cases, it clearly signals a transition to the next topic (e.g. On 
Signs and Sign-Inferences III, which signals the transition to a discussion of the Empirical school 
of physicians, presumably the topic in book IV); in other, the conclusion of the whole ensemble 
                                                            
55 The briefest introduction to Philodemus' argumentative strategy is Neubecker 1983, who focuses on arguments 
in the On Music; more expansive is Delattre 1996 on the On Music as well as the On Signs and Sign-Inference. 
He discusses the organization of the whole book with special attention to matters of punctuation and sign-posting 
in the text. Discussions of the structures of individual works can generally be found in the introductions to their 
editions. 
56 The beginnings of works, because they were at the outside of the rolls, are far more damaged and fragmentary 
than later parts of the same books; additionally, because editorial work has focused on the midolli at the centers 
of rolls, outer portions of texts (i.e. the parts towards the beginning) have been recognized only rarely. For 
example, only nine words survive complete from the first 10 columns of On Poems I. Therefore, anything 
discussed at the beginning of a work is lost to us. Noteworthy are the three instances in On Poems V when 
Philodemus cites τὰ ἐν Φιλοµήλωι, τὰ ἐν Ζήνωνι, and τὰ παρὰ τῶι Κράτητι,  though these instances come 
late in the text.  In these cases, the works were probably more explicitly named earlier in the text or were well-
known enough that full citation was not thought necessary. 
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(e.g. On Music IV and On Poems V). 
 
§5 On the Structure and Contents of the On Poems 
 In 1955, Nathan Greenberg put forward a very tentative reconstruction of the work, 
which turns out to be correct in many particulars: specifically, book II is concerned with the 
euphonists, book IV with a criticism of Aristotelian theories of genre as irrelevant in the search 
for the good poem, and V with the division between form and content and the judgment of 
poems.57 His survey was vitiated by incomplete information, but it was remarkably perceptive, 
especially given the terrible state of the editions at that point. 
 I put forth, by way of working hypothesis, the following summary of the structure: 
• Books I and II are concerned with euphony, specifically the euphonies of letter, word, 
and phrase. That they come as a pair is guaranteed by the fact that a group of critics is 
summarized in book I and Philodemus' refutation begins there but continues into book II.  
• Book III appears to be about the relationship between euphony and sense and about 
poetic and prosaic words. 
• Book IV is about genre, and the discussion of Aristotle's views on the matter seems to 
continue into book V. 
• Book V is about how poetry works and the judgment of poems; it ends with brief 
rebuttals of poorly-thought out positions and a single, exhausted sentence by way of 
conclusion: “As for the rest, you can easily figure out how they erred from what we've 
already said.” 
 Subscriptions to books IV and V survive, and the number of book II is guaranteed by a 
                                                            
57 Greenberg (1990: 269-70). See also Janko (2012: 228-9). 
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back-reference later in the work, at V.29.7-23, and says that book II was appropriate διὰ τὸ καὶ 
περὶ ποιήµατοϲ εἶναι κοινῶϲ, which I take to mean “since it is about verse generally,” i.e. 
primarily phonic qualities of verse.58 Continuity of contents strongly suggests that I and II are in 
that order, and book III is left by elimination. Book V ends by mopping up a wide array of 
unrelated opinions, which suggests the end of the work, though there is no formal conclusion or 
wrap-up. 
 A movement from small to large, or most detailed to most global, is easily discernible. 
Books I and II are not about “poems generally” as Greenberg thought, but “verses” generally, 
and in a limited sense: verses treated as linguistic and sonic phenomena. Book III moves towards 
the larger concerns of book IV but still has connections with the discussions of euphony in the 
earlier section; sadly, this book is the worst preserved and it is extremely difficult to draw secure 
conclusions. Book IV leaves individual verses behind entirely and discusses the classification of 
poems; book V leaves even these divisions behind. Therefore, On Poems, as a title, is an accurate 
description of the contents. However, the extensive damage to the beginnings of books (and the 
generally poor state of III and IV especially) makes it impossible to be certain about this 
organizational scheme, but it has the benefit of explaining the double discussion of Crates of 
Mallos, whose doctrines about letters are refuted in book II, whereas his interpretation of poems 
is mentioned in book V.  
 It is an interesting fact that very few of Philodemus' opponents in the On Poems are other 
philosophers. I do not think that Crates of Mallos was a Stoic, but he did use Stoic terminology.59 
Other Kritikoi used Peripatetic terminology, but it is not clear that this means that they were 
                                                            
58 Jensen translates “weil dieses [sc. das zweite Buch] auch über das Gedicht im allgemeinen handelt” and Porter 
(1989: 161 with n. 67) translates “since it [our treatise] is a general work on poems.” 
59 Broggiato, the editor of his fragments, considers him one, but see Barnes' (2005) attack on the evidence in his 
review. 
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Peripatetics. Aristotle is handled in book IV, and Heraclides of Pontus in book V, but the 
majority of the opponents are not philosophers. 
 
§6 Why is Reconstructing Philodemus' Thought So Hard? 
 It is clear that some of Philodemus' own formulations are subject to some of his own 
criticisms: he is not as clear or explicit as he demands from his opponents. This is due, at least in 
part, to the nature of the work: it is a critical “anti-commentary,” in which opponents' views are 
systematically demolished but the author does not put forward his own views. Plutarch's Against 
Colotes is probably the most famous example of this genre, and Colotes himself seems to have 
specialized in it: beyond the On the Proposition that it is Impossible to Live According to the  
Doctrines of Other Philosophers, he wrote works Against Plato's Lysis and Against Plato's 
Theaetetus. There are several possible audiences for anti-commentaries: people within the 
author's school (to reinforce their beliefs), members of the criticized school (to get them to 
convert), or the general public. It may have varied on a case by case basis. In Plutarch's case, the 
dedicatee is Saturninus, a Roman nobleman interested in fine and old things (φιλόκαλον καὶ 
φιλάρχαιον), who considers it a very worthy activity to have the discourses of the ancients in 
hand as much as possible (καὶ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχειν ὡϲ µάλιϲτα δυνατόν ἐϲτι τοὺϲ λόγουϲ τῶν 
παλαιῶν βαϲιλικωτάτην διατριβὴν ἡγούµενον). This implies that Saturninus may be 
interested in philosophy, but he need not be to be flattered by the dedication. The work seems 
aimed towards those who would be interested in reading anti-Epicurean polemic, rather than 
Middle Platonists specifically or Epicureans specifically. Plutarch does not espouse doctrine in 
this work, however. The converse of the anti-commentary is defense of a view or practice, like 
that found in the first part of Philodemus' On Piety, where Epicurean theology and Epicurus' 
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religious practice are defended against critics. 
 This genre may have been a major mode of philosophical engagement, especially since 
no particular philosopher needed to recapitulate school teaching on a particular subject each time 
they discussed it. We are probably safe in assuming that this treatise was not intended to be 
Philodemus' only word on the matter, either because his own views were espoused elsewhere or 
because he was following a previous authority, perhaps Zeno of Sidon or Metrodorus of 
Lampsacus.60 If so, his phrasing could be elliptical but still intelligible, because it would only 
need remind his audience of the fuller formulation. However, Porter (1993, esp. pp. 625-8), 
Mangoni (1993: 31 and n. 25), and Pace (2000: 73-4) thought that there was never a formal 
expression of the Epicurean position on literary criticism, because they simply relied on the 
prolepsis. This seems overly reductive to me: the Epicureans thought that there was an easily 
enunciable and clear prolepsis of the gods, but this never stopped them from writing several 
books through the centuries On the Gods and on related topics, like On Piety: both Epicurus and 
Philodemus wrote books with those titles, and Demetrius Laco wrote on theology. Hermarchus, 
for instance, covered theological topics in his Against Empedocles (also an anti-commentary?), 
according to citations of that work in Philodemus' On Piety. These discussions occasionally 
descend into such trivia as what language the gods spoke, so there is no reason to think that 
Epicurean discussions of poetry would be impossible simply because of the prolepsis.61 
 In the other partially extant Epicurean work on poetry, Demetrius's On Poems, there is 
similarly no lengthy discussion of the Epicurean position.62 The rolls are in bad condition, 
                                                            
60 On this topic, see the next chapter. 
61 I suspect the real cause of scholarly skepticism to lengthy and detailed treatment of poetry on the part of the 
Epicureans is due to the same mistaken assumptions about their relationships with poetry and education that I 
outlined above. 
62 See Romeo's edition, pp. 58-9. 
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however, and book I in particular is represented by very few fragments.63 Demetrius may have 
set it out in a lost part of the book, or he too may have been relying on a previous authority. 
 Finally, it is possible that no Epicurean ever systematically set forth school doctrine on 
the matter. This seems unlikely, in light of how many treatises On Poems (vel sim.) Epicureans 
actually wrote, but it may be the case. There are at least four: Metrodorus, Demetrius Laco, and 
Philodemus all wrote On Poems (all in several books) and Zeno wrote an On the Use of Poems. 
Finally, Epicurus himself commented several times on poetry, as we know from fragments from 
unknown works. These fragments had to have come from somewhere, and they may stem from a 
full discussion which was a digression in a work dedicated to a different topic; for instance, he 
may have discussed poetry fully in a letter, or he may have lectured on it and allowed 
Metrodorus' treatment to stand as the written statement of the school's position. 
 In light of the fact that Zeno of Sidon, Philodemus' own teacher, wrote a treatise Περὶ 
χρήϲεωϲ ποιηµάτων (On the Utility of Poems), I suspect that Philodemus assumed knowledge 
of that work on the part of his readers. Further, Zeno's work may have been an update to 
Metrodorus' On Poems to meet more recent criticism, and Philodemus may have written his book 
as a complement, in order to criticize competing theories. Unfortunately, since Zeno's and 
Metrodorus' books no longer exist (and Demetrius' is poorly preserved), certainty is impossible. 
 
§7 Guide to the Other Sources 
A) Other Epicureans: 
                                                            
63 Book I is in terrible condition; hardly a single complete sentence is reconstructable, but col. 9 (in my 
forthcoming edition) is intriguing. Book II is in much better condition, but we only have the end of the text, 
which deals with individual problems rather than theory and judgment. For details about the condition and topics 
of book I, see my forthcoming article; for book II, see Romeo's edition (1988). 
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 Οἱ ἄνδρεϲ (“The [Great] Men,” or “the founders”)64 is the term used by Philodemus to 
refer to the Epicurus and the other three founders of the school: Metrodorus of Lampsacus, 
Hermarchus of Mitylene, and Polyaenus of Lampsacus. They are also called οἱ καθηγέµονεϲ, or 
“the leaders.” It is not clear to us now why these four were selected from the first generation of 
Epicureans, which included Epicurus' brothers, as well as his slave Mys and evidently some 
women as well (polemically, and probably dishonestly, referred to as courtesans in the 
tradition65), but the grouping was canonical for Philodemus. He cites their opinions with obvious 
reverence and once, memorably, accuses any Epicurean who disagrees with them of assaulting 
their own father (On Rhetoric I, PHerc. 1427.7.24-29 = p. 21 LA). 
 In nearly every case, however, their works survive only in fragments; the only exceptions 
are three letters of Epicurus himself and his composition αἱ κυρίαι δόξαι, or “The Authoritative 
Opinions,” which are preserved in Diogenes Laertius' tenth book. Taken together with his wide 
excerpting from other Epicurean texts, Diogenes thought that they provided a firm introduction 
to Epicurean thought. 
  Herculaneum has not been unkind to the Founders, either. There seem to have been 
multiple copies of Epicurus' Περὶ φύϲεωϲ in the library (two copies of some books have been 
identified, and three copies of at least one).66 More often, Philodemus quotes them, as e.g. in the 
De Pietate and Rhet. II. All this serves to put our knowledge of the early Garden on much firmer 
footing. Unfortunately, very little of the new material directly bears on poetics, though there are 
some relevant parts. 
                                                            
64 See Longo Auricchio (1978) for a complete discussion of the term. 
65 On women in the Garden and the polemics about them, see Gordon (2004). 
66 See Houston's chapter on the library as well, in which he estimates its original size at 600-1,000 rolls (2014: 87-
129). 
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 Philodemus' rhetoric guarantees his fealty to them and their opinions. He is willing to 
modify lightly their views as, for example, in the case of the [On Choices and Avoidances],67 but 
in each case he preserves the main thrust of the original formulation. I do not think that we can 
assume that orthodox Epicureans absolutely followed the literal words of the Founders, or even 
Epicurus, in the light of such modifications of doctrine and the reports of Diogenes Laertius, 
discussed above. However, this is not to call Philodemus unfaithful; on the contrary, he may 
reargue and slightly modify original formulations, but remains firmly committed to the system as 
set out by the Founders. It is safe to assume that he would not lightly contradict an explicit 
statement and that he would try to remain firmly within the spirit of the original formulation. 
Therefore, I consider it safe to cite opinions of Epicurus and the others as evidence for what 
Philodemus thought. 
 
 Demetrius “nicknamed 'the Spartan'” (ἐπικληθεὶϲ Λάκων, D.L. X.26) was another 
Epicurean philosopher, probably roughly contemporary with Zeno of Sidon, teacher of 
Philodemus and Cicero.68 Among other works, some notably on mathematics as well as a treatise 
on textual problems in Epicurus, he wrote an On Poems, probably in two books, which deals 
especially with lexis and style. Philodemus uses him as a source in On Signs and Sign-Inferences 
III (mentioned at col. 28.13) and Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus mention him; we have 
no reason to believe that Philodemus disagreed with him on anything substantive. 
                                                            
67 See Tsouna-Indelli (1995: 39-53, esp. 42-46), where they discuss several instances of such slight modification to 
answer critics. 
68 For biographical discussion and a collection of testimonia, see Gigante in Puglia (1988). Based on how Diogenes 
refers to him, I do not think that he was actually a Laconian, but was given a nickname for some reason. His 
papyri do show consistent, odd spellings, most notable are τἀτό (etc.) for ταὐτό and η instead of ει before 
vowels, e.g. ἀλήθηα (neither seems to be particular to a specific dialect). His language shows other peculiarities, 
particularly in diction (the various editions should be consulted for details). 
   28 
 Therefore, Demetrius' On Poems is particularly interesting. Since he writes about the 
same topic from the same perspective, we have both a new source of evidence and a check on 
our conclusions. For example, Philodemus endorses an opponent's claim that the job of a poet is 
to write about topics in non-prosaic language; Demetrius says the same thing in different words 
at Poems II.14.6-8: [ἡ] κ[ατάϲ]κευοϲ πε|φ[ε]υγυῖά [ἐϲτι τὸ λ]ογ[οει|δέϲ (“[sc. the poetic 
style] is the one which avoids the prosaic style”). On its own, this is not a particularly profound 
or insightful statement, but it is confirms that this is what Epicureans saw as important about the 
style of poetry. 
  
 Titus Lucretius Carus wrote a poem De Rerum Natura in Latin epic verse in the first 
century BCE; he was more or less contemporary with Philodemus. The work concentrates on 
physics, though there are some extensive sections dealing with ethics and other topics. Lucretius' 
orthodoxy has never been questioned and so what he says can be safely taken to represent 
Epicurean positions.  Sedley69 has argued that Lucretius was in fact working only from Epicurus' 
own De Natura and that later Epicurean thinkers do not enter into the picture. This seems 
probable to me, but it is not an essential point. Furthermore, it is possible that a copy of the poem 
was in the library of the Villa dei Papiri, but I consider the evidence inconclusive and it is in any 
case irrelevant for my arguments70.  
 Lucretius' poem is useful for providing a full, if not complete, overview of Epicurean 
physics as well as treatments of other topics which are not covered in the extant texts of Epicurus 
                                                            
69 Sedley (1998, esp. chapters three, five, and seven), and updated in Sedley (2010). 
70 In question are PHerc. 1829 and 1831. See Kleve (1989), Capasso (2003), Delattre (2003), and finally Obbink 
(2007), who comes out in favor of some of Kleve's original identifications. If Lucretius' poem was in fact in the 
villa, it may have gotten there after Philodemus' death, and so it is unsafe to draw conclusions from the mere fact 
of its presence there. 
   29 
or other Epicureans. For example, his account of the invention of human society provides some 
supplements to the fragmentary text of Diogenes of Oenoanda. The poem itself is in six books 
and covers the first 15 books of Epicurus' work71, but is generally considered unfinished, though 
just lacking the ultima manus, rather than lacking major sections. It is nevertheless possible that 
Lucretius intended to finish a complete version of the 37 book original. 
 It is not clear whether there was a connection between Lucretius and Philodemus. On the 
one hand, it seems unlikely that two Epicureans of such devotion and spatial proximity would 
not know each other. On the other, Sedley72 has pointed out that there were two camps of 
Epicureans in Italy, a Roman one which focused more on physics and, in Cicero's opinion, was 
not very learned, and the Bay of Naples Greek circle including Philodemus and Siro, whom 
Cicero through a character in the dialogue calls familiares nostros...cum optimos viros tum 
homines doctissimos, “our good friends... just as excellent as they are very learned” (De Fin. 
2.119). The combined reference suggest that they were on good terms with each other and 
possibly worked together. Owing to this split between Greek and Latin philosophizing, even if 
Philodemus and Lucretius knew each other, they may have been at odds.73 
 
 Diogenes of Oenoanda (probably 2nd, perhaps 3rd CE), a wealthy man in Oenoanda in 
Lycia, set up an inscription in the town agora which expounded Epicurean philosophy, both in 
Diogenes' own words and with quotations from Epicurus and perhaps other earlier Epicureans. 
According to Smith's reconstruction, the standard version, it is the largest inscription known 
from antiquity. Smith dates it to the second century CE on the basis of the inscriptional style of 
                                                            
71 According to Sedley's reconstruction (see above, n. 69). 
72 Sedley (2009: 39-40). 
73 Kleve (2011) suggests that the famous epigram inviting Piso to dinner implies that Lucretius will be giving a 
recital. 
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the letters; others put it in the third century. As far as Diogenes' opinions are concerned, he 
appears to be completely orthodox, although he seems to have focused on physics and ethics. 
Happily, textual discoveries continue to accrue as survey work at Oenoanda continues. 
 
 A final note about Epicureans:  At the end of Philodemus' life, there were a variety of 
Epicurean groups—the Roman one, working in Latin, concentrating on physics, the Neapolitan 
one, working in Greek, working widely, but evidently not on physics, as well as the original 
Garden in Athens, Demetrius Laco's group (possibly located in Miletus), and the group on 
Rhodes and Cos (perhaps the same as the group whom Philodemus sarcastically calls 
φαϲκοβυβλιακοί),74 who disagreed with Philodemus (and, as Philodemus presents it, with Zeno, 
who spoke on behalf of the Athenian Kepos). Additionally, Diogenes Laertius mentions at X.26 
that orthodox Epicureans called heterodox Epicureans “sophists” and ascribes one opinion to 
Epicurus and a modification of that view to (evidently orthodox) Epicureans at X.31 (we know 
that this later group includes Philodemus).75 I mention all this to call attention to the geographic 
and doctrinal variety possible among Epicureans in the first century BCE and to suggest that 
making categorical claims in the absence of evidence of both the opinions of the founders and 
the opinions of these other groups is futile; it is quite impossible, in many cases, to know 
whether Philodemus, or any other Epicurean, is innovating, rephrasing, or only slightly 
modifying the work of the school founders, and, to judge by the passage of Diogenes Laertius 
mentioned above, it does in fact seem possible that Epicureans innovated or revised the school 
                                                            
74 See Del Mastro (2014: 184-7). 
75 The point at issue is a detail of epistemology: Epicurus recognized πάθη, αἰϲθήϲειϲ, and πρόληψιϲ as criteria of 
truth. Diogenes adds that “Epicureans” add the φανταϲτικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆϲ διανοίαϲ, to which Philodemus 
subscribes at De Signis fr. 1. 
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founders without being labeled heterodox. My work focuses quite narrowly on Philodemus' own 
opinions, and so I hope to avoid these perils by presenting the views of only this one Epicurean 
with careful supplementation as necessary. 
 
§8 From Papyrus to Edition 
 Owing to the fragmentary and damaged condition of the papyri, an extended note on the 
editions used is warranted. All Herculaneum papyri suffered greatly in the eruption of Mt. 
Vesuvius in 79 CE, but they were also preserved by the same forces, which turned them into 
carbon. They suffered further when discovered and unrolled, and have been very slowly 
disintegrating ever since their discovery.  
 First, the rolls were cut into, lengthwise, so that they were divided into three sections: the 
middle of the roll, which was still rolled up (called midollo or “marrow” in Italian), and two 
“halves.” The halves, called barchette “little boats,” or scorze “bark,” were sometimes subject to 
a process called scorzatura (“de-barking”) in which the visible layer was drawn by a disegnatore 
or draftsman, then scraped off from the front or top of the stack, so that only the outer layers and 
occasional fragments from the inner layers remain intact. In many cases, the outermost layers, 
which were the most burned, could not be separated, so that, between burning and disintegration, 
the first columns of a given work are always extremely fragmentary, illegible, or missing 
entirely. Other times, they were subject to a process called sollevamento or “lifting-off,” in 
which layers of papyrus were lifted off the outside of the stack of scorze. Sometimes, in a 
process called scorzatura totale, the midollo was completely destroyed. In other cases, widthwise 
cuts were made, so that tops and bottoms of columns were separated. 
 The drawings made from the scorze, two sets of which were made, are called disegni 
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(singular: disegno) and are now stored at Oxford in the Bodleian Library and in Naples at the 
Officina dei papiri.  The Oxford disegni were made first, when the papyri were in a better 
condition. In many cases, they are the only witnesses to the text; even when the papyri still 
survive but have become more damaged, they may be valuable sources of information. Multi-
spectral images taken of the surviving papyri by the Brigham Young imaging team are 
invaluable for showing more than can be seen with the naked eye, but because the papyri are not 
flat, sometimes they misrepresent the papyrus, particularly when the papyrus is especially 
cracked, bent, warped, or has holes. Both infrared photograph and natural light autopsy are 
required. 
 Whole book rolls, more or less, were found, but when these were divided into fragments 
and unrolled, parts of the same roll were given different inventory numbers.  Within inventory 
numbers, the fragments were numerated in series, but the series goes forward in the cases where 
sollevamento was used, and backwards in cases of scorzatura.  E.g. On Poems I, as reconstructed 
by Janko, includes PHerc. 444, 460, 466, 1073, 1074a, and 1081a, each of which is in fragments. 
No midollo has been found, so the roll was probably subject to scorzatura totale, hence the last 
column extant, 213 according to Janko's reconstruction, is unlikely to be the final column of the 
work.76 For comparison, the midollo of On Music IV (PHerc. 1497) contains 39 columns, 
whereas the entire work contains 152 columns divided between nine separate PHerc. numbers. 
 Grouping the parts of a single book requires careful paleographic work on the papyri 
themselves, as well as historical research into the numbering systems used by those who unrolled 
                                                            
76 There are no internal, textual grounds for determining if the end of col. 213 was in fact the end of the papyrus.  
The end of book III is missing, Philodemus indicates that book V is ending, but books two and four end at the 
conclusion of a line of argumentation, without a “sign-off” or internal indication that it is the end of the book 
(the subscriptio of book IV is present, but that of two is not, although there is a coronis), so we should not expect 
the ending for book I to be clearly marked in the text of the book.  The lack of subscriptio and coronis at the end 
of col. 213, however, is in favor of this not being the real end of the book. 
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them.  Once the midollo, the scorze, and the disegni are gathered, the order of the columns in the 
roll is reconstructed using what is called the “Delattre-Obbink method,” in which the scorze are 
interleaved backwards, and so the true order of columns is obtained.77  
 The first parts of rolls, and therefore of books, are very poorly preserved, since they were 
exposed when the eruption occurred and so were charred more severely. Consequently, our 
knowledge of the beginnings of Philodemus' works is very limited. It is safe to assume that he 
identified his opponents and the works he cited, and probably gave a brief general overview of 
his project. The summaries and résumés are in bad shape as well, though they are better 
preserved. It seems that they are simple extracts, paraphrases, or epitomes of the opponents' 
work, with minimal comment by Philodemus himself. Since the summaries are sometimes 
quoted again or paraphrased in the refutation, correspondences between the two are a valuable 
way to join fragments and reconstruct whole rolls.78 
 Refutations are linked to arguments throughout. First Philodemus will quote a opponent's 
statement, then refute it. Quotations are often discernible through punctuation, asyndeton 
between the end of Philodemus' previous section and the beginning of the quotation, and through 
prospective (rather than retrospective) particles at the beginning of Philodemus' refutation (µέν is 
common). Regularly, Philodemus speaks in oratio recta and quotes his opponents in oratio 
obliqua. Unfortunately, it is not clear that Philodemus always quotes, stricto sensu, especially 
later in books, and paraphrases can evade the usual techniques. Non-Philodemean stylistic 
                                                            
77 See Janko (2003: 3-119) for a detailed description of a particular case with bibliography of the theory and history 
of the methods involved. Janko (forthcoming) will be more up-to-date. In general, see Obbink (1996: 37-61), 
Delattre (1989) and (2007: cii-cvii). and Janko (1992) and (1993). 
78 A related method is to use the internal column numeration and line numeration of works to place fragments 
identified as belonging to the same roll. Similarly, the mathematics of Archimedean spirals provides a method 
which does not rely on content (and so subjective judgment) for reconstruction on physical grounds. See Essler 
(2008). 
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features, such as hiatus, can also betray quotations or close paraphrases. Of course content and 
context also help one to decide.  
  
§9 Typographical Conventions 
 The Greek printed is quoted from the editions named above; any changes to text or 
punctuation are noted ad loc. Leiden conventions for printing papyrological texts are followed 
with the following adjustment: any letter, clearly transmitted (whether on the papyrus, in a digital 
image, or in a disegno), which is nevertheless changed by an editor is marked by an under-
asterisk, like so: τ͙ὴν will be printed when the papyrus or other source clearly reads πην. This is 
because the papyri were copied so recently after their composition that many feel that even 
minor editorial interference ought to be signaled to the readers.79 I agree with them and so follow 
the convention. Note also that under-dots are used only in cases when the reading is doubtful, 
that is, it could be a different letter, not in cases of a damaged, but obvious letter. The test is 
purely paleographic: I print e.g. τὴ̣ν even when the only other possible reading is τµν, even if 
τµν provides complete nonsense. I have silently eliminated vacat marks as well as signs for 
space-fillers. 
 I have represented the texts as they are on papyri, and so I respect line divisions from the 
papyri, rather than running the text together. I find this easier to read and it makes patterns of 
damage more apparent, which is useful for judging possible supplements and corrections. When 
words are divided across lines, I note this with a hyphen, which does not correspond to anything 
                                                            
79 In so doing I follow the practice of, e.g. Richard Janko and Giuliana Leone. The specific siglum varies by time 
and publisher (e.g. Leone's edition of On Nature II, from Bibliopolis, uses ⹂α⹃ to mark that a letter has been 
changed into an alpha). Further, precise conventions for the use of the under-asterisk vary by editor, e.g. Dirk 
Obbink only uses it to mark a changed disegno. 
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on the original text and is purely editorial. For complete details as to constitution of the text and 
readings, as well as citations for emendations, see the editions.  αβγ  mark text supplied from 
a parallel source, either a second manuscript of the same text (in the case of e.g. On Rhetoric II) 
or a quotation that survives more completely in another source. I have freely repunctuated texts 
(usually simply adding commas); deeper interventions have been signalled in footnotes. 
 I use these conventions in all quotations of Herculaneum papyri, both to present clearly 
the state of the text and to use a uniform system. Vogliano's80 quite extensive and detailed system 
for precise notation is overly burdensome and, I believe, unhelpfully subjective, but not flagging 
editorial intervention or editorial doubt seems irresponsible.81 Note that this causes some slight 
changes to the presentation (but not the texts) of some newer editions and quite extensive 
changes to older editions, especially those published before the Leiden conventions were 
adopted. In all cases, recourse should be had to the editions, especially because I make no 
attempt to reproduce any kind of apparatus criticus. 
 
§10 List of Editions  
 The five books of Philodemus' On Poems have been edited a number of times in a variety 
of different forms.  For this work, I cite the editions of Janko (2003: revised edition of book I; 
                                                            
80 Set out on page xx of his edition.  It includes different sigla for letters preserved only in one or the other disegno, 
letters in both, and rates his confidence in a reading from damaged but certain, to uncertain, to very uncertain, as 
well as the usual marks of editorial intervention (addition and deletion) and the specialized papyrological sigla 
(e.g. additions and deletions by the ancient scribe). A damaged but clear letter inserted above the line and 
preserved only in one disegno would have, therefore, three different marks in his edition. Under the system here 
adopted, it will only have one (that of supralinear insertion). 
81 I admit some disquiet at not marking letters preserved only in disegno or only visible in infrared photographs 
differently from those preserved visibly on the papyrus. However, since the disegni constitute in effect a 
manuscript tradition different only in historical circumstance from more familiar ones, I am content not to mark 
the differences. Most modern editors are scrupulous about noting the sources of their readings in their apparatus 
(cf. the practice of noting “MS deficit usque v. 100, and similar notes in the apparatus of texts with medieval 
traditions), so the information is generally readily available. Furthermore, the welter of dots and brackets renders 
already difficult texts more difficult, to no real gain. 
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2010: books III and IV), as well as his edition of book II (forthcoming), which revises Sbordone 
(1976) and other works.82  For book V, I use  the unpublished edition of Fish, Armstrong, and 
Porter, which revises Mangoni 1993 (to which reference will also be made; their column 
numbers are the same) and incorporates several other Herculaneum papyri which she did not 
know belonged to book V, but which were edited separately by her and others.  References to the 
On Poems take the form I.2.3, in which the capital Roman numeral is the book number, the first 
Arabic numeral is the column number, and the second Arabic numeral is the line number. All 
citations of the On Poems are to Janko (books I-IV) and Fish, Armstrong, and Porter (V) unless 
otherwise noted. 
 Of the four books (almost certainly) of the On Music, only book IV remains. Citations are 
of Delattre's edition of 2007, and are in the form IV.2.3.  The column numbers of Neubecker's 
edition match those given for van Krevelen (IA - XXXVIII) and Kemke's book IV (IV,IA – 
IV,XXXVIII), so the table of concordances given in Delattre is usable for her edition as well. 
N.b. the three aforementioned editions have columns IA and IB, which count as two separate 
columns in Delattre. Rispoli edited part of the text, then thought to be book I, but now known to 
be part of book IV.  
 The Rhetoric is cited from the edition of Longo Aurrichio (1977) for books I and II, and 
follows the same conventions as the On Poems. Her text has been corrected in places by later 
scholars; their readings will be cited as necessary. Book III will be cited from Hammerstaedt's 
edition, book VIII from Blank's. 
 
                                                            
82 Janko (pers. comm.) informs me that much of the material assigned to Pausimachus in book I has been 
reassigned to Heracleodorus on the basis of new readings in book II. Pausimachus' section begins now at I.82 
and Philodemus' rebuttal of his views around I.152. Precise details will be available in Janko (forthcoming). 
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The following are used throughout this dissertation; translations are generally indebted to the 
editors' versions, but have been freely changed throughout. 
Epicurus  Letters, Vatican Sayings (= VS), 
   and Kyriai Doxai (= KD) Von der Muehll (my translation) 
  De Nat. xxviii    Sedley 
Philodemus  On Poems I-IV    Janko 
  On Poems V     Fish, Armstrong, Porter (my translation with 
        reference to Armstrong 1995b) 
  Econ.      Jensen (usually Tsouna's translation) 
  On Rhet. I-II    Longo Auricchio (my translation with  
        reference to Chandler) 
  On Rhet. III    Hammerstaedt (my translation) 
  On Rhet. IV    Sudhaus (my translation) 
Lucretius      Bailey (1947, edition and commentary) 
   
Diogenes of Oenoanda    Smith (Fragments are numbered according  
        to his publications, including NF  
        (“new fragments”). 
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Chapter Two 
Epicurean Poetics Before Philodemus 
 
§1 Introduction 
 Epicureans engaged with poetry from the beginning; Epicurus got his start, so the story 
goes, out of frustration with an interpretation of Hesiod, and the school never escaped the 
reputation for being unlettered that came from their rejection of poetry.83 The purpose of this 
chapter is to trace the views of individual Epicureans, in chronological order, from Epicurus 
down to Philodemus. In so doing, I will try to individuate each philosopher's contribution or 
innovation (or lack thereof) to school doctrine.  
 Epicurus clearly held that poetry was not a source of knowledge or good opinions about 
the world, and the school never deviated from this opinion. More controversial is to what degree 
he limited his followers' involvement with poetry more generally. I hold, following Asmis 
(1995a), that the ban was rather limited and aimed at writing poetry as a lifestyle or source of 
income rather than writing poetry at all. There never seems to have been any restriction on 
reading poetry (or hearing it) so long as the Epicurean understood the potential dangers and 
knew how to avoid them. 
 This does not mean that there were not changes of emphasis and targets over time. On the 
contrary, it would be very surprising if Philodemus were fighting the same battles that Epicurus
                                                            
83 The story was told by Apollodorus the Kepotyrannos (“Tyrant of the Garden”) in book I of his Life of Epicurus 
and cited by Diogenes Laertius x.2. 
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did over two hundred years earlier. But a change in emphasis does not necessarily mean an 
innovation in doctrine. My view here is that Epicurus' teaching about poetry is divisible into two 
discrete doctrines: (i) the thesis that “poetry is not a source of truth about the world,” and (ii) an 
explanation of how poetry works. Our fragmentary evidence tell us that Epicurus was more 
concerned with (i) and Philodemus with (ii), but this does not mean that (ii) is Philodemus' 
innovation. I argue that this is implausible, given what we know about the history of Epicurean 
engagement with poetry and poetics. 
 
§2 Epicurus 
 Epicurus wrote about both poetics and poetry, at least in a certain sense. His primary 
goal, it seems, was to prevent his followers from thinking that poetry was a source of truth about 
the world, i.e. that it was educational.84 He devalued it in comparison with his own philosophy, 
but the extent to which this is true is usually overstated. Fragments 568 and 569 say only that the 
sage will discourse correctly about poetry (and music) and that he will not write it ἐνεργείαι.85 
We will return to the meaning of energeia in a moment. 
 It is apparent from his writings that his actual complaint was with liberal education in 
general, not with poetry specifically or per se. A line from his letter to Pythocles calls a student 
blessed for not being corrupted by the liberal education of the day: fr. 163 παιδείαν δὲ πᾶϲαν, 
µακάριε, φεῦγε τἀκάτιον ἀράµενοϲ (“O blessed one, set sail on your skiff and flee all 
education”). He expressed similar sentiments to Apelles in fr. 117: µακαρίζω ϲε, ὦ Ἀπελλῆ, ὅτι 
                                                            
84 Arrighetti (2006: 315) overstates the case by calling it “una particolare avversione.” 
85 I will argue that it means “activity involving serious engagement,” and thus that the dative here means “the sage 
will not write poetry as a serious engagement (vel sim.).” The MSS read ἐνεργεῖν; the emendation is Usener's. 
Sider (1995) suggested ἐνεργείωϲ. 
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καθαρὸϲ πάϲηϲ παιδείαϲ86 ἐπὶ φιλοϲοφίαν ὥρµηϲαϲ (“Apelles, I call you blessed, because 
free of all education you set off for philosophy”), and at VS 58: ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοῦϲ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ 
τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσµωτηρίου (“we must free ourselves from the prison of liberal 
education and politics”). We should remember that liberal education at the time, above the 
primary level, was primarily literary and oriented towards participation in elite culture and 
politics; neither of these were goals for Epicureans. Hence, to mistake a literary education for an 
education in values and truth is a serious error in the eyes of Epicurus. Poetry  did make up a 
large part of that education, but it was not poetry that Epicurus objected to; rather, the goals of 
those who studied poetry for social gain were the problem. That ethics and social mores were 
taught through literature were the reason, for Epicurus, to avoid such instruction. But literature 
itself could be innocent of the misuse; the intentions and attitudes of the student and teacher are 
important. After all, the sage can correctly discuss poetry and music. 
 Epicurus was indeed polemical about education and poetry, but, when judging his 
polemic, we should keep in mind his treatment of his teacher Nausiphanes, as well as other 
philosophers, a sample of which is preserved in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene 
summarized by Diogenes Laertius X.7-8 (= frr. 236, 238, and 172) and is worth quoting at 
length:  
πλεύµονά τε αὐτὸν ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγράµµατον καὶ ἀπατεῶνα καὶ πόρνην τοὺϲ τε περὶ 
Πλάτωνα Διονυϲοκόλοκαϲ καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα χρυϲοῦν καὶ Ἀριϲτοτέλην 
ἄϲωτον, ⟨ὃν⟩ καταφαγόντα τὴν πατρῴαν οὐϲίαν, ϲτρατεύεϲθαι καὶ φαρµακο-
πωλεῖν φορµοφόρον τε Πρωταγόραν καὶ γραφέα Δηµοκρίτου καὶ ἐν κώµαιϲ 
γράµµατα διδάϲκειν, Ἡράκλειτον τε κυκητήν καὶ Δηµόκριτον Ληρόκριτον καὶ 
Ἀντίδωρον Σαννίδωρον τούϲ τε Κυζικηνοὺϲ ἐχθροὺϲ τῆϲ Ἑλλάδοϲ καὶ 
Διαλεκτικοὺϲ πολυφθόρουϲ, Πύρρωνα δὲ ἀµαθῆ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. 
 
                                                            
86 παιδείαϲ is the universally accepted emendation of Schweighäuser and Wachsmuth for the αἰτίαϲ of the MSS. 
It is guaranteed by the contexts in Athenaeus (who says ἐγκυκλίου παιδείαϲ ἀµύητοϲ) and Plutarch, who 
mentions µαθήµατα. 
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He called Nausiphanes a jellyfish,87 unlettered, a cheat, and a whore, and the students of 
Plato Dionysiac88 ass-kissers and Plato himself gilded89 and Aristotle a dissolute who, 
after having blown through his inheritance, became a mercenary and peddled snake-oil,90 
and Protagoras a lumberjack91 and copy-cat92 of Democritus who taught elementary 
school out in the boonies, and Heraclitus a botcher and Democritus a shit-stirrer and 
Antidorus “Cockodorus” and the Cyzicenes enemies of Greece and the Dialecticians 
ravagers and Pyrro unlearned and uneducated. 
 
To all this abuse, we should add fr. 93, probably from the same Letter to the Mytilineans: ἀλλ’ 
ἴτωϲαν· εἶχε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοϲ ὠδίνων τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ϲτόµατοϲ καύχηϲιν τὴν ϲοφιϲτικήν, 
καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνδροπόδων (“but let them drop: he has a painful case of 
sophistic running-at-the-mouth, just like many other slaves”) and fr. 114: καὶ γὰρ πονηρὸϲ 
ἄνθρωποϲ ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκὼϲ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατὸν εἰϲ ϲοφίαν ἐλθεῖν (“indeed, the 
man was a bastard, and practiced in the sort of things from which is it impossible to arrive at 
wisdom”), which Brescia (1955: 41) considers a reference to Nausiphanes,93 and his comment 
about Leucippus—οὐδὲ Λεύκιππόν τινα γεγενῆϲθαι…φιλόϲοφον (“nor was there any 
philosopher Leucippus,” fr. 232 from D.L. X.13)—which is not to be understood as a historical 
comment but a polemical one: Leucippus existed but does not deserve the title “philosopher.”94 
                                                            
87 As Warren (2002: 191) points out, this draws both on Plato Phlb. 21c6 in which humans who cannot reason are 
compared to jellyfish, as well as Aristotelian biology, which says that jellyfish, since they have no perceptions, 
are like plants (PA 681a19), and so unable to reason or argue. “Vegetable” comes close for us, though it is used 
mostly of victims of accidents rather than idiots. 
88 By “Dionysiac” does he mean unrestrained, drunken, effeminate, or “queer” (in either sense), or all of the above? 
89 Implying either that he was “all shine and no substance” (i.e. well-spoken but with bad ideas) or, if synonymous 
with κατάχρυϲοϲ, that he was specious or a fake, cf. Janko (2011: 285 n. 2). 
90 The reference is surely to Aristotle's family relationship: Aristotle himself was tutor to the young Alexander; 
Aristotle's father Nicomachus had been a courtier or friend and doctor (so Suda, Ν 399) of Philip's father 
Amyntas. So, according to Epicurus, Aristotle, after having wasted his inheritance, had to join Alexander as a 
mercenary and misuse his father's lessons in medicine to make a living dishonestly. 
91 This seems to be a reference to the anecdote, related by Aullus Gellius (N. A. V.iii) that Protagoras was taken as 
a student by Democritus when he discovered a better way to haul logs. 
92 Literally “secretary;” the insult is that Protagoras just copied out what Democritus claimed without adding his 
own ideas. 
93 There is a reference to him just before this fragment, so the identification seems likely. 
94 In an unknown book of Epicurus On Nature, partially edited and discussed by Sedley (1973), Epicurus seems to 
talk about his atomist forefathers in the plural, thereby including Leucippus. He later switches to the singular to 
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In short, Epicurus treated other philosophers far more ferociously and obscenely than he did 
poetry or liberal education. 
 Why Epicurus' position on poetry has been misunderstood in this way is worth a 
moment's consideration. Even before the Greeks began to write, they held poetry in high esteem; 
even in Homer, a bard is entrusted to watch over Clytemnestra in her husband's absence (Od. 
3.276-7). Soon, thinkers began criticizing the poets, often Homer (possibly because he was 
particularly their object, but more probably, I think, as an emblem for “poetry” or “poets” 
generally) usually on ethical grounds. Heraclitus (B42 DK) and Xenophanes (B11-16 DK) are 
good examples. Eventually, there grew to be a standing contrast between poetic myths and 
historical truth: see, for example, Thucydides' statements in his History95 and Livy's Praefatio.96 
Plato was able to frame the issue as an “ancient feud” (παλαία τιϲ … διαφορά, Resp. 10, 607b) 
and, indeed, philosophers had been criticizing poets for more than a century by the time of the 
Republic.  
 But most philosophers valued poetry, like the Stoics (who thought it had a variety of 
helpful effects on its audience97), or else, like the Peripatetics, they valued the traditional liberal 
arts curriculum, in which poetry played a large role. This is the historical setting for Epicurus' 
statements about poetry, and, in light of the great cultural value put on poetry, criticisms of it 
were bound to be controversial. But in fact, his position is actually less extreme than that put 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
focus on Democritus as the major expositor of the doctrine. See especially Sedley (1973: 29-30) for discussion 
of the rhetoric and interpretation of this passage. 
95 A skeptical attitude towards Homer's account is noticeable at 1.9-10, and at 1.21 he explicitly distinguishes his 
sober history from the elaborations and exaggerations of poetry. 
96 At Praefatio §§6-9, Livy says that the founding of history is more “poetic stories” (poeticae fabulae) than 
reliable fact and mentions his rather lenient position, which allows such a mix of fact and admitted fiction in a 
work of history. 
97 See especially Delattre (2007: 11-20). N.b. that at this time, µουϲική, “music,” covered not only instrumental 
music (i.e. music in our sense) but also poetry. See chapter four. 
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forward by Plato:98 the wise can discuss poetry, as long as they do not write it ἐνεργείαι. In fact, 
he may have even said that the Sage would enjoy poetry, inasmuch as it was part of the 
Dionysiac spectacles mentioned in fr. 20: ...φιλοθέωρον µὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν ϲοφὸν ἐν ταῖϲ 
Διαπορίαιϲ καὶ χαίροντα παρ’ ὁντινοῦν ἕτερον ἀκροάµαϲι καὶ θεάµαϲι Διονυϲιακοῖϲ … (“ 
… demonstrating in the Diaporiae that the sage will be a lover of spectacles and will rejoice like 
anyone else in Dionysiac recitals or spectacles …”). I take it that this means that the Epicurean 
sage is not at risk of taking a false cue from poetry and so can listen to and enjoy it without 
risk.99 Furthermore, examples from poetry can be put forward to adorn a philosophical argument, 
as Epicurus himself did (e.g. in the letter to Pythocles, quoted above in §2, which is a reference 
to the Odyssey), but the argumentum ad auctoritatem poetarum is not valid and should be 
avoided. 
 The role that poetry played in the liberal arts curriculum is important here. Since 
Epicurus did not demand such an education of his followers, he was open to the attack that his 
followers were uneducated, and by extension, that he was uneducated (or that, because he was 
uneducated, he demanded that his followers also be uneducated).100 This is manifestly unfair, but 
ancient polemics were vicious and ad hominem to an extent that we have difficulty appreciating 
(as were the polemics of Epicurus himself, as I discussed above). The case finds a distant parallel 
in Cicero's oratory: much of it deals with the characters of the persons involved in the trial, a 
much greater proportion than we expect from modern courtroom oratory, and the rules of 
                                                            
98 Later Platonists would have to play down, explain away, or otherwise grapple with Plato's hard line on poetry. 
99 So Asmis (1995a: 20 and n. 26), contra Boyancé (1963: 91-2). Specification of “Dionysiac recitals or spectacles” 
seems to indicate public artistic performances (under the auspices of Dionysus, to be sure) rather than religious 
rituals, and Plutarch, our source for the fragment, understood Epicurus to be referring to art rather than religion 
in it (Non Posse 1095c). 
100 So Sextus Empicus Adv. Math. I.1 = Epicurus fr. 227, and note that Quintilian makes similar statements at I.O. 
II.17.15 = fr. 42 and XII.2.24 = fr. 156. 
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evidence seem to be fewer and weaker than we might be comfortable with. So too in polemics 
among philosophers leaps of association, condemnation of the company one keeps, and 
purposeful misrepresentation of doctrine were common. A good example is the role of women in 
the Garden.101 I should say at the outset that we have almost no idea of the truth of the matter, 
except that there were, apparently, women involved in the philosophical life of the Garden and 
that there was at least one marriage (technically concubinage, in accord with the laws of Athens) 
between one of these women philosophers and a male Epicurean (i.e. Leontion and 
Metrodorus).102 But so long as the women were there, mixing with the men, they could be 
presented as prostitutes, the men as débauchés who enjoyed them, and Epicurus' whole 
philosophy as pure hedonism, like that of the Cyrenaics, and effeminate to boot. Epicurus was 
not a Cyrenaic hedonist, and the rest of the report is very likely to be slanderous as well. In a 
similar way, Epicurus' antipathy towards the ἐγκύκλιοϲ παιδεία in favor of his own philosophy 
could be willfully misunderstood as outright hatred of poetry and education broadly (in turn 
polemically taken to mean that Epicurus himself was uneducated, as discussed above). This 
antipathy towards the liberal arts continued in the Epicurean tradition, as Demetrius Laco's 
advice to a youth in PHerc. 831 indicates, in which he denigrates it in favor of physiologia, the 
study of nature.103 
 An excellent example of the kind of teachings inculcated by the liberal arts education can 
                                                            
101 For this example, I draw heavily on Gordon (2004). 
102 See D.L. x.23. 
103 See Parisi (2012: 112-14) for discussion of the work, and  p. 116 for the following passage, PHerc. 831.8.4-10: 
ᾧ δ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύϲιν πέρατι κατακέκλειται τἀγαθὸν κ(αὶ) τὸ κα[κ]όν, τούτῳ πᾶϲα αἰώρα ψυχῆϲ [γ]ε̣ 
(ego : [ ̣]ε̣ papyrus) πέφυκται. ϲυνεχίζωµέν [τ]ε ἐν τῷ κατὰ φιλοϲοφίαν ⸌ἐν⸍εργήµατι καὶ µάλιϲτα τοῖϲ κατὰ 
φυϲιολογίαν θεωρήµαϲιν (“But for whom the good and the bad are enclosed within the limit according to 
nature, for him every fluctuation of the soul has been avoided. And let us continue in the practice of philosophy 
and especially in the studies of natural science.”) N.b. the scribe does not write iota adscript and καί is 
abbreviated. 
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be found in Plutarch in his essay Non Posse, at 1095a, where he says that old men (in this case, 
they are specifically Epicureans, but Plutarch's point is general) would not be bothered by lust if 
they had only learned to write about Homer and Euripides and followed the example of 
Sophocles, who considered himself lucky to have escaped his sexual urges, like a slave who 
escaped a harsh master. The lifestyle promoted by this course of study is at odds with Epicurean 
philosophy and therefore wrong and without value (the Epicureans had no objections to the 
enjoyment of sex per se and they probably would have mocked the naïveté of Plutarch's 
argument). However, simply reading poetry can be a very enjoyable endeavor, which Plutarch, in 
the same passage, admits that Epicurus recognized, when he reports that Epicurus suggested 
reading poetry and history as substitutes for sex for those unable to enjoy it any longer. We 
should note that this did not mean that Epicurus recommended sex generally. He did not deny 
that poetry was enjoyable and so he did allow his followers to read poetry for their own 
enjoyment. 
 However, he did deny that poetry was, qua poetry, useful. Sextus Empiricus preserves a 
series of four arguments against the utility of poetry which are due to others “and especially the 
Epicureans.”104 They are as follows: 
1. Poetry contains both useful and harmful statements and it is not the role of grammar but of 
philosophy to distinguish what is useful from what is harmful. In the lack of such a guide, the 
audience will misunderstand the poetry. 
2. Poets do not have any special access to the truth or particular knowledge of what is useful; 
                                                            
104 Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. I.299: τὰ µὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων λεγόµενα κατὰ τὸν τόπον, καὶ µάλιϲτα τῶν 
Ἐπικουρείων, ἐϲτὶ τοιαῦτα. The arguments are at I.279-98. Blank (1998): 286 and introduction §6 suggests 
that Sextus' source is a treatise by Zeno of Sidon; that the arguments treated here are genuinely Epicurean is 
argued by Blank on pp. 296-7. For other treatments of these arguments, see Asmis (1995a: 25-6) and Beer (2009: 
77-8). If Sextus' source is Zeno, it will be his Περὶ ποιηµάτων χρήϲεωϲ “On the Use of Poetry.” 
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only philosophers do. 
3. Poets do not aim at providing any use in their poems, unlike prose authors, but aim solely at 
entertainment, which is better accomplished with fiction than truth. 
4. Poetry is not only useless but actually harmful since it encourages the passions. 
 The first three of these arguments attack the usefulness of poetry as a source of truth, for 
it is either ambivalent or has no legitimate claim to authority; the fourth attacks it on the basis 
that it is positively harmful. It may be, as Blank suggests, that only the Epicurean sage can safely 
read poetry: “since only he is immune to being taken in by its bad sentiments, he alone can allow 
himself the lesser good of pleasure without running the risk of losing the greater good of freedom 
from the pain caused by false beliefs.”105 It need not be only the sage, however. Any sufficiently 
advanced Epicurean, who knows that poetry is no source of truth and may be the source of 
injury, can read it without distraction or harm. The situation would be parallel to others, 
according to the principle set out in KD 8: οὐδεµία ἡδονὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν 
ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλαϲίουϲ ἐπιφέρει τὰϲ ὀχλήϲειϲ τῶν ἡδονῶν (“No pleasure is per 
se a bad thing, but some things which cause pleasures bring also disturbances many times more 
than the pleasures”). Epicurus said that we should not have sex while overfull from eating or 
drunk because of possible damage to our atomic constitutions, but sex, food, and drink were 
counted among the pleasures.106 Luxurious food and drink as well are pleasant so long as we do 
                                                            
105 Blank (1998: 300). 
106 V. S. 51 (an extract from a letter from Metrodorus to Pythocles): πυνθάνοµαί ϲου τὴν κατὰ ϲάρκα κίνηϲιν 
ἀφθονωτέραν διακεῖϲθαι πρὸϲ τὴν ἀφροδιϲίων ἔντευξιν. ϲὺ δὲ, εἰ µὴ τοὺϲ νόµουϲ καταλύειϲ µήτε τὰ 
καλῶϲ ἔθει κείµενα κινεῖϲ µήτε τῶν πληϲίον τινὰ λυπεῖϲ µήτε τὴν ϲάρκα καταξαίνειϲ µήτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα 
καταναλίϲκειϲ, χρῶ ὡϲ βούλει τῇ ϲεαυτοῦ προαιρέϲει. ἀµήχανον µέντοι γε τὸ µὴ οὐχ ἑνί γέ τινι τούτων 
συνέχεϲθαι· ἀφροδίϲια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ µὴ ἔβλαψεν (“You tell me that the movement 
of your flesh is too inclined towards sexual intercourse. So long as you do not break the laws or disturb proper 
and established conventions or distress any of your neighbors or ravage your body or squander the necessities of 
life, act upon your inclination in any way you like. Yet it is impossible not to be constrained by at least one of 
these. For sex is never advantageous but a fine thing if if it does no harm”). I follow the text and translation of 
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not become accustomed to them and therefore pained when we cannot have them.107 Likewise, 
the fact that poetry could be damaging under certain situations does not mean it necessarily 
warranted a total ban. Indeed, there is evidence that this is so. 
 That Epicurus was not hostile to poetry, qua poetry, is demonstrated by a variety of 
sources. For example, Plutarch misunderstands Epicurus' attitude when he remarks on the 
strangeness of some Epicurean statements: (fr. 20, apud Plut. Non Posse 1095c) ἀτοπίαν ὧν 
Ἐπίκουροϲ λέγει φιλοθέωρον µὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν ϲοφὸν ἐν ταῖϲ Διαπορίαιϲ καὶ χαίροντα 
παρ’ ὁτινοῦν ἕτερον ἀκροάµασι καὶ θεάµασι Διονυσιακοῖϲ, προβλήµαϲι δὲ µουϲικοῖϲ καὶ 
κριτικῶν φιλολόγοιϲ ζητήµαϲιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺϲ χώραν (“ … the strangeness of 
what Epicurus claims, who demonstrates in the Diaporiai that the sage likes spectacles and 
rejoices just like anyone else at recitals and Dionysiac spectacles but who does not grant a place 
to musical questions and the philological problems of literary critics even accompanied by 
wine”). Plutarch cannot understand how Epicurus held this opinion because, for him, enjoying 
poetry and the study of poetry are inseparable. Not so for Epicurus; the sage can go to recitals 
and performances at festivals of Dionysus and enjoy them just like any other person (scilicet 
who is not a scholar). What he will not do is waste his time studying the grammarians only to 
score points in eristic symposium table talk.108 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Long and Sedley (1987): ii.120 and i.116), except the last clause, which I understand following Purinton (1993) 
and Brennan (1996). 
107 Fr. 181 shows his practice and reason: βρυάζω τῷ κατὰ τὸ σωµάτιον ἡδεῖ, ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ χρώµενοϲ, καὶ 
προϲπτύω ταῖϲ ἐκ πολυτελείαϲ ἡδοναῖϲ οὐ δι’ αὐτὰϲ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξακολουθοῦντα αὐταῖϲ δυϲχερῆ (“I 
revel in bodily pleasure using only water and bread, and I spit on the pleasures that come from extravagance – 
not on their own merits but because of the troubles that follow on them”). Of course, if he could come by 
something extravagant without trouble, he would not hesitate to enjoy it (fr. 182, to a follower): πέµψον µοι 
τυροῦ κυθρίδιον ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωµαι πολυτελεύϲαϲθαι δύνωµαι “send me a small pot of cheese, so that I can 
feast when I want.” See also fr. 464 about eating meat. 
108 V. S.  45: οὐ κόµπου οὐδὲ φωνῆϲ ἐργαϲτικοὺϲ οὐδὲ τὴν περιµάχητον παρὰ τοῖϲ πολλοῖϲ παιδείαν 
ἐνδεικνυµένουϲ φυϲιολογία παραϲκευάζει, ἀλλ’ ἀϲοβάρουϲ (Leopold: ἀλλὰ ϲοβαροὺϲ MSS) καὶ αὐτάρκειϲ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖϲ ἰδίοιϲ ἀγαθοῖϲ, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖϲ τῶν πραγµάτων µέγα φρονοῦνταϲ (“the study of nature does not 
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 A revealing summary of all this can be found in Cicero's De Finibus, when he makes 
Lucius Torquatus say 
 [sc. Epicurus] qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam 
 eruditionem esse duxit nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret. an ille tempus aut in 
 poetis evolvendis … consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est 
 delectatio? aut se, ut Plato, in musicis geometria numeris astris contereret, quae et a falsis 
 initiis profecta vera esse non possunt et si essent vera, nihil afferrent quo iucundius, id est 
 quo melius viveremus? eas artes persequeretur, vivendi artem tantam tamque operosam et 
 perinde fructuosam relinqueret? non ergo Epicurus ineruditus, sed ii indocti, qui quae 
 pueros non didicisse turpe est, ea putant usque ad senectutem esse discenda. 
 
 [sc. Epicurus] who seems to you hardly educated, for the reason that he thought that it 
 was not an education unless it would aid the practice of a happy life, or should he waste 
 time in perusing poets in whom there is no solid utility but pure, childish delight? Or 
 wear himself down as Plato did in the study of music, geometry, mathematics, 
 astronomy, all of which, because they set out from false premises, cannot be true, and 
 even if they were true, bring no help by which we might live more pleasantly, that is, 
 better? Should he pursue those arts and neglect the large and so difficult, but therefore 
 fruitful, art of living? Therefore, Epicurus was not uneducated, but they are, who think 
 that what was not shameful to learn as boys, should be studied straight through until old 
 age. (De fin. I.71-2)109 
  
What always mattered to Epicurus was the good life, and the only means to get there is his 
philosophy. The liberal arts, poetry chief among them, cannot accompany a student on the way; 
indeed, they can be a waste of time, if not damaging. But, importantly, poetry can still be a 
pleasure—paideia was not necessary for wisdom, and could often be a hindrance, but that does 
not mean that pleasure cannot be gotten (sometimes, perhaps, or only under certain 
circumstances) from some or all of its parts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
make people skilled producers of boasts or their own voice nor show-offs of the education which is much fought 
over among the hoi polloi, but instead humble and self-sufficient and proud of their own good qualities rather 
than their own possessions”). 
109 Giancotti and Boyancé argued over the exact interpretation of the phrase in poetis evolvendis … in quibus nulla 
solida utilitas...est. I side with Boyancé in thinking that it means “in reading poets, in whom (generally, as a rule) 
there is no solid utility” rather than “in reading [sc. only those] poets, in whom there is...,” which would require 
⟨iis⟩ poetis. For discussions of Epicurean opinions about music, see Delattre (2007), esp. pp. 91-113 and for 
geometry and mathematics, see Sedley (1976). Cosmology and quite a few astronomical phenomena are handled 
at length in the Letter to Pythocles §§88-98: the constitutions of the sun, moon, and stars, their movements 
(including the solstices) and apparent changes (the phases of the moon, eclipses) and the changing length of days 
and the seasons. In short, to say that the Epicureans did not care at all about these topics is a misrepresentation. 
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 Now we return to the question of ἐνεργεία, specifically, what does it mean to do 
something ἐνεργείαι?110 In fr. 219, Epicurus defines philosophy: φιλοϲοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι 
λόγοιϲ καὶ διαλογιϲµοῖϲ τὸν εὐδαίµονα βίον περιποιοῦϲαν (“philosophy is an energeia 
which aims at the happy life by debate and argument”). As Herodotus' troubles with Epicurus' 
On Nature demonstrate (§35), his philosophy was intellectually demanding and he required 
much from his students. In fact, in his letter about meteorology to Pythocles, he says µάλιϲτα δὲ 
ϲεαυτὸν ἀπόδοϲ εἰϲ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ⟨τῆϲ⟩ (addidi) ἀπειρίαϲ καὶ τῶν ϲυγγενῶν τούτοιϲ 
θεωρίαν, ἔτι δὲ κριτηρίων καὶ παθῶν, καὶ οὗ ἔνεκεν ταῦτα ἐκλογιζόµεθα (“most of all, give 
yourself over to the contemplation of principles and the unlimited and the ideas related to these, 
and further, of criteria for judgement, and of emotions, and the reason why we consider these 
topics,” §116). Whatever “giving one's self over” means, it is surely a more time consuming 
process than writing poems in one's free time, and the term ἐνέργεια seems to mean “full-time 
occupation” rather than just “activity.”111 
 Also relevant is a section of Philodemus' On Epicurus, which one of its editors, Achille 
Vogliano, called “queen of the columns preserved in the Herculaneum papyri.” The topic is the 
feasts held in memory of Epicurus. 
Philodemus, On Epicurus (PHerc. 1232, fr. 8.1.10-20):112 
10             … ὅϲοι τ[ὰ]ϲ [εὐ]νοίαϲ [καὶ    … who are well disposed both to him and 
                                                            
110 Asmis (1995a) reaches a similar conclusion to mine, though my formulation is stronger. I do not accept 
Arrighetti's (2006: 319-322) criticisms of Asmis' arguments: although her parallel for the translation of ἐνεργείαι 
as “being busy at, making a practice of, practicing energetically” (22) disappeared when Delattre published his 
new edition of On Music, I  provide several more in this discussion. Further, Arrighetti's assumption that we 
should translate the term according to Aristotle's usage is not acceptable, since the parallels I give provide 
evidence for a specifically Epicurean usage. Arrighetti understands Epicurus' dictum to mean that poets will not 
expound the results of new research in poetry, but does not provide any support for his assertion. That view was 
first put forward, so far as I know, by Giancotti (1959). 
111 ἐνέργεια also appears in fr. 2, where however ἐνάργεια should probably be read with Ritter. 
112 I follow Tepedino Guerra's edition (1994) with Clay's translation (1986), except at the end of the excerpt, where 
I follow Bignone and Festugière's understanding of the word µακαρία, which is discussed in Clay's commentary. 
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 τὰϲ] ἑαυ[τ]οῦ [κα]ὶ τὰ[ϲ τ]ῶν ἑαυ- 
 τ]οῦ φίλων ἔχουϲιν· [ο]ὐ γὰρ δη- 
 µαγωγήϲειν, τοῦ[τ]ο πράττον- 
 ταϲ, τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυϲιο[λ]ό- 
15 γη[τ]ον δηµαγ[ωγ]ίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐν  
 τοῖϲ τῆϲ φύϲεω[ϲ οἰ]κ̣είοιϲ ἐνερ- 
 γοῦνταϲ µ[ν]η̣[ϲθ]ήϲεϲθαι πάντων 
 τῶν τὰϲ εὐν[οίαϲ] ἡµῖν ἐχόν- 
 των, ὅπωϲ ϲυ[γκαθ]αγίζωϲιν τὰ 
20 ἐπὶ τῆι αὑτ[ῶν µα]καρίαι 
his friends. In doing this [Epicurus says], they 
will not be engaged in gathering the masses, 
something which is a form of meaningless 
pandering and unworthy of the natural 
philosopher; rather, in practicing what is 
congenial to their nature, they will remember 
all those who are well disposed to us so that 
they can join in the appropriate rites for their 
happiness …  
 
Clearly, occasional feasts and religious rites were not meant as a full-time occupation, but 
“practicing what is congenial to our nature” should be, and the memorial feasts are one aspect of 
what is congenial. 
 Diogenes Laertius records (§136) a quotation of Epicurus in which he held that ἡ µὲν 
γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ⟨ἡ⟩ (add. Usener) ἀπονία καταϲτηµατικαί εἰϲιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χάρα καὶ ἡ 
εὐφροϲύνη κατὰ κίνηϲιν ἐνέργειαι βλέπονται (“Ataraxia and aponia are static pleasures, but 
chara and euphronsyne are considered to be energeiai in movement”).113 There is debate about 
the text: the MSS are divided between ἐνεργεία (sic, probably representing the dative) and 
ἐνεργείαι; the plural is Long's emendation on the grounds that “the dative has never been 
satisfactorily explained.”114 What special force the word has here has not been explained 
either.115 “Activities” does not seem an appropriate term for states of the soul, but it is supported 
by a comment by Diogenes of Oenoanda (noted already by Arrighetti). 
Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 34 VI 2-6 (Smith): 
2        ⸏  ἡµ[εῖϲ δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶµεν ἤ̣δ̣η 
 πῶϲ ὁ βίοϲ ἡµεῖν ἡδὺϲ 
Let us now investigate how 
life is to be made pleasant 
                                                            
113 The four are states of pleasure: ataraxia is stable mental pleasure, aponia is stable physical pleasure (they consist 
primarily, but not entirely, in the lack of disturbance, hence their formation as negatives), chara and euphrosyne 
are kinetic mental and physical pleasures, respectively. See Gosling and Taylor (1982), especially chapter 19. 
114 Discussion in Long and Sedley (1987: II.125) to their 21R. 
115 Diano (1946: 138, the commentary to his [37]) tries to explain it by glossing eo quod movendi vim habent (“the 
means by which they have the power of movement”), which seems to make it a property or quality of chara and 
euphrosyne. 
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 γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖϲ κα- 
5 ταϲτήµαϲι καὶ ἐν ταῖϲ 
          ⸏  πράξεϲιν. 
for us both in states and in 
actions. 
 
A discussion of things that disturb one's peace of mind, like fears of death and the gods, 
followed; a discussion of the praxeis, activities, seems to be lost.116 Additionally, philosophy is 
called a praxis at fr. 29 I 5-13, just as Epicurus had called it an energeia in fr. 219, quoted and 
discussed just above.117 This implies, however, that it was simply appropriate to talk of chara 
and euphrosyne as activities, though further evidence is lacking. It seems reasonable to suspect 
terminological looseness, like that in the case of the different words for prolepsis (and it is 
notable that energeia does not appear in the fragments of Diogenes' inscription).  Nonetheless, 
though chara and euphrosyne are not the goal for Epicureans, they are no small thing and, 
depending on the view of Epicurean pleasure adopted, may be important constituent parts of it. 
 The verb ἐνεργέω continued to be used by later Epicureans. Additionally, Polystratus,118 
Carneiscus,119 and Philodemus120 use ἐνέργεια to mean “action” or “course of action, policy” 
and ἐνεργέω to mean “to enact an ἐνέργεια,” that is, to act habitually or deliberately. Only once 
does it appear in an Aristotelian sense: in Polystratus' On Irrational Contempt 15.2 it appears 
with δύναµιϲ, which is not a typical Epicurean pairing.121 
 Ἐνεργέω and ἐνεργεία, then, are fairly strong words: to act, to practice regularly, to act 
as a result of a policy. The connotations of this are important for the question of the Epicurean 
                                                            
116 For the reconstruction of the inscription and its argument, see Smith (1993: 473-5). 
117 However, eating, drinking and sex are also called praxeis in fr. 33 VII1-9, in what is clearly not a technical use. 
118 On Irrational Contempt 31.12. 
119 Life of Philistas 2.6. 
120 On Arrogance 21.15, [On Choices and Avoidances] 14.14 and 22.10, Against Those Who Claim to be Literalists 
(PHerc. 1005) 102, and On Anger 26.17 are interesting cases, where the word refers to acting or not acting on 
the basis of strong emotional states and mistaken beliefs, respectively. While not exactly parallel, they tend to 
support my view that the word should not be taken in its Aristotelian sense. 
121 There are no examples of the pairing listed s.v. in Usener's Glossarium, nor do Epicureans seem to use it in its 
Aristotelian sense. 
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view of poetry: you can write it all you like, as long as you do not mistake it for The Real Thing, 
for philosophy, for a source of truth. To write poetry ἐνεργείαι is to engage in that activity as if it 
were on par with philosophy, which is simply impossible for Epicurus or an Epicurean. 
 So the Epicurean sage can also be a poet, probably in the same way they can be said to be 
a household manager: they can use a techne to achieve the proper end of that craft, so long as 
their practice of the craft is subordinate to the overarching goals and practices of 
Epicureanism.122 The only proper profession for an Epicurean sage is of course professing 
Epicureanism, but there is no obstacle to their writing some verses as a diversion. That is to say, 
for Philodemus to write epigrams and for Lucretius to write the De Rerum Natura are not 
necessarily problems, when viewed in an Epicurean framework.123 What matters are their own 
attitudes, needs, and circumstances, about which we are in no position to speak. 
 As for the correct discourses about poetry and music, the discussion of Menander 
probably by Epicurus preserved in PHerc. 1570 (probably Philodemus' On Wealth II), and 
Philodemus' own Περὶ τοῦ καθ’ Ὅµηρον ἀγαθοῦ βαϲιλέωϲ and the criticism of the poets in 
the second half of his Περὶ εὐϲεβείαϲ are examples of such treatments. However, the poetry 
itself is not morally useful; rather it is the philosopher's reading and analysis of it that highlights 
the correct and incorrect actions of the characters in the poems, or correct and incorrect 
statements on the part of the narrator. In the criticism of the character of Wealth in Menander's 
Georgos, Epicurus points out that the statements made by the goddess Poverty are simply false 
and damaging. He treats the poem as a competing instructor whose doctrine needs to be refuted 
                                                            
122 So already Asmis (1995a), and see chapter three. 
123 Lucretius' poem, however, does seem to violate Philodemus' statement at On Poems V.17.20-24 that no one has 
ever, nor will ever, write useful poetry. I suspect he would have defended himself on the grounds that his poem 
could function as a protreptic and he may have taken a different view of the possible utility of poems from 
Philodemus'. I intend to consider this problem in greater detail elsewhere. 
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for the good of the students.124 In the On the Good King, Philodemus points out good and bad 
actions by the characters for instruction (but it is his reading of the poems, not the poems 
themselves, that is educational);125 in the On Piety, he points out false theological statements so 
that they might not confuse the audience.126 By claiming that the philosopher will be able to 
discourse correctly about these topics, Epicurus indicates that well-trained Epicureans will not be 
damaged by the contents of poetry both because they can recognize harmful statements and 
because they will have the correct attitude about it in the first place. Less well-trained Epicureans 
might mistake poetry for a convincing source of truth about the world or take characters, actions 
or attitudes praised in the poem to be actually praiseworthy. In short, Epicurus merely meant that 
Epicurean philosophers will have correct attitudes towards poetry and will be able to criticize it 
or draw on it for useful lessons. That is, they will write it, or not, as their personality and 
circumstances dictate, but they will never mistake it for an authoritative source of information 
about the world and can criticize what they find in it. 
  
§3 Metrodorus 
 No extensive discussion from the pen of Metrodorus, the second in charge of the Garden 
while Epicurus was alive, survives, but he did write an On Poems in at least two books, of which 
some fragments are preserved in Philodemus' On Rhetoric II.127 These discuss what types of 
rhetoric could be considered to be technai. It seems certain that this topic was brought in as a 
                                                            
124 On this work, see Armstrong-Ponczoch (2011). 
125 See Fish (2011b). 
126 See Obbink (1995b). 
127 They start at B.49.27 (p. 145 Longo Auricchio) and B1.21.10 (p. 215 Longo Auricchio; this part of Philodemus' 
On Rhetoric II is preserved in two rolls, which are given the arbitrary designations B and B1 and their columns 
are numbered sequentially within each papyrus, so B1 col. 21 comes from later in the work than B col. 49). 
Metrodorus' fragments were collected by A. Körte (1890); frr. 20-23 are from the On Poems. 
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comparandum for an analogous discussion of poetry, i.e. was it a techne or not, and on what 
grounds? We know Philodemus' answer: yes, but not very much of one.128 
 The most famous and important fragment, however, is in Plutarch's Non Posse (1094e = 
fr. 24 Körte): ὅθεν µηδ’ εἰδέναι φάϲκων, µεθ’ ὁποτέρων ἦν ὁ Ἕκτωρ, ἢ τοὺϲ πρώτουϲ 
ϲτίχουϲ τῆς Ὁµήρου ποιήϲεωϲ ἢ πάλιν τὰ ἐν µέϲωι, µὴ ταρβήϲῃϲ (“for which reason do not 
be upset to say that you do not know on whose side Hector was or the first lines of Homer's 
poetry or what happened in the middle”). Plutarch quotes it to abuse the Epicureans for ignoring 
the pleasures of the liberal arts, but he misrepresents the point: you do not need to know Homer's 
poetry, or anything about it, to live a pleasant life according to Epicurus. Put differently, once 
you are freed from the fear (n.b. ταρβέω) that you need to know Homer's poetry and the 
mistaken belief that Homer teaches the truth, you are free to enjoy his poetry as poetry (or to 
ignore it as irrelevant). 
 We can gather from a fragment preserved in Philodemus' discussion of political rhetoric 
in the third book of his On Rhetoric that the limits of what was included under the techne of 
poetry were a topic.129 
On Rhetoric III, PHerc. 1506.18-3: 
18   [ὅ]τ̣ι̣ δ̣ὲ̣ τῆι ῥη- 
 το]ρικῆι τῶν ϲ̣οφι̣ϲ̣τ̣ικῶν 
20 ο]ὐ̣ ϲυ̣µβέβ[ηκ]ε͙ν εἶναι πο- 
 λι]τικῆι̣, καθὸ̣ ῥητορική, ἐϲ- 
 τ]ίν, ο̣ὐδ̣ὲ τῶ̣ι  ῥήτορι τῶι 
 τ̣[ο]ιούτ̣[ωι], κ̣αθὸ ῥήτωρ, ἐϲ- 
 τιν τὸ ⟦υ⟧ πο̣λ̣ι̣τικῶ[ι] εἶναι, 
25 ο̣ὐδὲ πάλι̣ν̣ τῶ̣[ι πολιτι- 
 κ]ῶι τὸ ῥ̣ή̣τ̣[ορι, πολλῶ]ν 
    That it was not characteristic 
of the rhetoric of the sophistic 
(rhetors), qua rhetoric, to be 
political rhetoric, nor is it for 
such a rhetor, qua rhetor, to be 
a politician, nor in turn is it for 
a politician to be a rhetor, is 
clear from many passages: 
                                                            
128 See On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1672.22.28-39 (p. 219 L.-A.); at On Rhetoric III, col xlviii.33-5 (Hammerstaedt) 
lessons in poetry are mentioned. 
129 Metrodorus fr. 23 Körte = Philodemus, On Rhetoric III (PHerc. 1506 col 44.17-33 = II 247 Sudhaus). 
Hammerstaedt (1992) is the most recent edition and I follow his text (with simplified editorial sigla). -εν in l. 20 
is an emendation by the proof-readers of the disegni for -ην which is read on the papyrus. 
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 φ̣α̣ν̣ε̣ρὸν ἐκ τόπ̣ων· Ἐ̣[πί- 
 κο̣υ̣ρ̣όϲ̣ φηϲιν ἐν [τ]ῶ̣ι̣ Περὶ 
 ῥ̣η̣τορικῆϲ καὶ Μ[η]τ̣ρόδ̣ω- 
30 ροϲ ἐν τ̣ῶ̣ι π̣ρώτωι π̣[ερ]ὶ ̣
 ποιη̣µά̣των καὶ Ἕρµ̣α̣ρ- 
31 χοϲ …  
Epicurus says so in his On 
Rhetoric, Metrodorus in On 
Poems I, and Hermarchus ... 
 
The point is simply that a rhetorician is not, by dint of being such, a politician and vice versa. 
These are separate spheres of inquiry.130 In an On Poems, a discussion of the technicity and 
bounds of rhetoric is out of place; so why was Metrodorus discussing them? He must have been 
using what Epicurus established in his On Rhetoric to provide analogies for the case of poetry. I 
would cautiously suggest that his discussion gave rise to certain claims in Philodemus, such as 
that the good versifier is not necessarily a good poet (On Poems V col. 11.23-29), and that if 
poets aid their audiences, they aid them by means of arguments, not by the poetic form in which 
they are expressed (On Music IV.134.7-16 and 143.27-38). Both of these topics handle the 
distinctions between poetry qua poetry and poetry qua vehicle for words or qua verbal form. 
This is, admittedly, a somewhat weak chain of inferences. 
 
§4 Hermarchus, Polyaenus, and the other 3rd and 2nd century Epicureans 
 Unfortunately, very little is known about these figures, and from what we do know, they 
were more interested in rhetoric than poetry. Their works are fragmentary, usually preserved 
because they were cited as authorities by Philodemus or another author in the Herculaneum 
collection.  
 Hermarchus' language is notably poetic, however, and shows points of contact with 
                                                            
130 For Philodemus, only “sophistic rhetoric” was really a techne; political, forensic, and panegyric oratory were 
knacks, but political and forensic oratory have need of practice, instruction, and empirical inquiry: see Phld. On 
Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674 col 54.15-27), the fragments of Epicurus' On Rhetoric (frr. 46-55 Usener), and Blank 
(1995). 
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Aeschylus and Pindar, among others.131 Bignone conjectured that Hermarchus might have 
written poetry as a youth, before becoming an Epicurean. We need not go as far as Bignone did 
and find Hermarchus in PHerc. 1040, which contains a description of an unknown scholar, 
probably an Epicurean philosopher.132 
 However, that text is worth consideration. It describes an extremely learned young man 
who, in his youth, studied rhetoric, poetry, and music,133 as well as γράµµατα, which I take to 
be “literature,” i.e. poetry and perhaps classic works of oratory and prose. The appearance of 
Epicurus' name guarantees an Epicurean setting, but nothing more than that. Hermarchus is a 
possible topic, but there are many others. It is notable, however, that youthful excellence in the 
liberal arts was apparently praised in this young man. 
 
§5 Colotes 
 Colotes was a first generation folower of Epicurus and was a favorite student.134  He is 
primarily known for his polemical treatise “On the Proposition 'That it is Impossible Even to 
Live according to the Doctrines of Other Philosophers,'” which was refuted at length by 
Plutarch. 135  The Herculaneum papyri preserve fragments of two other works of his: the 
anticommentaries “Against Plato's Euthydemus” (PHerc. 1032) and “Against Plato's Lysis” 
                                                            
131 Longo Auricchio (1988: 37-39). In the two reliably verbatim fragments, 23 and 24, he strictly avoids hiatus and 
engages in word play as well. 
132 See Longo Auricchio (1988: 48-53 and ad fr. 24). The papyrus is published in Crönert (1906: 97-100, with 
second thoughts on 183); Longo reread the papyrus and publishes a more conservative, reliable edition, and a 
sober discussion, to which I am indebted. The numeration is Crönert's. Several instances of hiatus rule out 
Philodemus or Demetrius Laco as author. 
133 So I understand “harmonies and rhythms” in  II.1. 
134 As the pet names Κωλωταρᾶϲ and Κωλωτάριον suggest, both attested by Plutarch (Adv. Colotem 1007e). 
135 See Kechagia (2011) for a recent treatment of this essay. 
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(PHerc. 208). In the latter, he discusses the prolepsis (preconception) of the good poet.136 His 
discussion is occasioned by a remark of Socrates at the beginning of the Lysis, during a 
discussion of how best to seduce an eromenos. One of the interlocutors was so enamored that he 
even wrote poetry. Socrates rounds off the discussion by warning him to not make his lover too 
haughty or arrogant lest he come to spurn him, and finishes by saying καίτοι οἶµαι ἐγὼ ἄνδρα 
ποιήϲει βλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἄν ϲε ἐθέλειν ὁµολογῆϲαι ὡϲ ἀγαθόϲ ποτ’ ἐϲτὶ ποιητήϲ, 
βλαβερὸϲ ὤν ἑαυτῶι “And yet I think that you would not be willing to agree that a man who 
harms himself with poetry is a good poet, since he is harmful to himself.” It is this conclusion 
that Colotes discusses: 
T.  IV, p. 10b (p. 164 Crönert):137 
3                οὗτοϲ παρ’ ἑ- 
 αυ]τῶι καλεῖν ἀγαθὸν 
5 πο]ι̣ητ[ὴν] ἐδόξαζεν 
 α]ὐτὸν ἀγ̣αθὸν ποιη- 
 τὴν εἶναι. κ̣αὶ τῶι Ἱπ- 
 π̣οθάλ[ε]ι̣ ἐχρῆ[ν] µ̣άχεϲθαι 
 ὃϲ] διατεταγµ[έ]νοϲ παρ’ ἑ- 
10 αυ]τῶ̣ι [κ]αλεῖ[ν] κ̣ατὰ τὸ 
 ἐν]α̣ργὲ[ϲ] καὶ µὴ [δ]ο̣ξαζό-  
 µ]ε̣νον ἀγα[θὸν] ποι[η- 
13 τὴν τ]ὸν τ[οιοῦτο]ν... 
     This man, on his own, 
thought it best to claim that he 
was a good poet. And it was 
necessary to contradict 
Hippothales who, being 
charged on his own to define 
such a man as a good poet 
according to what is clear and 
not a matter of opinion …  
 
T. IV p. 10d, ll. 2-11 (p. 165 Crönert):138 
2   ⟨ὅ, τι⟩ βού- 
 λει ϲηµ̣ή⟦ο⟧νηι͙ ὁ φθόγ- 
 γοϲ. [ἀλ]λὰ µὴν ἥ γε κοι- 
5 νὴ πάντων ἡµῶν ὁµι- 
 λία ἦ̣ν τ̣[η]ρεῖν τοῦϲ φ[θ]ό̣γ- 
 γου[ϲ] κα̣[τ]ὰ τὸ ἐν[α]ργέϲ, 
 οὐ] τ̣ὸ δοξαζόµενόν 
What do you want that the statement 
should mean? Well, the common 
way of speaking among all of us 
(Epicureans) was to preserve the 
utterances in accordance with what 
is clear, not that which is a matter of 
                                                            
136 Their editions are to be found in Crönert (1906), in the Nachtrag, pp. 163-167, and to be read with the notes of 
Concolino Mancini (1976). Michael Erler is currently reediting them. 
137 Crönert read µὴ ⟨τὸ⟩ in line 11, which I consider unnecessary: “what is clear and non-conjectural,” taken 
together as one idea, makes sense, since what is clear for Epicureans is not conjectural. Hippothales is a 
character in Plato's Lysis. ὃϲ] in line 9 is mine; Crönert printed ὁ. 
138 Janko conjectured ὅ,τι in line 2; ϲηµήνηι is my correction for Crönert's reading ϲηµηονην; the construction is a 
deliberative subjunctive after βούλει, see Smyth §1806. Perhaps read [µὴ] at the beginning of l. 8 instead of [οὐ] 
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 γ’ ἐκ[ε]ῖνο καὶ οὐχὶ ὃ ο[ὗ- 
10 τό]ϲ̣ φ̣[ηϲι]ν. 
opinion and not what this man says. 
 
T. IV p. 10 e, ll. 2-13 (p. 165 Crönert):139 
2  κατὰ τὸ ἐν]αργὲϲ 
 κ̣α[ὶ οὐ τὸ δοξαζό]µ̣ενόν 
 π[ο]τε, καὶ προϲδιαλ̣ε- 
5 γόµενόϲ µοι τοὺϲ φθόγ- 
 γο[υ]ϲ̣. ἐν δὲ τοῖϲ κατὰ 
 µέρ[ο]ϲ̣ περὶ ποιητῶν 
 ἤδη̣ ἀντιλέγωµεν. κα[ὶ 
 ὃ µέν̣ φαϲ̣[ι] εἴτ’ ἐναρ̣γ̣[ὲϲ εἶ- 
10 να[ι] τὸ γ̣[νω]ριζόµ[ε]ν[ον 
 π[ερὶ] ποιητῶ̣ν̣ ἀγαθ̣ῶ̣ν 
 τ]ῆι [διανοίαι τρ]όπον 
13 [τινά...] 
      According to what is clear 
and not ever what is a matter of 
opinion, also addressing his 
utterances to me. But in the 
sections partially about poets let 
us refute then what they claim, 
whether what is known about 
good poets is clear in his mind in 
some way (?)... 
 
Concolino Mancini pointed out that Colotes speaks as if there was a prolepsis of the good poet, 
founding it on τὸ ἐναργέϲ, i.e. what is clear.140 We know from Philodemus that the Epicureans 
did think there was such a prolepsis, and the discussion about calling such a person a good poet 
confirms that Colotes had such a prolepsis: how could he name someone “good poet” without 
reference to a prolepsis guaranteeing meaning to that phrase?141 It is worth noting also that 
Colotes uses the opportunity to discuss Epicurean views on language, which is closely connected 
to epistemology for them. 
 In this connection, Colotes mentions Archilochus.142  Because he was a famous, widely-
read and canonical poet, he is used as a test case in Philodemus' On Poems; he appears at II.34 
alongside Semonides, Hipponax, and Euripides; in IV.104 as a poet who is good despite using 
bad diction, and in V.18 as a poet who is considered good “only with indulgence” by a Stoic 
                                                            
139 Perhaps we should read κα[ὶ µὴ at the start of l. 3. 
140 Concolino Mancini (1976: 62), developing suggestions by Körte (1907: 253-4) and Long (1971). Crönert (1906: 
8) thought that Colotes was reflecting Epicurus' ban on poetry; Philippson (RE 2479-80) points out that this is 
not necessarily the case. 
141 For Philodemus' statement, see On Poems V.30.29-33 and 33.33-6. 
142 At T. IV p. 10b* line 7 (p. 164 Crönert), which is a sovrapposto conserved only in in the Oxford disegno of the 
text. It reads αρχιλοχα, which is probably to be emended to Ἀρχιλόχω͙[ι (ego, cf. Archilochus fr. 301 West).  
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literary critic who could not find intellectual contents of value in his poetry. The discussion here 
is surely similar: is Archilochus, who slandered others and admitted shameful things about 
himself in his poems, thereby a bad poet?143 
 Obviously, given the discussion, it was not Colotes' goal to explain what the prolepsis of 
the good poet is, but he felt free to invoke the idea, which shows that it had already been 
discussed in the school. The most obvious place for such a discussion is in Metrodorus' On 
Poems, which seems to have been less concerned with the status of poetry in Epicurean 
education, but rather with understanding it as a human endeavor: is it a techne? What makes a 
good poet? This last question hints that, even among the first generation of Epicureans, there was 
a complete “theory of poetry,” in which quality and judgment were discussed as well as the 
ethical import of the contents. That some of these questions were handled by later Epicureans is 
not an argument against their treatment here: school doctrine had to be defended in the face of 
criticism, if not developed over the course of the centuries to meet new challenges. 
 
§6 Demetrius Laco  
 Demetrius was probably active in the late second and early first centuries BCE; his dates 
are not secure. He mentions Zeno and is probably a rough contemporary.144 His treatise, in 
contrast to the others discussed so far, actually survives in some extensive parts. PHerc. 1014 
contains book II and PHerc. 188, much less extensive, is agreed to contain the first book and 
                                                            
143 Concolino Mancini suggests two possibilities: (i) Archilochus is cited because he damaged himself by being 
hateful to everyone or (ii) his verse κηλέ͙ε͙ται δ’ ὄτιϲ [βροτ]ῶν ἀοιδαῖϲ (εε is Treu's emendation of the ω in the 
Neapolitan disegno; West prints a more fragmentary text as fr. 253) “whichever mortal is enchanted by songs” 
(Phld. On Music IV.49.38-9 = fr. 352 West) is compared with the discussion in Plato (206b1-2) that poetry 
should κηλεῖν, enchant, and not ἐξαγριαίνειν, enrage. My position develops her first option. 
144 For his biography, see Gigante ap. Puglia (1988). For the reference to Zeno, see below n. 161. 
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treats the rôles of the hearing (ἀκοή) and mind (διάνοια) in the judgement (κρίνειν) of poetry.145 
Neither work contains a positive exposition of school doctrine in the surviving parts, but 
Demetrius seems to have been interested in problems rather than the systematic refutation of 
opponents (like Philodemus) and so, potentially, there is much to be learned from him. 
 The remains of book I are very scanty and difficult to control. The topic seems to be 
whether the hearing or the mind judges the quality of poetry.146 The second book discusses 
questions of genre (the Pythian nome is handled in some detail) and some, more technical, 
aspects of lexis and poetry: the definitions of lexis (col. 36), metaphor (col. 40), and ϲτεναὶ 
φωναί, sounds that are difficult to pronounce (col. 27). 
 Of greater interest is his identification of a πραγµατικὴ ζήτηϲιϲ, or “investigation into 
the facts,” which philosophers interested in poetry can perform.147 At this point, the idea that 
poetry could be an object of research should not be surprising, and that poems are considered 
things rather than pure language is not, after a moment of reflection, particularly surprising 
either: poems can be analyzed for their propositional contents (as hinted at above) or for their 
verbal beauty, but even verbal beauty is not “pure language.”  
 Demetrius has several other very interesting but, as yet, poorly understood positions 
about genre and perhaps the intelligibility of poems. A phrase of his, ἐντροχάζουϲα κοινότηϲ 
“commonality that obtains,” picks out the feature, or collection of features, which grants a poem 
                                                            
145 For book II, see Romeo (1988) which includes both books along with introduction, Italian translation and 
commentary, but whose reconstruction of the second book is faulty in some particulars. McOsker (forthcoming) 
will reedit the text. References here are to Romeo's column and line numbers. Book I has been reedited in 
McOsker (2014). 
146 See McOsker (2014) and (forthcoming) for discussion of the topic and adversaries, who are Andromenides (also 
known from Philodemus) and possibly Crates of Mallos. 
147 For discussion of the term, see Romeo (1988a: 162), which is her note to II.15.4ss. I follow Longo Auricchio's 
suggestion for the translation (in Romeo). The term probably indicates one of the two avenues of Epicurean 
research, namely, research into facts; the other was research into pure language (Diogenes Laertius X.34). 
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its belonging to a genre. In Demetrius' example, it is the Pythian Nome:  
On Poems II col. 49.1-10:148 
1    [ἐ-] 
 π̣ὶ διάταϲιν [ ̣  ̣]η[ ̣  ̣]ν 
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἔνκλι̣ϲ̣ι̣ν ἢ 
 τοιαύτην κατάϲτα- 
5        ⸏  ϲιν v δ̣ι̣ὰ̣ τὴν ἐντρο- 
          ⸏  χάζουϲαν κοινότητα. 
 ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦ- 
 τα τῶν ποηµά[τω]ν̣, 
 ἃ ἢ̣ γ̣ρ̣άφ̣ο̣υϲιν οἱ γρ̣αµ- 
10 µα[τικοὶ] ἢ̣ ε̣ὑ̣ρί̣ϲκου[ϲι]ν 
     … for tension (modifier 
missing) and for vocal 
modulation or such a situation, 
on account of the commonality 
that obtains. Thence such 
poems too the grammatikoi 
either write or discover …  
 
and col. 51.4-8: 
4    [λέ-] 
 γεται πο̣ή̣µ̣ατα διὰ ̣
 τὴν κατὰ τ[ὸν ν]όµον 
 ἐντροχαζού[ϲ]α[ν κοινό- 
8 τητα. 
  … they are called poems on 
account of the commonality that 
obtains throughout the Nome 
genre. 
 
The previous editor, Costantina Romeo, took κοινότηϲ to mean ambiguity or vagueness (in 
contrast with ἰδιότηϲ “precision” or specificity). But the word in the sense of “commonality” 
(derived from a set of features or characteristics in common) is equally Epicurean, and when 
Demetrius wants to say “the ambiguity or lack of clarity that occurs,” he says so.149 Demetrius 
even discusses the parts of the Nome at some length.150 
 There are a series of terms which, owing to the poor quality of the text, are difficult to 
comprehend: ἀνυπότακτοϲ, however, is surely to be understood in reference to Epicurean 
linguistic practice, especially the demand at Ep. Hdt. §37 that we understand what is arrayed 
                                                            
148 The text is substantially the same as Romeo (1988) though I succeeded in reading several more traces which 
make the text more secure. The major differences are that Romeo prints [χρ]η[ϲτὴ]ν at the end of line 2, which 
seems too long for the space, and that I read τῶν ποηµά[τω]ν̣, | ἃ at 49.8-9 for her τῶν ποηµά[τω]|ν ̣
149 Cf. On Poems II col. 61.5-10: δι̣ὰ γ̣ὰρ τὴν ἐντροχάζουϲαν ἀδηλότητα περὶ τοὐν̣ γλ̣[ωϲ]ϲήµαϲίν εἰϲιν 
Ἀλ̣κ̣α̣ῖοϲ̣ τε καὶ Ϲαπφὼ κ̣[α]κ[ο]ύµε̣ν̣ο̣ι ̣(“for on account of the lack of clarity which obtains, regarding the 
aspect of rare words, Alcaeus and Sappho have both been abused”). For κοινότηϲ see LSJ and Usener GE s.v. 
and note that it is used three times in Epicurus Ep. Hdt. §§58-59, and only in the plural to mean “common 
features” as at, e.g., De Ira 24.28 and De Morte 24.8. 
150 See Romeo (1988b). 
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beneath (τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα) our utterances (φθόγγοι). Only in this way will we be able to 
make reliable, well-founded judgments about the world: 
On Poems II.45.2-11:151 
2    [ἀ- 
 νυπότα̣κτα ποή̣[µα- 
 τα δύϲκολον µ̣[ ̣  ̣ διαι-   
5 ρεῖν. καὶ ⸌[γ]ὰ̣ρ⸍ τὰ Π̣[ολυδεύ- 
 κουϲ καὶ τὰ Εὐφ̣ρ̣ο̣νίδου 
 διηρτηµένα µέν τι- 
 να καὶ ψευδῆ προφα- 
 νῶϲ] ϲηµαίνει, v καθό- 
10 λ]ο̣υ δ’ οὐκ ἔϲτιν ἀνυ- 
 πο̣τακτ[ὰ  ̣  ̣  ̣ ( ̣)]ο ̣[  ̣ ̣]α 
                     … it is difficult 
to understand anhypotakta 
poems. In fact, the poems of 
Polydeuces and Euphronides, 
signify some incoherent and 
false things, but generally 
they are not anhypotakta …  
 
The term ἀνυπότακτοϲ is to be connected with the mention of τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα in Epicurus' 
Letter to Herodotus §37, which stand for the prolepseis which are subordinated to our utterances. 
Here, the anhypotakta poems are perhaps those without any meaning derivable from the text. 
The context is broken, but Demetrius may be saying that, however difficult their poems are, 
Polydeuces and Euphronides wrote poems which correspond in some way with our notions of 
reality and that they signify. This is not a demand for historically or factually accurate poetry, but 
rather poetry that means something and is not nonsense.152 
 A similar term is ϲύνδεϲµοϲ, which should be understood in connection with the 
rhetorical use of “reasonable connection” rather than the grammatical use “word other than a 
                                                            
151 The passage is extremely difficult and of uncertain meaning. [διαι]ρεῖν (ll. 4-5) is uncertainly restored and of 
uncertain meaning. The sense here may be similar to that at On Piety pt. 1, col. 16, line 438-9: εἰ µὴ τὰϲ 
ἀνωτάτω{ι} διαιρούµενοϲ κοινότητ⟦ο⟧αϲ ἔµελλεν ἔνφρων {η} τιϲ ⟨τῶν⟩ ἐν ταύταιϲ προειληµµένων 
εἰδῶ͙[ν] µνηµονεύ[ϲειν … (where Obbink translates “unless any rational person distinguishing the highest 
general classes were going to mention types already included in them … ”) and at Herodotus 7.103.1 or Plutarch, 
Life of Ti. Gracchus §2. The meaning “explain,” “interpret,” “define” (i.e. “attempt to explain”) generally should 
probably be recognized for this verb, which usually means “articulate” or “punctuate” in literary contexts. N.b.  
Romeo's note ad loc. actually refers to δύϲκολον, not διαιρεῖν as written. In l. 4, Romeo had printed µ ̣[ὲν, which 
would be late in the sentence, or have to correlated with a δέ missing in the lost remainder of the column. Janko 
suggests (pers. comm.) µ ̣[ὴ. The translation follows the suggestions of Ruth Scodel (pers. comm.). 
152 It is plainly connected with Philodemus' term ἡ ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια, on which see below. 
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noun or verb” or “conjunction.”153 This makes, I think, better sense of Demetrius' definition of 
“metaphor:” 
On Poems II.40.2-7 Romeo:154 
2   ἐ̣νθέν-  
 δε] π̣αρά τιϲιν ἐπ̣ι̣το- 
 µὴ τοῦ ὁ]µ ̣ο̣ί̣ου λέ̣γ̣εται 
5 ἡ µετ]α̣φορά· v τὸ γὰρ µ[η- 
 δ’ ἐκ τ]ῶν ϲυνδέϲµων ̣  
 - - - ] ̣[ ̣]ο̣ι̣δ ̣τικων ε[ 
     For which reason metaphor is 
said by some to be an abbreviation 
of a simile. In fact, the [noun 
missing] from the connections... 
Mention of the connections, whether natural or linguistic, between two things may better fit a 
discussion of metaphor than technical linguistic details.155 
 
§7 Zeno of Sidon 
 Zeno of Sidon was the scholarch in the early first century BCE and taught Philodemus 
and Cicero (apparently at different times, otherwise Cicero probably would have mentioned it). 
His treatise Περὶ ποιηµάτων χρήϲεωϲ, “On the Use of Poems,” is not extant.156 It is possible 
that a section at the end of Philodemus' On Poems V is indebted to it; unfortunately, the section 
is identified solely as αἱ παρὰ Ζήνωνι δόξαι “The opinions in Zeno” (On Poems V.29.29). The 
opinions deal with judgment of quality rather than utility, which perhaps tells against identifying 
the Zeno with Philodemus' teacher. In light of Philodemus' loyalty to his teacher, and his 
statement at On Poems 25.30-34 that poems qua poems do not aid either in language or in 
thought (i.e. contents), it seems impossible that Zeno radically reevaluated the Epicurean 
                                                            
153 For the latter sense of the term, see Romeo ad loc. 
154 The text is somewhat different from Romeo's edition. The major difference is that she restored µ[ετα|βαίνειν at 
ll.5-6, which is too long. Janko suggests (pers. comm.) µη|δ’. 
155 These discussions fill out an Epicurean theory of language, though we do not know if Demetrius is recapitulating 
or actually innovating. 
156 Its title is mentioned in a list at PHerc.1005, col. 10.19-20 (= fr.12 Angeli-Colaizzo): περὶ ποιηµάτ̣ω̣ν̣ 
χρή|[ϲεωϲ. In the same context, works Περὶ γραµµατικῆϲ (“On Grammar”), Περὶ ἱϲτορίαϲ (“On History” or 
perhaps “On Grammatical Inquiry,” as Sbordone [1947: 144] suggested), Περὶ παροιµιῶν καὶ ὁµοίων (“On 
Proverbs and Similes”) and Περὶ λέξεωϲ (“On Language” or “On Style”) are mentioned. 
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position, either to meet the new demands of a Roman context157 or under the influence of Stoic 
thought.158 
 The title of the work suggests that it was concerned with claims that poetry could be 
educational or otherwise useful. One thinks of Stoic or Peripatetic opponents, who claimed that 
verse and music had certain psychological effects. However, it does not seem likely that it dealt 
with questions of how poetry works or is to be judged, that is to say, poetic theory on its own 
terms. 
 Several doctrines in other works have been ascribed to Zeno. See above (§2) for a 
discussion of Sextus Empiricus' Epicurean arguments against the utility of poetry. Additionally, 
Armstrong (1995: 228 n. 41) has suggested that Zeno introduced Democritus' analogy between 
atoms and letters to Epicurean theorizing about poetry. Lucretius, in turn, developed this analogy 
as a main aspect of his poetic style.159 It is quite possible that Sextus drew on Zeno, but the atom-
letter analogy seems to lie further afield.160 Further, two references to a Zeno in Demetrius 
Laco's Textual Problems in Epicurus may indicate some work in that field by Zeno of Sidon, but 
this would be the only indication of it.161  
 
 
 
                                                            
157 So, e.g., Philippson (1938) and Erler (1992). 
158 So Crönert (1906: 8). 
159 See generally Snyder (1980) and Holmes (2005). 
160 I consider it an innovation by Lucretius, who drew directly on Democritus rather than the Epicurean tradition. 
Zeno's only known work on poetry focused on its potential utility, which he probably denied.The analogy is only 
useful insofar as poetry is considered a valid medium for philosophy. I intend to take up this issue in another 
venue. 
161 The name appears at coll. 44.2 and 50.6; in the first he is called ὁ φίλτατοϲ Ζήνων, which makes it all but 
certain that the Zeno in question is the scholarch, since φίλτατοϲ was almost a technical term for referring to 
fellow Epicureans. The work is published under the title Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro by Puglia 
(1988). 
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§8 Siro 
 Siro was the teacher of Vergil,162 and he seems to be mentioned in PHerc. 312.163 The 
testimonia reveal nothing related to poetry and it is not certain that he wrote anything in the first 
place. However, he may have been in a circle with Philodemus (the latter's dedication of at least 
one work to Vergil suggests as much), so the two probably shared the same, or had similar, 
opinions. Besides Vergil, he was also the teacher of either Varus164 or Varius165. If the latter, the 
possibly Epicurean-inflected poem De Morte may be testamony to the impact of his teaching.166 
 
§9 Conclusion 
 Epicurus did not himself write an On Poems, but Metrodorus did, and Epicurus did 
discuss poetry at length in several of his works. Certain Epicurean doctrines, specifically that 
poetry is useless educationally and that it is a techne, are clearly datable to this phase of the 
school. That Metrodorus put forward a positive doctrine about poetry's technicity is important, 
because it meant that his engagement with poetics was not merely criticism of its ethics and 
utility, but he attempted explanations of how it worked. He also said that people should not 
worry about not knowing the contents of Homer. This is in line with the concern with ethics and 
utility in the early Garden, but does not rule out a more technical discussion of poetry as such, 
especially since Metrodorus' work was in multiple books. 
 In the next generation, Colotes seems to rely on his readers' familiarity with a reasonably 
fully fleshed out Epicurean theory of poetry. Since the work in which his discussion appears (his 
                                                            
162 Cf. Catalepta 5 and 8, and Servius ad Ecl. VI.13. 
163 His testimonia are collected by Gigante (1990). 
164 So the editions of Servius. 
165 So Cairns (317 n. 8). 
166 Hollis (1977). 
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anti-commentary Against Plato's Lysis) is an inappropriate venue for such a discussion, and he is 
not known to have written about poetry elsewhere, we can reasonably, if not certainly, state that 
he relied on his teachers. 
 Zeno of Sidon's work On the Use of Poetry is an obvious locus for innovation (and 
indeed, many scholars have ascribed various doctrines to it). Despite its being lost, however, it 
seems all but certain that he did not innovate on the important point of poetry's utility. His 
motivations for writing are obscure, but two are easily within reach. The first is that he was 
updating Epicurus' or Metrodorus' arguments to meet newer or more sophisticated attacks. The 
second is that he was rebutting heterodox Epicureans like the group on Rhodes, which was 
known to hold divergent opinions on several points of ethics.167 
 Demetrius Laco may have presented a new theory in the badly mangled book I of his On 
Poems. The extant part begins with an argument against an unknown critic and Andromenides 
about the judgment of poems, namely, whether the hearing is responsible for it or not. Demetrius' 
view agrees with Philodemus, but Philodemus does not cite Demetrius as a source for the On 
Poems, as he does in the On Signs and Sign-Inferences. Unfortunately, there are no points of 
overlap with what we can infer from Colotes. 
 Philodemus' own treatise contains no positive exposition of his poetics. I take this to 
mean that he was relying on his audience already being familiar with it from other authoritative 
works. It is possible that he had Demetrius Laco in mind, but Epicurus and Metrodorus are just 
as possible, if not more so. 
 It seems certain that the Epicureans never wavered in their view that poetry was useless 
educationally. The question of when they developed a full theory of how poetry worked is still 
                                                            
167 It seems that Philodemus continued his teacher's polemic against them in the topics of rhetoric and anger, at least. 
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open, but I hope to have given good reason to believe that it should be dated early in the school, 
probably to Metrodorus' On Poems. This is, of course, not the only possible solution, but it 
seems to me to be most likely. 
 Philodemus' overlap with Demetrius can be explained in several ways. He may not have 
known of Demetrius' work when he wrote, or he may have found it insufficient or unsatisfactory 
in some way. The overlap may also be less than it appears: Andromenides, at least, does not play 
a very large role in Philodemus' work. 
 This has several implications for our understanding of Philodemus and his project. First 
of all, his work was purely polemical, devoted fully to criticism of opposing views, without any 
interest in explaining or adapting doctrine. We need not therefore conclude that he was 
completely unoriginal or just a pedisequens of his teachers; other works show much greater 
flexibility and generosity towards other schools. Second, he is located firmly within the context 
of his school tradition, as he himself claims with repeated protestations of loyalty, not only to 
Zeno, but to the Founders as well. 
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Chapter Three 
The Prolepsis of the Poem 
 
§1 Kanonike and the Canon 
 As we will soon see, Philodemus considered poetry primarily as language organized in a 
particular way and for a particular reason. That a poem is language has important implications 
and, in fact, is the basis of many Epicurean positions about poetry, with consequences for their 
positions about what poems are and how to judge them. Because language relies fundamentally 
on human senses (usually, for the Greeks, hearing), it is well to consider how the senses work, 
because they are our access to the world outside our own minds. The section of Epicurean 
philosophy devoted to epistemology was called κανονική (canonic), from κανών, a measuring 
rod. Canonic undergirds the system of Epicurean physics, which in turn supports their ethics. In 
this case, we will see that fundamental concepts in Epicurean canonic reappear in Philodemus' 
discussion of poetry. It is only by a happy accident of shared etymology that the term “canon” 
came to be used for the recognized set of great authors which are the classics of a given society. 
 Epicureans held that humans experience the world more or less directly, through our 
senses. Outside matter impacts our sense organs and the sense-impressions are interpreted by our 
minds. This chain of events—αἴϲθηϲιϲ, πάθη, πρόληψιϲ (sense, feeling, preconception)— 
makes up our criteria for determining the truth of something. 168  Our primary source of 
knowledge is our senses, which transmit information about the world to us, to our souls, in a 
                                                            
168 See Diogenes Laertius X.31; n.b. that later Epicureans, including Philodemus, added the φανταϲτικαὶ ἐπιβολαὶ 
τῆϲ διανοίαϲ; cf. KD xxiv and Philodemus De Signis fr. 1.11-5. 
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reliable fashion.169 By “feelings” (πάθη), Epicureans mean pleasure and pain (fr. 260 Usener = 
D. L. X.34), and similarly, they are always true, because they are completely internal to the 
subject feeling them. We judge propositions about the real world by reference to our perceptions 
(“does this proposition match my perceptions of reality?”) and feelings (“does this sensation or 
proposition make me feel good or bad?”) in order to conduct research about reality and decide 
what to do (Ep. Hdt. §63). 
 The last of the original three criteria is the prolepsis, or preconception, a thought, idea, 
and/or memory of repeated experiences of the same thing which can be called to mind at will or 
is called to mind when provoked from without the person.170 Diogenes Laertius' definition is 
worth quoting in full (D. L. X.33):171  
 τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουϲιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν 
 νόηϲιν ἐναποκειµένην, τουτέϲτι µνήµην τοῦ πολλάκιϲ ἔξωθεν φανέντοϲ, οἷον “τὸ 
 τοιοῦτόν ἐϲτιν ἄνθρωποϲ·” ἅµα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι “ἄνθρωποϲ,” εὐθὺϲ κατὰ 
 πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύποϲ αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουµένων τῶν αἰσθήϲεων. παντὶ οὖν 
 ὀνόµατι τὸ πρώτωϲ ὑποτεταγµένον ἐναργέϲ ἐϲτι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαµεν τὸ 
 ζητούµενον, εἰ µὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειµεν αὐτό· οἷον “τὸ πόρρω ἑϲτὸϲ ἵπποϲ ἐϲτὶν ἢ 
 βοῦϲ;” δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸϲ µορφήν, οὐδ’ ἂν 
 ὠνοµάϲαµέν τι, µὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον µαθόντεϲ. ἐναργεῖϲ 
 οὖν εἰϲιν αἱ προλήψειϲ. 
 
 They mean by “prolepsis” a sort of apprehension or correct opinion or idea or general 
                                                            
169 Epicurus said that all sense impressions are true, but does not say how they are true. The most probable 
explanation is that they are true because, due to the atomic physics of eidola, all of our sense perceptions have 
some real, physical correspondence with the actual object; see, e.g., Asmis (2009: 85). This is open to objection 
because Epicurus admitted that a square tower, if seen from a distance, would appear round and explained the 
phenomenon on physical grounds: the eidolon of the tower had lost its sharp edges in transit. If the sense 
impression of the round tower is to be true, however, it must be true in the sense that the observer really is 
noticing it. That is, our sense impressions are true because they constitute mental awareness of physical realities 
which actually obtain. That is, the tower really is square, but we really do perceive it as round because the eidola 
which reach us really are so. The obvious problem of the unreliability of our senses is minimized in practice by 
demanding clear (ἐναργήϲ) sensory impressions and by withholding consent until we have those clear 
impressions. For discussion of the primary sources, see Asmis (1984: 153-4) and (1999: 284-5), as well as 
(2009). 
170 The fourth criterion, added by later Epicureans, are the φανταϲτικαὶ ἐπιβολαί, or acts of mental attention, which 
are not relevant to this discussion. See Long-Sedley i.90 with commentary on their passage 17a2. 
171 I follow Dorandi's text, except that I accept Gassendi's correction of the MSS' ἐπιτεταγµένον into 
ὑποτεταγµένον. 
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 thought which has been stored up within, that is, a memory of something which has often 
 appeared from without, e.g. the statement “such a thing is a human;” for at the same time 
 the word “human” is said, an outline of one is called to mind in accordance with the 
 prolepsis, because the senses have led the way. So, the first referent to every word is 
 clear, and we would not even try to ask about a difficulty if we did not previously 
 recognize it. For example, the question “the thing standing a ways away—is it a horse or  
 a cow?” For [sc. to ask this question,] it is necessary to have learned at one point the 
 shapes of a horse and a cow, nor could we name something if we had not previously 
 known its outline by preconception. And so preconceptions are clear. 
 
The senses lead the way because, without seeing humans several times previously (or hearing 
them described in some detail), we could not call to mind a mental image of one. We have 
prolepseis of very many aspects of human experience, both of simple things in the real world, 
like horses and cows, but also have more complicated concepts, like the goodness of a poem, 
which Philodemus explicitly mentions at On Poems V.33.34-6: [π]λὴν οὔτε παρεφάπτεται 
τ̣[ῆϲ] κ̣οινῆϲ ἐννο[ίαϲ οὔτε] προειλήφαµεν ταύτην ἀρετὴν ποιήµατοϲ (“but neither has he 
alluded to the common idea nor have we preconceived this to be the virtue of poetry”). κοινὴ 
ἔννοια (common idea) is a common synonym for “preconception” in Epicurean writings, and the 
verb προλαµβάνω is used technically to refer to the idea.172 
 When Philodemus, as an Epicurean, discusses poetry, he is discussing the prolepsis of 
poetry, and when he discusses the judgment of poems, he judges them in accordance with the 
prolepsis of good poetry. At stake in his discussion then is a point of Epicurean canonic: what 
people think are good poems must actually be good poems. Any theory or interpretive scheme 
which flies in the face of that commitment must be false. 
                                                            
172 Epicureans are free with technical terms and do not firmly hold to only one term for one concept. ἔννοια without 
κοινή means simply “idea,” but κοινὴ ἔννοια is used generally in philosophical discourse to refer to the same 
thing that prolepsis refers to (κοινὴ νόηϲιϲ is used as a synonym for prolepsis at Ep. Men. §123, as is πρώτη 
ἔννοια at Ep. Hdt. §38, as well as τὸ πρώτωϲ ὑποτεταγµένον (if we accept Gassendi's correction at D. L. 
X.33); κοινὴ φήµη may be used in this sense at PHerc. 1428.10.25, in Philodemus' discussion of Stoic 
monotheism. προλαµβάνω is used to refer to the prolepsis several times in Philodemus' corpus; see Mangoni's 
note to On Poems V.33.32-6. 
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 Near the beginning of the midollo of book V of the On Poems, Philodemus refutes 
Heraclides of Pontus, who has made several demands of poetry: that it benefit and delight the 
audience, and demonstrate excellence of some kind. He evidently also claimed that poetry which 
did not live up to these standards was to be banned or censored in some way. 
On Poems V.4.1 and 10-18: 
1          [ἄθ]λιοϲ ... 
10 κ[αὶ] διότι τὰ κά[λ- 
 λιϲτα̣ ποιήµατα τῶν [δο- 
 κιµ[ω]τάτων ποητῶ[ν   
 διὰ τὸ̣ µηδ’ ἡντινοῦν  
 ὠφελίαν παραϲκευά- 
15 ζειν· ἐνίων δὲ καὶ [τ]ὰ  
 πλ[εῖ]ϲτα, τινῶν δὲ πάν-̣  
 τα [τ]ῆϲ ἀρετῆϲ ἐκρι[πτ]ά- 
 ζει. 
           [sc. he is] wretched... 
and because he expels from 
excellence the most 
beautiful poems of the most 
famous poets, the majority 
of poems by some poets 
and all the poems of others, 
because they provide no 
benefit whatsoever.  
 
Two other objections have preceded this one,173 but the interesting claim is that the literary 
canon, once Heraclides of Pontus is done with it, will be bereft of many of its finest works, 
because they will have been expelled from the ranks of excellent poetry.174 This is the entirety of 
Philodemus' objection to Heraclides' claim about the excellence of the poem, which indicates 
that this result is per se unacceptable and would be obvious as such to Philodemus' audience. 
 Therefore, Philodemus recognized a literary canon and had a method by which it was 
constituted. But what was he talking about when he talked about poetry? 
 
§2 Philodemus' Definition of Poetry 
                                                            
173 The objections were that Heraclides demanded benefit, delight, and “excellence” (ἀρετή) from the poem, but did 
not specify in any case of what sort or how it was provided. I infer that the excellent poems, that is, those with 
ἀρετή, were those that both delighted and benefitted the audience, but the phrasing does suggest that it is a third 
quality alongside the other two, rather than a general term of commendation. 
174 No examples are named at this point, but Homer, Archilochus, and Euripides are common examples of high 
quality poets who write about bad topics (Hipponax is less commonly used in this connection); cf. e.g. On Poems 
V.17.32-35 for Homer and Archilochus's poems being good only “with indulgence” (µετὰ ϲυγγνώµηϲ).  
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 ἡ µουϲικὴ τέχνη, the art of the Muses, is the term in classical Greek for a group of arts 
taken all together, including music (instrumental and sung) and poetry (the words sung) in their 
contemporary English senses.175 Aristotle, in the Poetics, considers ποιητική, the art of poetic 
composition, separate from that of musical composition and the other aspects of dramatic 
composition and staging. He divides tragedy into six parts: µῦθοϲ (plot), ἤθη (characters), λέξιϲ 
(diction), διάνοια (thought), ὄψιϲ (spectacle), and µελοποιία (music), and appears to have been 
the first explicitly to do so (50a7-10); Aristophanes' Frogs presents criticism of Aeschylus and 
Euripides on metrical and lexical grounds, but without explicitly separating the words from the 
music (Aristophanes does not actually seem to consider their music, but the issue is not raised 
per se). Philodemus follows them in this respect and divides µουϲική into lyrics and music in our 
senses of the words, and leaves music out of his consideration of poetry, since it is a different 
thing. It follows that musicians and poets are different professions, though one person may fulfill 
both tasks, and indeed he makes this claim. For Philodemus, music is only decorative, in a way; 
it serves to please the ear, but does not make a bad argument strong, nor can it fulfill any of the 
weighty claims made on its behalf by the Stoics.176 
 The On Music comes into consideration here for its important testimony to the basic 
division between poetry and music maintained by Philodemus, and because it examines poetry in 
its role as lyrics in a song. This fundamental distinction is not explicitly made in the On Poems 
(though it could of course be lost in a damaged part of the work), but it underlies his treatment of 
poetry as a verbal phenomenon. Without the precision afforded by this separation, his whole 
                                                            
175 Cf. Koller (1963: 5-24, esp. 8-9), and [Pl.] Alc. I. 108a12 – d3. For clarity's sake, mousike refers to the earlier 
Greek sense of the word, whereas “music” will be used for instrumental music, “lyrics” for the words of a song, 
and “song” for a piece of music constituted from lyrics and/or music; “poem” is reserved for a poem in our sense 
or for the lyrics of a song considered without reference to their accompanying music. 
176 See Delattre (2007: 1-20) for Diogenes of Babylon's views (and see the next footnote). I intend to discuss Stoic 
views generally in a different work. 
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theory would be open to attack on the grounds that he is ignoring the effects of the music on the 
audience of the poem. Furthermore, the distinction is in line with Epicurean thought on language, 
sensation, and decision-making. The ear, being a sense organ, cannot make decisions; it cannot 
judge. It can transmit sensory data to the mind, which then judges them, but delight of the ear is 
not a criterion of truth for the Epicureans. The data transmitted by a song or poem are the words 
and their form; it is only on these bases that a poem can be judged. The distinction drawn by 
Philodemus in On Music IV clarifies the relationship between the music and the words and so 
lays the groundwork for the rest of his analysis of poetry.  
 Beyond the distinction between music and poetry, Philodemus also makes several 
statements about the role of the poet. Since the poet is responsible for the verbal content of a 
song, or for the entirety of a poem, he (not the musician) can influence people, but one gathers 
that Philodemus does not think this is a common occurrence, since it is not necessary that the 
poet have a positive impact, or any influence at all, on his audience. This point will be taken up 
in greater detail below. 
 Towards the end of the fourth book, Philodemus takes Diogenes of Babylon177 to task for 
confusing the effects of music and lyrics on the audience of a song. In this section, he is giving a 
definition of music, and so separates poetry from it. He is engaged in a larger polemic against 
Diogenes' argument that music is useful for worship because it brings the worshiper closer to 
god, since poetry can describe divinity in a way that prose cannot. In the previous column, 
Philodemus refutes this view on pragmatic grounds (how could music at a festival, with so many 
                                                            
177 A Stoic philosopher, who was born c. 240 and died c. 150; he was scholarch of the Stoa in Athens and 
participated in the embassy of the three philosophers (along with Carneades and Critolaus) to Rome. He may 
have been a founding figure in the Middle Stoa. For a general introduction to his life and theories of music, see 
Delattre (2007: 1-20). His fragments are collected in SVF III 1-126, among which are extracts from On Music 
IV, as well as Rhetoric III. N.b. the addenda to SVF noted in Delattre (2007: 1 n. 3); fragments drawn from the 
On Music were reedited in Delattre's edition.  
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distractions, work better than an argument in prose?); now he builds on the distinction implied in 
his division of poetry from music to define his terms more closely, after some brief observations 
en passant about music's effect and utility for its audiences. Some of these arguments will be 
examined later, as for now they are not relevant. 
On Music IV.143.39-43:178 
39  ε̣ἰ̣ δ’̣ ἕ[τ]ε̣ρ̣όν τιϲ καλεῖ 
40 µ[ουϲι]κὴν πα̣[ρ]ὰ τὸ πᾶν ποη- 
 τι[κὸ]ν̣ γ̣̣ένοϲ, ἀποδιαλα̣βὼν 
 τ]ὰ̣ µ̣έ̣[λ]η ψιλὰ καὶ τοὺϲ ῥυ- 
43 θ̣µού̣ϲ̣, π̣[ο]εῖ̣ν̣ φη⟦ϲ⟧̣µὶ̣ ε̣ὐ̣π̣[ρ]ε̣πῶϲ. 
But if someone says that music is something 
other than the whole genus of poetry, once 
he has set aside the melodies that are bare 
and rhythms, I say that he does well. 
 
Philodemus says that fundamentally music and poetry are different things and stem from 
different technai.179 By Philodemus' day, this was not a radical statement to make, but it 
demonstrates that his poetics starts from first principles, in this case, a definition of the scope of 
the field of study, just as in the case of Aristotle's Poetics. It is true that, because of the form of 
Philodemus' work, the systematic nature of his thought is hidden, but it nevertheless relies on 
carefully thought out positions. 
 Philodemus makes clear in other passages that rhythm and melody are adornments for the 
lyrics, rather than essential to them. Being adornment, they do not contribute to the meaning of 
the text. Although the argument is earlier in the work, the topic of discussion is the same: the 
proper worship of the gods. As part of his refutation, he dismantles claims that song is the most 
appropriate way to worship the gods, because it makes a greater impression on the worshiper. 
The first section repeats the claim made by Diogenes; the following sections are Philodemus' 
various objections to it. 
                                                            
178 In line 42, τὰ µέλη ψιλά are bare melodies, i.e. melodies without lyrics. See Delattre ad loc. 
179 On the technicity of poetry, see below. 
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On Music IV.124.1-36:180 
1   καὶ τὸ µόνον 
 λέγει]ν ὅτι “τὸ τοῦ Κρέξου πόη- 
 µα, καίπερ οὐκ ὂν ἀνάρ̣µο- 
 ϲτον, πολὺ ϲεµνότερον φαίνε- 
5 ται [τ]οῦ µέλουϲ προϲτ⟦ι⟧⸌ε⸍θέν- 
          ⸏ τοϲ,v καὶ τοὺϲ ὕµνουϲ τοὺϲ ἐν 
 Ἐφέϲωι καὶ̣ τ̣[ο]ὺϲ ὑπὸ τ̣ῶν ἐν 
 Λακεδαίµον[ι] χ̣ο̣ρ̣ῶν ἀιδο- 
 µένουϲ µηδ[ὲν π]οήϲειν πα- 
10 ραπλήϲιον, ἀφαιρεθέντοϲ,” 
 ἀποχρ̣ῆν ἐ[νό]µιϲεν πρὸϲ ἀ- 
 πόδειξιν τ[οῦ] µᾶλλον κ{ε}ι- 
 νεῖν, οὐθὲν π̣[ρ]ολο̣{γα}γιϲάµε- 
 νοϲ ὅτι [ῥ]αιδίωϲ πρὸϲ αὐτὸν 
15 ὁ µὲν ἐρεῖ µηδὲ ἓν πρὸϲ ϲε- 
 µνότητα καὶ λογιϲτικὴν 
 ἔ[µ]φαϲιν ποιεῖν τὸ µέλοϲ δι- 
 αφ̣ορώτερον, ἀλλὰ τέρψιν 
 ἀκοῆϲ προϲτιθέναι µόνον, 
20 ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν [π]ρ[ο]ϲυπολαµ- 
 βανοµένην τιµὴν τῶν 
 θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ο[ὐ 
 δι[ὰ] τὸ µέλο[ϲ, ἐ]µ ̣φαίνεϲθαι 
          ⸏ τὴ[ν] κα[τ]αλλ[α]γήν, ὁ̣ δ[ὲ τ]ά- 
25 χ’ [ἴϲωϲ] τοῦτο [µ]ὲν γίνεϲθαι, 
 τὴν δ]ὲ διά[νο]ιαν τοῦ ποή- 
 µ]α̣[τ]οϲ ἀιδο[µέν]ου καὶ̣ π̣ροϲ- 
          ⸐ διακ]νᾶϲθ[αι.v τ]ὸ δ’ “ὑπὸ τῶν 
 ἀρχ]αίων [τετι]µῆϲθαι τὴν 
30 µου]ϲικὴν” ἰδ[ι]ώτῃ µὲν καὶ 
 ἀπ̣αι[δεύτωι τ]εκµήριον ἡ- 
 γ̣εῖϲθα[ί γ’ εὐχ]ρηϲτίαϲ, ϲυγ- 
 γ]νωϲ[τόν, πε]παιδεύµε- 
 ν]ῳ δὲ κ[αί, µ]ᾶλλον ἔτι, φι- 
15 λοϲοφ[οῦντι π]ᾶν ὄνειδόϲ 
 ἐ]ϲτ̣ι·̣ 
He thought that merely claiming 
that “the poem of Crexus, although 
it [i.e. the lyrics] is not unharmonic, 
appears to be far more majestic 
when the melody has been added, 
and that the hymns in Ephesus and 
those sung by the choruses in 
Lacedaemon will create no similar 
effect if the melody is removed 
from them” would suffice for a 
demonstration that they are rather 
moving, since he did not foresee at 
all that one critic will easily say 
against him that the melody does 
nothing at all superior for the 
majesty and the logical force other 
than adding only the delight of the 
hearing, that another critic would 
say that the difference appears, 
because of the additional honor for 
gods and men, not because of the 
music,  and that a third would 
perhaps say that this [i.e. what 
Diogenes claims] occurs, but that 
the thought of the poem, since it is 
sung, is effaced. The claim that 
“music was honored by the ancients 
is a proof of its utility” is forgivable 
in the case of a foolish or 
uneducated person, but for an 
educated person, a philosopher even 
more so, it is completely blame-
worthy. 
 
This is an excellent example of Philodemus' style of argumentation. First he reports the 
opponent's opinion, namely that music added to lyrics adds power and majesty to the praises of 
                                                            
180 We might have also expected paragraphoi at ll. 15 and 20, but none are recorded by any of the editors 
(Neubecker also neglects the one in l. 6). Delattre in his apparatus notes that the space left in l. 6 might have 
contained a letter or two, and suggests γε. I accept Delattre's suggestion of π̣ροϲ[διακ]νᾶϲθ[αι in l.27 (and see 
his note). 
  For the use of ἀλλά in l. 18 instead of ἤ after comparatives, see LSJ s.v. A.I.3. In l. 23, perhaps “gives 
force” is a better translation than “appears” for ἐµφαίνεϲθαι; cf. the translation of ἔµφαϲιν ποιεῖν in l. 17 of this 
passage. 
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the gods, then he gives three criticisms of it, all of which are on point and represent possible 
avenues of attack, keeping in mind that, for Epicureans, only argumentation was convincing. 
Appeals to emotion or sensation held no sway, and music affects only the ear, which is irrational 
and so not a decision-making organ. After the criticisms, Philodemus forcefully and polemically 
sums up his position. 
 The next passage follows a little further on in the text, and similar claims are at stake. 
On Music IV.125.14-24: 
14   οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ ̣
15 π̣οητικόν ἐϲτιν πρόϲφο-̣ 
 ρον, καὶ τὴν µουϲικὴν τὰ 
 ϲ]υµπλ[ακ]έντα περίϲ[κ]επτον 
 ἐποίηϲ[ε]ν· κ̣αὶ διὰ τὴν τέρ- 
 ψιν ὁµο[ί]ω̣ϲ [κ]αὶ τὴν ψυχα- 
20 γωγία[ν, ἀλλ’] οὐ̣ διὰ τὰ πρὸϲ 
 τούτω[ν ἀξι]ούµεν’ ἀπεδε[ί- 
 χ]θη π̣[ροϲληφθε]ῖϲ’, οὐδ’ ἄλλωϲ 
 ἢ κ]α[τα]ϲκευὴ [τ]οῦ κεφαλαί- 
24 ου.  
Nevertheless, the poetic is suitable [i.e. 
for symposia?], and the complex makes 
the music into something admirable. 
Both for the sake of enjoyment and of 
enthrallment, but not for sake of what 
is claimed by those people [i.e. the 
Stoics], it [sc. music] was demonstrated 
to have been added in, and no 
differently from artistic elaboration of 
the main point. 
 
Only for pleasure, and not for any other reason, was music included. Thus, it can hardly be an 
essential part of the mental work of a song, which (as the passage quoted just before this one 
states) is proper to the lyrics. 
 What is meant by τὰ ϲυµπλακέντα (“what has been interwoven” and thence “the 
complex”) is not entirely clear at first glance. The plural neuter participle is used similarly in 
several other places in On Music: at IV.131.25, where Philodemus claims that variety of 
enjoyment is brought about by the complex, not the harmonies (or nuances181) of the music; 
132.18, where he claims that not music and rhythm but “the thoughts that are interwoven with 
them” cause relaxation and joy; and 148.15, where he claims that it is on account of the complex 
                                                            
181 ἁρ̣[µονιῶ]ν and χ͙ρ̣[ωµάτω]ν are the two possibilities mentioned by Delattre, whose reading of the rho rules 
out earlier suggestions. Since the alpha is clear on the disegno (Delattre admits as much in his note), I prefer the 
former. 
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that they have preferred music so much, as well as col. 140, quoted and translated just below. At 
141.35, the finite verb ϲυµπλέκω is used to refer to the music which is interwoven with words. 
If this is so, then Philodemus claims at ll.16-17 of the current passage that the lyrics make the 
song worthwhile, because they are the only part of the song not included in its music. This 
interpretation is supported by his statement at ll. 22-4, that the relationship between words and 
music is comparable to that between the topic of a speech (τὸ κεφαλαῖον, the “head” part, i.e. 
the topic) and its rhetorical elaboration (καταϲκευή), since the two combine to form the finished 
product of the speech. 
 This passage comes at the end of a critique of the Stoic unity of virtue and the Stoic 
position that music can teach the virtues.182 Philodemus, after his rebuttal, sums up his position 
as follows: 
On Music IV.140.1-14:183 
1 εἴ]ρηται περὶ πάϲηϲ ἀρε- 
 τῆϲ καὶ χυδαῖα̣ καὶ φατικὰ  
 κἆιτα µαχόµενα, καὶ πολ- 
 λῶι µᾶλλον παρ’ ἐν[ί]οιϲ. οὐ 
5 µὴν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κ̣αθὸ ποιη- 
 ταὶ ταῦτ’ εἰδεῖε̣[ν] ἂν, οὐχ ὅτι 
 καθὸ µουϲικοί, καὶ τοῖϲ δια- 
 νοήµαϲιν, οὐ τοῖϲ µέλεϲι 
 καὶ ῥυθµοῖϲ, ὠφελοῦϲι· παρέλ- 
10 κεται δὲ ταῦτ’ ἄλλωϲ, {µ} µᾶλ- 
 λον δὲ καὶ περιϲπᾶι ϲυµ- 
 πλεκόµενα [πρ]ὸϲ τὸ τ[ο]ῖϲ δι- 
 ανοήµαϲιν π[α]ρακ[ο]λου- 
...commonplaces and bare assertions and, 
even worse, contradictory statements have 
been said about each virtue, and far worse 
than that in some authors. Nevertheless, not 
even as poets could they know such things, 
to say nothing of [their knowing it] as 
mousikoi, and they aid by means of 
thoughts, not by means of melodies and 
rhythms; these later are added in 
pointlessly, or rather, because, when they 
[i.e. the music and lyrics] are intertwined, 
they distract the hearer with regards to 
                                                            
182 Neubecker (1986: 179-181) is a useful summary of this section. 
183 The end of the previous column is missing and there is no connective particle preserved; so we begin in the 
middle of a sentence. Nevertheless, the sense seems complete enough, so it is unlikely that much is missing.The 
end of the passage is difficult. The most obvious translation, “they distract the hearer towards paying attention to 
the thoughts,” is in fact diametrically opposite to what Philodemus has been arguing the whole time and 
somewhat awkwardly phrased. Delattre's summary of Philodemus' position is as follows: “pour lui, la musique 
est un art exclusivement sensuel – source de plaisirs non nécessaires (col. 151), sans être pour autant 
négligeables, au même titre que ceux de la rhétorique et ceux de la poésie – et sans liaison aucune avec la raison, 
en tout cas (col. 115)” (104). The translation I have given follows the suggestions of Ruth Scodel (pers. comm.), 
which solve the difficulties. 
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          ⸐ θεῖν. attention to the thoughts.  
 
Of importance is the explicit distinction drawn at ll. 4-9 between the poets and mousikoi, who are 
actually the same group of people acting in different roles, that is, as composers of lyrics in the 
first case and composers of music in the second. Philodemus makes several points. The first is 
that the two types of composition are different activities and so poetry and music are different 
things. The second is that the thought contained in poetry does not necessarily aid the reader or 
listener, since the poet does not necessarily know anything useful about his topic. Music has no 
positive impact on the audience, and possibly just distracts them from paying attention to the 
content of the lyrics. 
 The forked paragraphos at 140.14 marks the end of the section of the book dedicated to 
rebutting Diogenes. Philodemus then takes up a defense of the Epicurean position.184  
On Music IV. 140.14-24:185 
14  ἤκουϲα δέ τινων λε- 
15 γόντων ὡϲ ἀγ̣̣ροικ[ιζ]ό̣µ ̣ε-̣ 
 θ̣α τὰ µέλη καὶ τοὺϲ ῥυ⟦θ⟧- 
 θµοὺϲ ἄνευ ϲηµαϲίαϲ οἰό- 
 µενοι λέγειν τι̣νὰϲ φ̣̣[ι]λο-   
 ϲόφουϲ ἢ τοὺϲ ἔµ̣φροναϲ  
20 µουϲικοὺϲ ἐπ’̣ ἀρετὴν προ- 
 τρέπειν, τῶν Ἀ[ν]δρῶν τοὺϲ 
 ἐµµελεῖϲ καὶ ἐνρύθµουϲ  
 λόγουϲ ἀ[ξ]ιούντων τοῦτο 
24       ⸏ προ⸌ϲ⸍φέρεϲθα[ι. 
I heard some people saying that we 
are uneducated rustics for thinking 
that some philosophers and the 
intelligent music theorists claim that 
songs and rhythms without 
signification turn the audience 
towards virtue, while the Great Men 
claim that melodic and rhythmic 
arguments contribute this. 
 
Philodemus' opinion clearly is that ϲηµαϲία (signification, l. 17) and λόγοι (arguments, l. 23) 
are what actually influence people's decision-making, rather than the music. He adds, as if an 
afterthought, that the kathegemones, the leaders of the Epicurean school, claim that arguments, 
                                                            
184 Neubecker (1986: 181-186) and Delattre (2007: 277-279) give slightly differing interpretations. 
185 The Stoics (for these are most likely the unidentified opponents) are merely abusing the Epicureans for denying 
the Stoic view of music's effect on its audience. The Great Men (οἱ Ἄνδρεϲ) are Epicurus, Metrodorus, 
Hermarchus, and Polyaenus. For the use of the term, see Longo Auricchio (1978). 
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here described not entirely seriously as “melodic and rhythmic,” lead to truth.186 
 The same point is made later in the same treatise with reference to stories told about how 
Simonides and Pindar had rescued cities from civil disturbances through their music.187 
On Music IV.143.27-39:188 
27       ⸏  κα̣ὶ̣ τοὺϲ περὶ Ϲιµωνί- 
 δ[ην] καὶ Πίν⟦θ⟧⸌δ⸍αρον γεγονέ- 
 ν[αι µ]ὲν̣ καὶ µουϲικούϲ, γεγο- 
30 ν[ένα]ι δὲ καὶ πο⸌ι⸍ητάϲ, καὶ κα- 
 θὸ [µ]ὲ̣ν̣ µουϲικοὶ τὰ ἀϲήµαν-̣ 
 τα, κ[α]θὸ δὲ ποιηταὶ πεποιη- 
 κέν̣[α]ι τοὺϲ λόγουϲ, ὠφελεῖν 
 δ’ — ἴϲω[ϲ] µηδὲ κατὰ τοῦτ’, ἢ παν- 
35 τελῶϲ ἐ̣πὶ µικρόν — οὐδὲ µό- 
 νουϲ τοὺϲ µουϲικούϲ, οὐδὲ  
 µᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πάνταϲ ὁ- 
 µοί̣ω[ϲ] τοὺϲ πεπαιδευµέ- 
39       ⸏ νου[ϲ. 
[sc. I assert] that both Simonides and 
Pindar were both musicians and poets, 
and, inasmuch as they were musicians, 
they composed works that do not 
signify anything, but inasmuch as they 
were poets, they composed texts and 
they aided (perhaps, not even in this 
regard, or only a very tiny bit) neither 
the musicians alone, not even [sc. them] 
more [sc. than other people], but all 
educated people alike. 
 
Composers of songs are both mousikoi and poietai but they only aid their audiences qua poets, 
because only poets compose logoi, probably best rendered in this case by “texts,” that is, the 
lyrics of their songs. These texts signify (i.e. make intelligible statements), which the music does 
not do (cf. l. 31 in this passage and IV.140.17, quoted above.), and could possibly make 
philosophical arguments, but Philodemus is pessimistic about poets' ability to do so. 
 So far, the discussion has focused on the On Music, since it provides an important 
fundamental distinction between music and poetry, as well Philodemus' assertions that only the 
words can bear meaning and make an argument sufficient to change someone's mind or behavior.  
 We now turn to the On Poems itself, to book two, where Philodemus gives a hypographe, 
                                                            
186 Delattre ad loc. takes the passage differently: the Founding Fathers of Epicureanism stated that arguments in 
songs, even if clothed in melody and rhythm, lead us to truth. I understand the arguments to be “melodic and 
rhythmic” because they harmonize with Epicurean thought and lead to happiness (and because Philodemus 
would not describe prose as “melodic”). 
187 On Simonides, see Σ Pindar Ol. 2.29d. On Pindar, see Delattre (2007: 76 n. 6) with the citations there, and n.b. 
frr. 110 and 109 Maehler. 
188 In line 34, Janko (pers. comm.) conjectured µηδὲ⟨ν⟩, which would mean “not at all.” The word µουϲικοί seems to 
mean “musicicans” in the first instance and “the musically inclined” in the second. 
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a sketch-definition, of poetry.189 There is a major problem with this definition as stated, however, 
which will be handled below. 
On Poems II.32.5-15:190 
5        ⸏  τίνα γ[ὰρ τ]//ρόπον, ὦ  
 Κορύβαντεϲ, ε̣[ἰ τ]//ὸ πόηµα 
 πάντεϲ οὐχ ὡ[ϲ] // τερέτιϲµα 
 καὶ κροῦµα νο//ο̣ῦµεν̣΄, ἀλ-  
 λὰ λέξ`ε´ιϲ ἐκ τοῦ [π]//ωϲ ϲυντί- 
10 θεϲθαι διανόη//µα ϲηµαι-   
 νούϲαϲ, οἷον ὁ [λό]//γοϲ οὐ πέ-  
 φυκεν, ἂν “ὅλω⌊̣ϲ ἀ⌋//γ̣νοῆται  
13 τὸ νοούµεν⌊̣ον⌋”; 
How is it so, O Corybants, that, if 
we all think that what is a poem is 
not rattle and hum, but language 
which, as a result of some kind of 
composition, signifies a thought, of 
the sort which speech does not do 
naturally, if the contents happen to 
be completely unknowable? 
 
The “Corybants” are euphonist critics who held that the meaning signified by the words of a 
poem is irrelevant to the judgment of the poem as good or bad; in their opinion, only the sound 
of the poem mattered. Philodemus' mockery is pointed: the corybants worshiped ecstatically with 
loud drums and cymbals. Philodemus rebuts them on the grounds that no one actually thinks that 
the words of a poem do not mean anything. Arguments from consensus are not part of Epicurean 
epistemology, but the argument is clearly from some sort of commonly held view, in this case, 
the prolepsis of a poem, which, Philodemus implicitly asserts, contains “makes sense” among the 
attributes of “poem.”191 All of this follows neatly from what Philodemus said in the On Music 
about the effect that music can have on its audience. There, the intellectual impact stemmed only 
from the lyrics, and here he maintains that poems must make sense. 
 The terms used in this quasi-definition deserve further investigation. Lexis is used in con-
                                                            
189 Despite the Epicurean refusal to use definitions, Philodemus feels no compunction about discussing the aspects 
of the prolepsis of poetry, which is what he does here. 
190 For “speech” (ὁ λόγοϲ l. 11), “prose” (so Janko, pers. comm.) is also possible. I take Philodemus' point to be 
communication more generally: poetry presents thoughts dressed up in language that no one would use or 
communicate under normal circumstances, not just that no one would communicate in prose. For the translation 
of πέφυκεν, see LSJ s.v. II.2  and supply ϲηµαίνειν from the previous clause (the perfect indicates that the 
speech is in a state of having been formed). More literally: “of what sort speech/prose is not formed by nature 
[sc. to signify].” 
191 The majority of people can be wrong, as Epicurus thought they were in the case of theology. See Obbink (1992). 
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temporary authors to mean “word” or “phrase,”192 but as early as Aristotle means “language” in 
the sense “words and sentences used in a text.” Aristotle joins it with diathesthai in a discussion 
of style and speech-writing (On Rhetoric III, 1403b20). The first thing is finding the persuasive 
parts of the matter at hand, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέϲθαι “Second is their 
organization in language,” third is delivery and the emotions which the orator can produce by 
skilled delivery. That is, after deciding on the arguments, the orator has to compose his speech, 
to arrange the matter in language. A little later, Epicurus himself, in book 28 of On Nature, uses 
lexeis, in the plural, to denote language and usual linguistic usage.  
Epicurus, On Nature  xxviii, PHerc. 1479/1417 fr. 13 col. V sup ll.2-13:193 
2  κ]αὶ µαλ’ ὀρ̣θ̣ῶϲ [γε, ὦ 
 Μητρόδωρε· πάνυ γὰρ οἶµαί 
 ϲε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειµ προε[ν]έγ- 
5 καϲθαι ἃ ἐθεώ̣ρ̣ειϲ γελοίωϲ [π]ώ[ϲ 
 τ̣ι[να]ϲ̣ ἐγδεξαµένουϲ̣ καὶ π̣[άν- 
 τ[α] µᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούµενον 
 κατὰ τὰϲ λέξειϲ, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν 
10 ἰθιϲµένων λέξεων ἡµῶν 
 χρω̣µένων οὐδὲ µετατιθέν- 
 των ὀνόµατα ἐπὶ τῶµ φανε- 
13 ρ]ῶν. 
Quite so, Metrodorus. For I do not doubt 
that you could cite many cases, from your 
own past observations, of certain people 
taking words in various ridiculous senses, 
and indeed in every sense in preference to 
their actual linguistic meanings, whereas 
our own usage does not flout linguistic 
convention, nor do we alter names with 
regard to the objects of perception. 
  
Epicurus, in dialogue with his student and friend Metrodorus, mocks philosophers who use 
words in strained and unaccustomed senses. He further claims that his own usage does not 
violate linguistic norms. Here, lexeis appears twice, both times with the meaning “language” or 
“usage” (once specified as “customary usage”). 
 ϲηµαίνω is used in a general linguistic sense as “to signify, to mean;” in this sense it is 
                                                            
192 Cf. LSJ s.v. II and n.b. the citations of Epicurus and Polybius there. 
193 Note that Sedley's edition follows the spellings on the papyrus, so for normal orthography, read in line 4 ἔχειν, in 
l. 6. ἐκδ-, in l.10 εἰθιϲµένων, and in l. 12 τῶν. 
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not found in Epicurus or Diogenes of Oenoanda, but it is in Philodemus' On Rhetoric.194 It 
reflects the relationship between physical thing and word from the perspective of language, 
whereas, in the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus uses different terminology to show the relationship 
from the perspective of physics (§37):195  
 πρῶτον µὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα τοῖϲ φθόγγοιϲ, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι ὅπωϲ 
 ἂν τὰ δοξαζόµενα ἢ ζητούµενα ἢ ἀπορούµενα ἔχωµεν εἰϲ ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντεϲ 
 ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ µὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡµῖν ⟨ἦι⟩ εἰϲ ἄπειρον ἀποδεικύουϲιν ἢ κενοὺϲ 
 φθόγγουϲ ἔχωµεν· 
 
 First of all, Herodotus, it is necessary to grasp what is subordinate to our utterances, so 
 that we might have a reference point for judging what we think or seek or do not know, 
 and so that everything not be unjudged by us as we draw inferences in an infinite regress 
 or so that we not have vain utterances. 
 
Here, the real world objects are subordinate to the utterances and the whole system is seen from 
the perspective of physics and canonic, as the mention of ἀπόδειξιϲ, demonstration, indicates.196 
From the linguistic perspective, however, the φθόγγοι, utterances, refer back to real things, and 
the verb used for this is ϲηµαίνω. Further evidence for this interpretation is provided by 
Demetrius Laco in a work whose title is not known, but which is on textual problems in 
Epicurus' text.197 In column 40 of that work, he quotes lines from an epigram of Callimachus and 
one of Empedocles' poems to demonstrate the ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction. 
                                                            
194 E.g. On Rhet. II.38.31-39.9. The verb used in Epicurean discussions of sign-inference is ϲηµειόοµαι and it seems 
that the terms were not interchangeable. ϲηµαίνω does appear three times in the de Signis, but in twice in its 
linguistic sense and once in a context too broken for certainty. Diogenes of Oinoanda does have ϲηµεῖον, which 
is limited to its meaning in sign-inferences (“sign” or “evidence”). 
195 ⟨ἦι⟩ is Roeper's conjecture; most MSS have nothing, one reads ἢ and another ἦ. Von der Muehll prints it in 
brackets because most MSS have no reading, so he thinks that it counts as an insertion rather than an 
emendation. Usener conjectured ἴηι. Both conjectures are open to the objection that they cause hiatus before εἰϲ, 
which Epicurus normally avoids in this letter. 
196 For an excellent discussion of this passage from the perspective of Epicurean physics and epistemology, see 
Asmis (1984: 20-24). See also Barnes (1996) and Hammerstaedt (1996). 
197 PHerc. 1012 was published in 1988 by Puglia who called it Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro. The 
papyrus lacks a subscription, but Demetrius' authorship is certain due to spelling peculiarities found only in texts 
by him, especially η for ει before another vowel; the title lacks authority but accurately describes the content. 
That volume contains testimonia and a discussion of Demetrius' biography by Gigante. For details of the 
ascription and discussion of the contents, see the introduction to Puglia's edition. 
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Demetrius Laco, Aporie testuali, PHerc. 1012.40.1-14:198 
a [“ἄλλων µὲν κήρυκεϲ ἐπὶ]  
b [βραχὺν οὔνοµα καιρὸν φθέν-] 
c [ξονται, κείνου δ’ Ἑλλὰϲ ἀεὶ] 
1 ⸏ϲοφίην.” δῆλ⟦ογ⟧ον γὰρ ὡϲ οἱ  
 µὲν κήρυκεϲ φθένξονται, 
 ἡ δ’ Ἑλλὰϲ φθένξεται, µία 
 δ’ ἡ δύναµιϲ τοῦ ϲηµαινοµέ- 
5 νου. [εἶ]τα τόδε κα[ὶ] παρ’ Ἐµ- 
 πεδ[οκ]λεῖ γέγονεν ὅτε λέ- 
 [γ]ε[ι τὸ·] “τὸν δ’ οὔτ’ ἄρ τε Διὸϲ 
 τέγεοι δόµοι αἰγ[ιόχοιο οὔ- 
 τε ̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ]ο Ἅ⸌ι⸍δου δέ[χεται ̣ ̣ 
10 ⸏κ[ ̣ ̣ ]η̣ϲ τέγοϲ [ ̣ ̣ ]δ[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ .” µία 
 δ’ ἡ τ]ο̣ῦ̣ ϲη̣µ̣[αινοµένου δύ- 
 [ναµιϲ. δῆλον γὰρ ὡϲ οἱ µὲν] 
 δόµοι] δέχο̣ντα̣[ι, τὸ δὲ τέ- 
14 γοϲ δέχεται. 
“Of other poets, heralds shall declare 
the names for a short time, but 
Hellas always shall declare his 
skill.” For it is clear that, on one 
hand, the heralds will give voice 
and, on the other, Hellas will, but the 
force of the signified is one. Then 
this happened also in Empedocles 
when he says “Him may neither the 
palace of Zeus cover over...northe 
roof of Hades receive …” The force 
of the signified is one, for it is clear 
that, on one hand, the palace 
receives, and on the other, the roof 
receives.  
 
The first quotation is from an epigram by Callimachus, the second from one of the two poems of 
Empedocles.199 In both cases, the verb is taken apo koinou with different nouns that appear in 
their own clauses: in the first case, the heralds and Hellas both proclaim; in the second, the 
palaces of Zeus and Hades both do not receive someone or something. But the meaning of the 
phrase µία ἡ δύναµιϲ τοῦ ϲηµαινοµένου, “the force of what is signified is one,” has seemed 
more obscure. I explain it as referring to the nouns used in each clause, both of which, in each 
case, refer to the same thing. This is clearer in the second case, since the roof is necessarily part 
of the palace. Hellas itself, in the first case, cannot actually proclaim, so heralds (or everyone, or 
everyone relevant) must be doing the action of the verb in both clauses. Readers could say that 
the overstatement of all Hellas making the proclamation is “poetic,” but Demetrius' point is that, 
if anyone is going to declare the poet's skill, it must be heralds, and so heralds are actually doing 
                                                            
198 I read δ’ ἡ in lines 4 and 11 in place of δὴ (Puglia) and the reading of line 11 generally is due to my autopsy of 
the papyrus. 
199 Only the last word of the quotation from Callimachus (7 Pfeiffer = lxii GP = AP IX.565) is legible on the 
papyrus; however, Diels restored it securely on the basis of the ensuing discussion. The fragment of Empedocles 
is B142 D-K. 
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the proclaiming in both clauses. So, in both clauses in both quotations, the subjects are the same, 
though different words are used, and the verb is the same, even though it is not repeated in both 
clauses. The same state of affairs obtains in both cases in each poem, so the force, i.e. 
“meaning,” of what is signified is the same, that is, there is only one state of affairs being 
signified. In both cases, then, the φθόγγοι, though poetic, match up to the intended content.200 
 διανόηµα is the final problem in the passage from book II. The word is uncommon in 
Epicurean philosophy; its earliest occurrence is in an Epicurean context seems to be PHerc. 176 
fr. 25.201 It does not appear in Epicurus or any of the kathegemones, as far as we can tell, nor did 
Usener include it in the Glossarium Epicureum. The obvious meaning, derived from the use of 
dianoia to refer to the part of the soul which aids in perception but which also perceives atomic 
structures too fine for the sense organs to perceive, is “the object of perception by the dianoia,” 
that is to say, a thought. 
 This is supported indirectly by arguments that Philodemus makes in On Music IV 
regarding the benefit and harm provided by songs, in response to Diogenes' assertions that 
youths were harmed by the lascivious songs of Ibycus and Anacreon. 
On Music IV.128.8-13: 
8        ⸏  οὐδὲ τοὺϲ νέουϲ 
 τοῖϲ µέλεϲι διαφθείρονταϲ 
10 παρέδειξεν τὸν Ἴβυκον 
 καὶ τὸν Ἀνακρέοντα καὶ 
 τοὺϲ ὁµοίουϲ, ἀλλὰ τοῖϲ δια- 
8        ⸏ νοήµαϲι. 
Nor did he demonstrate that 
Ibycus and Anacreon and similar 
poets were corrupting the youth 
by their songs, but by their 
thoughts. 
 
Very similar is another passage: 
On Music IV.132.2-19: 
                                                            
200 Note also the use of ϲηµαϲία at On Music IV.140.17 above. 
201 Printed by Vogliano among the “fragmenta ad pap. 176 pertinentia.” See his notes on pp. xvi and 55. The text is 
not by Philodemus or Demetrius Laco, since it exhibits hiatus (it also does not show Demetrius' distinctive 
orthography). Dorandi (1983) hesitantly suggests that it might be by Philonides. 
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2         ⸏   τὸ δὲ µό- 
 νον τέλοϲ αὐτῶν εἶναι φι- 
 λοφροϲύνην οὐ τιθέντεϲ, 
5 ἀλλὰ καί τιν’ ἕτερα, πρὸϲ τὴν  
 ἡδονήν, οὐ πρὸϲ ἐκείνην, χρη- 
 ϲιµεύειν ὁµολογήϲοµεν, ὥϲ- 
 τ’ οὐδὲ πρὸϲ φ̣̣ιλίαν, καὶ τούτων 
 ἐναργὲϲ ἑκάτερον εἶναι, τό γε 
10 ἐπιτερπῶϲ ἡ̣µᾶϲ ἀκρ̣οωµέ- 
 νουϲ τῆϲ µουϲικῆϲ διατίθε- 
 ϲθαι καὶ τὸ µηδέποτε µηδὲν 
 αὑτοῖϲ ϲυνιϲτορηκέναι πρὸϲ 
 φιλοφροϲύνην καὶ φιλίαν ἐ- 
15 πιϲτατικὸν ἐκ µελῶν καὶ ῥυ- 
           ⸏  θµῶν ἐϲχηκόϲιν. οὐδ’ ἀν- 
 ⟦ε⟧ίηϲι δὲ ταῦτ̣α καὶ ἀφιλαροῖ, 
 τὰ δὲ ϲυµπεπλεγ̣µένα αὐ- 
19      ⸏  τοῖϲ διανοήµατα. 
Since we do not set friendliness as the 
only goal of them (sc. of symposia), but 
also some other goals as well, we will 
admit that it is useful for pleasure, not for 
that (sc. friendliness), and so not for 
friendship, and either of these two is clear 
proof, the fact that once we have heard 
music we are disposed agreeably, and the 
fact that never have we been aware of our 
taking anything from melodies and 
rhythms which provides an impulse 
towards friendliness and friendship. Nor 
do these things (sc. melody and rhythm) 
relax us and cheer us, but rather the 
thoughts that are intertwined with them. 
 
Philodemus points out that the experience of listening to music disposes the audience well, that 
is, they are simply happier and on that account friendlier people afterward, not that music 
provides a particular impulse towards friendship.  If anything, it is the thoughts that move us in a 
particular way. 
 These two passages indicate that Philodemus is skeptical that even the thoughts of the 
lyrics of a song do in practice move the audience in a particular direction, though he admits the 
possibility. Note also On Music IV.143.27-39, quoted above in this section, where Philodemus 
doubts that poems provided any benefit.  For the Epicureans, only argument could be 
convincing, since it was λογικόϲ, and pleasure could not be convincing, since it was ἄλογοϲ; 
only the διανόηµα, thought, which can be an argument, could convince an audience of anything. 
 Though Epicureans eschewed definitions,202 Philodemus is not above partially describing 
the prolepsis of a concept to clarify it for his readers. In this case, he has given such a partial 
                                                            
202 See the quotation of Epicurus in an anonymous commentary on Plato's Theaetetus in Sedley's edition in the 
Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, vol. 3, col. 22.39-47 (= Usener fr. 258). The editio princeps was in 
BKT II. 
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description, stating that a poem is language which communicates some idea or thought. He 
indicates that poetic form is required with the phrase ἐκ τοῦ πωϲ ϲυντίθεϲθαι “as a result of 
being somehow composed” (On Poems II.32.9-10). Philodemus' views about poetic form will be 
discussed later, in chapter five, except for one particular, since it is more useful for 
distinguishing poetry from prose but otherwise does not play a large role in Philodemus' poetics: 
meter. 
 
§3 The Problem of Meter 
 Philodemus does not explicitly state in any extant passage that poems are defined in part 
by their meter. Nevertheless, such an opinion is deducible from statements that he does make 
about the relationship between prose and poetry, and between prose authors and poets. One such 
passage occurs near the end of book V of the On Poems, when Philodemus discusses briefly 
some theorists found “in Philomelus.”203 The first of these unnamed opponents claims that 
consistency in style is the most important part of composing a poem. Philodemus objects that this 
requirement is not specific to poetry and is equally true of a prose author. 
On Poems V.12.10-27:204 
10 τῶν το[ί]νυν παρὰ τῶι Φι- 
 λοµή[λω]ι [γ]εγραµµέ- 
 νων, οἱ µὲν οἰόµενοι  
 τὸν ἐν τοῖϲ µύθοιϲ καὶ 
 ταῖϲ ἄλλαιϲ ἠθοποιίαιϲ 
15 κἀν τῆι λέξει µαραπλη- 
Of those who are recorded in 
Philomelus' handbook, some, 
who think that the poet who 
keeps a consistent level in his 
choice of topics and depiction 
of characters and in style is 
                                                            
203 Probably in a handbook written by Philomelus. For discussion, see Mangoni (1993: 47-52). 
204 At l. 22, I read [κἄλλ]ου intead of [ἤ π]ου because the disjunctive particle seems out of place after the preceding 
conjunctions. [ἤ τ]ου is also possible. Mangoni notes that Jensen's [ἢ ἄλλ]ου is spatio longius, to which 
objection my supplement may also be open. Janko hesitantly suggests [ἢ ὅλ]ου, but ὅλοϲ in the sense of πᾶϲ is 
extremely rare: Sophocles, Ajax 1105, Menander, Perik. 295 (Sandbach; LSJ uses an out of date numeration) and 
LXX I Ki. 14.23 are the only literary examples before it becomes somewhat more common in later poetry. 
However, use in Menander and the Septuagint may indicate that it was more common in colloquial use than in 
literary. The theorists in Philomelus are unknown and, because so little is known of their theory, unknowable. 
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 ϲίω[ϲ] ὁ̣µ̣α̣λ̣[ί]ζ[ο]ντα ποη- 
 τὴν ἄριϲτον εἶναι λέ- 
 γουϲι µὲν ἀληθέϲ  
 τι, τὸν δὲ ποητὴν τὸν ἀ- 
20 γαθὸν οὐ διορίζουϲι. καὶ 
 γὰρ µιµογράφου καὶ ἀρε- 
 τ[ά]λογου [κἄλλ]ου ϲυνγρα- 
 φέωϲ ἀρετὴν ἄν τιϲ ἐκ- 
 θ̣ε̣ῖτο ταύτην. καὶ τὸ 
25 παραπληϲίωϲ ἀναγκαῖ- 
 α τήν τε λέξιν εἶναι καὶ 
27 τὰ πράγµατα λόγον ἔχει. 
the best, say something true, 
but they do not define the 
good poet. In fact, someone 
could set that as the goal of a 
mimographos or a aretalogos 
or any prose author. Also, it is 
reasonable to say that both 
style and subject matter are 
equally necessary. 
 
Mimes were in prose (at least originally), 205  and aretalogoi, composers of marvelous or 
miraculous tales, were also evidently prose authors.206 Philodemus is belittling his opponent by 
mentioning low genres, instead of e.g. historians or rhetoricians. Syngrapheus is the general 
word for prose author. Although Philodemus changes topic immediately after this statement, it is 
clear that he was objecting to the fact that his opponents at this point did not make clear how 
poets differ from prose authors. The demand that poets write in a style consistent with their 
subject matter is reasonable, but it does not define the task of the poet. The use of the term 
syngrapheus is suggestive, precisely because it is the usual word for “prose author” and contrasts 
so obviously with poetes, whose defining feature was commonly thought to be, as Aristotle 
reports (although he disagrees), composition in verse.207 Though not necessarily true, the beliefs 
of the majority have an obvious practical connection with the prolepsis, especially the prolepsis 
                                                            
205 See Hordern (2004: 4-10) and Wiemken (1972: 31-3). Epicharmus, active late 6th through the 5th century, was a 
comedian who wrote in verse (see Aristotle Poet. 49b5, cf. Plato Theaetetus 152e), but Sophron, second half of 
the 5th, wrote in prose, and it is likely that his son Xenarchus did as well. Verse mime might be an invention of 
Hero(n)das and/or Theocritus in the third century BCE, from which the Roman tradition of mimes in verse 
descended (cf. Decimus Laberius). For bibliography and a list of papyrus texts assigned to the genre, see POxy. 
LXXIX 5187-5189 “Mimes” (pp. 13-14). 
206 See Reinach (1885). They are rarely mentioned in extant texts, but no hint is made of their composing in verse. 
Strabo implies by use of the verb ϲυγγράφω that they were written in prose (17.1.17, where the text has been 
needlessly questioned). 
207 For ποητήϲ and ϲυγγραφεύϲ used together to mean “all writers,” see, e.g. [Longinus] 1.3. At On Rhet. IV 
(PHerc. 1423.vi.3 = p. 150 Sudhaus), Philodemus uses the phrase ῥήτωρ δ[ὲ] καὶ πᾶϲ ϲυγγρα[φεὺϲ in a 
context which implies that only prose authors are at issue (Isocrates, Demosthenes, and their imitators are 
discussed shortly afterwards). 
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of something that exists by human convention: what we experience as poetry are the texts that 
other people present to us as poetry. Unlike the gods, who have an existence independent of 
humanity, poems are human products and defined by human usage. So common usage and what 
the majority of people believe matters a great deal to the constitution of the prolepsis. 
 On Poems I contains a discussion and rebuttal of the theorist Heracleodorus, who appears 
to be unique in considering mimes and some other prose to be poetic, despite not being in verse, 
on the basis of aspects of their style. Aristotle suggested that the traditional distinctions drawn 
regarding poetry and prose on the basis of meter were inadequate, but is not known to have fully 
developed a new definition.208 Theophrastus may have gone further than Aristotle in redefining 
poetry and prose, as well as in discussions of style, and he may have claimed that some works 
written in prose were poems.209 Heracleodorus then is the first known certainly to actually 
suggest that a work in prose was in fact a poema or poemata, but Theophrastus, or some other 
theorist now completely lost, may have preceded him. 
                                                            
208 At Poetics 47b10, he does not know what to call the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, both of whom wrote in 
prose, but he calls Epicharmus, who wrote in verse, a poet at 48a33. On mimic elements in Epicharmus see 
Hordern (2004: 10) and Wilamowitz (1959: 54-55), who connects Epicharmus with mime (“Auf italischen 
Untergrund ist der Mimus und seine künstlerische Blüte, die Epicharmische Posse, erwachsen”). There is no 
evidence for metrical mimes before Hero(n)das and Theocritus in the third century, but some later mimes were 
clearly metrical; see the mimes in POxy. II 219 (= 75 Page, Select Literary Papyri = pp. 182-4 CA) and 
PLond.Lit. 52 (= 79 Page); POxy. III 1903 (= 76 Page) is prosimetric. The lovers’ dialogue on p. 184 CA is 
partly metrical, and seems to be intended to be metrical throughout. Decimus Laberius, in the time of Cicero, 
wrote in meter, and probably could not have done so and called his works “mimes” without this being a 
conventional option. In Philodemus' day, it seems that mimes could be either metrical or prose (or both). N.b. in 
this connection Janko (1987: xv). 
209 Theophrastus' ipsissima verba on the definition of poetry are not preserved. Cicero at Orator §67 says that 
“nonnulli” thought that Plato and Democritus wrote poemata, though not in verse, and the comic poets are barely 
deserving of the title “poet,” since their language hardly departs from the quotidian; Cicero himself disagrees. 
Mayer claims this for Theophrastus (cf. p. x on his use of Cicero as a source for Theophrastus) and notes a close 
connection with Orator §184 “qui locus locupletem Theophrasti exhibet doctrinam” (p. 39). Ardizzoni (72-3) 
argues that for Theophrastus any work made up of καλὰ ὀνόµατα will have poetic language and so be a πόηµα, 
although it is not verse, which corresponds with Cicero's report in Orator §67. It is not clear what his 
requirements for mimesis were. This might have the result of banishing some genres from the canon: comedy 
and mime, which use low words and are mimetic, were worthy of consideration by Aristotle (whether as poetry 
or literature more generally), but will not be poetry for Theophrastus under this reading. Note the methodological 
caution about doctrines ascribed to Theophrastus advised by Innes (1985). 
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 Heracleodorus' idea that all artistic prose is poetry and Philodemus' refutation of it are 
reasonably clearly expressed in the following passage: 
On Poems I.197R.2–198R.9:210 
2 καὶ αὐτὸϲ “εἶν[αι ἐ- 
 κεῖνα 'ποήµατα'” ἔφη, “καὶ 
 µὴ µόνα· καὶ γὰρ [τὰ τοῦ 
5 Ϲώφρονοϲ καὶ τὰ [τῶν 
 ἄλλων µιµογρ[άφων 
 ἐν͙ί͙οτε 'ποήµα[τ’' εἶναι λέ- 
 γεται, καὶ µὴ 'µ[ῖµοι,' καὶ 
 οἱ ϲυντιθέν[τεϲ αὐτὰ 
10 'µίµων ποη[ταί' ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣  ̣ 
 
14 ἀφ’ οὗ 'π[οητὰϲ' τοὺϲ 
15 ἀκρι̣β̣ῶνταϲ κ[ατανοµά- 
 ζουσιν, ὑπελάµ[βανε λέ- 
 γειν, ἢ παρακοῦ[ϲαι δοκοῦ- 
 µεν ἡµεῖϲ ἢ παρα[πλῆξ 
 ἐκεῖνοϲ ἐµαίν[ετο, “'πο- 
20 ήµατα'” φάϲκων “τὰ [Δη- 
 µοϲθένουϲ καὶ [τὰ Ξενο- 
 φῶντοϲ, µᾶλλον [δὲ καὶ 
 τὰ Ἡροδότου, καί[τοι κατὰ 
 τὴν ϲυνθήκην [ἑκάϲτου ϲυγ- 
25 γράφο[ν]τ͙οϲ,” εἰ µὴ [τὴν ἱϲ- 
1 τορία]ν̣ πολλ[ο]ὶ πολλάκιϲ ἐν 
 ἁδρῷ] πλάϲµατι προθε- 
 τέαν] λέγουϲιν. κἄν, 
 προθ]έµενοϲ ἐν [ἰϲ]χ̣νῷ 
5 πλάϲµ]ατι µεγ[άλ]α καὶ 
 ϲεµ]νά τιϲ πράγµατ’ εἰ- 
 πεῖν], µακρὰν ἀφεϲτή- 
 κοι τ]ο̣ῦ πόηµα κατ[αϲκ]ευ- 
9 άζειν ἀ]πὸ τ[ούτω]ν. 
     He himself said that “those 
works are poems, and not only 
those. For Sophron's works and 
those of the other mimographers 
are sometimes said to be verses 
and not 'mimes,' and those who 
compose them are said to be 
'poets of mime' … from which 
they call 'poets' those who are 
precisely correct, he understood 
that they meant them, we 
suppose either that he mis-
understood or that critic was a 
raving lunatic to claim that “the 
words of Demosthenes and 
Xenophon are 'verses,' and even 
more so those of Herodotus, 
although according to con-
vention each is a prose-writer,” 
except many often say that 
history is to be undertaken in a 
grand style. Even if someone 
should set out to say great and 
serious things in a light style, he 
would be far from composing 
poetry from these starting points 
(or “materials”).  
 
Philodemus' objection is based on the prolepsis of poetry; this is, in effect, what he means by 
ϲυνθήκη or “convention.”211 Stylistic and well-composed prose is indeed artistic, but it is not 
poetry according to the normal usage of that term. The normal definition of poetry includes 
                                                            
210 Note that the text is quoted from the columns printed at the back of revised edition of 2003. 
211 ϲυνθῆκαι, conventions, will be discussed in chapter six, §3 under the guise of θέµατα, rules. There, they are 
“conventions” (in the normal sense) for the composition of poetry which, because they guide the actual practice 
of poets, eventually come to constitute the relevant prolepses. 
   90 
meter; Aristotle denied that some verse writers, e.g. Empedocles (Poetics 47b17), really deserved 
to be called poets, but did not in any case claim that a prose-writer was actually a poet. 
 Philodemus' precise objection is revealing. He makes no claim about style or subject 
matter, but simply dismissing the claim with another appeal to common usage: prose authors are 
simply not poets. It is again likely that the distinguishing criterion is meter. 
 Similarly On Poems I.201.21-26: 
 
21  οὐ µὴν ἀλλ[ὰ δι- 
 ὰ τὸ {υ} θέ⟦ν⟧⸌µα⸍ ἕ̣καϲ̣τ’ [ἀ]ν[έφη- 
 ⸌ν⸍εν Ἡρακλεόδωροϲ 
 ἡµ{ε}ῖν, εἴτε τοῦ νοου- 
25 µένου ποήµατ[οϲ] ὑπο- 
 δεί[γ]µατα κατεχώρι‖[ϲεν 
     Nevertheless, Heracleodorus 
presented each of the cases to us to 
prove the rule, whether he set down 
examples of what he conceived of 
as “verse”…  
 
Philodemus' implication is that what was verse for Heracleodorus was not so considered by 
many other people. The further inference that Heracleodorus was trying to redefine “verse” and 
“poetry” is reasonable. 
 Another passage, in book four, supports the claim that Philodemus required meter for a 
literary work to be a poem. 
On Poems IV.109.4-15:212 
4    κ]α̣ί 
5 φηµι] π̣ά̣ντων ἐκε̣ῖνο[ν δεῖϲ- 
 θ̣α[ι, //ὁ]π̣ό//ϲῳ διοί[ϲ]ει τῆϲ ϲυν- 
 θέ̣[ϲ]εωϲ̣ ἰδιώτ[ου τ]ῆϲ ἐν 
 αὐτῇ, τ]ὴ̣ν πο[ί]ηϲ[ιν γινοµέ-  
 νην αὐτίκ̣[α εὑρ]ὼν γ̣̣[ινοµέ- 
10 νηϲ̣ ἀ̣ρετ̣//ῆ̣ϲ̣, οὐ//δ’ ἐν [τῶι 
 αὐ]τ[ῶι //γ]ένει τ//ῆϲ ἐν [ποι- 
 ήµαϲιν // τ]έχνη//[ϲ]· ο̣ὔ̣[κουν 
 τὰϲ αὐτὰϲ]//ποήϲ̣//[ει, ἀλλὰ 
 ἑτέραϲ καὶ ἕτερα [γένη 
15 τ̣ῆϲ ἐµµέτρου. 
     And I claim that he [sc, the good 
poet] has need of everything, to the 
extent that he will surpass the 
composition of a layman in it, since he 
found that poetry at once comes into 
being when its excellence comes into 
being, and not in the same genre of the 
art in verses; so he will not compose 
the same poems but different ones, and 
different genres of the metrical art. 
 
                                                            
212 I have modified Janko's translation. The referent of αὐτῇ in line 8 is not clear, and ταὐτῇ and ταὐτῷ may be 
possible, if not too wide for the space. 
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The text is very rough generally, and specifically the crucial word must be supplied in the last 
line, but the parallel phrasing in ll. 11-12 and the common ellipse of the word τέχνη makes this 
easy. Philodemus almost certainly would not have referred to the art of poetry as the art of verse 
or meter twice in the same column if he did not think that poetry needed meter. 
 Although the following passages provide the clearest evidence that Philodemus thought 
that poems were metrical, I have reserved them until last because of the difficulties they present: 
in the first case, the problematic state of the text, and in the second, the fact that Philodemus may 
be stipulating a position, possibly for dialectical reasons rather than because he agrees with it. In 
the first passage, Philodemus explicitly says that even bad poets preserve meter and rhythm, 
strongly suggesting that meter was involved in the prolepsis of poetry, since even bad poets used 
it. 
On Poems II.209.1-10: 
1    φ[α- 
 ν[ερ]ῶϲ̣ δ’̣ ἐδ[είχθ]//η τ[ὰ ἐλ- 
 λ̣[εί]π̣[ο]ντα, κ̣[ἀξ ὀ]//νοµ[άτων 
 κακῶν ἐτέθ̣[η κα]ὶ̣ ὑ̣[πὸ 
5 τῶν κακῶν ποητῶν. 
 πῶϲ οὐχὶ καὶ “τελε̣ίωϲ 
 ἀπαραλλάκτουϲ” ε[ἴρηκ]εν, 
 ἐπειδὴ κα̣ὶ τὰ µέτ[ρα καὶ 
 τοὺϲ ⟦µετ⟧ ῥ⟦ο⟧υθµοὺ[ϲ εἰ- 
10 ώθαϲι τηρεῖν; 
     “But deficient verses were 
obviously pointed out, and were 
put together out of bad words and 
by bad poets.” How is it not true 
that he has actually said that “(the 
bad poets are) perfectly indis-
tinguishable,” since they are 
accustomed to preserve both the 
verse-forms and the rhythms?  
 
The first part of the section is a quotation or paraphrase of the opponent; Philodemus returns to 
his own voice with the customary asyndeton. The topics of the previous columns do not give any 
aid. Nevertheless, the text of lines 8-10, the relevant part, is not in doubt. 
 The second passage comes from the disconnected fragments which are all that remain of 
the first part of book 5 of the On Poems. On the basis of the vocabulary (specifically ϲοφά, 
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ϲπουδαῖον, and καταχρηϲτικῶϲ), the opponent seems to be the anonymous Stoic. We have 
little context, however, besides the fact that Philodemus is attacking the philosopher's use of the 
terms κυρίωϲ and καταχρηϲτικῶϲ.  
On Poems V, PHerc. 403 fr. 2 col. 1, ll. 6-17: 
6   δεδο- 
 µένου γὰρ τοῦ τὸν κυ- 
 ρίωϲ, εἰ βούλονται, πο- 
 ητὴν ἀγαθὸν καλού- 
10 µενον τοῦτον ὑπάρ- 
 χειν, ὃϲ ἐκφέρει διὰ µέ- 
 τρων ϲοφὰ πράγµα- 
 τα, καὶ ϲπουδαῖον πόη- 
 µα τὸ τοιαῦτα περι- 
15 ειληφόϲ, ἐπιϲκεφθή- 
 ϲεται τὰ καταχρηϲ- 
17 [τικῶϲ...] 
     For, given that “the poet 
called 'good' in the true 
sense,” if they wish it so, is 
fundamentally that person 
who expresses wise contents 
by means of metrical verses, 
and that a “good poem” is 
one that includes such 
contents, the “transferred” 
sense will come into 
question... 
 
Since the definition of poet used here is clearly that of the opponent and includes a demand that 
we know Philodemus definitely did not accept, it is possible that he did not agree to the demand 
for metrical form either. That the statement is part of a stipulation for the sake of the argument, 
rather than a firm statement of position, leaves open the possibility that he did not require meter 
for a work to be poetry, but this seems unlikely in light of the other evidence. 
 While it is not definitely certain that Philodemus required a poem to be in meter, the 
balance of the evidence clearly favors this position. Dismissal of statements that prose authors 
wrote poemata as well as references to poetike as an art in verses or a metrical art strongly point 
to his conclusion. The cultural milieu in which verse was commonly thought to be a, if not the, 
defining feature of poetry, points to the same conclusion. 
 
§4 Responses to Objections to a Prolepsis-Based Theory of Poetry 
 Porter (and Mangoni following him) has argued that, precisely because Philodemus has a 
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prolepsis of the good poem, he has no need of a theory, or as Porter puts it, he “has no theory of 
poetry because he only has a prolepsis of poetry.”213 As for the theory of poetry, what follows 
will illuminate that. The implications which they draw from the existence of the prolepsis 
deserve consideration. 
 Porter characterizes the prolepsis as “hover[ing] between an empirically derived concept 
and functioning in an a priori way.”214 This is true, but it plays out otherwise than he argues. For 
instance, justice, about which we are reasonably well informed, “taken generally... is the same 
for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships.”215 This is one aspect of 
justice, namely that it guarantees security and peace in societies, but because different societies 
have different practices and customs, “the criterion of justice has no specific content: justice 'is 
not anything per se' and 'looked at concretely, across time and place, 'it is not the same for 
all.'”216 But the fact that justice itself differs does not mean that the prolepsis of justice has no 
specific content; instead, its content is dependent precisely on the experiences of the person to 
whom it belongs. As Diogenes Laertius defines it (X.33), it is (in one aspect) a µνήµη (a 
memory), so it is particular to an individual. Because justice itself varies from community to 
community (that is, there is no absolute standard), the prolepsis also varies. But it is not therefore 
true that the prolepsis has no specific content: its content will also vary according to the 
community. So it is not true that “it was never meant to be filled out with specific empirical 
content, but only to exemplify the natural content of concepts and to demonstrate the possibility 
of their empirical derivation (and application),”217 since it is in fact formed by empirical means 
                                                            
213 Porter (1996: 625). 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Porter (1996: 625-6). 
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(µνήµη τοῦ πολλάκιϲ ἔξωθεν φανέντοϲ, “a memory of what has often appeared from without,” 
D. L. X.33). If natural content means “consistent, uniform content regardless of particular 
circumstances,” then no, the prolepsis of justice does not have it, but that does not mean that it is 
without any content. If “natural” means “not dependent on convention, but instead on nature” 
then it cannot have natural content because Epicurus is a conventionalist for justice, which is 
ϲυνθήκη τιϲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεϲθαι, “a convention regarding not harming or 
being harmed” (KD xxxiii). In the case of poetry, the common taste of the community canonizes 
a group of poems, which  form the experiential basis for the prolepsis of each individual in the 
community.218 Presumably, this happens in school, at public recitations, and symposia.219 
 For poetry, according to Porter, reliance on the prolepsis has two main effects, which I 
will discuss in order. The first: 
 [T]he prolepsis of the poem points us to that feature of poems which most resembles 
 prolepsis: the clear view of what naturally is (the beauty of a rational content). The theory 
 of prolepsis thus forestalls on the theoretical level any attempt to dissociate language 
 from its being meaningful and in consequence diminishes the relevance of its secondary 
 characteristics to all but naught.220 
 
By “secondary characteristics,” he means the sensory effects of language. But it is not true that 
Philodemus diminishes their relevance; on the contrary, form is extremely important to his 
analysis of the goodness of poems.221 It is true that poetry must have intelligible contents for 
Philodemus, but to characterize poetry as “the beauty of rational content” is without basis in the 
                                                            
218 Mangoni made a similar error in her description of the prolepsis, “che comporta l'accettazione a priori di una 
certa poesia e di certi poeti come buoni, in base alla loro corrispondenza all'idea naturale e universale che della 
buona poesia e del buon poeta hanno gli uomini” (1993:31). But the prolepsis is not universal and it is not 
natural, if that means innate. Rather, it is dependent on the experiences of the individual person who has it 
(though it is likely to be shared among members of a community).  
219 This is also, I take it, why Philodemus relies on an educated audience, who will have had a literary education and 
leisure time for furthering their experience of poetry. 
220 Porter (1996: 626). 
221 See chapter six, §9. 
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texts: for Philodemus, it is contents expressed in non-prosaic, metrical language (at least). If we 
can generalize to the case of poetry the commitment expressed by Epicurus at Ep. Hdt. §37, that 
our utterances should always correspond with reality, then Philodemus is bound to an analysis of 
poetry which requires meaningful language, but this is no obstacle to developing an aesthetic 
theory of poetry.222 It does forbid theories which permit unintelligible or contentless poetry, 
however. 
 The second effect that Porter identifies is as follows: 
 Methodologically, Philodemus' tactics are misleading, for his object is not exactly to 
“refute” his opponents, but ultimately to reduce the content of what may be asserted to be 
the case, insofar as this is warranted by prolepsis. 
  This is not to say that Philodemus has no views about poetry, but only that he can 
defend them philosophically only by appealing to prolepsis, and on the terrain of 
prolepsis he has but one argument available to him: not evidence, and apparently not 
even sensory evidence, but self-evidence.223 
 
This position relies on the misunderstanding of the prolepsis I discussed just above. Since the 
prolepsis is empirically based, appeals to it are, indirectly but truly, appeals to experience. This 
precise argument is used against theorists who throw out generally admired poets: if the poet is a 
bad poet, why are they universally admired? Since the poet (e.g. Archilochus, Hipponax, or 
Euripides) is in fact admired, the objection has real force: the theory cannot account for what 
people will generally admit to be true and therefore cannot be a cogent explanation of how 
poetry works. 
 It is worth recalling that Epicurus himself, in a discussion about theology in Ep. Men. 
§§123-4 , argued that many people mistook the contents of the prolepsis of the gods:  οἵουϲ δ’ 
                                                            
222 We know that the contents of poetry need not be factual for Philodemus, but the language must always be 
intelligible, so the principle is not straightforwardly applied to poetry: it is possible that the language must 
correspond to the facts in the world of the poem or, more generally, be meaningful in its context, but the 
discussion is lacking. 
223 Porter (1993: 626, his italics). 
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αὐτοὺϲ ⟨οἱ⟩ πολλοὶ νοµίζουϲιν, οὐκ εἰϲίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουϲιν αὐτοὺϲ οἵουϲ νοµίζουϲιν 
(“of what sort the man think of them as being, they are not; because the many do not preserve the 
idea of the gods as what they think they are”). Most people have incorrect beliefs, Epicurus says, 
about the gods, because the majority of people do not follow their basic beliefs to their 
conclusions: they remove the attributes of indestructibility and imperturbability from the gods, 
and impiously add other attributes (Ep. Men. §123). These, Epicurus says, are not prolepseis, but 
simply mistaken beliefs. Because people do not necessarily have the prolepsis, it is possible to 
argue about theology. Similarly, people may have the wrong idea about poetry, and an Epicurean 
can correct their ψευδεῖϲ ὑπολήψειϲ (cf. Ep. Men. §124). 
 A prolepsis is not a definition, but it does admit of description and can used to explain 
and justify decisions. The body of good poems which forms the prolepsis functions as a sort of 
data set, in which trends are identified and from which principles can be abstracted: those trends 
and principles can be compared with the prolepsis to determine their truth:. For instance, an 
Epicurean considering a course of action would presumably consider whether or not it is just 
before acting, which I presume would mean comparing it to the prolepsis of justice to make sure 
it does not contradict any aspect of it. Likewise, an Epicurean literary critic will be able to 
compare a given poem to what he takes a good poem to be. Since the wise man can discourse 
correctly about poetry and music (fr. 269 Usener), this sort of analysis is possible for the 
Epicurean sage.  
 All this need not mean that the Epicureans actually had a theory of poetry, of course. But 
just as the fact of a prolepsis of “gods” did not prevent Epicureans from writing theological 
works explaining various aspects of the gods (including their shape, language, and diet), so the 
prolepsis of poetry need not prevent them from having well worked out and detailed ideas about 
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poetry. 
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Chapter Four 
Poetry as Techne and the Use of Poetry 
 
§1 Introduction 
 Philosophical discussions about the technai are as old as Plato,224 and the Epicureans took 
part in them as well. It is clear that Epicurus handled the development of the arts in one of his 
works; he summarizes his doctrine of the invention of language in his letter to Herodotus (§§75-
6) and we have versions of the story of the invention of the arts by Lucretius and Diogenes of 
Oenoanda which reflect school doctrine. He thought of an origin for the arts in human needs, at 
the dawn of society, and then discussed their development over the course of time. Technical 
questions of what constitutes a techne were entertained both by the founders and, later, by Zeno 
of Sidon, his student Philodemus, and several Epicurean philosophers contemporary with them. 
In this section, I will examine the status of poetike as a techne in Epicurean thought, and discuss 
the evidence. At a certain point, however, the evidence gives out, and in an excursus, I 
extrapolate from the extant texts and speculate on positions that Philodemus may have held, and 
I also discuss Epicurus' attitude towards poetry, poets, and poems, as well as the roles that 
education and philosophy play in the life of the Epicurean.  
 Techne is a problematic term and does not admit of a simple translation. It covers much 
of the same lexical ground as the English words “art,” “craft,” “skill,” and “science” and can 
even be used to refer to a handbook which teaches an art, craft, skill, or science. Furthermore, the 
                                                            
224 The Gorgias is probably the most familiar. 
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term was adopted into philosophical jargon and then subjected to redefinition. What the 
Epicureans meant by the term is the subject of most of this chapter. Generally, however, it is a 
term of approbation; technai, generally, are good things to know and usefulness is often made 
the criterion of technicity, i.e. the state of being a techne. They require knowledge of a set of 
rules or principles, which can be separated from specific applications or products.  A techne also 
requires some skill, training, innate knack or disposition, and/or combination of the three, and 
should result in some sort of product or result, which is not generally obtainable by the untrained. 
For example, Philodemus says that it is improper to use the adverb τεχνικῶϲ of tying sticks of 
wood together (On Rhetoric ΙΙ, PHerc. 1674, col. 18.29-19.10 = pp. 81-83 Longo Auricchio): 
there is no art of tying sticks together, even though someone must learn how to tie knots in the 
first place and exercise judgment about what sticks to tie together—should they be matched in 
length or circumference or species of tree? Tying sticks together is simply too banal and 
quotidian (possibly too narrow as well) to rise to the requirements of being a techne. Due to these 
difficulties, I leave the term untranslated and italicized. I refer to the techne of writing poems as 
poētikē to avoid the ambiguities of the English terms poetry (the whole field of study or a 
collection of poems, e.g. the poetry of Homer?) and poetics (much used in critical-theoretical 
treatments of literature, not all of which is verse or poetry). 
 Diogenes of Oenoanda briefly summarizes the invention of the arts in his monumental 
inscription. 
Diogenes fr. 12.ii.4-11:225 
                                                            
225 I follow the edition and translation of Smith. He prints the text in a column, rather than continuously, following 
the layout of the inscription, which was evidently modeled on papyrus texts. The inscription does not separate 
words, but a blank space is sometimes used for punctuation; this is represented by the sign u (for uacat). The 
section before the first line is Smith's supplement exempli gratia, but it must be along the right lines. Smith 
compares Diodorus Siculus 1.8.7, which seems to be following an Epicurean source, which itself probably 
descends ultimately from Democritus (Cole 1968). Note also Lucretius 5.955, where primitive humans live in 
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 [διὰ µὲν τῶν ϲπηλαίων εἰϲ] 
 [ἃ ἐφοίτων τοῦ χρόνου προ-] 
i.1 βαί]ν̣οντοϲ, χειµῶναϲ̣ 
 φεύ]γοντεϲ, v εἰϲ ἐπίνοι- 
 α]ν̣ [ο]ἰκ̣ηµάτων ἦλ̣θον, 
 δι]ὰ δὲ τῶν περ̣ιβολῶν 
5 ἃ̣ϲ ἐποιοῦντο τοῖϲ ϲώµα̣- 
 ϲιν, v εἴτε φύλλοιϲ αὐτὰ 
 ϲ]κ̣έποντεϲ εἴτε βοτά- 
 ναιϲ εἴτε καὶ δοραῖϲ, ἀναι- 
 ροῦντεϲ ἤδη τὰ πρ̣[ό]β̣α- 
10 τα, v εἰϲ ἐνθύµηϲιν ἐϲ- 
 θητῶν v (ϲτρεπτῶν µὲν 
 οὔπω, καϲωτῶν δ’ ἴϲωϲ 
 ἢ ὁποιωνοῦν). v εἶτα δὲ 
14 προβαίνων ὁ χρόνοϲ 
ii.1 ταῖϲ ἐπινοίαιϲ αὐτῶν 
 ἢ τῶν µετ’ αὐτοῦϲ ἐνέ- 
 βαλεν καὶ τὸν ἱϲτόν. 
 εἰϲ οὖν οὐδεµίαν τέχνην  
5 ὡϲ ο]ὐ̣δὲ ταύταϲ, v οὔτ’ ἄλ- 
 λ̣ο̣ν̣ τινὰ θεῶν u οὔτε 
 τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν παραληµ- 
 πτ̣έον· v πάϲαϲ γὰρ ἐγέν- 
 νηϲαν αἱ χρεῖαι καὶ πε- 
10 ριπτώϲειϲ µετὰ τοῦ 
 χρόνου. 
[The caves which they frequented 
with the advance of time, as they 
sought shelter from] wintry 
storms, gave them the conception 
of houses, while the wraps which 
they made for their bodies, as 
they protected them either with 
foliage or with plants or even (for 
they were already killing sheep) 
with skins, gave them the notion 
of clothes – not yet spun, but 
perhaps felted or of some such 
kind. Then the advance of time 
inspired them or their descendants 
with the idea of the loom as well. 
So no arts, any more than these 
(sc. building and cloth making, 
which were just mentioned), 
should be explained by the 
introduction of Athena or any 
other deity; for all were the 
offspring of needs and 
experiences in conjunction with 
time. 
 
 
Human ingenuity and experience in the face of necessity led to inventions and the development 
of technai, which are not due to any god. Need compelled the earliest humans to develop various 
practices, which they improved in the course of time. The whole account is broadly comparable, 
and indeed consistent in many details, with Lucretius' version in book V of the De Rerum 
Natura. But what is a techne according to the Epicureans? 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
groves and caves and sleep in bushes, and further 5.984, where humans flee lion attacks from their rocky roofs. 
For further details of the reconstruction, see his notes; the sigla for legible letters and the like are the same as for 
papyrus texts. 
  For ϲτρεπτῶν in l. 11, Smith gives “plaited” instead of “spun” (i.e. into yarn for weaving), but plaited 
cloth is out of place before the invention of the loom and fabric. καϲωτῶν, l. 12, is a hapax legomenon of 
uncertain meaning. Related words refer to some sort of heavy or thick clothing. Felting is indeed an ancient and 
fairly simple procedure which is not out of place here as a middle step between leather skins and spun and 
woven cloth. Historically, weaving seems to predate felting by several millennia and was known to the Greeks, 
but the process of felting does not require woven cloth (it often uses it, however) and might have been thought to 
be an intermediate step between leather and woven cloth. See Barber (1993: 215-222). 
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§2 The Definition of Techne and the “Technicity of Rhetoric”226 
 In book II of his work On Rhetoric, Philodemus argues with other Epicureans about 
whether or not sophistic (or panegyric), political, and forensic rhetoric are technai or not; his 
position is that only sophistic is a techne, because only the sophistic orator accomplishes his goal 
of making good speeches consistently and methodically, whereas the political and forensic orator 
cannot consistently persuade councils or juries. Furthermore, only a trained person can make a 
really stunning oration, but most citizens can figure out what is beneficial for their cities. In this 
discussion about techne, he reports the meaning of the word “among the Greeks,” that is, he 
summarizes the prolepsis, the mental image which allows words to have meaning and to 
correspond to things in the world.  
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.38.2-15 (p. 123 Longo Auricchio):227 
2    νοεῖ- 
 ται τοίνυν καὶ λέγεται 
 τ]έχνη παρὰ τοῖ[ϲ] Ἕ̣λ̣λ̣η- 
5 ϲ̣ι̣[ν ἕ]ξιϲ ἢ δ̣ιάθ[ε]ϲι[ϲ] ἀπὸ 
 παρ[α]τηρή[ϲ]εω[ϲ τιν]ῶν 
 κοινῶν καὶ [ϲ]τοι[χειω]⟦ν⟧- 
 δῶν, ἃ διὰ πλειόν[ω]ν δι- 
 ήκει τῶν ἐπὶ µέ[ρ]ο[υϲ], κα- 
10 ταλαµβάνουϲά [τ]ι καὶ 
 ϲ]υντελοῦϲα τοιοῦτον, 
 οἷον ⟨οὐδεὶϲ⟩ ὁµοίωϲ τῶν µὴ 
 µαθόντων ε[ἴθ’] ἑϲτη- 
 κ̣ότωϲ καὶ βε[βαί]ωϲ [εἴ- 
15 τ]ε ϲτοχαστι[κῶϲ]. 
     So a techne is, among the 
Greeks, thought and said to be a 
state or disposition deriving from 
observation of some common and 
fundamental elements which 
extend through most of the 
specific cases, which com-
prehends and accomplishes 
something, of such a kind that 
none of those who have not 
learned it could accomplish it 
either regularly and consistently 
or by hitting and missing. 
 
In this short passage, Philodemus includes the main points: the state or disposition must 
generally allow the craftsman to create the product of the craft successfully. Someone without 
                                                            
226 Much in this section draws on Blank (1995). 
227 The Greek text is quoted from the edition of Longo Auricchio (1977) and the translation is a lightly modified 
version of Chandler (2006). In line 13, where Longo Auricchio reads ἔνιοι,there does not appear to be enough 
room for the word in the disegni, nor is the resultant hiatus permissible. Sudhaus read [οὐδεὶϲ], which gives 
admirable sense, but is far too long for the space. Sedley (pers. com.) conjectured εἴθ’ (l. 13)...εἴτε (l. 14-5) and 
supplied οὐδεὶϲ, rightly in my opinion (cf. Poems I.167.19-20). The genitive could stand as a subject in the 
meaning “some of those who have not learned,” but this sense is not wanted. 
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training could not be as successful as the craftsman is, generally speaking. That is, Philodemus 
allows for beginner's luck, or the possibility that, e.g., a schoolboy without any particular training 
in poetry could compose a very fine poem. Philodemus' description of techne indicates that he 
requires method and teachability.228 In this connection, note especially the following: 
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.42.8- 17 (p. 131 Longo Auricchio):229 
8 πλὴν ἐγὼ µὲν τὴν ϲυν- 
 ήθε]ιαν ο[ὔ] φηµι κυρ[ί]ωϲ 
10 ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ[α 
 τέχναϲ καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τ[ὰ 
 προϲφεροµένα τὸ µε- 
 θοδικόν, ὃ προχει[ρ]ό̣τ[α- 
 τα κατὰ τὴν τῆϲ τέχνηϲ 
15 ἀναφώνη[ϲ]ι[ν] ὑποπίπτ[ει 
 καὶ ὑπὸ τ[ὴν] τῆϲ ἐ[πιϲτ[ή- 
 µηϲ 
But I deny that common usage properly 
calls these things technai [sc. the falsely 
so-called “arts” of running away, flattery, 
and luxurious eating, cited supra] but 
those [sc. arts] which bring method to 
bear, which most readily happens 
according to the expression “art” and 
under that of “science”. 
 
Some human activities are called arts by a misapplication of the term, but only those activities 
which admit of method properly deserve the title. 
 As Grilli (1983) has demonstrated, the diathesis is an atomic state, comparable to the 
dispositura of atoms discussed in Lucretius.230 That is, a techne is a particular arrangement of 
atoms in the soul of the person, which can be caused by teaching.231 However, the sine quibus 
non of a techne are method (which leads to success) and teachability, since teaching is 
                                                            
228 See Blank (2003: 73). Cf. Chandler (2006: 63-4) for a few brief comments on exact arts and natural talent. 
229 For ἀναφώνηϲιϲ, cf. Demetrius Laco's Aporie Testuali (PHerc. 1012) 67.7 where Puglia renders φύϲει δὲ τὰϲ 
πρώταϲ τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἀναφωνήϲειϲ as “per natura ... i primi pronunciamenti dei nomi” and the conclusion 
of Sedley (1973: 19) and his commentary to Epicurus De Nat. 28, fr. 10 I b 18, that ἀναφωνέω is particularly 
appropriate to a primitive utterance. This is probably another way of referring to the prolepsis. 
   ὑπό (l. 16) should mean something different from κατά (l.14), because variation for variation's sake is not 
Philodemus' style and in any case the two prepositions are not synonymous. The noun in the ellipse is surely 
ἀναφώνηϲιν, and the meaning is perhaps “according to the utterance 'art' and under the rubric 'area of human 
knowledge'; cf. Epicurus' usage of the prepositions in De Nat. 28, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπὸ τὴµ φυγὴν ἢ αἵρηϲιν 
[κα]τ’ αὐτὴν [ἀ]γόµενοϲ τέυψεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ, i.e. “and under its guidance [κατ’ αὐτήν] he will arrive at the 
truth just as much in the category [ὑπό] of avoidance as in that of choice” (fr. 13. col. VIII infra, ll. 9-7 [sic] 
Sedley). 
230 He argues further that both ataraxia and the state of being a sage are diatheseis.  
231 This seems comparable to the Aristotelian hexis at EN II.4 1105b20, though it is generalized beyond Aristotle's 
use, which was limited to explaining emotions and character. 
   103 
presumably the main way to instill a diathesis in the soul of the artist.232 Indeed, Philodemus 
requires teachability of arts a little earlier in the same work: 
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.26.3-16 (p. 99 Longo Auricchio):233 
3    οὐκ ὀρ- 
 θ͙ῶϲ δ’ ἵϲταϲθαι νοµιϲτέ- 
5 ο]ν̣ οὐδὲ τοὺϲ ἀποφαινοµέ- 
 νο]υϲ οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην, 
 ε̣ἴ̣ τι[ϲ] προείληφε τέχνην 
 τ̣[ὴ]ν τὸ µεθοδικὸν ἔχου- 
 ϲ[α]ν καὶ ἑϲτηκὸϲ παρά- 
10 δοϲιν], εἰ δὲ καλεῖ καὶ τὴν 
 ὁ[λ]οϲχερ̣ῆ παρατήρη- 
 ϲ[ιν τὴν] ϲτοχαζοµένην 
 τοῦ ὡϲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κα- 
 τὰ τὸ εὔλογον, ὥϲπερ ἰα- 
15 τρικὴ καὶ κυβερνητικ[ή, 
           ⸏ τ[έχ]ν̣ην εἶναι. 
     We must think that even 
those who demonstrate that it 
[i.e. any skill whose technicity is 
under question] is not a techne 
consider the matter incorrectly, 
if someone preconceived as a 
techne one with a methodical 
and stable transmission, and if 
he also claims that general 
observation which aims at 
general and probable success, 
like medicine and navigation, is 
a techne. 
 
That is, if someone has a preconception of a techne as having methodical and consistent 
transmission from teacher to student, and if he thinks that conjectural skills are also technai, then 
that person thinks rightly. In this passage, Philodemus is talking about the person who denies that 
they are technai, which leads to a confusing mass of negatives, and the conditional which 
provides the grounds on which he says they think wrongly. However, he does state that the 
prolepsis of techne includes the transmission of the techne. 
 More explicitly, when Philodemus is discussing the skilled actor or orator, who knows 
how to move his body for effect, he denies that this knowledge constitutes a techne, on the 
grounds that it is not teachable. The few lines preceding are broken and no sense can be got from 
them. 
                                                            
232 It seems sensible that practice will also play a role, but since non-technai can be practiced (one can practice, e.g., 
tying the knots used to bundle sticks), this cannot be a defining feature. 
233 The three negatives in the first part of the quoted section cause serious difficulties, but it seems that the οὐδέ is 
felt to follow the simple negative in οὐκ ὀρθῶϲ δ’ ἵϲταϲθαι νοµιϲτέον and so has no negative force of its own, 
as is regular when a compound negative follows a simple negative (cf. Smyth §2761 and Kühner-Gerth §514). 
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On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.39.35-40.19 (pp. 105-7 Longo Auricchio):234 
35  ὑ͙ποµν[η]σθήτω- 
40.1 ϲαν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, [διό- 
 τι τέχν̣[η]ν τοιαύ[την λέ- 
 γοντεϲ εἶναι τὴν ῥητο- 
 ρικήν, [οἵαν] ἄν τιϲ εἴποι 
5 τὴν ἐκ παρατηρήϲε- 
 ωϲ ποιᾶϲ ϲυνηϲκη̣µε- 
 νην ἕξιν, καθ’ ἣν ὡϲ [ἐ]πὶ 
 τ̣ὸ̣ πολὺ κ[αὶ] κατὰ τὸ εὔ- 
 λογον περιγίνεται τὸ 
10 προκείµενον τέλοϲ, τὸ  
 τῆϲ τέχνηϲ ἴδιον αὐτῆϲ 
          ⸏ ἀναιροῦνται. θεωρεῖται 
 γὰρ ἐµ µεθόδωι τοῦτο 
 καί τινι παραδόϲει κοι- 
15 νῶν τινων διατεινόν- 
 των ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ µέροϲ, 
 ἄν̣ τ’ οὖν ἦι τῶν παγίων 
 ἐ̣[πι]ϲτηµῶν, ἄν τε τῶν 
19 ϲτοχαϲτικῶν. 
But let them note this as well, 
that by claiming that rhetoric is a 
techne of such a sort as someone 
could call the hexis which is 
trained by some kind of obser-
vation, in accord with which the 
goal which was put forth comes 
about for the most part and 
probably, they remove the 
defining feature of the art itself. 
For this [sc. defining feature] is 
considered to consist in method 
and in a transmission of 
common elements which extend 
through the particular cases, 
whether it be a question of 
precise or of conjectural technai. 
 
The particular or defining feature of a techne is here said to be both its method and its 
transmission, that is, an art must both have a method and be teachable. It matters not whether the 
techne accomplishes its goal all the time or not, as long as someone using the techne is more 
reliably successful than someone attempting the same feat who does not have that techne. 
 Philodemus does distinguish between exact and conjectural technai, though this does not 
bear on their technicity. Exact technai are those which accomplish their goals in the vast majority 
of cases, such as γραµµατιϲτική, µουϲική, and ζωγραφία (PHerc 1674.38), and inexact ones 
are those which do not, such as ἰατρική and κυβερνητική.235 µουϲική and ποιητική are linked in 
                                                            
234  A hexis is a disposition, synonymous for Epicureans with the more common term diathesis. See above with n. 
231. 
235 For the distinction and the examples, see Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 1 §§72-5 with Blank's notes (1998).  
Philodemus mentions the distinction at Rhet. II, PHerc. 1674.6.3ff. (= p. 55 L.A.), and 30.17-9 (= p. 107 Longo 
Auricchio), and technical explanations are given at 1674.38.35ff. (= p. 123ff. L.A.). It is important to note that, 
on the Epicurean view, the art of music will consist of composing only a song, which can be reliably done by 
anyone with the appropriate training. Medicine, for example, can fail to save a patient even when the doctor does 
everything properly; similarly a navigator might be blown off course in a storm or unable to see the stars because 
of overcast skies and therefore lose the way. 
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similar contexts, and so it is reasonable to assume that ποιητική is also an exact art for 
Philodemus (subject to several provisos, again to be discussed below).236 Since ῥητορική is very 
narrowly, for Philodemus, the art of composing good speeches,237 it seems reasonable that 
ποιητική will be the art of composing good poems. 
 Each art has its own particularity, which is presumably its own specific defining feature 
or goal, for which it and no other art is responsible. This question is at issue in book I of 
Philodemus' Rhetoric, where he makes the following point. 
On Rhetoric I, PHerc. 1427 fr. 1.12-18 (p. 3 Longo Auricchio):238 
12       διαφορῶν γ̣̣ὰρ οὐ- 
 ϲῶν ἀπλάτ̣ων ὅ̣ϲ̣ων 
 ἐ]ν ταῖϲ τέχναιϲ, ὅταν 
15 ἰδιό]τητι προϲπέϲω- 
 ϲιν, ἐ]κ τῶν τ[ε]χνῶν εὐ- 
 θὺϲ ἐξ]ορίζουϲιν τὴν  
18 τοῦ]το προϲφεροµένην. 
For, because there are a monstrously 
large number of differences in the 
technai, whenever they do violence to 
the particularity, they exclude from the 
list of technai the techne that brings 
this to bear. 
 
Philodemus is here, as usual, arguing against those who deny that rhetoric is a techne, but on 
different grounds from those elsewhere. The context is lost, but the argument put forward was 
clearly based on the particular aspect of rhetoric that distinguishes it from other arts and skills. 
Philodemus' reply is that, every time his opponents make an error in identifying the particularity, 
                                                            
236  Music is mentioned at On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674 col. 38.33 (pp. 122-3 L.A.) and 41.12-3 (pp. 128-9 L.-A.); 
poetry is mentioned at On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1672 col. 22.39 (pp. 218-9 L.A.). See generally Blank (1995: 181-
2). 
237 Cf. On Rhetoric II, PHerc.1674.23.33-24.9: τῶν τε περὶ τὸ[ν Ἐ]πίκουρον ἀποφ[αι]ν̣οµένων τέχνην [εἶν]αι 
τὴν ϲοφιϲτικὴν τ[οῦ λ]όγου⸌ϲ⸍ ϲυγγράφειν καὶ ἐπ[ιδε]ίξειϲ πο̣ι̣εῖϲθαι, [τοῦ δὲ] δίκαϲ λέγειν καὶ 
δη[µη]γορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέ[χνη]ν, τὴν ϲοφιϲτικὴ[ν οὗ]τοι τέχνην φαϲὶν ε̣ἶ[να]ι, i.e. “although the Epicureans 
show that sophistic is a techne of composing speeches and making displays but that there is no techne of making 
legal or political speeches, those people claim that sophistic is a techne.” 
  Note that in Rhet I, PHerc. 1427.3-4 (p. 13-15 Longo Auricchio), Philodemus denies that λόγωι πείθειν 
(persuasion by speech) is the goal of rhetoric, since laymen can do it just as well as professionals, which violates 
his rule that the trained must accomplish the goal more often and more consistently than the untrained. 
238 For the translation of προϲπίπτω as “do violence to,” cf. LSJ s.v. I 2 “fall upon, attack, assault” with the dative. 
The idea is that the enemies make some kind of error which causes them to miscategorize the subject. Merely 
“chancing upon” (cf. Longo Auricchio “s'imbattano” and Chandler “encounter”) the peculiarity would not cause 
that kind of error. 
   106 
they assert that whichever techne actually has that particularity is somehow not a techne. 
 In summary, techne, for the Epicureans, denoted a diathesis, an atomic arrangement, 
which comes about by being taught, and allows the person with it to make products or 
accomplish tasks that someone without the techne could not do. They can do this either 
consistently or just most of the time, so long as they are reliably more successful than the 
unskilled person. If an art or skill cannot be taught or does not accomplish its goal, then it is not a 
techne.  
 
§3 The Technicity of Poetry 
 Now we turn to the question of ποιητική: is it a techne, and what specifically does 
Philodemus have to say about it?  
 He declares that poetry is in fact a techne. In a discussion rebutting Epicurean opponents 
with citations from the founder of the School Metrodorus239, he makes the claim that rhetoric is a 
techne and has method, and compares it to ποιητική. 
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1672.22.28-39 (p. 219 Longo Auricchio):240 
28  ἦν δὲ τοῦ⸌το⸍ πιϲτο͙ῦ͙- 
 ϲθαι, διότι δὴ̣ καὶ κατ’ ἀλή- 
30 θειαν ἡ ϲοφιϲτικὴ ῥητο- 
 ρικὴ τέχνη τίϲ ἐϲτιν περί 
 τε τὰϲ ἐπιδείξε[ι]ϲ, οἵαϲ αὐ- 
 τοὶ ποιοῦνται, καὶ τὰϲ τῶν 
 λόγων δ[ι]⸌α⸍θέϲε̣ιϲ, οἵων αὐ- 
35 τοὶ γράφουϲί⸌ν⸍ τε κ͙αὶ ϲχεδι- 
 άζουϲιν. φαµὲν τοίνυ̣ν  
 τὸ µεθοδ̣[ι]κὸν ἔχε̣ι̣ν αὐτήν, 
      Ιt (sc. our task) was to 
demonstrate this: that sophistic 
rhetoric really is a techne both 
about display pieces, of which 
sort they compose, and about the 
arrangements of the kind of 
speeches which they themselves 
write or improvise. So we claim 
that it has method, but not much, 
                                                            
239 Metrodorus of Lampsacus was also the author of a De poematis in at least two books, which Philodemus quotes 
here as support for his assertions about rhetoric, which Metrodorus had used as a comparandum for poetry (see 
chapter two, §3). There was another Metrodorus of Lampsacus, a century earlier, who was a follower of 
Anaxagoras and wrote allegorical interpretations of Homer. 
240 Slight changes to punctuations and accentuation, printed above, were suggested to me by R. Janko (pers. comm.) 
in lines 38 (for δὲ καθάπερ) and 39 (for -κὴν καὶ). 
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 οὐ πολὺ δέ, καθάπ̣[ερ] οὐδὲ τὴ̣ν 
 ποιητ[ι]κήν ... 
just as poetics does not …  
 
Philodemus admits that sophistic is in fact a techne, but that it and poetics do not have much 
method. Sadly, the papyrus breaks off just after this. I presume that he means that, after 
mastering basic metrical rules and lexical practices, there is not much method in composition, 
that is to say, either every poet goes about composing in their own, individual way which is not 
part of the techne, or, alternatively, that, after he masters the basic precepts, there is little or 
nothing left to learn. I incline towards the first reading because of the following discussion. 
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674 50.29-51 (pp. 147-9 Longo Auricchio)241 
    ⹄τοῦ-⹅ 
30 τ’ ἐµπ[είρωϲ τί]θεται, ὡϲ 
 ἄλλου µὲν [τὸ] λόγον ἔχει[ν 
 καὶ̣ ἅ[τ]τ[α π]ῶϲ ἂν καὶ 
 ⹄ἐκ τίν⹅ων γ⹄έν⹅οιτο καλλί- 
34 ϲ⹄τη⹅ ῥητορ̣[εία], ἄλλου δὲ ⸌τὸ καλῶϲ⸍ 
51.1  ⹄ῥη⹅[τορ]⹄εύ⹅ειν. καὶ [µ]ι[κρ]ὸν 
 προβά[ϲ π]ωϲ µαρτ[υ]ρεῖ τ[ὸ 
 µηδέν[α] πώ̣ποτε γε[νέ]ϲ- 
 θαι ποητὴν †ἐν τοϲο[ύ]τοιϲ†  
5 ἢ ῥήτορα ἱκανὸν ἀπό γ̣̣[ε 
 τῶν τεχνολογι̣ῶ̣ν [αὐ]τῶν. 
     This is set down as a matter of 
experience, that it is one man’s to have 
a method and the means by whichever 
and from whichever the most beautiful 
set-speech comes about, but it is 
another's to practice oratory well. 
Moving a bit further on [sc. in the 
treatise], he [sc. Metrodorus] bears 
witness that no one ever became a poet 
among the best or a competent orator 
from handbooks alone. 
 
The discussion is about what training and talents are necessary for a public speaker; the poet is 
mentioned for the first time at the end. Philodemus asserts that in addition to handbooks, the 
rhetor and the poet need method and means for composition and, if “practicing oratory well” 
                                                            
241 The passage is a paraphrase of Metrodorus, which began in col. 49.27. In 50.4, the phrase ἐν τοϲούτοιϲ seems 
to be corrupt. It is usually followed by a noun of some sort, e.g. ἐν τοϲούτοιϲ κακοῖϲ “in the midst of so many 
evils” vel sim., and so I suspect that either a word has fallen out after τοϲούτοιϲ or the phrase has been misread. 
Demosthenes 18.101 has a similar, but not exactly parallel phrase, ἐν τοϲούτοιϲ καὶ τοιούτοιϲ, which Yunis ad 
loc. glosses without explanation as “long Athenian tradition” relying heavily on the context of the passage. 
Neither Longo Auricchio nor Chandler translate the phrase. Janko suggests “among such great ones” (pers. 
comm.) which I have (modified and) accepted. Furthermore, lines 6-12 of col. 51 are mutilated and attempts to 
restore them have not been successful. On the basis of the Oxford disegno, I read a gap of two letters before των 
in line 6 and supplement αὐτῶν; happily the rest of the damaged part is not necessary for the argument. For my 
translation of αὐτῶν as “alone,” see LSJ s.v. I 3. 
  Longo Auricchio (1985) reads ἔµπειρον in l. 30, but in 1977 she printed ἐµπείρωϲ, which I follow. The 
expression is unparalleled and requires an extension of the normal meaning of ἔµπειροϲ, but it is not difficult. 
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means good delivery, perhaps natural talent is necessary as well.242 Nevertheless, the clear 
implication of the final statement is that good poets need something more than what the 
handbooks provide, which could be experience gained from practice and criticism, vocabulary 
and a feel for the literary tradition gained from reading other poets, or something else. I imagine 
that practice of the art leads to the hexis or diathesis, which functions as a sort of “muscle-
memory,” that is, the faculty which allows someone to ride a bicycle or drive a car competently 
even if they have not done so in some time. 
 Further, a discussion of how method and observation are related is relevant, because it 
indicates that observation alone is not method. 
On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.41.1- 13 (= p.129 Longo Auricchio):243 
1   παρα- 
 τετήρηκεν πῶ̣ϲ ἑαυ- 
 τὸν ϲτῆϲαι δεῖ καὶ πῶϲ 
 ἰ]έναι καὶ ποῦ ⸌τ[ὸν] πόδα θεῖναι καὶ ποῖ⸍ ϲυνεπι- 
5 νεύειν, ἀ[λ]λ̣ὰ παρατε[τ]ή- 
 ρηκέ τινα µόνον, καὶ  
 µόνοϲ τοὖ̣ργον π[ο]ιεῖ καὶ 
 διὰ παντόϲ· µε[θ]οδ[ικὴν  
 δὲ καὶ ϲτοιχειώδη [τινὰ  
10 παράδοϲιν διὰ πλ[ειό- 
 νων δι[ήκου]ϲαν, ὥϲ[περ 
 γραµµατιϲτήϲ ⟨ἢ⟩ ὥϲπερ µ̣ο[υ- 
           ⸏ ϲικόϲ, οὐκ ἔχει. τὸ δ’ [ὅ]µο̣ι-̣ 
 ον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πετευρ[ι- 
15 ζοµένων καὶ τὰϲ µαχαί- 
 ραϲ ὑπεραλλοµένων ἔ[τυ- 
17 χε. 
He [sc. the good orator] has 
observed how it is necessary to 
place himself and how to move and 
where to put his foot and in what 
direction to move his head, but he 
observed only some things and only 
he performs the action consistently; 
but he does not have a methodical 
and systematic transmission which 
extends through most cases, like the 
grammarian or like the musician. 
Something similar obtains also in 
the case of acrobats, even the ones 
who dance on swords. 
 
                                                            
242 In PHerc. 1674.25.9-15, Philodemus' opponents assert that good delivery requires physis (which I take to be 
natural talent), and Philodemus does not explicitly contradict them on this point. This is questionable, however, 
since the argument focuses on other matters. 
243 I read παρατε[τ]ήρηκέ τινα at 5-6 (Longo Auricchio prints -ρηκε τίνα) and µουϲικόϲ followed by a comma 
(Longo Auricchio prints no comma and a grave). I also print µε[θ]οδ[ικὴν since it is better fitted to the letter 
count of the line (cf. On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.27.5-6); Longo Auricchio prints Sudhaus' µέ[θ]οδ[ον. My 
translation further reflects the printed text at 15,which I interpret as meaning “gymnasts, even sword-dancers, do 
not have a techne.” It seems to me that Philodemus almost always uses a double article and so to get “both 
gymnasts and sword-dancers” would require ⟨τῶν⟩ τὰϲ, which is an easy enough correction, but would weaken 
his point. Finally, R. Janko (pers. comm.) supplied ⟨ἢ⟩ in line 13. 
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The rhetor or actor in question, who moves well and effectively, does so only because he has 
observed what sorts of movements are effective. He has no method, only observation, and cannot 
teach this skill to any students. 244  On these grounds, Philodemus denies that his ability 
constitutes a techne, which the grammarian and musician both have. 
 In a passage of book III of the On Rhetoric, Philodemus mentions lessons in poetry. 
Unfortunately, the context is too broken to learn much from the passage, even though the work 
survives in two copies. 
On Rhetoric III, PHerc. 1506 col. xlviii.28-35 = PHerc. 1426 col. Ia.1-8 (p. 23-5 
Hammerstaedt):245 
28  διὰ] τῆϲ ἐκ τῶν δι- 
 δαϲκ[α]λείων τούτων εὐ- 
30 ρυθµίαϲ ἱκανῶϲ χαριέϲ- 
 τερ[οι] γεγόναϲι καὶ ἐν δή- 
 µοιϲ καὶ ⸌ἐν [δι]καϲτηρίοιϲ καὶ⸍ ἐν ἐκκληϲίαιϲ. 
 κ̣αὶ γ̣ὰρ τάχα κ̣α̣ὶ ποητι- 
 κῶν καὶ φιλοϲόφων µαθη- 
35 µ̣άτων µετα[ϲ]χό̣ντεϲ …  
They have become considerably 
more elegant on account of the 
good use of rhythm they learned 
from those schools both in public 
assemblies and in courts and in 
meetings. In fact, perhaps they 
have even taken part in lessons 
about poetry and philosophy …  
 
Lessons are an obvious and straightforward means of learning the basics of the craft, but, as we 
saw above, they are not sufficient for becoming a poet. 
 The clear implication for poets is that mere observation of other poets going about their 
business does not constitute method or instruction. The apprenticeship may be useful for learning 
the skills, but is not the method of composition, which presumably guides what a poet does when 
he sits down to compose. That poetry does not have much method is an interesting claim, 
espcially in light of traditions that assign a high level of method to poets. For example, Horace 
                                                            
244 On the topic of Philodemus' opinions on rhetorical delivery, see the first part of Winter (2004). 
245 Because the text survives in two copies, I print a composite text and mark only letters which are damaged 
or must be supplied in both copies. Hammerstaedt edits each papyrus separately and uses half-brackets to mark 
supplements from the other papyrus; that system seemed too cumbersome for this kind of study. The supplement 
in l. 32 appears only in PHerc. 1506, which is the papyrus whose lineation I have followed. διὰ in the first line is 
my supplement; Sudhaus suggested µετειληφότεϲ and Hammerstaedt suggested ἀπὸ. For the use of ἱκανῶϲ in l. 
30 cf. Antiphon 2.1.6 and 2.2.2. 
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devotes a section of the Ars Poetica (ll. 295-332) to the topic of how to be a good poet and 
suggests a thorough knowledge of realia in order to represent characters correctly: 
 qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis, 
 quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes, 
 quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae 
 partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto 
 reddere personae scit conuenientia cuique. 
 
 Whoever knows what is owed to his father land and his friends, 
 with what love a parent, a brother, and a guest are to be loved, 
 what the duty of a senator is, that of a judge, what 
 are the offices of a general sent to war, that man immediately 
 knows how to provide fitting features for each character. 
 
Horace has Roman society firmly in view here, as the patriotism and mention of a senator show, 
but the basic demand that the poet have thorough knowledge of the roles of his characters is 
much older. Such demands are often linked with demands for educational content, as apparently 
was done by the critic handled by Philodemus before Heraclides Ponticus in book V. It might be 
that, because Epicureans denied educational content to poetry, the barriers to entry were not very 
high, that is, since a poet only has to develop good taste and learn versification, she does not 
need much training, and the art, accordingly, does not require much method―there simply is not 
that much for it to teach.246 Similarly, Aristotle has quite a bit of advice for poets at Poetics §§17 
and 25 as well as scattered throughout the rest of the treatise; whether this constitutes “a lot of 
method” I doubt. Additionally, Aristotle247 and Horace248 both say that the poet must visualize 
the scenes and try to feel the same emotions as the characters in the poem in order for the 
                                                            
246 Because the Epicureans denied didactic intent in poetry, it is not clear if they would consider, e.g., Aratus' or 
Manilius' knowledge of astronomy to be part of the techne of astronomy or of the techne of poetry, or part of 
both. The question simply does not arise for them. 
247   Poetics 17, 55a17-32, cf. fr. 80 Rose, apud Cicero Tusc. IV.19, on rhetoric 
248   A. P. 101-113 
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characters to present them realistically and make the audience feel those emotions.249 This entails 
a method of poetic composition in which the poets work themselves up into feeling emotions 
before composition.  
 However, it is clear enough that discussions of method were common in Hellenistic 
treatises and it is therefore likely that Philodemus is staking out a position opposed to one which 
demanded a great deal of method from poets. 
 
§4 Do technai benefit those who know them?250 
 The scholiast to Dionysius Thrax (p. 108.27 Hilgard = Epic. fr. 227b Usener) records an 
Epicurean “definition” of techne: οἱ µὲν Ἐπικούρειοι οὕτωϲ ὁρίζονται τὴν τέχνην· “τέχνη 
ἐϲτι µέθοδοϲ ἐνεργοῦϲα τῶι βίωι τὸ ϲυµφέρον.” “ἐνεργοῦϲα” δὲ οἷον ἐργαζοµένη (“the 
Epicureans define techne as follows: 'a techne is a method which brings about what is useful for 
life.' 'brings about' is like 'works out'”).251 
 One ought always to have been cautious with this testimony, since the Epicureans are 
known to have eschewed definitions of precisely this sort.252 A further problem is that it 
contradicts explicit statements of Philodemus. As shown above, he considered ποιητική to be a 
techne, but in On Poems V he says again and again that poems do not benefit:  
                                                            
249 Advice similar, coincidentally, to the modern technique of “method acting.” 
250 Asmis's discussion (1991) of poetic utility in Philodemus will be treated in chapter six, §9. 
251 Chandler (2006: 93-4) discusses this passage from a similar perspective. He too is suspicious of the definition 
(“it could also be said that it resembles a rather simplistic formulation of the Stoic definition”) and is inclined to 
consider it to be “of little, or at least questionable, consequence in the analysis of Philodemus' view of art.” My 
view is different, in that I consider the definition to be of no consequence at all. 
252 See Asmis (1984: 39-47). The case is built on several late citations (Erotian and an anonymous commentary to 
Plato's Theaetetus) which explicitly deny that Epicureans the use of definitions, Cicero's exchange with 
Torquatus in book two of the De Finibus, and the absence of discussion of definitions from Epicurus' extant 
work. Note especially pages 42-3 with n. 27 for a possible Epicurean use of ὑπογραφή or ὑποτύπωϲιϲ, 
outlines or sketches, in place of definitions. 
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On Poems V. 25.18-21 and 30-34253 
18  ἠλήθ[ε]υ̣[ον] δὲ φυ- 
 ϲι[κ]ὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐµ ποιήµα- 
20 τι µηδὲν εἶναι λ̣έγον- 
 τεϲ, εἴπερ τοῦτ’ ἔφαϲκον ... 
 
30  ο͙ὐ͙ γὰρ {ο̣} κα- 
 θὸ πόηµα φυϲικὸν οὐδὲν 
 οὔτε λέξεωϲ οὔτε δ[ια- 
 ν]οήµατοϲ ὠφέληµα [πα- 
34 ρ]αϲκευάζει. 
But they told the truth when the claimed 
that there is no natural good in a poem, 
if they actually claimed that.  
 
  
For, qua poem, it does not cause any 
natural benefit, either in diction or in 
contents …  
 
And again: 
On Poems V.32.17-19 
17 καὶ διότι, κἂν ὠφελῆ⟨ι⟩, 
 καθὸ ποήµατ’ οὐκ ὠφε- 
 λεῖ. 
And that, if they should aid, they do not 
aid as poems. 
 
This is to say, if a poem does somehow benefit its reader, this is not due to whatever makes it a 
poem, but rather to the argument residing in the language, which could conceivably benefit the 
reader, if the poem, for example, exhorted them to an Epicurean lifestyle. Finally, the verb 
ἐνεργέω is characteristically Stoic in this sense.254 
 The mistaken ascription to the Epicureans will have arisen through a misunderstanding of 
a statement like fr. 219 Usener (= Sextus Empiricus xi.169): ἐπαγγέλλονται γὰρ τέχνην τινὰ 
περὶ τὸν βίον παραδώϲειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ἐπιίκουροϲ µὲν ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοϲοφίαν ἐνέργειαν 
εἶναι λόγοιϲ καὶ διαλογιϲµοῖϲ τὸν εὐδαίµονα βίον περιποιοῦϲαν. This should be translated 
“they announce that they will transmit an art of life, and accordingly Epicurus claims that 
                                                            
253 οὐ is the emendation of Janko, in his review of Mangoni's edition, for the ευ corrected into ει of the manuscripts. 
Mangoni reads only an doubtful omicron after γὰρ, which she deletes. The disegni both have οι, which is the 
basis of Gomperz' reading εἰ γὰρ ⟨τ⟩οι. Jensen noted in his apparatus that the papyrus did not have the οι, and so 
he printed κ͙α͙ὶ͙ γὰρ, which Mangoni followed. A conditional followed by apodotic δέ is grammatically possible 
(as the next sentence begins διὰ τοῦτο δὲ, with weakened punctuation, it could mean “for if it does not...then 
nevertheless on that account”), but this is unlikely (the construction is rare, according to Denniston p. 180, 
outside Homer, Herodotus, and Xenophon). 
254 Cf. SVF 3.242, 293 and Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math 11.205 
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philosophy is an activity which brings about the happy life through arguments and discussions,” 
but it could be misunderstood to say “they claim that the art will transmit some [sc. useful] things 
about life.”255 
 If poetry does not benefit through poems, its product, it is not clear at all how it could 
possibly benefit; the scholiast only claimed that the techne provided something beneficial, which 
poetry does not. Thus the scholiast is somehow mistaken.256  
 Further, we must reckon with the consequences of a techne not necessarily providing 
anything beneficial or useful.257 Some arts are useful, at least sometimes; this is not a necessary 
condition for being a techne.258 In the On Household Management, Philodemus' position on the 
“two types” of management is that the one is worthwhile but the other does not befit the 
philosopher.259 The difference stems from the attitude and goal of the person practicing the skill: 
the philosopher has the goal of happiness in mind, whereas the professional money-manager has 
the goal of making the most money possible, and so the money-maker will practice differently.260 
This distinction is not clearly relevant to poetry and Philodemus does not discuss it in the extant 
portions of the On Poems. Even so, in the excursus below I have considered some possible ways 
that this difference might play out in the realm of poems. 
 Philodemus recognizes only a single art of poetry under which are subsumed all the types 
of poetry. The important passage is in On Poems IV. He is rebutting Aristotle's doctrine that 
                                                            
255 The correct rendering follows closely that in Ramelli (2002). 
256 Chandler notes that this definition looks like a simplification of the Stoic definitions given in Olympiodorus' 
commentary on Plato's Gorgias (12.1.69 = vol. II p. 420 fr. 392 Hülser). It is just possible that Zeno of Sidon and 
Zeno of Citium were confused. 
257 At On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674.38.14-8, Philodemus explicitly leaves aside any discussion of the utility of the 
art; it is not taken up again in our extant texts. 
258 Cooking and household management are examples used by Philodemus. 
259 See the discussion at Blank (2009: 218-9). 
260 Philodemus says that he has an ἐµπειρία and a δύναµιϲ, which the philosopher does not have. 
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poets compose certain genres according to their characters. 
On Poems IV.111.4-10: 
4 κα]ὶ̣ [ὁ ϲεµνό]τ̣ατοϲ̣ //πο/̣/[ητήϲ, 
5 φη̣µ̣ί̣, γελοίο[υϲ] ἐ̣[οι]ίει ϲα- 
 τύρου̣ϲ· καὶ πρότε̣[ρ]ον δ’ ἐ- 
 χλ̣[εύαζο]ν̣ µετ⟨̣ὰ τῶν⟩ [α]ὐ̣τῶν 
 ῥη[µάτ]//ω//[ν], ἢ̣ κ[α]ὶ̣ διαφό- 
 ρων ἀ[λλ]//ὰ̣ τ/̣/ῆ̣ϲ αὐ̣τῆϲ ἐπ̣[ι- 
10      ⸏ ϲτήµηϲ. 
The most dignified poets used to 
compose, I affirm, laughable satyr-
plays; and previously too they used to 
make mockery with the same words, 
or even with different ones but be-
longing to the same skill. 
 
Aristotle claims that poets write according to their characters, but Philodemus, by way of 
rebuttal, points out that even tragedians also wrote satyr-plays, which were of a very different 
character from tragedies and were written in a different register. Philodemus' point is that the 
specific diction, and even the character of the poet, are irrelevant; whatever diction is used, it is 
all covered by the one single skill of poetry. This is of a piece with his devaluation of genre as a 
relevant criterion for the judgment of poems, but presumably he does not mean to forbid poets 
from specializing in a particular genre. The goal of poetry, in his view, is to create a 
communicative composition in non-prosaic language, and this can be accomplished in any genre, 
or even in no recognized genre. All equally have the same goal, and so this is not an important 
difference between them. 
 What are we left with? Philodemus has said that poetics is an art, presumably that of 
writing good poems. An art is a method which can be taught and learned, but which does not 
necessarily provide any benefit; it affects the person who has it, since it is a diathesis, which is 
an arrangement of atoms, and only brings about a narrowly limited goal. In the case of poetry, 
this is simply a poem. 
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§5 Excursus: Two Types of Poetics? 
 Philodemus distinguishes between two levels of the application of a techne in an 
interesting passage in his On Household Management. 
On Household Management col xii.5-25:261 
5    διαλεξόµε- 
 θα τ[ο]ίνυν οὐχ ὡϲ ἐν οἴκωι κα- 
 λῶ[ϲ] ἔϲτιν βιοῦν, ἀλλ’ ὡϲ ἵϲτα- 
 ϲθαι δεῖ περὶ χρηµάτων κτή- 
 ϲεωϲ τε καὶ φυλακῆϲ, περὶ [ἃ 
10 τὴν οἰκονοµίαν καὶ τὸν 
 οἰκονοµικὸν ἰδίωϲ νοεῖϲθαι 
 ϲυµβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφε- 
 ρόµενοι πρὸϲ τοὺϲ ἕτερα τοῖϲ 
 ὀν[ό]µαϲιν ὑποτάττειν προ- 
15 αιρ[ο]υµένουϲ, καὶ περὶ τῆϲ 
 φιλοϲόφωι δεούϲηϲ κτήσε- 
 ωϲ, [ο]ὐ̣ τῆϲ ὁτ̣ωι[δ]ή̣ποτε. φι- 
 λοϲό]φωι δ’ ἔϲτι πλούτου 
 µέ̣[τρ]ον, ὃ παρεδώκαµεν 
20 ἀκολ]ο[υ]θωϲ τοῖϲ καθηγε- 
 µόϲιν] ἐν τοῖϲ Περὶ π[λού]του 
 λόγο]ιϲ, ὥϲτε τὴν οἰκον̣[οµι- 
 κὴ]ν̣ τῆϲ τε τούτου κ[τή]ϲε- 
 ωϲ κ]αὶ τῆϲ τούτου φυλ[ακ]ῆϲ 
25 ἀποδ]ίδοϲθαι. 
             Now we shall discuss not how it 
is possible to live well in a household, but 
what stance it is necessary to take 
regarding the getting and preservation of 
money, about which matters it turns out 
that “household management” and 
“manager” are to be understood strictly, 
taking issue in no way with those who 
prefer to consider other things the 
referents of these terms, and about the 
acquisition of wealth necessary for the 
philosopher, not for just anybody. For the 
philosopher, there is a limit to wealth, 
which we have propounded in accordance 
with the founders of our school in our 
treatise “On Wealth,” so that the art of 
management is assigned the properties of 
gaining and protecting it. 
 
Philodemus distinguishes between the manager or money-maker properly so called and the 
philosopher, and gives each of them a different relationship to the art of household 
management.262 The manager is supposed to make as much money as possible and to manage the 
property he already owns in the best manner possible; the philosopher has a limit, that is, he does 
not need all the wealth that the manager does. The name of the art does not change, but 
Philodemus says that the use of the terms “manager” and “household management” with 
                                                            
261 The text is based on the edition of Jensen (1906). The translation of this passage is indebted to Tsouna (2007: 
177). Note ἔϲτι (Janko) for ἐϲτὶ (Jensen) in line 18. The usage of ἵϲτηµι in l. 7 is peculiar to Philodemus; it also 
occurs at On Rhetoric II, PHerc. 1674 col. 26.3-6 (= p. 99 Longo Auricchio): οὐκ ὀρθῶϲ δ’ ἵϲταϲθαι 
νοµιϲτέ[ο]ν̣ οὐδὲ τοὺϲ ἀποφαινοµέ[νο]υϲ οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην, i.e. “it must be thought that not even they who 
claim that it is not an art hold the correct position.” 
262 My discussion throughout this section is indebted to Tsouna (2007, chapter 8). 
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reference to philosophers is not strictly correct. The choices made by managers and philosophers 
will be different since they have different goals, and, though they share some techniques and 
skills, they will be employed differently. The manager will have a much more specialized 
knowledge as well. Later in the treatise, Philodemus explains the philosopher's attitude towards 
wealth: 
On Household Management xiv.23:263 
23   τ]ῶι γὰρ µὴ 
 λ͙υ[πε]ῖ̣ϲ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ τῶ̣[ι] παραπολλυµέ- 
25 ν[ωι] µηδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄκρατον 
 ϲ[που]δὴν περὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ 
 το[ὔλαττ]ον ὑφ’ αὑ[τ]οῦ ζητρ͙ί- 
 οιϲ τιϲὶ]ν ἐγ͙[κ]εῖϲθαι, τούτω[ι 
 γ’] ὀ̣[ρ]θ̣ω̣ϲ οἰκο[νο]µεῖϲθαι νο- 
30 µίζω τὸν πλοῦ[τ]ο̣ν· ὁ̣ [γ]ὰρ κατὰ 
 τὴ[ν κτῆ]ϲ[ι]ν π[όν]οϲ [κἀ]ν͙ τῶι 
 προ[ϲφορ]ὰν ἕλκειν ἑαυ[τῶι] γί- 
 νε̣τ̣[αι] κἀν τῶι περὶ τῶν ἐλατ- 
 τ[ωµάτ]ων ἀγωνιᾶν, ὡϲ εὐ- 
35 θέ[ωϲ εἰ]ϲ ἀλγηδόν[α κ]α[τ]α- 
 ϲτηϲόν̣τ̣ων ἢ παροῦϲαν ἢ  
         ⸏ προϲδοκωµένην. ἂν δέ τιϲ  
 περι[έ]λη[ι] ἑ̣αυτοῦ τὰϲ τοι[α]ύ- 
 ταϲ [δ]υ̣ϲχερείαϲ, καὶ µὴ [ϲ]ω- 
40 ρεύειν ἐπ̣ιβάλ[η]ται καὶ πο- 
 εῖν τὴν οὐϲίαν ὅτι µεγίϲτην, 
 µηδ’ ἣν ὁ πλο[ῦ]τοϲ ἐξουϲί- 
 αν παρέχει τα[ύ]την παραϲκευ- 
 άζη[τ]αι τῶι δ̣[υ]ϲ̣χερ̣ῶ̣ϲ αὐ- 
45 τὸϲ [τ]ὰ χρήµατα φυλάτ[τειν ἢ ϲυν- 
 άγ̣̣ε[ιν] λ͙ιπαρῶ͙ϲ, ἀπα̣ρ̣ά[λλα- 
xv.1 κτοϲ γίνοιτ’ ἂν διὰ [ταῦτα   
 ἑτοιµότηϲ τῆϲ κτήϲεωϲ τῆι  
         ⸏ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ κοινωνούϲηι· δι- 
 οικεῖν γὰρ οὕτω ταῦτα τῶι κε- 
5 κτῆϲθαι καὶ κτᾶϲθαι τὸν ϲο- 
 φ̣̣ὸν φίλουϲ ἀκόλουθον· 
 Indeed, I think that the right management 
of wealth lies in this: in not feeling 
distressed about what one loses and in not 
trapping oneself on treadmills because of 
an obsessive zeal concerning the more 
and the less. For the pain involved in the 
acquisition of wealth consists both in 
eking out a profit for oneself and in 
agonizing over one's losses on the 
grounds that they will bring one directly 
into pain, whether present or expected. 
But if one has removed from oneself such 
difficulties and does not eagerly desire to 
amass and make one's property as great 
as possible, and, moreover, one does not 
procure for oneself those resources that 
wealth offers by oneself watching 
painfully over one's possessions or by 
collecting them in rich abundance, as a 
result of this a readiness for acquisition 
would become indistinguishable from 
one's readiness to share things very much 
on one's own initiative. In truth, that the 
wise man administers these goods in such 
a manner is a consequence of the fact that 
he has acquired and continues to acquire 
friends. 
 
                                                            
263 Trans. Tsouna (2012). ζήτριον in l. 27 is occastionally attested in this spelling, but George Choeroboscus (ap. 
EM 411.33 vouches for ancient dispute about the accent and the spelling with a diphthong ζήτρειον (or 
ζητρεῖον). Accordingly, ζητρείοιϲ should probably be restored here. 
  At xiv.32 and xv.1, I respectively adopt Delattre and Tsouna's reading (πρὸ[ϲ βί]αν...ἑαυ[τον] Jensen) and 
Sedley's (δία[ιτα καὶ Jensen). The hiatus in line 38 betrays this as paraphrase of Metrodorus.  
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The major objection is that, if the philosopher gets too involved in managing his household, he 
will lose his ataraxia. Wealth, Philodemus admits, is useful for a philosopher in a variety of 
ways (mostly to benefit her friends), but only instrumentally, never per se.  
 This implies that there are two different levels of involvement in a techne, i.e. in this case 
a light to moderate involvement appropriate to the philosopher (with use of the term in an 
extended sense), and a deep involvement appropriate to the manager in the strict sense. Indeed, 
Philodemus says as much, earlier in the On Household Management264:   
On Household Management xvii.2-27:265 
2         ⸏    τεχνί- 
 τηϲ µὲν οὖν ἅµα καὶ ἐργάτηϲ 
 κ]τήϲεωϲ πολλῆϲ καὶ ταχέ- 
5 ωϲ ϲυναγοµένηϲ οὐκ ἴϲωϲ 
 ῥητέοϲ ὁ ϲόφοϲ· ἔϲτι γὰρ δή 
 τιϲ ἐµπειρία καὶ δύναµιϲ καὶ 
 περὶ χρηµατιϲµόν, ἧϲ οὐ κοι- 
 νωνήϲει ϲπουδαῖοϲ ἀ[ν]ήρ, 
10 οὐδὲ τοὺϲ καιροὺϲ παρατη- 
 ρήϲει, µεθ’ ὧν κἂν ἡ τοιαύ- 
 τη δύναµιϲ χρηϲίµη {µη} γί- 
 νοιτο· φιλοχρηµάτου γὰρ ἅ- 
 παντα τοιαῦτα. οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ 
15 φαίνεταί γε καθάπερ [καὶ] ἐ- 
 π’ ἄλλων πλειόνων, ἐν οἷϲ ἀ- 
 γαθῶν ὄντων δηµιουργῶν 
 τό γε [πρ]ὸϲ τὴν χρείαν [ἀρ- 
 κοῦν ἕκαϲτοϲ ἡµῶν, [ὡϲ] εἰ- 
20 πεῖν, οὐ⟨κ ἂν⟩ κακῶϲ ἐπιτελῴηι, 
 οἷον ὁρῶµεν καὶ πε̣ρὶ τὴν 
 τοῦ ϲίτου κατεργαϲίαν ἢ τὴν  
 τῶν ὄψων ϲκε[υ]αϲίαν· πᾶϲ 
 γάρ τιϲ ἱκανὸϲ α[ὑ]τῶι τὰ τοι- 
25 αῦτα ποιεῖν µέχρι τῆϲ [ἀ]ρ- 
              So the sage perhaps is not to be 
called an expert (technites) or producer 
(ergates) of a great deal of property 
collected in a short time. For there is 
indeed an element of experience and a 
capability even regarding money-
making, in which a serious man will not 
take part, nor will he keep an eye out for 
special opportunities, at which times 
such a capability could be useful, 
because all such things are characteristic 
of the greedy man. Never the less, it 
appears to be just as in many other 
cases, in which, although the craftsmen 
are good, nearly any of us could without 
baseness achieve sufficiency for our 
needs, as we see both in baking and in 
the preparation of other foods: everyone 
is capable of doing these things for 
himself to the point of fulfilling his 
need, although there is also a technical 
(i.e. professional) practice of them. 
                                                            
264 See also Blank's discussion (2009: 218-219). 
265 µετά with the genitive (l. 11) in a chronological sense is rare, but attested (LSJ s.v. A IV). It can also more 
broadly mean “in connection with” (LSL s.v. A III).  I take the sense of the passage to be that the sage will not 
keep an eye out for special opportunities at which his experience and capability could be put to greater use than 
normal, for example, special sales or opportunities for investment, since watching the markets so closely is 
bound to distract him from the real business of Epicurean philosophizing. 
  For the mention at ll. 21-3, it is useful to remember that the Greeks divided food not into two categories 
(food and drink) but three: bread, other foods, and drink. For full discussion, see Davidson (1998: 20-23). 
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 κούϲηϲ χρεία[ϲ], οὔϲηϲ [πε]ρ̣ὶ 
27 αὐτὰ καὶ ἐνπερίαϲ ἐν[τε]χνου. 
 
The parallel drawn by Philodemus between cooking and household management is instructive. 
Everyone, he claims, can cook at least well enough that they do not starve; similarly, they should 
be able to manage their households at least well enough that they do not go bankrupt. However, 
beyond cooking well enough for one's own needs, there is a professional level as well, e.g. being 
able to cook luxurious meals for many people, rather than sufficient meals for a small group, like 
a family. The professional level is here called the ἐµπειρία ἔντεχνοϲ266; the normal level is not 
named, but seems to be within the grasp of most people. If the parallel with household 
management holds, then this normal level might be a techne only be extension. At col. 16.34-5, 
Philodemus refers to this familiarity as αὐτὸϲ ὁ λόγοϲ καὶ κοινὴ ἐµπειρία, reason itself and 
common experience, which suffice for non-professional practices that might otherwise be 
classified under the heading of one techne or another. The non-professional, personal use does 
not seem to be a techne (at least not in the technical sense), which requires education, dedicated 
pursuit, and practice to qualify as such. In these cases, most people can manage their households 
and cook well enough to survive, but this does not rise to the level of a techne properly so called.  
For our purposes, we can refer to this as the non-technical skill and the techne. 
 If this division holds in the case in poetry as well, then what differentiates the two 
types? There is no extant evidence that Philodemus made such a division, but I will consider its 
possible implications. Probably, it would simply be a difference of attitude and goals, as in the 
case of the household manager discussed above, though training may enter into the question. 
                                                            
266 Tsouna (2007: 193) notes that Philodemus uses τέχνη, ἐµπειρία and ἔντεχνοϲ ἐµπειρία interchangeably. See 
also On Poems II.43.16-19. 
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After all, being a professional chef does not differ from home cookery in its fundamental goal 
(feeding people), but the skills required and time dedicated to the practice of the techne are quite 
different. In terms of poetry, it would be the difference between being a poet by way of vocation 
(which is banned by Epicurus' famous dictum, fr. 569 Usener), and being pretty good at writing 
verse as a hobby. Nothing stands in the way of such an amateur poet being quite accomplished; 
at issue, rather, is their attitude towards their craft and their use of their own time. If an amateur 
poet maintains their ataraxia, there is nothing obviously standing in the way of their hobby, as 
seems to have been the case for Philodemus' own poetic career. A professional, however, will not 
have enough time to devote to the study of Epicurean philosophy, as well as damagingly 
misplaced priorities. We can also expect differences in results which stem from different levels of 
skill and time devoted to the task. A professional chef is capable of much more than a home 
cook, and a professional poet would compose better poems than an amateur. 
It is true that cooking and household management are necessary skills for people to have 
generally, and that the ability to write poetry is in no way necessary for anyone, but this does not 
seem relevant to Philodemus. The philosopher needs none of the three technai in question, but 
only non-technical skills related to two of them. Some skill in writing poetry could be useful, 
depending on the situation, but many other non-technical skills could potentially be useful.  
Epicureans are expected to dedicate themselves to the study and practice of philosophy rather 
than the cultivation of other skills or technai, and they were expected to be able to thrive even in 
conditions of poverty, both of which obviate the need for most technai. If one follows the 
example of Epicurus, and is perfectly happy with lentils and bread, and counts cheese is a luxury, 
technical knowledge of cookery is a waste of time and effort that would be better expended 
elsewhere. 
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Chapter Five  
The Form, Content, Judgment, and Purpose of Poems 
 
§1 Introduction 
 The two aspects of poetry, content and form, were first distinguished by Plato, Resp. III 
392c6, where the terms are λόγοι (“stories,” i.e. contents) and λέξιϲ (“language”). Philodemus 
explicitly sets out a relative valuation of them and indicates that they are inseparable, though 
evidently they can be discussed separately. His discussion of form and content, as well as the 
criteria he advances for judging poems, are the topic of this chapter; I hope to explain what, in 
Philodemus' opinion, constitutes both parts, their relative valuation, and the principles by which 
he judges poems. 
 In a passage to be examined in greater detail later, Philodemus sets outs his idea of the 
basic interrelatedness of form and content. For now, it will suffice to know that Philodemus is 
responding to Crates of Mallos, the critic and Homeric scholar, who had set out a particular and 
idiosyncratic scheme for interpreting Homeric cosmology and was a euphonist critic of poetry. 
Philodemus' objection is that Crates' cosmological interpretations violate the meanings of the 
words while his euphonic strictures ignore them.  
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On Poems V.28.33-29.7:267 
33   ἢ πρόϲλ[ο- 
 γον ἐϲτὶ τὸ διὰ τ̣ῆ[ϲ] ἀκο- 
35 ῆϲ τὰϲ λέξειϲ παραδέ- 
1 χεϲθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ ἀ- 
 ληθὲϲ δι’ ὅλο̣͙υ͙ [τὰ νο]ούµε- 
 να ἐν ποήµ[αϲι]ν κρίνεϲ- 
 θαι, καὶ µηδ’, ὅταν τὴν 
5 ϲύνθεϲιν ἐπαινῶµεν, ἀ-  
 ποϲπᾶν̣ αὐτὴν τῶν ὑπο- 
 τεταγµένων. 
Either it is reasonable that the 
mind accepts the language 
through the faculty of hearing 
or it is generally true that the 
contents in poems are judged 
and that, whenever we praise 
the composition, we should 
not tear it away from what 
underlies it. 
 
Philodemus' objections deal with the separation of language and meaning which Crates requires 
in his theories. By demanding euphony without concern for the meaning, Crates is severing the 
necessary connection between words and referents, and by interpreting Homer symbolically (or 
allegorically, i.e. through hyponoiai), he is doing violence to the obvious meaning of the text. 
Both objections hinge on the close relationship between form and content, or better, language 
and meaning demanded by Epicurus. 
 For now, we will examine what Philodemus means by form and content taken separately, 
and then we will consider their interconnection and how this plays out in the judgment of poems. 
First, we will discuss the terms—what does Philodemus mean when he says form and content?—
and then their relationship to each other. 
 
§2 Terminology: λέξιϲ, διάνοια, ϲύνθεϲιϲ, and ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια 
 Philodemus accepts the division of poetry into content and form, but the terminology is 
                                                            
267 The text incorporates a correction of misprinted ἢ at 28.33 (Janko [1994] correcting Mangoni [1993]). Janko also 
suggested to me reading πρόϲλογον instead of πρὸϲ λόγον, which is the usual supplement and interpretation. 
The adjective is not attested, but is presupposed by the rare ἀπρόϲλογοϲ (in Polybius) and may have been 
common in the banking industry (cf. Theocritus, Ep. 14 = AP ix.435 and LSJ s. v. λόγοϲ. I.1). I also conjectured 
δι’ ὅλου for δι’ ὅλα in 29.2, since the latter is almost certainly wrong; it does not have a parallel until the 16th 
century CE. The genitive was simply attracted to the case of the following phrase. 
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not completely straightforward.268 There are several words for each, which seem at first glance to 
be used without differentiation. On investigation, however, it is clear that Philodemus' preferred 
terms are λέξιϲ for language, ϲύνθεϲιϲ for “arrangement,” which is probably shorthand for 
ϲύνθεϲιϲ τῆϲ λέξεωϲ, or arrangement of the language, is “form,” and διάνοια “thought” for 
content. λέξιϲ is used sometimes for form as well, in an extension of its usual sense.269 He uses 
other terms as well, but they are usually borrowed from whichever critic he is engaging at that 
point in the treatise. 
 Demetrius Laco offers two definitions of λέξιϲ, one for the proper definition (κυρίωϲ), 
the other for the specific use in question (ἰδίωϲ), at On Poems II.36.2-10. The context is too 
broken to be useful in specific details, and one important term is not well understood, but he was 
willing to recognize two uses of the term.270 For what it is worth, his definition for the proper 
usage is ὅτι λέξιϲ κοινῶϲ µὲν λέγεται φωνὴ ἔναρθροϲ ἐν ὧι τρόπωι καὶ ἡ ἀνυπότακτο͙ϲ, 
“lexis is commonly termed articulate speech in the same way as ἀνυπότακτοϲ [sc. speech] is 
also,” which I take to mean that language is articulate speech and that it stands in a relationship 
                                                            
268 Mangoni (1993: 79-103) has usefully analyzed the terms used in On Poems V, and my discussion is founded on 
her work. 
269 Philodemus juxtaposes λέξιϲ with διανόηµα at V.25.32, διάνοια at V.26.2, and νοήµατα at V.35.6. For a 
complete list of these juxtapositions, see Mangoni (1993: 87). Further, “language” is an obvious choice to refer 
to the linguistic aspects of a work of literature, especially when composition (ϲύνθεϲιϲ) is already a technical 
term. λέξιϲ was a technical term for Aristotle, who used it to refer to the language which characters in poetry 
used. 
270 The word in question is ἀνυπότακτοϲ, which can mean “not restrained, free; unclassified; irregular.” Romeo ad 
loc. rightly rejects “irregular” for our sense, but I think she is wrong to link it with ϲύνδεϲµοι (conjunctions) and 
the processes of διαίρεϲιϲ and διαϲτολή (both “division” of some sort) and translate it as “loose” (sciolto) 
stylistically. I would rather compare it with Philodemus' use of ὑποτάττειν and perhaps translate it as “casual, 
quotidian, careless, without ordering principle” i.e. quotidian conversational discourse, rather than carefully 
composed verse or prose works (which for Philodemus have a ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια), with reference not to 
style but to the thought given to the composition. The translation given above reflects my opinion; Romeo would 
have it mean “lexis is articulate voice in the same way in which the unbound (i.e. without ϲύνδεϲµοι, 
conjunctions) style is” (“Lexis viene definita la voce articolata nello stesso modo in cui viene definito anche lo 
stile slegato” [1993: 136]). 
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to unorganized, i.e. disjointed speech.271 Since incomprehensible speech does not maintain its 
connection with τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα (cf. Ep. Hdt. §47), it could be said to be ἀνυπότακτοϲ or 
“without anything underlying it.” This fundamental demand for meaningful language carries 
through into Philodemus' poetics, in which the διάνοια ὑποτεταγµένη plays an important role 
(see below for more on the verb and on the idea). 
 The words for content are more problematic, because they seem to refer to two different 
types of content. First, there is the content of the poem in the sense of “what happens in the 
poem,” i.e. the plot. There are terms like µῦθοϲ (“plot” or “story,” Aristotle's term) and ὑπόθεϲιϲ 
(“plot,” the term in general use in the Hellenistic period). πλάϲµα (probably Heracleides' term), 
which in later Greek means “fiction,” also occurs in a lacunose passage at On Poems V.8.34.272 
Alongside these terms are another set with a different reference: διάνοια, διανοήµατα, 
νοήµατα, and νοούµενα are all taken to refer to the “thought” of the poem.273 We tend to 
separate the plot of the poem from the author's intention, but it does not seem that Philodemus 
(or any other ancient theorist) did this consistently.  
 Philodemus' preferred term for “thought” seems to be διάνοια and it is significantly 
paired with parts of the verb ὑποτάττειν. It means “mind” or “reason” in Epicurean philosophy 
                                                            
271 The emendation to the papyrus reading of ανυποτακταϲ was made by De Falco. Hiatus in φωνὴ ἔναρθροϲ 
means that the definition is not Demetrius' own, because he avoids hiatus. I have suggested in a paper delivered 
in 2013 that he is quoting Epicurus. Romeo ad loc. suggests that it has a Stoic origin on the basis of the mention 
of articulation, which plays an important roll in their theory. However, this is no indication that Stoic theories are 
at issue, and it is more likely that Demetrius, an Epicurean after all, would object (cf. ὡϲ ἂν οὐ βλέπων ὅτι ... 
“as if he didn't understand that ...” introducing the quotation in the main text) to an opponent on Epicurean 
grounds rather than Stoic grounds. However, the context is very damaged and much about this passage remains 
mysterious. It is not clear what the ἰδίωϲ use was. It may have been either lexis as a particular language (e.g. 
Greek) or lexis in its sense of “literary style.” 
272 If Philodemus did use it, it was almost certainly a borrowing from Heracleides, since it appears nowhere else in 
Philodemus' treatise in this sense, but it is used in books I and II to mean “style:” see Janko (2003: 415 n. 6). Its 
use to mean “(work of) fiction” seems to be much later. 
273 That διάνοια is the “meaning” of a poem rather than the contents was suggested by Hammerstaedt (2003, 308) à 
propos the instance at On Poems V.26.4-5, but this does not seem to hold up throughout the treatise. See further 
on content below, §4. 
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generally; it is appropriate that the contents of the poem, which, as we will see, must appeal to 
the mind, should be referred to with the same word.274 Aristotle had already used διάνοια in his 
analysis of tragedy in a different sense (i.e. the thought behind the statements of the narrator or 
of a particular character in the tragedy, see Poetics 50a6-7). In the scholia it is used to signify 
“meaning,” i.e. the paraphrasable content of a sentence or passage.275 The use of dianoia in the 
phrase hypotetagmene dianoia in Philodemus is more closely akin to that in scholiastic literary 
criticism.276 
 As for the meaning of ὑποτεταγµένη, two passages from Epicurus' On Nature XXVIII 
indicate that the verb has to do with the relationship between words and meaning for 
Epicureans.277 The surviving portions of this book handle a type (or types) of error in language. 
The first passage belongs to a discussion of how confusion and false utterances arise, which 
Sedley ascribed to the period when Epicureans were trying to reform language usage. I have 
italicized his translations of the verb ὑποτάττειν. 
Epicurus On Nature XXVIII Fr. 6 col. I:278 
5   οὕ[τω γ]ὰρ 
 ἀνα̣γκαῖον ἦν̣ τοῦτο {υτο} 
 ἐνδίκνυ̣[ϲ]θαι τὸ δ̣ὴ ὅτ̣[ι] βλέ- 
 ποντεϲ [το]ὺϲ ὁµοφώνο̣υ̣[ϲ ἡµῖν 
 ὄ̣[ν]τα̣[ϲ] ἀ[ν]τικειµ[έ]ν̣[ω]ϲ ̣αἷϲ ἡ-̣ 
10 µε[ῖ]ϲ φωναῖ̣ϲ χρ̣[ώµ]ε̣[θα] ψευ- 
 δ[έϲ τι ἄλ]λ̣ο̣ ὑπ̣[οτ]ά̣ττοντα[ϲ 
 ἀνύπ]ο̣π̣τό[ν τε] ἐ[π]’ ἐκίναιϲ τα[ῖϲ 
 ἐ̣[ννο]ία[ι]ϲ̣, ἀλλὰ µέ̣νο̣[ν]τ̣[εϲ  ̣  ̣ 
 π̣ρ̣ὸ̣[ϲ α]ὐτοὺϲ  ̣  ̣εϲ[ ̣  ̣ δεδο- 
15 ξάϲθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ τι̣[ ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣   ̣
For it was so necessary to point 
out that we, by observing that 
those who speak the same 
language as us were, in contrast 
to our own use of words, 
assigning some unsuspected false 
connotation in addition to those 
meanings but remaining, in 
respect to them … to think rather 
than on account of … 
 
                                                            
274 On the meaning of the term, see Kleve (1963). 
275 So Dickey (2007: 232). Schironi (2009) argues that Aristarchus continued to use Aristotle's sense of the term 
dianoia. 
276 Schironi (2009: 297-300) argues that Aristarchus uses the term in the familiar Aristotelean sense “contents” (cf. 
Poetics 50a6-7 and 56a36-b2 and Rhetoric 1404a18-19). 
277 Both these passages should be read with Sedley's introduction and notes to his edition (1973). 
278 I have added the last part of the translation; Sedley left it untranslated. 
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A second passage contains a similar worry, about how changing views of language in the early 
days of the Epicurean school might leave them open to attacks from opponents: 
 
Epicurus On Nature XXVIII, fr. 13 col. VI inf. 10-col. VII sup. 5 (numeration sic): 
VI.10     καὶ̣ [ἐκῖ- 
 νο ἔγωγε πολλάκιϲ ἐνεθυ- 
 µήθην τὸ ὅτι [εἰ, ἐ]µοῦ προφέ- 
 ροντοϲ ἀπορήµ[α]τα ἅ τιϲ 
 ἂµ πρὸϲ ἡµᾶϲ ἔ[τρε]π̣εν, ἀπο- 
5 δι̣δ̣ώιη ὃ ἐκ τῶν [λέ]ξεων ϲυν- 
 οι̣κ̣ε̣[ιοῦν] ὡϲ̣ ̣ταὐτὸ ϲυ̣νέβαινε 
 µελε̣τ̣[ᾶν] ἐπὶ τῆϲ γραφῆϲ, 
 πολλο[ῖ]ϲ ἂν ἴϲωϲ δόξειε τό- 
1 τε µέν, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸν ἐπι- 
VII.1 βλ̣ητικὸν τρόπον ἢ περιλη- 
 πτ̣ικῶϲ ̣ἢ φανταϲτικ[ῶϲ] ἢ 
 δ[ι]ὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶϲ, 
 ψευδὴϲ ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖ[ϲ 
5 λέ̣ξ̣εϲ[̣ιν] ἐκίναιϲ δόξα ... 
I also frequently reflected that if, 
when I raised difficulties which 
someone might have turned against 
us, he should claim that what used 
to be assimilated from ordinary 
language was the same as used to 
be practised in the written work, 
many might well conclude that in 
those days false opinion was 
represented in that language, 
whether through an empirical 
process, an imaged-based process, 
or a theoretical process... 
 
Sedley has translated ὑποτάττειν differently in both of these passages, but it is clear that it 
refers to the ideas that undergird our language. In the first passage, ὑποτάττονταϲ refers to the 
action of assigning a meaning to a word, and, in the second, ὑποτετάχθαι refers to the opinion's 
being arrayed among the meanings of a word. In this connection, we should remember that the 
same usage occured in the phrase τὰ ὑποτεταγµένα τοῖϲ φθόγγοιϲ (Ep. Hdt. §37). 
 I suggest that Philodemus uses the phrase ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια in poetry by analogy 
or extension with or from language: in language, meaning undergirds words. In poetry, the 
meaning of the poem undergirds the words of the poem. This will have an important 
consequence for the interrelationship between form and content: the content determines the form, 
at least to some extent, since words and meanings are linked and not to be separated. 
 The most suggestive statement of what Philodemus means by ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια 
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comes at V.29-31, in his refutation of the anonymous opinions in Zeno's book.279 The first 
opinion handled by Philodemus claims that the excellence of a poem comes about when the 
composition delights the hearing or is easily borne (κ[αλῶ]ϲ φεροµένη) and impresses its 
meaning (διάνοια) on the audience. Philodemus' objections are predictable: word order does not 
delight the hearing, the opponent did not define “excellence,” or what kind of meaning the poem 
ought to have, or several other terms besides. After registering his objections, he makes a brief 
statement in his own words in which he expands on his objection that his opponent has not said 
anything particular to poetry:  
On Poems V.30.6-12:280 
6          ἡ δὲ  
 ϲύνθεϲιϲ λέξεωϲ ἐναρ- 
 γῶϲ καὶ ἐµφατικῶϲ τὴν  
 ὑποτεταγµένην διάνοι- 
10 αν [ϲ]ηµαίνουϲα{ν} κοι- 
 ν]ή [γ’ ἐϲ]τι καὶ λόγου παν- 
          ⸐ τὸϲ ἀρετή{ϲ}. 
But the composition of the 
language, which clearly and 
expressively signifies the 
underlying meaning, is common 
to every discourse and is their 
virtue.  
 
For the moment, Philodemus treats poetry and prose together as discourse and defines clear, 
                                                            
279 This Zeno is commonly assumed to be Philodemus' teacher, Zeno of Sidon, who did write a work Περὶ 
ποιηµάτων χρήϲεωϲ “On the Use of Poetry,” although if the Stoic were Zeno of Tarsus, he would be making a 
reappearance here. Since the doxai are not presented as belonging to Zeno, but as in his work, the assumption 
that the author is Zeno of Sidon seems unwarranted (see chapter two, §7). They are transmitted anonymously 
here (though one is assignable to Andromenides), and difficult to refer to specific philosophical schools or 
intellectual traditions, because of their brevity and general nature. See generally Asmis (1992c). This same 
brevity, paradoxically, makes them useful for exploring Philodemus' poetics, since he presents the totality of his 
opponent's statement and then explains his objections to it. Since the compass is so small and the discussion is at 
the end of the book, it is well preserved. (Four of the same opinions are handled, though with minor differences 
in phrasing, in PHerc. 228, fr. 3, which is an earlier part of On Poems V.) 
280 The emendations in ll. 10 and 12 were made by Dübner and Jensen respectively. According to Gaines, ἔµφαϲιϲ 
(l. 8), as a technical term, can refer to a use of language to mean more than the bare denotations of the words: “a 
forceful use of language to express a meaning deeper or broader than that literally conveyed by the composer's 
words” (1982: 76 n. 18). Otherwise, in the realm of verbal communication, it can mean “force” or 
“expressiveness.” But we need not assume that the word always has its technical significance. Philodemus 
himself seems to use ἐµφατικόϲ to simply mean “forceful” in the On Rhetoric (lib. inc.) PHerc. 1004 fr.7.6 
(I.326 Sudhaus); his example is a saying of Epicurus (δι’ οὗ γίνεται τὸ ζῆν ἀλ̣[ύ]π̣ωϲ, ἐπιµελητέον το[ύ]του· 
δι’ οὗ δὲ [µ]ὴ γίνετ’, οὐδαµῶϲ), which is notable more for its brevity, pith, and force than for any implication 
that there is something deeper to be apprehended. 
  In ll. 10-12, I take λόγου παντὸϲ with both κοινή and ἀρετή. 
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forceful communication of their ideas as an excellence common to both of them. That the 
διάνοια is ὑποτεταγµένη λόγωι recalls Epicurus' usage (Ep. Hdt. §47, discussed above) in 
which he demands that our language correspond to the underlying meanings. Philodemus 
concludes his refutation of this opinion as follows:  
On Poems V.30.34-31.7: 
34 καὶ τὴν διάνοι[α]ν µέντοι, 
 πο̣ίαν τινὰ τοῖϲ ποιή- 
36 µαϲιν ἀξιουµένην 
31.1 ὑπο̣τάτ[τ]εϲθαι, καὶ ὅ- 
 λωϲ οὗτοι καὶ πολλ[οὶ 
 τῶν πρό]τερον ἐξητα[ϲ- 
 µ[έ]νων καὶ τῶν ὕϲτε- 
5 ρον θεωρηθηϲοµένων 
 πο[λ]ὺ [δ]έ̣ουϲιν ἀποχ̣α- 
          ⸏ ρά]ττειν. 
However, what sort of thought 
is judged worthy to underlie 
poems, both these critics in 
general and many of those 
whom we examined previously 
and will investigate later are far 
from characterizing. 
 
 
 Philodemus' complaint is that these critics and many others simply have not given an 
adequate description of the contents of poetry. There is no hint here that a ὑποτεταγµένη 
διάνοια is something characteristic of only a few poems, and that it is generally the same as the 
διάνοια is suggested by a passage from the start of the refutation of this doxa: Philodemus 
objects that the διάνοια (unqualified in the doxa) has not been defined: 
On Poems V.29.32-6: 
32     ⸏             οὐ 
 διορίζει δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν 
 τῶι τίνα καὶ ποίαν δεῖ 
35 διάνοιαν ἐ̣[κ]φέρειν µὴ 
36 ὑπογεγραφέναι̣. 
And he does not define 
excellence by not indicating 
which and what kind of thought 
one ought to express. 
 
The objection in this case is the same as the one above; the only difference is in its phrasing. This 
leads us to believe that διάνοια is just a shorter way of saying ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια, which 
itself implies τοῖϲ ποήµαϲι. 
 Thus διάνοια is the contents of the poetry, and Philodemus does not seem to distinguish 
  128 
between contents of the poem stricto sensu and the poet's “take” on them or intention. This state 
of affairs is surprising to us moderns, but it is worth remembering that Aristotle did not 
recognize the distinction in his Poetics, nor did Horace in his Ars Poetica. Aristotle may have 
subordinated authorial intention to his own view of how tragedy works on the psyches of its 
audience, or considered them to be the same. Horace might be assuming a certain intention 
(either elite propagandizing or entertainment) or have left it out of what is a fairly practical book 
of limited scope. They may also have considered it to be part of the poet's responsibility during 
the selection and arrangement of the contents. With this in mind, we can perhaps see a 
requirement for the poet to have a take on his material enter through the back door when 
Philodemus says that the contents are said to move the audience “rationally by artistic means” 
(τῶι τεχνικῶι λογιϲτικῶϲ κ{ε̣}[ι]νεῖ, I.175.22-23).  
 The phrase implies a certain view of the relationship between form and content, namely 
that contents have priority over form, not just chronologically or in the process of composition, 
but also linguistically, in that the poet's word choice is determined by her choice of contents.281 
That is, contents are selected and then the form is built up over them: the thought underlies 
(ὑποτάττεται) the form. Though this may seem to separate the two from each other, the verb 
implies rather a much closer relationship: form and content have the same kind of close 
relationship to each other as words and things do in the Epicurean analysis of language. The 
language of the poem cannot help but reflect the contents, because correctly used language 
                                                            
281 Such a priority is, on reflection, reasonable: one cannot write verses that literally do not have a topic. For 
compositions of a whole poem to occur, the poet must have an intended topic. See chapter 3, §4 and §4 below on 
On Poems II.64.23-65.24. At On Poems II.30.17-23, Philodemus says that the poet thinks of the contents which 
he then makes clear through the composition: φροντίϲαϲ γὰρ τοῦ διανοήµατοϲ, ὃ διὰ τῆϲ καταϲκευῆ̣[ϲ 
ἔλ]εγον ἐµφαίνεϲθαι, κ[ριθήϲ]εται ποητὴϲ ἀγαθὸϲ ἐ[πὶ] τ͙ῆ[ι] φροντιϲτεί⟨αι⟩ (“For by taking care of the 
thought, which as I was saying is manifested by means of the elaboration, he will be judged a good poet 
according to a certain standard of care”). On this last passage, see below, chapter six, §3. 
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cannot help but have meaning. This close relationship has important consequences for the 
Epicurean analysis of how poetry works. 
 This is different from Aristotle's view in the Poetics (51b13-32), where he states that the 
poet can decide on and work out the plot before the language, or even the character names, is 
added in. It seems that, for Aristotle, the plot is completely prior and not intertwined with 
language; for Philodemus, the form and content are inseparable, even though the poet must 
logically conceive of the contents prior to the language.  
 
§3 Form and Content 
  As we shall soon see, form is valued more highly than content, but they constitute the two 
halves of a coin and are just as inseparable. This inseparability is grounded in Epicurean 
commitments about language, specifically that words should always signify. Both are essential to 
the judgment of poems, but are not equal in that realm. First I will lay out Philodemus' rules for 
judging poems, which he gave in his rebuttal of the Stoic Critic:282 
                                                            
282 For this Stoic, see Mangoni (1993: 61-69), who is agnostic about his identity, and Ioppolo (1980: 256-278; 
2005), who treats him as Ariston. Textual evidence for his name survives only at col. 16.28-30, where the 
reading is  ]τ̣ων, with the tau very uncertain, since it survives only in the Oxford disegno. Fish and Armstrong 
state that Ἀρίϲ]τ̣ων is too long by two letters for the space (leaving only one and a half or two letter widths 
before the damaged tau in the Oxford disegno, or two and half to three spaces and -ων if that trace is 
disregarded), but do restore a reference to the Stoic school just before the name. Wigodsky's conjecture δο]ξ̣ῶν 
is probably the best option (“The one upholding Stoic beliefs”). If that is not accepted, the adversary might be 
the Stoic Zeno of Tarsus (successor of Chrysippus in 204), whose name would fit if the tau in the Oxford 
disegno is interpreted as a slight miscopying of the top horizontal and diagonal instead of a horizontal. Very little 
is known of his work. The extant fragments (SVF III p. 209; n.b. the fragment of Philodemus' history of the 
Stoics has been reedited in Dorandi's edition of that work) focus on the organization of philosophy and the 
ekpyrosis, as well as a possibly spurious work in five books Against Hieronymus, who, interestingly, wrote on 
rhetoric and style. He did write on dialectic, however, which may indicate a broader interest in language, 
including poetry. Amusingly, the Suda's entry shows confusion between the Stoic Zeno of Tarsus and the 
Epicurean Zeno of Sidon, Philodemus' teacher.  
  Very little is actually known about Stoic positions about poetry; the main idea seems to have been that 
poetic form seems to foster or aid the inculcation of correct beliefs irrationally. See esp. Seneca Ep. 108.10 and 
the quotation of Cleanthes at Philodemus On Music IV.142.1-14 (which is Philodemus' rebuttal of a position 
possibly summarized at 53.8). 
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On Poems V.19.34-21.27:283 
34   εἰ γὰρ] οὔτ’ ἀϲ- 
35 τείαν ⟨οὔ⟩τε φ[α]ύλην ἔλε-  
20.1 γε, τίνα τὴν [ἔχουϲαν ϲο-  
 φὰϲ καὶ [παιδευτικὰϲ ὑ- 
 πέλειπεν δ̣[ιανοίαϲ, κ]α[ὶ 
 ποῖα τῶ̣ν ἀρχαίω[ν ὑ]π͙ε͙[τί- 
5 θει ποη̣µ ̣[άτων ταύτ]α̣ϲ 
          ⸏ περιέχειν; κα[θόλ]ου 
 δ’, εἰ µὴ ταῦτα καλ[ὰ π]οή- 
 µατα φήϲει τ[ιϲ, πα]ντε- 
 λῶϲ οὐχ ὁρῶ τ̣[ί]να φή- 
10 ϲει]. τεχν̣ι͙κ͙[ὰ µ]έντοι  
 τὰ παρα[πλή]ϲια τοῖϲ Ἀ[ν- 
 τιµάχο[υ γιν]ώϲκω τ[ι- 
 νὰϲ λέγον̣[τα]ϲ. ε[ἰ] δ’ ἑτέ- 
 ροιϲ, κ̣αὶ [δὴ τ]αὐτά̣ (πᾶϲ[α 
15 γὰρ ἐ̣ξουϲία π͙ᾶϲιν ἐ͙δόθη) 
 λ̣ελέχθω. κατὰ τέχνην δὲ 
 τὴν ἐπαιν̣[ε]τὴν γέγρα- 
 πται, πόλεω̣[ν] αὐτ[οῖϲ] καὶ 
 τόπων οὕτωϲ εὐαρµ ̣όϲ- 
20 τωϲ ἐ[νόντω]ν̣, ϲὺν τῶι 
 καὶ τὴν τάξι[ν] διαφυλάτ- 
 τειν, ὃ κἂν ὠφέλιµόν τιϲ 
 εἴπειεν. λέγοντα δ’ ἑ[π]ο-̣ 
 µένω̣ϲ, “ὅϲα µήτε τὴν ϲύν- 
25 θεϲιν µήτε τ[ὴν δ]ιάνοι- 
 αν ἀϲτείαν ἔ[χει, µ]ήτε 
 ἀϲτεῖα µήτε φαῦλα ε͙ἶν̣αι,” 
 µέµφοµαι διό[τ]ι τῶν το[ι- 
 ούτων οὐ πα[ρ]έθηκεν ὑ͙-  
30 πόδε[ι]γµα. θαυ[µ]αϲτὸ[ν 
 γὰρ̣ εἶναί µοι δο͙[κεῖ τὸ 
 ϲύνθεϲιν ἔχον οὐ̣[κ ἀϲτεί- 
 αν καὶ διάνο͙ι[αν οὔθ’ ὁ- 
 λ͙ῶϲ ποητικὴν [οὔτ’ ἀϲτεί- 
35 αν µὴ φαῦλον ε[ἶ]ν̣[αι. ἐ-  
21.1 κεῖνα τοίνυν ἐπ[αι]νῶ, δ[ι- 
 ότι “[τ]ὰ̣ τὴν [µὲν διάν]ο[ιαν 
 ἀϲτείαν ἔχο[ντα, κακὴν  
... [for if] he meant neither good 
nor bad [sc. contents], what poem 
with wise and educational thoughts 
did he leave us, and which of the 
ancient poems did he think 
contained these? Generally, if 
someone denies that these are good 
poems, I cannot possibly see which 
ones he will say are good poems. I 
recognize that some people claim 
that the poems similar to those of 
Antimachus are in line with the 
demands of the art. But if [sc. the 
poems are similar] to other 
[poems], let the same be said, since 
every indulgence has been granted 
to everyone. The poems have been 
written in accordance with the art 
that is praised, since the cities and 
places are in them so harmoniously, 
along with the preservation of the 
order, which someone could even 
call “useful.” 
 I blame him for not pro-
viding an example for his next 
claim that “those poems which 
have neither good synthesis nor 
good thought are neither good nor 
bad.” For it seems amazing to me 
that “a poem with neither good 
synthesis nor good or any poetic 
thought at all is not bad.” 
 So I praise those [sc. 
opinions], that “those that have 
good thought but bad composition 
are bad,” and that “being badly 
                                                            
283 The supplement εἰ γὰρ at 19.34 is Janko's. At 20.10, I read τεχν̣ι͙κ͙[ὰ µ]έντοι (my emendation) for the reading 
τέχν̣η̣[ν µ]έντοι of Fish and Armstrong. O however seems to read τέχνην clearly. Janko conjectured 
ἐπεν̣[εχθέντων at the end of 21.12, which is likely if the letters now read there belong to a different layer. I have 
translated πόηµα as “poem” since Philodemus' usage generally shows little indication that it should mean 
“verse” (the idea that a πόηµα is a small part of a πόηϲιϲ is Neoptolemus', not Philodemus', and that usage 
should not be imputed to him). I take the reference in ll. 16-23 to be to the poems of Antimachus, but it may be, 
as Janko suggests (pers. comm.), to the Catalogue of Ships in the Iliad. 
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 δὲ τὴν ϲύνθε[ϲ]ιν, µ[ο]χ̣θη-  
5 ρά ἐϲτι,” [κ]αὶ διό[τι] “τὸ κ[ακῶ]ϲ  
 ϲυνκεῖϲθαι πρὸϲ τὸ φ[αῦ-  
 λον ἀπόχ̣ρη.” τὸ͙ δ̣ὲ π̣[ρὸϲ 
 τὸ ϲπουδαῖον µὴ ἀπ̣[ο- 
 χρῆν τὸ καλῶϲ, ἀλ[λὰ] προϲ- 
10 δεῖϲθαι καὶ εὐφω̣[νίαϲ 
 καὶ διανοίαϲ̣ [καὶ π]ολλῶν 
 ἀλλῶν επεν̣[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣]ϲ̣π̣α̣[ ̣  ̣
 µο[ι] φ̣̣αίνεται [ ̣ ̣( ̣)]ηϲθειϲ ̣
 τεϲ[  ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣   ̣( ̣) κ]αὶ ϲυν[ε- 
15 πενηνέχθαι ταῖϲ ἀγε[νή- 
 τοιϲ εὐφωνίαιϲ τῶν κ[ρι- 
 ⸏τικῶν. ἔτι δ[ὲ µ]ᾶλλον 
 τὸ “τινὰ τῶν ἀρχ̣[α]ίων κα- 
 τά τι χρ̣η̣ϲ[τ]ὰ̣ [ὄ]ντα καὶ µά- 
20 λιϲτα κατὰ τὴ[ν ϲύ]νθε- 
 ϲιν καθάπαξ εἶναι φαῦλα.” 
 τ]οῦ γὰρ “τὰ κατά τι ϲπου- 
 δα]ῖα καθάπαξ εἶναι [φ]αῦ- 
 λ]ά γ’” [οὐδ]ὲν ἀδιανοη[τό]τε- 
25 ρον] εὑρίϲκω κατ[ὰ τὴν 
 ϲ͙υνή[θ]ειαν ἀκούων τῶν 
 λεγ[ο]µένων. 
composed suffices for a judgment 
of 'bad.'” But that being well 
composed does not suffice for a 
judgment of “good,” but there is a 
further need for euphony, thought, 
and many other [qualities] … 
seems to me [somehow mistaken], 
and to have been brought in with 
the nonexistent euphonies of the 
critics. Even more so the claim that 
“some of the poems of the ancients, 
though good in one respect, but 
mostly in composition, are 
completely bad.” If I read that 
according to the accepted sense of 
the words, I can find nothing more 
thoughtless than the claim that 
poems which are good in one way 
are completely bad. 
 
This passage has been recognized as fundamental for Philodemus' poetics since at least 
Greenberg.284 The opponent is unknown; Jensen identified him as Ariston of Chios, a Stoic; 
Mangoni refers to him as “the Stoicizing critic.”285 Whoever he was, his poetics are fairly simple. 
He thinks that poems can be good, bad, or intermediate, and that both good synthesis and good 
thoughts are important, but Philodemus takes him to task for claiming that a poem without any 
good aspect might somehow be “not bad” and for claiming that a poem with at least one good 
aspect is completely bad. He seems actually to like Antimachus, as Plato did. Despite that, some 
of his critical rules are approved by Philodemus.286 
  The implication of the Stoic critic's position is that, while composition and contents are 
                                                            
284 Summarized at (1990: 273). 
285 See above, n. 282. 
286 Ioppolo (2005, updating the relevant chapter in Ioppolo 1980) discusses this Stoic's opinions and attempts to 
prove that he was Ariston (she does not take into account the papyrological problem of the space for his name). 
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different things, and can be evaluated separately, a poem requires them both, and requires them 
both to be at least reasonably good. Philodemus accepts this much, but his objections reveal his 
positions: bad composition makes a bad poem, no matter the quality of the thought. No matter, 
that is to say, how educational or beneficial the contents of the poem might be thought to be, if 
the composition is bad, it is a bad poem.287 On the other side of the coin, mere good composition 
does not suffice for a judgment of “good”—good contents are also necessary. A poem cannot 
judged good without good contents and good composition. Finally, even if a poem is bad, if it 
has some good aspect, it is not wholly bad (and to claim so is an affront against the normal use of 
language). Philodemus' specific statement that the euphonies demanded by the kritikoi do not 
and never have existed was supported by argumentation in books Ι and ΙΙ of the treatise, where 
he demonstrated that the rules are arbitrary and were not actually followed by poets in practice, a 
position that he summarizes neatly here. 
 What do composition and content consist of? This is a much vexed question. Philodemus 
gives a hint elsewhere in book V in his discussion of some unnamed philosophers who made 
some interesting claims, firstly that poets composed according to themata, arbitrary stipulations, 
and secondly that poetry provided no natural good or natural benefit (φυϲικὸν ἀγαθόν, φυϲικὸν 
ὠφέληµα) either in language or in thought. The identity of these philosophers is a riddle.288 The 
passage is worth quoting at length: 
On Poems V.25.2-26.11:289 
                                                            
287 See below for more on this topic. 
288 There are many possibilities: Janko (2003: 129-133) argues for early Epicureans, Philippson (1924) and now 
Hammerstaedt (2003) suggest Skeptics. They were definitely not Stoics nor is it likely that they were Peripatetics 
(if later members of that school hewed closely to Aristotle's views). 
289 See Hammerstaedt (2003: 305-315) for discussion of the text of this passage and further bibliography. In 25.30, I 
suggest {ε ̣}⸌τ̣ο̣ι⸍γάρτ̣ο̣ι ̣as the interpretation of the traces reported on the papyrus. For ἔπη (25.27) as “verses” 
simply rather than “epic verses,” see LSJ s.v. ἔποϲ IV b and c. The generality of the discussion here warrants the 
less specific translation. Asmis's discussion (1991: 8-9) of this passage specifically is vitiated by taking the goals 
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2 τ[οὺ]ϲ δὲ θ[έ]µατα φάϲ̣κ̣ον- 
 τεϲ εἶναι φιλο̣ϲ̣ό̣φουϲ π[ρὸ]ϲ 
 ἃ δ̣εῖ βλέπονταϲ κρίνειν, 
5 κ[αὶ] τὰ λοιπὰ προϲτιθέν- 
 ταϲ ἃ µετέγραψεν, εἰ µὲν 
 τ]οὺϲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον 
 ἠι]νίττετο, φλύαροϲ ἦν,  
 ὡ̣ϲ καὶ γέγονε καὶ γενή- 
10 ϲ]εται π̣ρ̣ο̣ι̣όντω[ν] ϲυµ- 
 φ[α]ν̣έϲ. εἰ δ’ ἄλλου̣ϲ τινάϲ,  
 ἐ[κε]ῖνοι τὸ µὲ̣[ν] ἠλήθευ- 
 ο[ν, τ]ὸ δ’ ἐψεύδ[ον]το, τὰ δὲ  
 παρέλιπον. παρέλειποµ 
15 µὲν ὅλωϲ τὰϲ͙ ἐνν̣οίαϲ 
 τῶν ἀϲτείων καὶ φαύλων 
 ποιηµάτων καὶ ποιή- 
 ϲεων], ἠλήθε̣υ[ον] δὲ φυ- 
 ϲικ͙ὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐµ ποιήµα- 
20 τι µηδὲν εἶναι λ̣έγον- 
 τεϲ, εἴπερ τοῦτ’ ἔφαϲκον 
 (ὃ̣ γὰρ οὗτοϲ ἔθηκε̣ν ἀδιά- 
          ⸏ ληπτόν ἐϲτιν), ἐψεύ- 
 δοντο δὲ θέ͙µ͙ατα πάν- 
25 τα ν̣[ο]µίζο[ν]τεϲ εἷναι͙ καὶ 
 κρίϲ[ι]ν̣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει[ν τῶν 
 ἀϲτείων ἐπῶν καὶ [φαύ- 
 λων κοινήν, ἀλλὰ πα- 
 ρ’ ἄλλοιϲ ἄλλη[ν], ὡϲ τὴν 
30 νοµίµων. {ε ̣}⸌τ̣ο̣ι⸍γάρτ̣ο̣ι̣, κα-  
 θὸ πόηµα, φυϲικὸν οὐδὲν  
 οὔτε λέξεωϲ οὔτε δι̣[α-  
 ν̣ο̣ήµατοϲ ὠφέληµα π[α-  
 ρ]αϲκευάζει. διὰ τοῦτ[ο 
35 δὲ τῆϲ ἀρετῆϲ ἑϲτηκότεϲ  
26.1 ὑπόκεινται ϲκ[οπ]οί, τῆι 
 µὲν λέξει τὸ µ[εµι]µῆϲ- 
 θαι τὴν ὠφέλι[µα] προϲ- 
 διδάϲκουϲαν, τῆϲ δὲ δι- 
5 ανοίαϲ τὸ µεταξὺ µετ[εϲχη- 
 κέναι τῆϲ τῶν ϲοφῶν 
 καὶ τῆϲ τῶν χυδαίων. 
 καὶ ταῦτ’ ἔϲτιν, ἄν τε νο- 
 µίϲῃ τιϲ ἄν τε µή, καὶ 
10  κριτέον ἐπὶ τ[α]ῦτ’ ἐπα- 
 νάγονταϲ. 
As for those philosophers who 
claim that rules exist, with an 
eye to which we must judge, and 
who propose in addition the rest 
of what he copied out, if he was 
hinting that they were 
Epicureans, he was babbling, as 
has become clear and will 
become clear as we continue; but 
if [sc. he claimed] that they were 
some other [sect], then they were 
partly right and partly wrong and 
they left some things out. They 
left out completely the ideas of 
good and bad verses and poems, 
but they were right to claim that 
there is no natural good in a 
poem, if they claimed that, since 
what Crates wrote is not clear. 
And they were wrong to think 
that all are rules and that there 
exists no common judgment of 
good and bad verses, but that 
there is a different one for each 
group of people, like that of 
customs. For that reason, qua 
verse, it provides no natural 
benefit either in language or in 
content. Therefore there do exist 
solid goals for goodness—for 
language, the imitation of 
language which teaches useful 
things in addition, and for 
thought, being intermediate 
between the thought of the wise 
and that of the uneducated. And 
these (sc. goals) do exist, 
whether one thinks so or not, and 
one must judge with reference to 
them. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(ϲκ[οπ]ποί, 26.1) as goals for utility rather than for poetic quality. For more on her arguments, see below 
chapter six, §9. 
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Philodemus lays out the two goals for language and content in poetry, but we must first discuss 
his method. He first takes pains to correct Crates' apparent misunderstanding about the identity 
of the group: they were not Epicureans. Then he gives a critical summary of their positions, 
granting some of their positions and interpreting them generously, which allows them to hold a 
position he agrees with, even though they may not actually have done so. However, he does 
disagree with two positions, namely that good poetry is determined by themata and that there is 
no common basis for judgment of poetry. Both of these statements are incompatible with his 
Epicurean commitments. Philodemus did not believe that poetry per se was beneficial to its 
audience, but the prolepsis covers the same ground that these “Philosophers” attributed to the 
themata: it determines what is “good poetry.” The prolepsis also serves therefore as the common 
basis of judgement; since any educated person has a prolepsis of good poetry, they can determine 
the status of any poem by comparing it to their prolepsis.  
 Nicola Pace and more recently Jürgen Hammerstaedt have raised serious objections to the 
assumption that these opinions are Philodemus' own and not the “Philosophers'.”290 Their 
arguments rest on two points. The first is that the demand here is similar to those at On Poems 
V.32-3 and at Rhet. I.149 Sudhaus (book 4), both of which Philodemus clearly disapproves of: 
On Poems V.32.36-33.7:291 
32.36    ἡ δὲ 
33.1 ϲύν̣[θεϲιν λ]έ̣ξεων προϲ-  
 δι[δάϲκουϲάν τι περι]τ̣τ̣ό- 
The [opinion] that a composition of 
language (= style) teaches some-
thing additional by means of verse 
                                                            
290 Pace (1995: 166-75), Hammerstaedt (2003: 310). 
291 The term “composition of language” is odd. Philodemus seems to understand it as “poem” (i.e. a composition in 
language through verse), which gives good sense and is how I have taken it here. Another possibility is that it 
means “the composition of the language [sc. of the poem in question]”, which seems grammatically possible, but 
I think Philodemus would have had serious objections with the idea that the word order was supposed to “teach 
something in addition.” Janko suggests (pers. comm.) “arranged language,” whether in verse or not, which then 
is limited here to verse by Philodemus' qualification. It is impossible to recover what the original meaning of the 
term was in context, and Philodemus may be reading his opponent generously and taking the less objectionable 
interpretation of the phrase. Scodel (pers. comm.) suggests taking ταύτηι in ll. 3-4 as an instrumental dative. 
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 τερον διὰ ποιή]µ̣ατοϲ [ἢ τ]α[ύ- 
 τηι γ’ ὡµοιωµένην [τὸ 
5 µὲν προϲδιδάϲκειν πε- 
 ριττ[ό]τερον οὐ διαϲαφεῖ 
7         ⸏ τίνοϲ. 
or is likened to this [sc. 
composition or style?] does not 
make clear what it teaches in 
addition. 
 
Superficially, Philodemus' objection here seems fatal to the idea put forth in col. 26, quoted 
supra. But in col. 32 “something additional” is demanded, and Philodemus' objection is precisely 
that this “something additional” (τι περιττότερον) is not specified, whereas at 26.3 “useful 
things” (ὠφέλιµα, presumably educational content, but any sort of benefit, e.g. psychological, is 
possible) are in question. This is an indication that the two opinions belong to different critics: if 
the critic had specified that “useful things” were the “something additional” required, 
Philodemus would be an even worse debater than he is usually alleged to be. Since Philodemus' 
objection at col. 32 is that the critic did not specify what additional thing was required, and at 
col. 26 something is specified, the same objection does not apply. 
 The second textual basis for Pace and Hammerstaedt's objections is in On Rhetoric IV 
(I.149 Sudhaus), where the discussion is about prose style. Philodemus is refuting an unknown 
opponent, possibly a Peripatetic, about the demands for a good prose style. At issue, evidently, 
are both what features constitute a good prose style and what a good style ought to accomplish 
for its audience. But Mariachristina Fimiani informs me that this column was misrestored in 
Sudhaus' edition and that it is made up of two half-columns with a sezione missing in between, 
with the result that the particular text on which they rely no longer exists; hence the objections of 
Pace and Hammerstaedt are not valid.292 
 These considerations form a prologue to discussion of Philodemus' claim that the 
language of a poem should teach useful things in addition, and that the content should be 
                                                            
292 Pers. comm. She is currently reediting book four of Philodemus' Rhetoric. 
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midway between that for fools and that for the wise. There is a variety of opinions on what 
precisely these statements mean. However, we will discuss his demands for the content first, 
both because these are the more difficult to understand and because clarification of them will 
help clarify the demands placed on style. 
 
§4 Content 
 The demands placed on content are fairly clear: τῆϲ δὲ διανοίαϲ τὸ µεταξὺ 
µετ[εϲχη]κέναι τῆϲ τῶν ϲοφῶν καὶ τῆϲ τῶν χυδαίων (“and for thought, being intermediate 
between the thought of the wise and that of the uneducated”). χυδαῖοϲ, “base,” “vulgar,” is not 
really a technical term, but by Philodemus' time has come to mean “uneducated” and is used in 
opposition to terms which imply a high degree of intellectual attainment, as here. It is often 
joined with other pejorative terms (cf. e.g. Music IV.140.2, where it is joined with φατικά 
“merely assertory” and µαχόµενα “contradictory”). ϲοφόϲ is a technical term in Epicurean 
philosophy for the Sage, the philosopher who has a perfect grasp on the ideas and practices of the 
group. Epicurus used the term in this way (cf. frr. 222 - 223 Us.) and Philodemus himself used it 
similarly, for instance, in the De Ira (passim). 
 Therefore the demand is for contents which are intelligent but not philosophical, perhaps 
a sort of high-brow entertainment, similar to the diagoge (or liberal leisured pastime) allowed by 
Aristotle.293 Education, though perhaps admitted as a theoretical possibility, is firmly not the goal 
of a poet in writing a poem. This conclusion is supported by other positions taken throughout the 
On Poems. For instance, Philodemus denies that poems, qua poems, are useful (V.25.30-34), and 
                                                            
293 See Politics 8.5, 1339a11-1340b19 for a discussion of the status of mousike, which for Aristotle includes music 
and song (in my sense), and Janko (2011: 375-6). 
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claims that no useful poem ever was or will be written (V.17.20-24). Further, he may have stated 
that poets have no obligation to provide proofs or philosophical demonstrations in their poems, 
just as such demonstrative rigor is not required in most prose genres (V.1.26-33).294 If τὸ 
πραττόµενον at V.7.6-13 means “reality” (so Armstrong), then Philodemus does not even 
require poems to be about the real world.295 The utility of poetry is simply not a concern for 
Philodemus. This is not a wholesale denial of the possibility that poems could be useful. If a 
poem should turn out to be useful, it will not be so qua poetry but rather qua treatise, and he will 
then say that it would have been better to write it in prose, since that medium promotes clarity 
and argument. 
 If the Epicureans held that the speech of the wise was about better or more important 
topics in some way than was that of most people, then Philodemus' statement is understandable 
as follows: the contents of poetry should not be stupid, nor that of philosophers. This leaves a 
wide field in which poets can play, but does set some limits: stupid contents presumably will 
impede the poet from achieving a good poem in good literary form. On the other hand, if a poet 
wanted to write about philosophical topics, they would not do so in verse.296 
 We can say a bit more about contents in a more practical way. The poet is under no 
requirement to be original, as suggested by the comparison of poets with cooks: 
On Poems II.64.23-65.24:297 
                                                            
294 The subject of ἔχουϲι at l. 33 seems to be οὐκ ὀλίγοι (sc. ϲυγγραφεῖϲ) at l. 27 and τάγµα should be 
understood as “obligation” or “requirement,” a meaning not recognized in LSJ. 
295 Armstrong (1995b: 216-7). Mangoni translates it as “i fatti,” which amounts to the same thing, and reads the 
passage as permitting vivid descriptions of non-existent topics. The term looks like it could have a broader 
meaning of “subject matter” in the broad sense of “topic treated;” however, the rest of the sentence, in which 
Philodemus says that not only lies but also myths are narrated extremely vividly by poets, seems to demand the 
more precise term. 
296 For the implications of this statement about Lucretius see McOsker (forthcoming 2). 
297 ἴδια δὲ at the end of line 11 is my conjecture, and I read γὰρ at the end of l. 9 with Henry (τιϲ Janko), and  
“particular” sc. to him is another possibility for its translation. 
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23    διὸ καὶ  
 τὸν ποητὴν ϲυρίτ[τ]οι⟨µεν⟩  
25 ἂν δικαί̣[ω]ϲ, εἴ τι πον̣οί-  
 η τῶν ἀνα̣λ̣όγων. ὃ ο̣[ὐ- 
27 χ ὅµοιόν ἐϲ̣τιν ἐπ[ὶ τ]ῆϲ  
65.1 πο̣ητικῆϲ̣ τὸ “τὰ πρ[άγµα-  
 τα ἄγνωϲτα εἶναι̣, [τὰϲ δὲ  
 λέξειϲ οὐκ ἀρεϲτά[ϲ”, τῶι 
 ἐπὶ τῆϲ µαγε̣[ιρι]κ̣ῆ[ϲ ϲα-  
5           πρὰ τἀγοράϲµατα΄. τ[ῆϲ 
 µὲν γὰρ ἔξω ταῦτ̣’ ἐϲ̣[τί, 
 τῆϲ δὲ ποητικῆϲ ο[ὐ]κ [ἔϲ- 
 τιν ἔξω τὸ ποεῖν̣ [γνωϲ-  
 τὰ τὰ πράγµατα. [κἄν γὰρ 
10 παντελῶϲ αὐτὰ [παρ’ ἑ-  
 τέρου λαµβάνη[ι, ἴδια δὲ 
 τῇ ϲυνθέϲει τὰ π̣ο̣[ήµα-   
 τα, τοῦτ’ ἦν ἰδιώ[τατον 
 αὐτοῦ΄. διόπερ ο[ὐδὲ τὸ 
15 τὰϲ λέξειϲ ο`ἰ΄κείαϲ [ποιεῖν 
 ἐκτόϲ̣ ἐ̣ϲτι τῆϲ π̣[οητικῆϲ,  
 κἂν αἱ̣ λ̣έξειϲ ὠφ̣[ελείαϲ 
 τοῦ βίου παρεϲχή̣[κωϲι 
 κοιναί΄. τὸ γὰρ ἐγλ[έγειν 
20 τὰϲ ο`ἰ΄κείαϲ καὶ δ[ι]ατ̣[ιθ]έ- 
 ναι πρὸϲ ⟦α⟧ δήλωϲιν τοι- 
 ούτου νοήµατοϲ ἐπι- 
 τηδ//ε//[ίωϲ]΄, τ̣οῦτ’ ἦ[ν ἴ]δι- 
24      >ον αὐτοῦ΄. 
Hence we would rightly hiss the 
poet, if he prepared something of 
the same kind. The claim in the 
case of poetry that “the contents are 
unintelligible and the words not 
pleasing” is not like the claim in 
the case of cookery that “the 
ingredients are rotten.” For the 
latter are external to the art [sc. of 
cookery], but making the contents 
intelligible is not external to the art 
of poetry. For even if [sc. the poet] 
takes them [= the contents] over 
completely from someone else, and 
the verses are his own by his 
composition, this is, as we saw, 
very much his particularity. For this 
reason, even making the words 
one’s own does not lie outside the 
art of poetry, even if words that are 
common have provided the needs 
of life. For, as we saw, selecting 
appropriate words and arranging 
them suitably with a view to 
expressing clearly such a thought is 
his particularity.  
 
This passage will be discussed at greater length below, in §8. For now, it suffices to say that 
Philodemus can easily imagine cases in which the poet has no control over the topic. 
 Nor does the plot even have to be logical. 
On Poems V.10.23-34:298 
23    δύνα- 
 τα̣[ι γάρ] τ̣ι̣[ϲ] ἄλογόν τινα  
25 µῦθον καὶ ὑπόθ[ε]ϲιν  
 προθέµενοϲ ἐξε[ργ]άϲαϲ- 
 θα[ι] π̣οιητ̣[ι]κῶϲ, καί τι- 
 νεϲ πο[ιη]τ̣α̣ὶ̣ γεγόναϲι τοι- 
 οῦτοι. τέλ[ει]οϲ δὲ καὶ ἀγα- 
30 θὸϲ ποιητὴϲ ὁ ϲὺν τῆι κα[ὶ]  
Someone can set for themselves some 
irrational story or plot and work it up 
poetically, and there have been such 
poets. But a complete and good poet 
is thought to be the one with the 
selection of those aspects too [sc. 
plots or tropoi, mentioned earlier]. 
                                                            
298 Greenberg (1955: 33-7) and Pace (1995: 126-130) consider this passage, but they are mislead by a flawed 
understanding of poema and poesis in Philodemus. Janko (pers. comm.) suggests τίϲ in line 34. 
  139 
 τούτων ἐγλογῆι ν[ο]εῖται.  
 τὴν  µέντοι  τ̣άξ[ιν τελειο-          
 τ̣ά̣την, οἵα παρ' Ὁµ[ήρ]ω[ι καὶ 
34 Ϲοφοκλεῖ, τίϲ η̣[]οτϲ[ ̣  ̣]τιντα   
Yet who...the most perfect arrange-
ment [sc. of the plot], such as in 
Homer and Sophocles... 
 
Philodemus says outright that the plot need not be rational for the poet to be good (and the poet 
is already better than the merely good versifier). It seems safe to infer that a good and logical 
arrangement is the best and that this is the thrust of the damaged end of the column. As Pace 
indicates, this is related to Aristotle's position that plausible impossibilities are better material for 
a play than implausible possibilities (Poetics 24, 60a26-9). This probably implies that the 
irrationality of the plot, if unavoidable, should be at least not obvious. 
 
§5 Form  
 Philodemus' general term for “form” is ϲύνθεϲιϲ. Pace again has done an excellent job 
determining its significance in his poetics: it is precisely the ἴδιον, the particular feature, of 
poetry.299 This was inferred from the discussions of the ἔργον of the poet, since the ergon would 
surely be to produce a work of art ἴδιον to that art, and the ἔργον is saying something, not new, 
but in the way in which only a poet would say it.300 Similarly, τὸ ἀγαθόν, the “goodness” of a 
poem, is related to the ἀρετή, or “excellence” of a poet: the terms are not actually synonymous, 
but refer to the same thing seen from different viewpoints, those of the creation and of the creator 
respectively: the ἀρετή of the poet is to write ἀγαθὰ ποήµατα.301  
                                                            
299 Pace (1995: 184-190). 
300 Cf. On Poems I.167, with Janko's note. 
301 The idion accordingly is from the perspective of the poem and the ergon from that of the poet; see chapter six, 
§6. All of these terms can also retain their usual meanings in addition to their technical ones. 
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 Diction302 and the figures of language are probably to be included under the heading of 
“form,” but Philodemus does not go into details.303 The interconnectedness of form and content 
means that certain distinctions are difficult to make. Unusual word-order cannot be merely a 
stylistic feature and, since it surprises the reader with the postponed words, has an intellectual 
effect. So it is not purely a stylistic feature, but it cannot be said to be a feature only of the 
contents either.  
 More obscure is the demand made about style at On Poems V.26.1-4: τῆι µὲν λέξει τὸ 
µ[εµι]µῆϲθαι τὴν ὠφέλι[µα] προϲδιδάϲκουϲαν.304 Jensen explained the statement as a demand 
that the language of poetry be an imitation of daily usage, which arose under the compulsion of 
nature, and that, once this had been accomplished, it would contain all the stylistic virtues.305 
This may be right in broad outline but does not explain the unusual phrase, which he translates as 
“die nebenbei Nützliches lehrt.” This will turn out to be the most accurate translation. Greenberg 
(1955: 84) explains it as a demand for “an informally didactic” tone, or one which is 
“expositive” and “meaningful.” Grube (1968: 197-8) gives a similar explanation, with reference 
to Philodemus' poetic practice and Peripatetic theories of style: 
 As for the requirement that poetic language should imitate that of useful instruction, we 
                                                            
302 Many scholars have treated diction as if it were separable from “form” generally, though in some cases they 
discuss what I could call “form” generally or language as a mode of communication rather than word choice 
specifically, e.g. Pace (1995: 142-3), who calls it form, and Greenberg (1955: 274-5) who calls it language. 
303 Heracleodorus (so Janko, forthcoming, revising his previous opinion) discusses diction at I.43-6, possibly until 
48, but the rebuttal in book 2 is too fragmentary for any conclusions. See chapter six, §2. 
304 Everyone, as far as I know, takes τὴν...προϲδιδάϲκουϲαν as the object of µεµιµεῖϲθαι, though only an 
anacoluthon of a common type (switch from dative to accusative, ad sensum) prevents it from being the subject: 
“That the language imitate [sc. life?] while also teaching useful things is the goal.” This is a less obvious 
understanding of the word order and is in conflict with Philodemus' statement that he does not know of any 
useful poems nor does he think that a poet will ever write one (V.17.20-24). If he did require even incidental 
teaching of useful lessons, it would violate this stronger statement. 
305 “...daß die Dichtersprache eine Nachahmung der Umgangssprache sein soll, welche einst unter dem Zwang der 
Natur entstand, als sich bei den Menschen das Bedürfnis nach gegenseitiger Verständigung geltend machte. 
Wenn der Dichter diese Sprache richtig nachzuahmen versteht, werden seine Schöpfungen auch alle die 
Stiltugenden enthalten...” (1923: 157-8). 
  141 
 should  remember that, in Aristotle and Theophrastus, the language of useful instruction is 
 that of the philosopher who avoids ornamentation, and Philodemus seems to mean that 
 poetry should be simple and straight-forward in expression, which would appear to agree 
 with his own practice. 
 
Epicurus too demanded clear prose as the vehicle for useful instruction, so the comparison is apt. 
But we should be cautious of any rendering which makes, or seems to make, poetry out to be 
actually didactic. 
 The verb προϲδιδάϲκω (used in On Poems V.26.3-4, quoted above in §3) has remained 
an issue.306 A useful comparandum is De Poem. I.185-6, part of Philodemus' rebuttal of 
Andromenides, who claimed that beautiful language was important. Philodemus' rebuttal is that 
mere words “on their own, do not seem to have any beauty” (καθ’ αὑτό τι φαίνεται καλὸν 
ἔχειν, 186.1-2), nor do they ever make the thought intelligible, but those things, which give extra 
understanding of the characters and affections of the soul, seem to teach something useful in 
addition (ἀλλ’ οὐχί ποτε⟦ν⟧ ϲυνετὸν ποι|εῖν τὸ διανόηµα, ⟨ταῦ⟩τα δὲ προϲδιδάϲκειν τι τῶν 
ϲυµβαινόντων, ἃ προϲ[ε]πιϲυνετίζ̣̣ε͙ι͙ [τὰ ἤ]θη [ἢ πάθη τ]ῆϲ ψυ[χῆϲ]). προϲεπιϲυνετίζω is a 
hapax legomenon (and is partially emended to boot), so we are proceeding by explaining 
obscurum per obscurius, but the definition suggested by Janko ad. loc. (“to give extra 
understanding”) is surely along the right lines. This clarifies the use of προϲδιδάϲκω: in 
context, we are not expecting any discussion of education, and besides this sentence, there is no 
such discussion. So the verb must mean “teach in addition to doing something else” rather than 
                                                            
306 Besides Philodemus, the word appears several times. In the other instances, there is a previous explicit mention 
of learning or of a lesson, so the force of the preverb is obviously appropriate in context. N.b. the spurious 
fragment of Menander (553 Kock, not in Körte or Kassel-Austin) which appears under several guises in a TLG 
search for this verb. The date of the fragment, which is actually an excerpt from the Comparatio Menandri et 
Philistionis (4th-6th century CE) puts it out consideration here; see Koerte's preface  (vol. II pp. vii-viii) to his 
1953 ed. 
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“just one lesson in addition to another lesson.”307  
 So Philodemus' phrase τὴν ὠφέλιµα προϲδιδάϲκουϲαν does not refer to a style which 
teaches useful things in addition to teaching some other topic, but to one that teaches useful 
things in addition to doing something else entirely (e.g. be entertaining). Formulations such as 
“expository and meaningful” are not so far off from the idea, but “didactic” should probably be 
avoided, since real education via poetry is simply out of the question for Philodemus. 
 The demand for imitation is confounding as well, but there is again a useful 
comparandum at On Poems V.35.11-28. The doxa is anonymous there, but is very similar to a 
statement of Andromenides at I.160.17-18; he was a kritikos who demanded not only beautiful 
sound but also a match between form and content, specifically that the vocabulary should match 
the characters using it.308 
On Poems V.35.11-28: 
11  ὅτι “τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ 
 καὶ τοῖϲ ἥρωϲιν ἡ τοιαύ- 
 τη πρέπει λέξιϲ” ἠλιθί- 
 ων ἐϲτί, καὶ µεµιµῆϲ- 
15 θαι βέλτιον λέγειν τὴν   
 πρέπουϲαν.  τελείω[ϲ  
 δὲ µ̣[αν]ικὸν τὸ πα̣ρ̣[α- 
 ψηλαφ[ᾶ]ν ὁµοιότητα 
 λέξεωϲ τοῖϲ δηλουµέ- 
20 νοιϲ πράγµαϲιν.  εἰ   
 δὲ προϲυπακουϲτέον 
 καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ γρα- 
 φεὺϲ παραλέλοιπε, τὸ πο- 
...that “such a style befits the 
gods and the heroes” is the 
claim of foolish men, and it is 
better to say that it imitates the 
style which befits them. But 
the grasping after a similarity 
of the style to the actions it 
describes is completely 
insane. If “contents” must be 
understood as well, or if a 
scribe has left it out, it is 
ludicrous to assign to the art 
                                                            
307 See Smyth §1695.4: “Often in the sense additionally, qualifying the whole sentence rather than the verb.” Cf. 
πρὸϲ ἐξανδραποδίϲαϲθαι at Herodotus I.156.2 (written separatim in Hude's OCT), προϲαποκρίνοµαι in Arist. 
Metaphysics. Γ 4, 1007a17. and προϲλαµβάνω at Philodemus On Poems IV.117.16-7. and n.b. Armstrong 
1995b: 217 n. 18. Armstrong supplies “being attractive” as the thing which the poem does besides teaching. 
  Another relevant passage is in On Rhetoric IV (PHerc. 1423.xvii = I.159 Sudhaus), in which some things 
(αἱ µὲν... αἱ δὲ...τινὲϲ...τινὲϲ) προϲδιδάϲκουϲι, but others do not. Unfortunately, the antecedent is not preserved 
and the precise meaning of the verb is not clarified by context. 
308 He was an influence on Crates and was summarized in his work. See Janko (2003: 143-154) for a collection of 
fragments and discussion. That Demetrius Laco also discussed him in his On Poems (the name appears at I.16.8-
9) may be evidence of his importance and influence around the end of the second century and into the first. 
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 ητικῇ διάγνωϲιν ἀπο- 
25 νέµειν τ[ῶν ἑ]κάϲ͙τωι͙ 
 προϲώπωι͙ πρεπόν̣- 
 των λόγων παράκο- 
 πόν ἐϲτιν. 
of poetry the differentiation 
between the speeches which 
befit each character. 
  
This passage is discussed in detail below (chapter 6, §2), but here imitation is used as a way to 
avoid demanding from the poet technical knowledge which is outside the purview of the art of 
poetry. Poets need not be expert theologians to write gods' speeches in their poems, and so the 
standard to which they are held is a lower one: only the imitation or representation of the divine 
style, not actually producing or reproducing it. A better translation might perhaps be “portray 
fictionally,” i.e. to compose something resembling what most people think the object is like, 
regardless of whether or not it is actually that way, or more simply “to be or seem like something 
else,” regardless of how close the actual relationship is. In this case, Homer's job was to compose 
the speeches for the Olympians in the council of the gods as they discuss Odysseus' fate, even 
though, as good Epicureans, we know that the gods do not care for mortal affairs and would not 
have bothered themselves with him. In the first instance above, the demand put on poetic style is 
for it to be reasonably straightforward, clear, and informative, since it only has to mimic, imitate, 
or represent an informative or expository style. We might paraphrase this demand as “write 
plausibly and reasonably clearly.” 
 These are to be understood as general guidelines, not universally valid rules, however. 
Philodemus is happy to allow variation to fit style or theme, as he objects to one of the 
anonymous doxai in book V. 
On Poems V.31.18-32: 
18   π̣ρόϲ- 
 εϲτι δ’ αὐτῆι καὶ τὸ [πά]ντα 
20 ϲυντόµωϲ ἐκφέρειν ἀ- 
 ξιοῦν, ἐπὶ µέν τινω̣[ν 
     The demand for expressing 
everything briefly is additionally 
required [sc. by this doxa]; in some 
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 ἐξεργάζεϲθαι δέον, ἐπὶ 
 δέ τινων τ[ο]ῖϲ αὐτ[ο]ῖϲ 
 ἐνδιατρίβειν, ἐπ[ὶ δ’ ἐνί- 
25 ων καὶ περιφράζειν.  
 κα]ὶ τ[ὸ π]ᾶϲι̣ παρακολου- 
 θεῖν τὴν ϲαφήνεια[ν, 
 οὔτε πάϲηϲ ἐπιτρεποµέ- 
 νηϲ τοῖϲ ποηταῖϲ οὔτε 
30 τῆϲ ϲυγχωρουµένηϲ 
 ἅπαϲι τ̣οῖϲ νοουµένοι̣ϲ ̣
32 ἁρµόττειν δοκούϲηϲ. 
cases, it is necessary to compose 
[sc. briefly], but in others to dwell 
on the same topics, and in some 
cases to resort to paraphrase. And 
that clarity is incumbent in every 
case [sc. is also demanded by this 
doxa], though not all of it [sc. 
clarity] is entrusted to the poets, 
nor does it seem to allow befitting 
all types of contents. 
 
Here, Philodemus denies that brevity and clarity are appropriate in every case, because some 
topics require more expansive or more elliptical treatment or are too inherently difficult for 
perfectly clear exposition in any case.309 He is pessimistic about poets' ability to be clear, which 
is in line with his denial of utility to them. It is not evident from this passage whether he grants 
authority to authors to be unclear as a stylistic choice rather than because the material forces 
them to, but it seems possible that he does, depending on the interpretation of “cases” (ἐπὶ µέν 
τινων…ἐπὶ δέ τινων…ἐπὶ δ’ ἐνίων). If these are cases of contents, then he does not discuss 
style in this passage. If these are cases understood broadly to mean “cases in which poets can 
make choices about their poems,” then he seems to allow them consciously to decide to be 
unclear. 
 If I am right, then, the demands are for a reasonably clear style which expresses 
intelligent contents, but expert knowledge is not demanded in either case: gods can speak in 
poetry, but they need not speak in veritably divine style about Epicurean truths. This is 
permission for poets to compose by their own lights and a justification for permitting 
falsehoods—not just mistaken arguments, but outright lies and myths—in good poetry. A 
                                                            
309 It is difficult to imagine what kinds of topics could demand elliptical treatment, but, in the On Anger (20.18-34), 
he discusses those who, in fits of rage, violate the secrecy of the Mysteries. He could conceivably have a 
treatment of the Mysteries in poetry in mind here, such as the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. 
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possible basis for this position is precisely Philodemus' claim that no useful (i.e. philosophically 
educational) poem had ever or will ever be written (On Poems V.25.30-34). There was a large 
corpus of poetry recognized as good on some grounds or other (possibly on the basis of simple 
enjoyment), but which was not philosophical. By making the criteria for adjudicating a poem 
“good” unrelated to the poem's utility or truth, Epicureans were able to subordinate poetry to 
philosophy, because it is not a rival source of truth about the world. At the same time, they 
permit its enjoyment by those who are aware of the potential dangers.310  
 
§6 The Interrelation between Form and Content 
 Let us now turn to focus on the relationship between form and content, which has to 
some extent already been handled. To do so, we will need to consider how Crates of Mallos, the 
Homeric scholar of Pergamum, violates Epicurean doctrines about language in passages which 
we will discuss later. Specifically, Philodemus finds his idea of Sphaeropoeia (“sphere-making” 
literally), the interpretive practice of finding circles in Homer's poems, to be somehow ridiculous 
(if this is indeed what Philodemus means at V.28.33-29.7), which is consistent with his criticism 
of Stoic allegoresis and the discussion of the gods in the second half of the De Pietate.311  
 At this point in the discussion, Philodemus seems to be discussing the violence that 
Crates' interpretive schema does to the plain meaning of the poem as communicated by its 
                                                            
310 Philodemus was not the first to put forward the view that poetry was only for entertainment; both Eratosthenes 
and Aristarchus had similar opinions. 
311 See, for now, Schober's edition (1988) and Obbink (1995b); for further bibliography, see Obbink's 
bibliographical note on the “Theological Works” (1995: 280). Obbink's expected On Piety pt. 2 will supersede 
Schober's edition. On Crates, Broggiato's collection of fragments with introduction and commentary (2001) is 
indispensable. See also Asmis (1992) for a general treatment, Porter (1992) on the difference between 
Aristarchus's lines and Crates' spheres and their implications for readings of Homer, and Bilić (2012) on his 
geography and astronomy. N.b. the list of identifications made by “maniacs” between gods and bodily organs 
and natural phenomena given by Philodemus at II.53-4, with his criticism extending a few columns further 
(where, however, the text is badly damaged). 
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language. Crates thought that both the universe and the planet were spherical, that both Homer 
and Hesiod knew this, and that they reflected it in their works.312 He also had opinions about 
cosmological organization, e.g. the sun holds the highest circuit above the earth, then the moon is 
below it, and so forth, and about the seas. Based on an attempt to reconcile the statements of the 
Homeric poems with contemporary knowledge of geography, he made statements about the 
travels of the heroes, e.g. that Odysseus sailed in the Atlantic Ocean (frr. 44 and 77 Broggiato) 
and that Menelaus visited India after circumnavigating Africa on his way home from Troy (fr. 40 
Broggiato). 
 Philodemus' major tactic is to accuse Crates of inconsistency: for example, the latter 
claims that poems are pleasing, but should be judged according to how well they meet the logika 
theoremata, which serve as criteria. Philodemus understands him to be claiming that poems are 
judged both on the basis of the pleasure they give us and on how well they accord with the 
criteria. A more pleasing poem would reasonably be described as “better” than one that pleases 
less. But since Crates thinks that poems please on the basis of their euphony (see V.24.30-32), 
which does not seem to be part of the logika theoremata that should be the basis of judgment, he 
is inconsistent. What exactly the logika theoremata are is poorly understood: they may include 
euphony and interpretative strategies for poetry.313 Mangoni (1993: 296) suggested with great 
                                                            
312 For an account of sphaeropoeia, see Broggiato (2001: li-lix) whom I summarize in this paragraph. ϲφαιροποιία 
is also known as the ϲφαιρικὸϲ λόγοϲ; cf. Geminus at Crates fr. 50 and [Plutarch] De Homero II.92-111, which 
draws on interpretative practices known from Crates and the Stoics and dating back to Metrodorus of Lampsacus 
the elder. At the later, §92 ad init., ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸϲ λόγοϲ ἐϲτὶν ὁ περιέχων τὰ καλούµενα θεωρήµατα..., 
perhaps read ϲφαιρικὸϲ for θεωρητικὸϲ: an unfamiliar phrase was glossed using a word found later in the same 
sentence. These theoremata would then be the same as the logika theoremata mentioned by Philodemus at On 
Poems V.28.24. 
313 Jensen translated the phrase as “vernunftgemäße Anschauungen” (opinions which correspond to reason), which 
are naturally existent and in accord with the Stoic Logos. Mangoni translates the phrase as “princìpi razionali” 
(rational principles) and prefers Asmis' interpretation, which sees them as the theorems of the rational account of 
poetry which Crates provides in his work, though she jettisons the Stoic interpretation that Asmis provides. As 
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probability that they were natural rules which Crates suggested be used instead of the themata of 
the philosophers. These theoremata could be the same as the λόγοϲ τῆϲ τέχνηϲ (“account of 
the art”) mentioned at V.28.3; alternatively, they could be the “knowledge of the truth acquired 
in a systematic way” including via allegorical interpretations, mentioned in [Plutarch] de 
Homero II.92, a passage which is known to rely, at least in part, on Crates' views. Mangoni cited 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus De Comp. Verb. 5.38-9 (p. 27 Usener-Rademacher), where he refers 
to theoremata and techne together, to support the first view, but it could actually support 
either.314 What seems certain, at the end, is that these rules do not treat poetry as a matter of 
form, but submit the contents to judgment based on some external criterion, perhaps their fidelity 
to the truth. Crates' sphaeropoeia might be relevant in this connection: his anachronistic view of 
Homeric geography did serve to bring the poet into line with the best contemporary knowledge. 
The form of the poem is judged on euphonic grounds, which is the point of contact between 
Crates and the early kritikoi. 
 First we will consider Philodemus' objection to Crates' system of judgment, according to 
which the ear is pleased by the sounds of poetry, but the mind judges the poem according to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
such, they provide pleasure to the hearing, since they are the guidelines which enforce the techne of poetry 
(leading thereby to the audience's pleasure).   
  Instead I would connect these logika theoremata with Crates' logike episteme, mentioned by Sextus 
Empiricus (Adv. Math. I.79) who reports Crates' explanation: καὶ τὸν µὲν κριτικὸν πάϲηϲ, φηϲί, δεῖ λογικῆϲ 
ἐπιϲτήµηϲ ἔµπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ  γραµµατικὸν ἁπλῶϲ γλωϲϲῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προϲωιδίαϲ ἀποδοτικὸν 
καὶ τῶν τούτοιϲ παραπληϲίων εἰδήµονα (“the Critic, he claims, should be experienced in the whole linguistic 
art, but the grammarian need only be an explainer of rare words and concerned with pronunciation and 
knowledgeable about fields related to those”). That the critic needs much greater and more fundamental 
knowledge of the field is confirmed by Sextus' follow-up comment: παρὸ καὶ ἐοικέναι ἐκεῖνον µὲν ἀρχιτέκτονι, 
τὸν δὲ γραµµατικὸν ὑπηρέτηι (“for which reason he compared the critic to an architect, but the grammarian to 
an assistant”). The critic then understands the real reasons for the rules and choices, whereas the grammarian 
understands what the critic tells him. Unfortunately, at this point, our knowledge of Crates' episteme and 
theoremata gives out, but if he used the terms in reference to grammar as opposed to euphony, then Philodemus' 
point stands. I intend to take up the issue in another venue. 
314 “The ancients did not arrange their sentences at random, but they had an art and principles, by use of which...” 
(τέχνη δέ τιϲ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖϲ καὶ θεωρήµατα, οἷϲ χρώµενοι...). 
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logika theoremata. 
On Poems V.28.33-29.7:315 
33   ἢ πρόϲλ[ο- 
 γον ἐϲτὶ τὸ “διὰ τ̣ῆ[ϲ] ἀκο- 
35 ῆϲ τὰϲ λέξειϲ παραδέ- 
1 χεϲθαι τὴν διάνοιαν” ἢ ἀ- 
 ληθὲϲ δι’ ὅλο̣͙υ͙ [τὰ νο]ούµε- 
 να ἐν ποήµ[αϲι]ν κρίνεϲ- 
 θαι, καὶ µηδ’, ὅταν τὴν 
5 ϲύνθεϲιν ἐπαινῶµεν, ἀ-  
 ποϲπᾶν̣ αὐτὴν τῶν ὑπο- 
 τεταγµένων. 
Either it is pertinent that “the 
mind accepts the language 
through the hearing”, or it is 
generally true that the contents 
in poems are judged and that, 
whenever we praise the com-
position, we should not tear it 
away from what underlies it. 
 
 Both options speak to Epicurean commitments, that the hearing merely reports what it 
hears, in this case, the words, to the mind, which is responsible for judging them, and that 
language should correspond to reality. 
 Fairly complete Epicurean accounts of hearing survive in the Letter to Herodotus §§52-3 
and Lucretius IV.524-614.316 They run as follows: voice, and noise in general, is physical, since 
it strikes the senses (our ears, in this case) and our throats hurt when we shout. The atoms that 
make up a sound are emitted from our mouths in a certain form which splits into many different 
atomic structures; these all, nevertheless, keep the same shape. The consistent form allows it to 
preserve the intended sounds across the distance between source and recipient. The atomic 
structures can be eroded by distance or damaged by physical interference, which is why shouting 
is often indistinct over long distances and conversations heard through walls are muted. Hints of 
a semantic theory are gathered from frr. 334-5 Usener: words have a natural correspondence with 
the things they describe, since the first humans to use language were moved by nature to name 
things. This is consistent with the demand in the Letter to Herodotus §§37-8 that we take care 
that our words correspond to reality: since they have a natural correlation with their underlying 
                                                            
315 See n. 267 above for discussion of the text and translation. 
316 See also Epicurus frr. 231-3, which corroborate and fill out details in the main sources. 
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realities, we speak most clearly when we are most respectful of that relationship. If we violate 
that connection, other people cannot understand us. 
 It is this last demand which is at issue in Philodemus' criticism of Crates: his 
interpretations tear words away from their meanings. Philodemus and Crates seem to agree on 
what constitutes lexis, but not about nooumena, which is used in the passage just quoted to mean 
“contents” as dianoia is elsewhere, since dianoia is used, also in the passage just quoted, in its 
philosophical sense of “mind.” 317  Crates tries to find evidence for his geographical and 
cosmological speculation, even though they violate plain statements in Homer; this evidence is 
considered by Philodemus to qualify as dianoiai for Crates. That is, Philodemus thinks that, for 
Crates, those statements about geography or cosmology count as dianoiai. Since these contents 
are not reflected by the language used, it is a violation of Epicurean linguistic theory and Crates 
forces the poem not to make sense. 
 That Crates was willing to judge language apart from contents is another violation of 
Philodemus' poetics; this is a second sense that Philodemus' phrase “tear away from underlying 
meanings” can bear. According to him, Crates was willing to judge the sound without reference 
to the states of affairs that it refers to, since he was willing to foist understandings of Homer onto 
the text without its support, thereby tearing language away from its normal meanings.318 
 A second literary critic who made this same mistake is Neoptolemus of Parium, the 
purported source for Horace in his Ars Poetica. 319  Neoptolemus made claims about the 
tripartition of the art of poetry into three sections, poema, poesis, and poetes, but due to textual 
problems and an elliptical discussion by Philodemus, the passage is extraordinarily difficult and 
                                                            
317 It is likely that νοούµενα is Crates' term in this case. 
318 See Pace (1995: 113 with n. 8) for a summary of the arguments and bibliography and below, §7. 
319 Porphyrio on Ars Poetica 1. Wigodsky (2009) discusses the issue. 
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has been the basis of a remarkable amount of scholarly attention in the attempt to clarify it. 
 What Neoptolemus really meant by his terms is not relevant here; Philodemus criticizes 
him for the views that he thinks he held.320 What is certain is that Philodemus considered it 
absurd to rank the poet as part of the art that he possessed. It seems clear enough that Philodemus 
takes poema either to refer to some sort of formally organized section of a longer poem (he cites 
the first thirty lines of the Iliad as a poema321) or simply means “verse,” as at V.15.21-22, quoted 
immediately below. Poesis, on the other hand, has to do with hypothesis (“plot” or “topic”), and 
the whole Iliad is an example of a poesis. It probably denotes a complete, organized poem rather 
than a section of one and may mean “(complete) poem (with a plot)”. Philodemus will reject this 
distinction because it tears style and contents apart. For a deeper discussion of Neoptolemus' 
view and Philodemus' criticism of it, see the appendix to this chapter. 
 With this in mind, let us examine Philodemus' objections to Neoptolemus: 
On Poems V.14.26-15.22:322 
26  θ[α]υµ[ϲτὸ]ν δ’ αὐ- 
 τοῦ καὶ [τὸ] “τ̣ῆ[ϲ] ποήϲεω[ϲ 
 εἷναι τὴν ὑπόθεϲιν [µ]ό- 
 νον,” καὶ τοῦ ποήµατο[ϲ καὶ 
30 πάντων̣ ὅλωϲ τῆϲ ποήϲ[ε- 
 ωϲ ὄντω̣ν. ἡ µὲν [γ]ὰρ πό-̣ 
 ηϲιϲ καὶ π[όηµά γ’ ἐϲτιν, 
Also amazing of him was the claim 
“only the plot belongs to poesis,” 
since poema too and everything 
belong completely to poesis. For the 
poesis is also poema, e.g. the Iliad, 
but the first thirty lines of it are 
                                                            
320 I make this statement not to disparage Philodemus as a philosopher or reader of his opponents, but to cut the 
Gordian knot of this particular problem and focus on Philodemus' ideas rather than Neoptolemus'. Porter's 
attempt (1995) to reconstruct Neoptolemus' ideas is very interesting, and he may be right to argue that the three 
sections are aspects of a poem rather than a strict division of the art. This is clearly not how Philodemus 
interpreted him, however. 
321 We should understand him to be speaking loosely, since the thirtieth line of the Iliad ends in the middle of a 
sentence. Allen and West both begin a new paragraph at l. 33, however. 
322 I refrain from translating poema and poesis, since they are Neoptolemus' technical terms and their precise 
meaning has evaded scholars. Asmis (1992b) argues for understanding them as the medium and message of the 
poem, but does not propose translations. Porter (1995) argued for understanding them as the formal aspect and 
the contents-related aspect, but also did not propose a consistent set of terms. I intend to take up the matter 
elsewhere. In addition to adding quotation marks, I supply πάθη at the end of 15.4, instead of Asmis' ἤθη, to 
avoid duplicating the sense of προϲωποιίαϲ, punctuate with a dash in 15.3 and print a question mark at 15.6. 
Also, I read αἴτι]ο[ν (Mangoni) for ἴδι]ο[ν (Jensen) at 15.10 on the grounds that it reflects Philodemus' idea that 
the plot is prior to its treatment in language, cf. §2 ad fin. 
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 οἷον ἡ Ἰλι[άϲ], οἱ δ[ὲ πρῶτοι 
 ϲτίχοι τρι[άκ]οντα τα[ύ]τηϲ 
35 πόηµα µ[έ]ν, οὐ̣ µέντοι ποί- 
15.1 ηϲιϲ· καὶ τ̣ὸ “ποή[µατοϲ µό- 
 ν͙ον τὴ̣ν [ϲύνθεϲιν τῆϲ 
 λέξεωϲ”—ἀ͙[λλὰ µὴ τὰϲ κοι- 
 ν̣ὰϲ̣ διανο̣ί̣[αϲ καὶ πάθη 
5 καὶ πράξειϲ καὶ π̣[ροϲω- 
          ⸏  ποποιί[αϲ]; εἰ δ’ ἐν [τῆι 
 λέξει πε[π]ο̣ιῆϲθαι [δεῖν 
 λέ]γει, κἀνταῦθ̣[α νὴ Δί’ οὐ- 
 κ ἔϲτι τι πεποι[ῆϲθαι το]ύ- 
10 των χωρίϲ, ἀλλ’ [αἴτι]ο[ν το]ῦ 
 ϲυνκεῖϲθα[ι τὴν] λέξιν τὸ  
 ϲυ]νκεῖϲθαι [τὴν πρᾶξ]ιν εἶ- 
 ν]αι φαίνεταί µ ̣[οι. ἐῶ δὲ] καὶ 
 τὸ “τοῦ ποι̣η̣τοῦ ταῦτ]α καὶ 
15 δὴ] κα̣ὶ τὴν ὑπόθεϲιν καὶ 
 τ̣ὴ̣[ν] ϲ̣ύ̣ν̣θ̣ε̣ϲ̣ι̣ν̣·” [ὁ γ]ὰρ πάν- 
 τ[α ποι]ῶν οὗτ[όϲ ἐϲ]τιν. εὐ- 
 ήθ[ωϲ] δὲ γέγραπται καὶ 
 τὸ “[µ]ὴ κοινωνε̣[ῖν] τῶι 
20 πο̣[η]τ̣εῖ τῶν ἁµα[ρτ]ιῶν 
 τὰ[ϲ ὑπ]οθέ[ϲ]ειϲ καὶ τὰ πο- 
 ήµ[ατα]·” πονηρὰ γὰρ ἔϲτιν 
 ὅτε [γ]ίνετα[ι] ποιήµατα 
 κα[ὶ ὑπ]οθέϲειϲ φαῦλαι ποι- 
25  ήϲ[εω]ν̣, ἀφαµαρ[τά]νον- 
 ⸏το[ϲ τοῦ] ποιητοῦ. 
poema, and not poesis. Also [sc. 
amazing is] the claim “only the 
composition of the language 
belongs to the poema”—but not 
common thoughts and experiences 
and actions and characterizations? If 
he says that they need to be 
composed in language, then on 
those grounds, by Zeus, it is not 
possible for them to be composed 
without them, but the composition 
of the action seems to me to be the 
cause of the composition of the 
language. I also let pass his claim 
“these things belong to the poet, and 
in particular the plot and the 
composition,” since the poet is the 
one who composes all these things. 
His claim “the plots and the 
poemata (i.e. verses) do not share in 
errors with the poet” is stupidly 
written; for sometimes verses are 
bad, and plots of poeseis (i.e. 
poems) are bad, because the poet 
has erred. 
 
Armstrong (1995: 218-219) has treated this passage in part; he points out that Philodemus' 
objections center around the separation between contents and form that he sees in Neoptolemus' 
poetics.323 Further, Philodemus objects to the separation of the style and content from the poet, 
which seems ridiculous to him because the poet is responsible for them; he created, or at least 
formed, them. The statement about the cause (αἴτιον, at 15.10; see n. 55) is especially interesting 
(if correctly restored), since it indicates that the plot in some way determines the language of the 
poem. This leads into our next topic. 
 A striking statement of the interconnection between the form and content is at On Poems 
                                                            
323 On Neoptolemus generally, see Asmis (1992b) and Mangoni (1993: 53-61). 
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II.70.17-28. Although the text has been reedited since Pace handled it (1995: 134-6), his 
conclusions are still correct. He pointed out that Philodemus took over his opponent's categories 
and terms, but put them to his own use. 
On Poems II.70.17-28:324 
17 τάχ̣α̣ [γ]ά[ρ, τ]ὰ̣ϲ διαν[οίαϲ] ἄλ-  
 λου διδ͙[όν]τ̣οϲ καὶ τὴν χύ-   
 ϲιν τῶ[ν] λέξεων τοῦ βί-   
20 ου χορηγ̣οῦ̣ντοϲ, ἡ ϲύνθε-   
 ϲιϲ ἰδί̣[α γε]ίνεται τῶν πο-   
 ητῶν, οὐκ ἀέριοϲ οὐδ’ ἐπαι-  
 νο̣υµένη κα͙θ’ αὑτήν, ἀλ-             
 λ’ ὅτι π[ρο]ϲπαρίϲτηϲι διανο̣ί-  
25 αϲ΄ αἷϲ ψ[υ]χ̣αγωγοῦϲιν, οὐ  
 παρά τινοϲ λαβόντεϲ, ἀλ- 
 λ’ αὐτοὶ γεννήϲαντεϲ πα- 
28     > ρ’ αὑ̣τ̣ῶν.  
For perhaps, when someone else supplies 
the contents and life stage-manages the 
flow of the words, the synthesis becomes 
particular to the poets, not in vain nor 
praised for its own sake, but because it 
brings thoughts to bear in addition, by 
which they [sc. the poets] entertain, not 
taking them over from someone else, but 
giving birth to them from themselves on 
their own. 
 
The genitive absolute ἄλλου διδόντοϲ could also be conditional: “[even] if someone else 
gives...,” and it is worth noting that life provides the raw materials for the form, not the form 
itself.  That is to say, the synthesis is the work of the poet in question, and of no one else. 
Someone else can give the poet the contents and life can give the raw materials for the form, but 
the poet him- or herself is ultimately responsible for the verbal dress. The synthesis in turn is not 
pointless and it is not praised for itself, but because it causes additional thoughts in the audience 
(see §9 below). Let us note for now that verbal form is praised for its intellectual effect on the 
audience, not for any of the obvious aesthetic reasons why one might praise poetic form. Indeed, 
                                                            
324 As regards ψυχαγωγέω in l. 25, Wigodsky argued that psychagogia is “entertainment” in Philodemus (1995: 
65-68); the word first appears in Plato's Phaedrus, where it is a semi-technical term for convincing someone 
(specifically, in that case, leading their soul to the right conclusions through rhetoric), but is a metaphor from 
necromancy and related phrases are attested much earlier. While I find Wigodsky's conclusions broadly 
convincing, I suspect the term was chosen because of the moving effect that literature is often felt to have on its 
audience. Halliwell (2011: 324 n. 155) thinks that “entertain” is too weak and holds that the metaphor was still 
alive in Aristotle's day. Janko translates as “enthrall,” which seems to me too strong; three hundred years is long 
enough to kill even a necromantic metaphor. That Philodemus uses κινεῖν as a synonym also tells against 
Halliwell's position, but does suggest that “entertain” is too weak. Chandler (2006: 147-167) discusses the 
meaning of the term in Epicurean rhetoric. For convenience, I translate ψυχαγωγέω as “entertain” and κινέω 
as “move” without confidence that those renderings really capture the ideas. 
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that position, held by the Stoic critic, is called “wretched” by Philodemus in book V. 
On Poems V.23.33-2 4.11:325 
33          ἀθλι̣[ώ]τερον δὲ τὸ 
 τὴν ϲύνθεϲιν αὐτὴν τῶ[ν 
35 λέξεων (διανοία̣ι γ͙νω- 
24.1 ρ̣ιζ͙οµένην, ποτέρα φαύ- 
 λω]ϲ ἢ ϲπουδα[ίωϲ ἔ]χει), 
 τα]ῖϲ ἀ[λ]όγοιϲ ἀκ̣[οαῖ]ϲ καὶ 
 µηθὲν πολυπραγµο- 
5 ν̣ούϲαιϲ τῶν ἐπιτευγµά- 
 τω̣ν ἢ διαπ̣τωµάτ̣ω̣ν 
 ἀ̣νάπτειν, καὶ λόγωι φά- 
 ν[αι µ]ὴ γνωρίζε̣ι[ν] πῶ̣ϲ 
 ἁπάϲαϲ ἔϲτιν ἀποδ[ιδό- 
10 ναι λόγ⟦ο⟧ων τὰϲ ἰδ[ιότη- 
 ταϲ. 
But more wretched is his 
claim that the very synthesis 
of the language (which is 
known by the mind to be 
either bad or good) is referred 
to the irrational hearing, which 
has absolutely no interest in 
successes or failures, and his 
claim that that it is not 
possible to give a rational 
account of all the 
particularities of language. 
 
Philodemus' objection stems from the Epicurean position that the hearing cannot judge poetry. 
He also objects to the Stoic's position that it is not possible to give a rational account of 
language, which creates difficulties for the judgment of poetry, since poems are made of 
language.326  
 All this is to say that Philodemus claims that the mind knows whether or not the synthesis 
is good or bad, i.e. whether it is well-constructed or not. The hearing is not concerned with 
successes or failures because these are matters of judgment, not of data-transmission (i.e. it is up 
to the mind to decide if the data transmitted is accurate).327 Philodemus' Stoic opponent does not 
follow the Epicureans on this point and so thinks that the hearing is responsible for judging the 
synthesis of poems. The other view was probably the more widespread view in antiquity because, 
from very early, poetry was a terpsis (Hesiod Th. 917), along with such bodily pleasures as food 
(Pindar Pyth. 9.19), drink (Sophocles Ajax 1201), and sex (Hesiod Th. 206). The Epicurean 
                                                            
325 The marking of the parenthesis is mine, and represents Philodemus' polemical intrusion into a report of the 
Stoic's view, as does the reference to the “irrational” hearing two lines later. 
326 For an overview of the Stoics' views on grammar, see Blank and Atherton (2003); for Philodemus' demand that 
poetry be intelligible, see chapter five, §8. 
327 Cf. especially frr. 36 and 247, and see GE s.v. αἴϲθηϲιϲ. 
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position was therefore probably an innovation vis-à-vis the normal assumption; it was motivated 
by their commitment that the senses do not judge. 
 We know that Philodemus was profoundly skeptical of the euphonic schemes worked up 
by some of the kritikoi (Andromenides, for instance), and called them “inexistent” (ἐξ οὐ[κ 
ὄντοϲ ἐπιγενή[µ]ατο⟨ϲ⟩, II.77.21-2), that is to say “non-existent” or perhaps “impossible,” 
because they depart so far from actual experience of a poem (according to Philodemus, at least). 
This means that even the synthesis (the form of a poem, its verbal structure and the sounds of the 
words, if they matter) is appreciated intellectually, rather than as purely sensory delight. The 
content of poetry is also evaluated intellectually—in fact, the only part of poetry which has an 
effect on a non-intellectual part of the audience is the rhythm, which can tickle the hearing. 
Poems work their effects in a thoroughly intellectual way.328 
 
§7 The Inseparability of Form and Content 
 One of the few aspects of Philodemus' poetics which has been well understood is his 
position that the form and content of a poem are fundamentally connected. Though they can be 
discussed separately (at least, Philodemus himself feels licensed to do so), his position is that the 
contents of the poem help to dictate the form of the poem, at least in part.329 The form, in turn, is 
inseparable from the content: you cannot have form without content, nor the reverse. This 
explains his hesitancy regarding the critical method of “metathesis,” which was most famously 
used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The method involves changing a line or sentence in a 
variety of possible ways in order to show how it could be improved or that it is best the way it 
                                                            
328 See below on “Further Thoughts” (§9) for more on this topic. 
329 See the discussion at the end of §2. 
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was originally.330 Previously, scholars of Philodemus thought that the ban on this method was 
absolute, but the textual basis for this has disappeared.331 It is clear now that he merely thought it 
to be useless. 
 The first claim can be seen in Philodemus' rebuttal of Neoptolemus of Parium. 
Philodemus is discussing a claim made by Neoptolemus, whose text was just quoted above (§6) 
and which I repeat here for convenience. 
On Poems V.14.26-15.22:332 
26  θ[α]υµ[ϲτὸ]ν δ’ αὐ- 
 τοῦ καὶ [τὸ] “τ̣ῆ[ϲ] ποήϲεω[ϲ 
 εἷναι τὴν ὑπόθεϲιν [µ]ό- 
 νον,” καὶ τοῦ ποήµατο[ϲ καὶ 
30 πάντων̣ ὅλωϲ τῆϲ ποήϲ[ε- 
 ωϲ ὄντω̣ν. ἡ µὲν [γ]ὰρ πό-̣ 
 ηϲιϲ καὶ π[όηµά γ’ ἐϲτιν, 
 οἷον ἡ Ἰλι[άϲ], οἱ δ[ὲ πρῶτοι 
 ϲτίχοι τρι[άκ]οντα τα[ύ]τηϲ 
35 πόηµα µ[έ]ν, οὐ̣ µέντοι ποί- 
15.1 ηϲιϲ· καὶ τὸ̣ “ποή[µατοϲ µό- 
 ν͙ον τὴ̣ν [ϲύνθεϲιν τῆϲ 
 λέξεωϲ”—ἀ͙[λλὰ µὴ τὰϲ κοι- 
 ν̣ὰϲ̣ διανο̣ί̣[αϲ καὶ ἤθη 
5 καὶ πράξειϲ καὶ π̣[ροϲω- 
          ⸏ ποποιί[αϲ]; εἰ δ' ἐν [τῆι  
 λέξει πε[π]ο̣ιῆϲθαί [δεῖν 
 λέ]γει, κἀνταῦθ̣[α  νή Δί' οὐ- 
 κ  ἔϲτι τι πεποι[ῆϲθαι  το]ύ- 
10 των χωρίϲ, ἀλλ' [αἴτι]ο[ν το]ῦ 
 ϲυνκεῖϲθα[ι τὴν] λέξιν τὸ  
 ϲυ]νκεῖϲθαι [τὴν πρᾶξ]ιν εἶ-  
13 ν]αι φαίνεταί µ̣[οι.  
Also amazing is his claim “only the 
plot belongs to poesis,” since also 
poema and everything belong 
completely to poesis. For the poesis 
is also poema, e.g. the Iliad, but the 
first thirty lines of it are poema, and 
not poesis. Also the claim “only the 
composition of the language belongs 
to the poema”—but not the common 
thoughts and the characters and the 
actions and the characterizations? 
But if he claims that it has been done 
in language, from there is 
impossible, by Zeus, to have done 
something without these [sc. 
thoughts, characters, actions, etc. 
mentioned just before], but it seems 
to me that the composition of the 
plot is the cause of the composition 
of the language. 
 
Neoptolemus' opinions are not easy to understand, but he seems to claim that the poet, the 
poema, and the poesis are separate and independent (possibly equally important) parts of the art 
                                                            
330 Some instances of metathesis use only the same words as the original line; others go further afield. See 
Greenberg (1958) for a discussion of its use in the judgment of poetry and de Jonge (2005) for a discussion of 
Dionysius' use of it. 
331 See Greenberg (1990) and Armstrong (1995a) and (2001). The passage is in On Poems II, which is currently 
being reedited. 
332 On the text, see n. 322 above. 
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of poetry. Philodemus implies that poema maps closely onto form and poesis onto the plot (and 
poema has no part of it, V.14.26-29). µόνον in l. 28 implies that the separation is strict. For our 
purposes, what exactly Neoptolemus meant is not under discussion, only what Philodemus took 
him to be saying and how he responds.  
 Philodemus' basic objection to Neoptolemus' strict separation of form and content (as 
Philodemus understood him), as was pointed out by Asmis (1992b), is that these two aspects 
interpenetrate and are not separable. (That Neoptolemus seems to contradict himself by saying 
that some things belong to poema but not poesis is secondary.) Not only does the plot 
condition333 the language used by the poet, but the two are therefore inseparable to a certain 
degree. If Mangoni's supplement of αἴτιον is correct, they are not only inseparable, but have a 
partially causal relationship: “but it seems to me that the composition of the plot is the cause of 
the composition of the language,” that is, the formation of the plot, and its actions and characters, 
indelibly affects the language used to relate the plot to the audience, and that the plotting out of 
the poem is prior to its actual instantiation in language. This recalls the anecdote about Menander 
(Suetonius Vit. Ter. 5) in which he, in response to a friend worried about his finishing a play in 
time for the competition said, “the play is done. Now I just have to write the words.” This 
indicates that, for him, working out the plot was the lion's share of the work. 
 That this position is actually Philodemus' confirmed explicitly by another statement he 
makes against Neoptolemus, as Asmis (1992b) pointed out: 
On Poems V.13.32-14.4:  
                                                            
333 The language is not completely dependent on the plot, since both of these things are still under the control of the 
poet. Cf. On Poems V.15.22-6: πονηρὰ γὰρ ἔϲτιν ὅτε [γ]ίνετα[ι] ποιήµατα κα[ὶ  ὑπ]οθέϲειϲ φαῦλαι 
ποιήϲ[εω]ν̣, ἀφαµαρ[τά]νοντο[ϲ τοῦ] ποιητοῦ (“for sometimes the verses are bad and the plots of the poems 
are base because the poet makes mistakes”). The reason why the poet is blameworthy is simple: [ὁ γ]ὰρ πάντ[α 
ποι]ῶν οὗτ[όϲ ἐϲ]τιν (“he is the one who composes everything,” V.14.16-7). 
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32    __  ἀ]λλὰ  
 µὴν ὅ̣ [γε Νεο]π̣[τ]όλεµ̣οϲ  
 οὐκ ὀρ̣[θῶϲ ἔδοξ]ε τὴν ϲύν- 
35 θεϲιν [ἀπὸ τῶν ποητι]κ̣ῶν 
14.1 διανοηµά[των χωρί- 
 ζειν, οὐδὲν̣ ἥϲϲ[ω µερίδα 
 λέγων αὐτὴ[ν] ἢ πλεί[ω,  
4      __ καθάπερ ἐπεν[οήϲ]αµεν. 
In turn, Neoptolemus was 
wrong to think that the 
composition of the language is 
separate from the poetic 
contents, though he claimed that 
it was in no way a smaller or 
greater part, as we pointed out. 
 
Here, the issue is the separation of the parts, not the their relative importances, but Philodemus' 
use of the verb χωρίζω is important. Not only are they more or less equally important, but the 
worked out thoughts (i.e. those that the poet has selected and arranged) are inseparable from the 
language used to express them.  
 Lastly, we return to Philodemus' rebuttal of Neoptolemus for a possible glimpse of how 
he thought this interaction worked. 
On Poems V.14.12-17:334 
12 µᾶ[λλο]ν γὰρ ἐχρῆν  
 τὰϲ ⟨ποιήϲειϲ⟩ διαθ̣[έϲει]ϲ {ποιήϲειϲ}  
 ἐπ[ικαλεῖ]ν, ἔτι δὲ βέλ-    
15 τιον ἔ[ρ]γα τὰ ποήµατα,   
 τὰϲ δὲ ποιήϲειϲ οἷ[ον] ὕ- 
17 φη. 
       Because one ought to have 
called the poeseis “dis-
positions,” or, better, the 
poemata are “works” and the 
poeseis are like tapestries. 
 
On this reading, the poesis is taken to be some sort of organized product, just as a tapestry (or 
any woven product) is inseparably constructed from warp and woof, both of which are needed 
for weaving; it contains the smaller sections of the work, the erga or poemata, woven together in 
such a way that no part can be changed without implications for the whole, and so we can infer 
that the organization and effect of the whole (intended, after all, by the poet) would be altered by 
                                                            
334 I follow Ardizzoni's understanding of the term diathesis (1953: 23-5); especially n.b. Aristotle Metaphysics Δ 
19, 1022b1: διάθεϲιϲ λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντοϲ µέρη τάξιϲ. The emendation in line 13 is mine and is intended to 
restore consistency: with it, all the ποη- roots belong to Neoptolemus' technical vocabulary and all the non-ποη- 
glosses are Philodemus' attempts at rephrasing him. As Asmis (1992b) demonstrated, poema does not mean 
“short poem” or “part of a poem,” nor does poesis mean “complete poem” or “long poem” in either 
Neoptolemus' or Philodemus' critical vocabularies. 
  158 
changing the order of the parts. 
 A consequence of the close connection between form and content is Philodemus' distaste 
for the critical practice of “metathesis.” He does not ban the practice outright,335 but, in what 
amounts to the same thing, he thinks that it is perfectly useless for the judgment of poetry. 
Metathesis is handled extensively in books one and two of the On Poems and seems to have been 
a characteristic practice of the Kritikoi. 
 In Philodemus' rebuttal of Heracleodorus in book II, one passage has clear bearing on our 
topic. 
On Poems II.61.21-7:336 
21  [ἡ]µεῖϲ δὲ τὸν [ἀπο- 
 δε̣χόµ̣[εν]ον “ἀµετάθ̣[ε- 
 το{υ}⸌ν⸍” (τα[ύτ]ηϲ ⟨τῆϲ⟩ ϲυνηθεία//ϲ 
 ὑ]παρχ[ο]ύ̣ϲ̣ηϲ) “τὸν νοῦ̣[ν 
25 τ̣ῶ̣ν π̣ο̣ητῶν” εἰκαίωϲ 
 ἐ̣παινεῖν ἐροῦµεν ἢ [ἀπο- 
27        κόπτειν. 
But we will say that the 
(critic) who accepts that 
“poets' meaning is un-
metathesized” (if this 
usage exists) praises or 
rejects it at random. 
 
Uncertainties plague the passage, but it is clear enough that Philodemus thinks that whoever uses 
the method of metathesis “praises and blames poetry at random.” This is because metathesis 
fundamentally changes the poem: it cannot be said to be the “same poem” when it has been 
changed or manipulated in this way. Metathesis, according to its practitioners, only changes the 
form. So there are two possibilities for what exactly Philodemus' objection consisted in: either, 
given that form and content are so closely interrelated, it is impossible to change only the form 
                                                            
335 This was reasonably thought to be the case by e.g. Greenberg (1990), Armstrong (1995a), and Oberhelman and 
Armstrong (1995), because it was the correct understanding of the texts they were using, but reedition of the 
passages has changed the text, which can be found in Janko (forthcoming). The most important is On Poems 
II.61, quoted below. 
336 The major difficulty is in l. 23, where Jensen and Sbordone printed [ἄλλ]ηϲ and Greenberg (1990: 153) 
translated the passage as “but we say that the one who assumes that the thought of the poet is not changed, if a 
different usage of the speech is present...” Janko's new edition rules out that text and the interpretations built on 
it. The words from ταύτηϲ to ὑπαρχούϲηϲ are a parenthetical apology for a neologism or unfamiliar word. 
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without also changing the contents, or, by changing the form, even if the content of the verse 
remains unchanged, they are changing the poem so much that it is no longer “the same.”337  
 A passage from later in the book indicates that the second version is the one that 
Philodemus intended. 
On Poems II.76.1-22: 
1  πῶϲ οὐκ, “ἐὰν τὸ 
 µέτ̣ρον τιϲ ἢ τὸ κῶλον 
 {ι̣} ἐκβιβάϲηι διὰ τῆϲ µετα- 
 θέϲεωϲ΄, ἀνελεῖ τὰ καὶ τὴν   
5 ἀκοὴν ἐπιτερπῶϲ διατι- 
             θέντα;” οὐ µέντοι ⸌γε⸍, ⟦π⟧ὡϲ οὗ- 
 τοϲ οἴεται, ϲυνάξει διὰ τοῦ-    
 το{υ} τὸ “τὴν ἀρε̣τὴν τοῦ πο-  
 ήµατο̣ϲ ἐν̣ ε̣ὐφωνίαι κεῖ- 
10         ϲθαι·” “τὴν” γὰρ “εὐφωνίαν” 
 οὐκ ἔλ̣ε̣γ̣ε̣ “τὸ µέ[τ]ρον ἢ τὸ̣ν 
 τῶν κ̣ώλων ὅλων ῥυ- 
 θ̣µὸν” ὁ “µηδὲ ⟨ποεῖν⟩ πο̣ή{ι}µατα” 
 φὰϲ βε̣λτί̣[ο]να τῶν ὁµοί-̣ 
15 ω[ϲ] χρωµ[έ]ν̣[ω]ν αὐτοῖϲ,” 
 ἀλλὰ] ἑτέρα̣ν [α]ὐτ̣ῶν “ἐπι- 
 φαιν̣[οµ]//ένη//ν ταῖϲ ϲυνθέ- 
 ϲε]ϲ̣ι̣[ν,” ἣν οὔτ]’ ἐν τοῖϲ ἀκει-̣ 
 ν]ήτ̣οιϲ [ε]ὑ̣[ρ]ίϲκ̣οµεν ὑπάρ- 
20 χ̣ουϲ[α]ν΄, οὔτε̣ κατὰ τὰϲ µε- 
 ταθέ̣ϲ̣ε̣ιϲ ἀποβαλλοµέ- 
         > νην τὴν οὐκ οὖϲαν. 
Ηow is it not the case that, if 
someone eliminates the verse or the 
colon by means of his re-
arrangement, he will not destroy 
those elements which also dispose 
the hearing pleasantly? However, 
contrary to what this critic supposes, 
he cannot conclude on this account 
that “the excellence of verse lies in 
euphony.” For the person who said 
“good poets do not even compose 
better verses than those who use 
them likewise” did not call 
“euphony” the verse-form or the 
rhythm of entire cola, but “the 
euphony” different from them “that 
supervenes upon the com-
positions”—which, we find, does not 
exist in unaltered verses and does not 
lose in the rearrangements the 
euphony that does not exist!  
 
 
Heracleodorus, the opponent at this point, has evidently argued that metathesis can reveal faults 
in the sound of verses (which supervenes on the word order as the words are read out loud) and 
that therefore the excellence of poetry is in the sound. Philodemus criticizes him on two points. 
The first is that, by changing the word order, he is removing whatever was originally there that 
would please the hearing. The second criticism is that Heracleodorus' second claim does not 
                                                            
337 Relevant too is the refutation of Crates in book V, discussed at the beginning of the chapter at §1, in which 
Philodemus states that, when we discuss the composition, we should not “tear it away” from the underlying 
contents. 
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follow from his first. We are not in a position to evaluate the second claim, but the first seems 
compelling, and is in line with an earlier part of Philodemus' critique: 
On Poems II.71.17-21: 
17            λοιπὸν ἄπορον ἡµ ̣εῖ[ν 
 προπίπτει΄, τίνοϲ ϲ̣υµ⟨µ⟩έ{ν̣}- 
 νοντοϲ ἐκ τῆ[ϲ] µεταθέ- 
20 ϲεωϲ οἰκειούµ̣[εθ]’ ἢ{ι} δυϲ-  
 χεραίνοµεν; 
Finally, a puzzle presents itself to 
us: because of what element 
remaining after the metathesis are 
we pleased or irritated? 
 
We are pleased or displeased with a metathesized line according to its current form; but because 
of the connection between form and content, it is not clear to Philodemus what of the original 
form remains in the new form to provide a basis for judgment. That is, if the metathesis changes 
both form and content, nothing seems to remain from the original form. Metathesis gives you a 
completely new verse and is therefore useless as a technique for judging the verses that someone 
has actually written. 
 The objection, as it is found in Philodemus, is to the use of metathesis by the Kritikoi for 
their own ends: they rearranged verses in an attempt to judge the aural effects of poetry, whether 
these are found in word order itself or in the pronunciation of those words. But Philodemus' 
criticism goes beyond their claims: not only is this an invalid technique for judging euphony, but 
it is also useless for judgment of content, and a line and its metathesized variant are not 
comparable. However, he does admit that the new arrangement might result in a better or worse 
line than before: 
On Poems II.70.28-71.7: 
28     >  τὸ δὲ “τῆϲ αὐτῆϲ  
 δι]ανοίαϲ {ι} καὶ τῆϲ ⟨αὐτῆϲ⟩ λέξεωϲ 
71.1 ἐ]ν̣υπαρχο̣[υϲῶν, τῶ]νδε 
 δ̣ὴ κ[εινουµένω]ν΄ παρὰ 
 τ[ὸ µεταθ]εῖ̣ν̣α͙ι͙ ἢ καλὸν 
 ἢ µ[οχθ]ηρὸν ἀποτελεῖ̣ϲ- 
But his claim ‘if the thoughts 
and the diction are the same, 
but the latter are changed, 
the verse is rendered either 
beautiful or base because of 
the transposition’ is the most 
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5 θα[ι τὸ πόη]µ̣α”΄, πάντων µέν ̣
 ἐϲτι//ν π//ιθα̣νώτατον τῶν  
7     λεγοµένων·΄ 
persuasive of all his 
statements. 
 
Philodemus admits a minor point: if the metathesis does manage to affect only the verbal 
expression of the line, then the line will be better or worse depending solely on the new verbal 
expression.338 But he immediately places strict limits on the range of the procedure: 
On Poems II.71.7-17: 
7        ἀλλὰ τό γε 
 “πα[ρ]ὰ̣ τ̣ὴν ϲ̣ύνθεϲιν εὐφω- 
 νίαν τῶι΄ ‘Ϲέριφοϲ ἅλµηι 
10 πον̣τίαι περίρ̣ρ̣υτοϲ’΄ ἐπι- 
 φα[ί]νεϲθαι” κ[ἀπ]ὶ̣ τοῦ πά- 
 θου̣ϲ ἀντιφ[ω]νεῖ⟦ϲθ⟧\τ/αι.΄ τὸ 
 δ’ “αὐ̣τὴν ψυ[χα]γωγε̣ῖν ⟨τὴν⟩ 
 ϲύνθεϲιν κ[αθ’ α]ὑτήν,΄ ἕτε- 
15 ρο̣ν̣ οὐδὲν ἐ[πιφ]εροµέ- 
        ν[η]ν ἀγαθόν”̣, [ἀ]πίθανόν   
17         ἐϲτι.΄  
But his claim “it is because of 
the composition that euphony 
appears on the surface of (the 
verse) 'Seriphos, round which 
flows the salty sea'” is 
controverted even in the case 
of (our) experience. His claim 
‘composition itself by itself 
enthralls, contributing no other 
excellence,” is implausible.  
 
Philodemus appeals to experience to deny Heracleodorus' claim that the composition is 
responsible for the euphony in Euripides' verse and denies his claim that composition enthralls or 
entertains. His motivation for the second claim is probably to be found in the Epicurean doctrine 
that only arguments can sway an audience and that the ears can be tickled only by sound: 
euphony simply cannot exert by means of the irrational ears such a strong mental effect as 
psychagogia. But Philodemus' motivation for the first claim is mysterious: if it is not in the 
composition, where is euphony really to be found?339 Gomperz' suggestion that the triviality of 
the contents makes the nobility of the description ridiculous might be true, as far as it goes, but it 
does not touch Philodemus' assertion that the claim “the euphony appears because of the 
                                                            
338 He makes the same concession at length in II.72.6-73.17. 
339 It may be nowhere to be found: at On Poems II.76.18-22 and 77.21-23, Philodemus seems to deny that it exists. 
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composition” is false.340 
 On the topic of the “impossibility of metathesis,” Armstrong (1995: 221) had concluded 
that “[o]nce they have been through the poet's mind and become his own handiwork, the thought 
and subject as well as the style are then entirely his own, and to call the subject the identical 
thought or subject if it is written up in a different style is entirely superficial. Sophocles' version 
of a legend and Euripides' are not two treatments of the same subject, thought it may be 
convenient (grosso modo) to put it that way, but poems on two different subjects that are not the 
same any more than are their words.” He later adds: “Philodemus' doctrine, then, goes even 
further than to claim Sophocles' and Euripides' Oedipus are not simply not on the same subject. 
Indeed, Sophocles' Oedipus with any verse metathesized, that is with the same words 
metathesized, would not be the same poem because the thought would have been changed, not 
just the order of words; and the composition can never be praised apart from the composition of 
the whole” (1995: 222). We can be somewhat more precise now: the plot, when uncomposed 
(ἀπόητον), is common (κοινόν), but when the poet gives it verbal dress and form, he makes it 
“poetic” or composed (πεποιηµένον); it becomes part of a unique composition. Changing the 
form will change the effect that the form has on the audience, that is, it changes the “additional 
thoughts” that the synthesis of a poem provide.  
 A further problem is not mentioned by Philodemus here, but is implicit in a statement of 
Epicurus.341 In De Natura XXVIII, he says that all words have one and only one meaning each 
(τὸ πάντα φθόγγον ἐπιφέροντα δοξάζειν τόδε τι, fr. 13, col. 2 inf. ll. 5-8 Sedley). This means 
that, if the critic during metathesis changes a word into an apparent synonym, he has changed the 
                                                            
340 Gomperz (1891: 63). 
341 This point was made by in print by D. Armstrong (2001: 304), who says that M. Wigodsky mentioned it to him 
in conversation. 
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poem more deeply than might at first appear to be the case. Not only is the form no longer the 
same, but the contents have also been disturbed, however slightly, and the poem is not “the 
same” any more. 
 All of this is to say that, if a single aspect, even just one word or the word-order within a 
single line, is changed, the thought of the poem is changed, and so the poem itself is essentially 
changed as well. Ancient critical use of metathesis relied on the assumption that the line or 
poem, no matter how changed, is still fundamentally comparable with the original version; 
Philodemus allowed the comparison while denying its utility. 
 
§8 The Judgment of Poems 
 On these grounds, we can construct a broad outline of Philodemus' poetics, avoiding 
small details, in accord with his own wishes. A poet should take whatever contents he wants, 
provided they are intelligent, intelligible, and suited for a liberally educated audience, and clothe 
them in language which reflects the contents. The result will be a work of art whose purpose is to 
entertain the audience through an appeal to their minds by the unique combination of form and 
contents, which is made manifest by the particular arrangement imposed by the poet. The poem 
probably should belong to a recognized genre, but this is less important than its quality taken 
alone as a single poem without reference to generic demands. 
 That Philodemus is willing to judge the two aspects separately, and talks about them 
without reference to the other throughout his own treatise, indicates that, however intimately 
linked they may be, they are not completely inseparable: a judgment on either aspect does not 
constitute a judgment on the entire poem. Of course, some reference to the other aspect is 
necessary, because without the language, the contents would be incommunicable, and without 
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knowledge of the contents, it would be impossible to say whether the language is describing the 
contents well. Here too we find an implicit demand for intelligibility and perhaps a robust 
relationship between form and contents.  
 But how do we determine if a poem is good or bad? To answer that, we will have to 
return to the initial quotation, from the refutation of the Stoic critic (see §2, above). 
On Poems V.20.35-21.27:342 
35    ἐ-  
21.1 κεῖνα τοίνυν ἐπ[αι]νῶ, δ[ι- 
 ότι [τ]ὰ̣ τὴν [µὲν διάν]ο[ιαν 
 ἀϲτείαν ἔχο[ντα, κακὴν  
 δὲ τὴν ϲύνθε[ϲ]ιν, µ[ο]χ̣θη-  
5 ρά ἐϲτι, [κ]αὶ διό[τι] τὸ κ[ακῶ]ϲ  
 ϲυνκεῖϲθαι πρὸϲ τὸ φ[αῦ-  
 λον ἀπόχ̣ρη. τὸ͙ δ̣ὲ π̣[ρὸϲ 
 τὸ ϲπουδαῖον µὴ ἀπ̣[ο- 
 χρῆν τὸ καλῶϲ, ἀλ[λὰ] προϲ- 
10 δεῖϲθαι καὶ εὐφω̣[νίαϲ 
 καὶ διανοίαϲ̣ [καὶ π]ολλῶν 
 ἀλλῶν επεν̣[  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣]ϲ̣π̣α̣[ ̣  ̣
 µο[ι] φ̣̣αίνεται [  ̣ ̣ ( ̣)]ηϲθειϲ̣ 
 τεϲ[  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣   (̣ ̣) κ]αὶ ϲυν[ε- 
15 πενηνέχθαι ταῖϲ ἀγε[νή- 
 τοιϲ εὐφωνίαιϲ τῶν κ[ρι- 
 ⸏τικῶν. ἔτι δ[ὲ µ]ᾶλλον 
 τό “τινα τῶν ἀρχ̣[α]ίων κα- 
 τά τι χρ̣η̣ϲ[τ]ὰ̣ [ὄ]ντα καὶ µά- 
20 λιϲτα κατὰ τὴ[ν ϲύ]νθε- 
 ϲιν καθάπαξ εἶναι φαῦλα.” 
 τ]οῦ γὰρ “τὰ κατά τι ϲπου- 
 δα]ῖα καθάπαξ εἶναι [φ]αῦ- 
 λ]α γ’” [οὐδ]ὲν ἀδιανοη[τό]τε- 
25 ρον] εὑρίϲκω κατ[ὰ τὴν 
 ϲ͙υνή[θ]ειαν ἀκούων τῶν 
 λεγ[ο]µένων. 
And yet I praise those 
[opinions?], because, although 
they have good thought, but bad 
composition, they are bad, and 
because being badly composed 
suffices for a judgment of “bad.” 
But being well composed does 
not suffice for a judgment of 
“good,” but there is a further 
need for euphony and thought 
and many other [qualities] … 
seems to me [somehow mis-
taken], and to have brought in 
with it the nonexistent euphonies 
of the critics. Even more so the 
claim that “some of the poems of 
the ancients, though good in 
some one respect but especially 
composition, are completely 
bad.” If I read that according to 
the accepted sense of the words, 
I find nothing more thoughtless 
than the claim that poems which 
are good in one way are 
completely bad. 
 
From this passage, two general principles of judgment can be extracted: bad composition suffices 
for a judgment of “bad,” and good composition does not suffice for a judgment of “good.” A 
subsidiary concern is that it is stupid to say that a poem which is good in some respect is 
                                                            
342 Discussion of the text is included in n. 283. 
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completely bad. From this, we must infer that Philodemus recognized an intermediate category 
or gradations of quality, in that a poem which is good in some respect and bad in another is 
probably to be considered middling or mediocre. 
 That Philodemus is only arguing dialectically and does not genuinely hold the opinions 
he puts forth seems possible, but is probably not the case. His criticism, at the end of the quoted 
passage, that a poem said to be good in one part or aspect cannot be said to be completely bad, 
depends on Epicurean linguistic commitments, and it seems safe to assume that he is putting 
forward his actual opinions throughout the passage.343 
 We should note that Philodemus probably considered form and content to be roughly 
equally necessary; he reveals this position in his refutation of an anonymous critic preserved in 
Philomelus344: 
On Poems V.12.24-27: 
24             καὶ τὸ  
25 “παραπληϲίωϲ ἀναγκαῖ- 
 α τήν τε λέξιν εἶναι καὶ  
27 τὰ πράγµατα” λόγον ἔχει. 
And the statement “both the language 
and the plot are more or less equally 
necessary” is reasonable. 
 
Here, their relative weights are at issue, and Philodemus is succinct. It will turn out that form is 
slightly more important for him, however. 
 It is possible to construct a chart. Along the x-axis the contents are rated according to the 
three possibilities outlined by the Stoic Critic. Along the y-axis are the same possibilities for 
                                                            
343 Ioppolo (2005) attempts an explanation of how the Stoic might evade Philodemus' criticism or even not have 
been subject to it in the first place; the important thing for my argument is that Philodemus' criticism, regardless 
of its target, is motivated by his Epicureanism and reflects his views. 
344 Philomelus is otherwise unknown (the name is fairly common, with 101 entries in the LGPN). He seems to be 
Philodemus' source for Praxiphanes (presumably the Peripatetic from Mytilene), Demetrius of Byzantium 
(another Peripatetic), and several anonymous critics. Because he quotes Peripatetics and the anonymous critics 
use Peripatetic-sounding terms like µῦθοι, πρᾶξιϲ, and λέξιϲ, I suggest that he too was a Peripatetic and wrote a 
resume or critical summary of earlier Peripatetics. See also Mangoni (1993: 47-52). It seems more likely that 
Philodemus' judgment of “is reasonable” reflects his own position than that he is just conceding a point for no 
clear reason to this particular anonymous opponent. On this passage, see Pace (1995: 122-5). 
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form. At the intersections are Philodemus' statements about the poems with that combination of 
form and contents. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the list of statements below, taken 
from the passage quoted just above. I have marked with question marks cases where the term 
adopted seems doubtful . 
                      Contents 
Form 
Good Mediocre Bad 
Good Good (Best?) Good?  (Better?) Bad (2.5) 
Mediocre Good? (Better?) Mediocre? (3) Bad (inferred from 
2.5) 
Bad µοχθηρόν (1) µοχθηρόν (1) µοχθηρόν (1) 
 
1.  “being badly composed suffices for a judgment of 'bad.'” (i.e. if the poem is badly composed, 
it is bad regardless of the quality of the contents.) 
 1.5  “although they have good thought, but bad composition, they are bad” 
2.  “being well composed does not suffice for a judgment of good”  
 2.5 “...but there is an additional need for ... thought”  
3 “I find nothing more thoughtless than the claim that poems which are good in one way are 
completely bad.” 
 
For hesitations about this chart, see below. I understand the rule in 2.5 for “thought” (διάνοια 
without an adjective) to mean “moderate thought,” and have written the table in accord with that 
interpretation. It could mean “good thought,” in which case, a poem with moderate form and 
moderate contents will be bad. Further, I infer that the poem with moderate form and bad 
contents is bad, because a better poem, one with good form and bad contents, is still bad. 
Likewise, a poem with good form but bad contents is bad and therefore a poem with moderate 
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form and bad contents must also be bad. 
 In general, then, any poem with a single bad aspect, whether form or contents, is bad. 
Those poems in which both elements are moderate or good are acceptable. Philodemus uses only 
“good” and “bad” as judgments, not “mediocre;” so we do not know what distinctions he drew; 
however, if he recognized the gradations available, the table would be as it appears above. I think 
would be perverse of him not to recognize that a poem with good form and contents is better than 
a poem with good form but mediocre contents. The case of the fully mediocre poem is also left 
somewhat undefined. It seems strange to call a thoroughly mediocre poem “good” (i.e. it would 
contradict the normal usage of language), but to call it “mediocre” or “acceptable” seems 
reasonable. Similarly, to call a poem which has one good aspect and one mediocre aspect 
“mediocre” may also seem strained. A scheme like “good, better, best” would allow all four 
categories to be good while still recognizing the differences, but, unfortunately, Philodemus is 
himself being schematic in his response to a schematic critic and the shades of grey are not fully 
treated.  
 If Philodemus did not actually recognize a “moderate” category, the only good poem will 
be one with both good form and contents, since a single bad element suffices to render the poem 
bad. The reason for thinking that he did not recognize such a category is that (i) he never uses it 
in his discussion (except possibly in the ambiguous phrasing “not bad”), and (ii) the following 
passage. 
On Poems V.20.30-35:345 
30  θαυ[µ]αϲτὸ[ν 
 γὰρ̣ εἶναί µοι δο͙[κεῖ τὸ 
 ϲύνθεϲιν ἔχον οὐ̣[κ ἀϲτεί- 
 αν καὶ διάνο͙ι[αν οὔθ’ ὁ- 
    For it seems amazing 
to me that “a poem with 
neither good synthesis 
nor good or poetic 
                                                            
345 The adjective “poetic” in line 34 is unexplained. It may be borrowed from the adversary. 
  168 
 λ͙ῶϲ ποητικὴν [οὔτ’ ἀϲτεί- 
35 αν µὴ φαῦλον ε[ἶ]ν̣[αι. 
thought is not bad.” 
 
It is not clear what Philodemus understands his negations to mean. “Neither good synthesis nor 
good ... thought” can mean either bad or mediocre, but here he seems to be excluding the middle 
ground. A poem without good form and without good thought could be mediocre, but, if this is 
so, Philodemus should be willing to say that it is “not bad,” since that can also mean “mediocre;”  
however, he not only does not say so, but pretends to be scandalized that someone else said so. 
Unfortunately, Philodemus' words here conflicts with his apparent commitment to clear language 
and I do not see how to arrive at his actual opinion. 
 An apparent exception to the above statements is found in doxa 8, recorded in book V, 
according to which the best poem is that with language which matches the speakers. In it, 
Philodemus objects that the author of the doxa only considers language, while ignoring the 
thoughts. 
On Poems V.35.6-10: 
6  καὶ περὶ τῆ[ϲ] λέ- 
 ξεωϲ µόνον λαλεῖ, τὰ νο- 
 ήµατα κυριωτέραν δύ- 
 ναµιν ἔχοντα παραπέµ- 
10 πουϲ[α. 
And this opinion speaks 
about style only, ignoring the 
thoughts, though they have 
the more authoritative 
power. 
 
More context clarifies the issue: the doxa is concerned with the relationship between characters 
in a poem and the speeches composed and put into their mouths by the poet. The author has 
discussed only the style of these speeches, and left aside discussion of their contents (or 
alternatively the thoughts of the characters). The word κύριοϲ (“authoritative” above) presents a 
problem. Mangoni (ad loc.) takes it to be the opponent's term taken over polemically: 
Philodemus is accusing the author of this doxa of ignoring what he considered to be more 
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important, even though Philodemus himself disagreed with that analysis.346 This is in line with 
Philodemus' method. Since the style relates to the character giving the speech, so too the 
thoughts/content (clearly in this context those of the speech) should match the character. 
 There are two final cases to discuss, which do not easily enter into the framework 
established just above. The first case is when a poem's content is unintelligible; the second is a 
poem whose form does not meet the requirements for poetry or verse. Let us take the former case 
first: 
On Poems II.64.23-65.24:347 
23    διὸ καὶ  
 τὸν ποητὴν ϲυρίτ[τ]οι⟨µεν⟩  
25 ἂν δικαί̣[ω]ϲ, εἴ τι πον̣οί-  
 η τῶν ἀνα̣λ̣όγων. ὃ ο̣[ὐ- 
27 χ ὅµοιόν ἐϲ̣τιν ἐπ[ὶ τ]ῆϲ  
65.1 πο̣ητικῆϲ̣ τὸ “τὰ πρ[άγµα-  
 τα ἄγνωϲτα εἶναι̣, [τὰϲ δὲ  
 λέξειϲ οὐκ ἀρεϲτά[ϲ”, τῶι 
 ἐπὶ τῆϲ µαγε̣[ιρι]κ̣ῆ[ϲ εἰ ϲα-  
5           πρὰ τἀγοράϲµατα΄. τ[ῆϲ 
 µὲν γὰρ ἔξω ταῦτ̣’ ἐϲ̣[τί, 
 τῆϲ δὲ ποητικῆϲ ο[ὐ]κ [ἔϲ- 
 τιν ἔξω τὸ ποεῖν̣ [γνωϲ-  
 τὰ τὰ πράγµατα. [κἄν τιϲ 
10 παντελῶϲ αὐτὰ [παρ’ ἑ-  
 τέρου λαµβάνη[ι, ἴδια δὲ 
 τῇ ϲυνθέϲει τὰ π̣ο̣[ήµα-   
 τα, τοῦτ’ ἦν ἰδιώ[τατον 
 αὐτοῦ΄. διόπερ ο[ὐδὲ τὸ 
15 τὰϲ λέξειϲ ο`ἰ΄κείαϲ [ἔχειν 
 ἐκτόϲ̣ ἐ̣ϲτι τῆϲ π̣[οητικῆϲ,  
 κἂν αἱ̣ λ̣έξειϲ ὠφ̣[ελείαϲ 
 τοῦ βίου παρεϲχή̣[κωϲι 
 κοιναί΄. τὸ γὰρ ἐγλ[έγειν 
20 τὰϲ ο`ἰ΄κείαϲ καὶ δ[ι]ατ̣[ιθ]έ- 
 ναι πρὸϲ ⟦α⟧ δήλωϲιν τοι- 
 ούτου νοήµατοϲ ἐπι- 
 τηδ//ε//[ίωϲ]΄, τ̣οῦτ’ ἦ[ν ἴ]δι- 
24      >ον αὐτοῦ΄. 
Hence we would rightly hiss the 
poet, if he prepared something of 
the same kind. The claim in the case 
of poetry that “the contents are 
unintelligible and the words not 
pleasing” is not like the claim in the 
case of cookery that “the 
ingredients are rotten.” For the latter 
are external to the art [sc. of 
cookery], but making the contents 
intelligible is not external to the art 
of poetry. Even if a poet takes them 
over completely from someone else, 
and the verses are his own by his 
composition, this is, as we saw, 
very much his particularity. For this 
reason even making the words one’s 
own does not lie outside the art of 
poetry, even if words that are 
common have provided the needs of 
life. For, as we saw, selecting 
appropriate words and arranging 
them suitably with a view to 
expressing clearly such a thought is 
his particularity. 
                                                            
346 δύναµιϲ might also be the opponent's word, but it does not appear in Philodemus' summary of the doxa here. It 
may have occurred in the summary of them, partly preserved in PHerc. 228. 
347 See n. 297 on the text and translation of this passage. 
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The comparison is not obvious.348 The freshness of the ingredients of a recipe is not under the 
control of the cook (instead, apparently, it is the responsibility of a provisioner, as in Menander's 
Dyscolus349); only the recipe and techniques are up to the cook. It is, however, the poet's job to 
make his poems understandable, even if uses someone else's plot. Philodemus lived in a world in 
which kings could command poets to write about their victories; such a choice is not up to the 
poet nor to the art of poetry, but a poet who wrote a poem which no one can understand has not 
done his job. Additionally, many poems were about traditional myths and so their plots were not 
invented by the poets, even if they controlled the choice of topic. Very relevant is Philodemus' 
brief comment on something that the Stoic said. He accuses the Stoic of being inconsistent vis-à-
vis a different position that he took elsewhere, but nevertheless Philodemus approves the claim 
under discussion. 
On Poems V.22.13-21:350 
13   κα[ὶ  µ]ὴν τὸ 
 φ]άϲκειν “ἐφ' ὧν [οὐ]κ ἔχο- 
15 µ]ε̣ν εἰπε[ῖν, εἰ διάνο]ιά τιϲ  
 ὑ]ποτέτακται, µηδ' εἰ  
 π]οιήµατ' ἐϲτὶν [ἔχ]ειν  
 ε[ἰ]π̣εῖν,” τῶι µὲν [ἀ]ρτίωϲ 
 τούτου διαϲύρει̣[ν] τι πο- 
20 λὺ δεδ̣έηκεν ἀκολ[ο]υθεῖν,  
 ἄλλωϲ δ' ἀρέϲκε[ι] µ̣ο̣ι. 
...and moreover, his claim “in those cases 
in which we cannot say whether there is 
thought underlying [sc. the poem], we 
cannot say whether they are poems 
either” is, on the one hand, some long 
way from being coherent with his just 
now savaging part of this opinion, but 
otherwise I like it. 
                                                            
348 Nor is it satisfying. Surely it is the cook's responsibility to make an edible meal, which requires satisfactory 
ingredients, just as it is the poet's responsibility to make an intelligible poem, which requires understandable 
contents. 
349 At ll. 393-9 the cook complains about the sheep again, and at ll. 438-9 the Mother mentions that it looks near to 
death. The text does not provide any clue as to who provided it; Gomme and Sandbach ad loc. assume that the 
cook did. Instances of comic complaint at the poor quality of sacrificial animals are collected by Gomme and 
Sandbach ad Samia 399 and by Sommerstein ad Samia 399-404; in at least one case, Plautus' Aulularia (ll. 294-
5, 564), the complainer was given the animal rather than owning it to begin with or having to buy it ad hoc. 
350 The translation of the phrase at ll. 18-20 is difficult. τῶι is to be taken with διαϲύρειν as an articular infinitive 
with τούτου as a partitive genitive dependent on τι, the direct object, and ἀρτίωϲ as an adverb (Jensen 
translated “daß er sich kurz voher über etwas derartiges lustig machte”). Alternatively, one could accept 
Mangoni's emendation of τούτου into τοῦτο and understand it as simply “this opinion”; τι πολὺ would then be 
taken together to mean “some long way” (cf. Xen. Resp. Lac. 15.8 for this word order). The phrase is dative 
dependent on ἀκολουθεῖν, which in its turn depends on δεδέηκεν.  
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 We know that contents are required of a poem, so the line of thought must be that, if we 
cannot understand the contents, we cannot actually say for sure that they are there, in which case, 
we cannot say for sure that it is a poem.351 
 The second difficult case, not mentioned by Philodemus but implied by his formal 
requirements for poetry, is a written work which does not meet those formal criteria. The classic 
requirement is for meter, which Philodemus too seems to demand.352 If a poem does not meet 
those formal criteria, it probably cannot be judged as a poem or, if it can, it will have bad form, 
and so receive a judgment of “bad.” Unfortunately, we do not know specifically what these 
formal criteria were. 
 We should inquire into why form should weigh more in the balance than content. The  
reason is that form is the idion of poetry: it is the specific thing that poets do that no other artist 
does. The telos, the goal, is to use the medium well, that is, to compose the literary form well. 
Choice of topic is indeed outside of the art of poetry: a sculptor or prose author can choose to tell 
the story of, say, Laocoon just as much as a poet can; the poet's goal is to use language and verse 
to tell that story in a way that a sculptor or prose author cannot. Similarly, the sculptor's goal is 
not merely to tell the story, but to do it in a way that a poet cannot.  
 
§9 “Further Thoughts” 
 Finally, we come to an investigation of how, according to Philodemus, a poem works and 
                                                            
351 At II.37-8, there is discussion of unintelligible poems and the adoption or non adoption of rules ἐµ παραλήψει 
θ̣ε͙µα[τι]κῶν τινων ἢ ⟨µὴ⟩ παρα[λή]ψει (38.5-7), which may indicate that Heracleodorus thought that the one 
way to judge non-intelligible poems was to adopt arbitrary rules (rather than by using the natural prolepsis?). 
  Judgement of the contents as harmful (that is, out of line with Epicurean thought) is not a matter of poetry, 
but of the relevant part of philosophy; see chapter six, §1 for more on this topic. 
352 See chapter three, §3. 
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what it does. First of all, what a poem is: a poem is language in meter which relates contents. It 
need not present arguments (this is the job of the prose author) nor is it likely to be useful. A 
good poem has both good style and good contents, and they work well together to communicate 
the ideas of the author to the audience. Good style matters more than good contents to the quality 
of a poem.353 
 All of this is in the hands of the poet, as Philodemus makes clear earlier in the On Poems, 
during the refutation of Andromenides, who had claimed that ornate and impressive diction gives 
pleasure to the ear. 
On Poems I.175.18-24: 
18 βλέπ̣[ε]τ͙αι κα⟨ὶ⟩ τοῖϲ τυ͙- 
 χοῦϲιν ὅτι πρὸϲ τὴν 
20 ἀκοὴν οὐθέν ἐϲτιν, 
 οὐδὲ τὴν ψ[υ]χὴν ἀλό- 
 γωϲ ἀλλὰ τῶι τεχν̣ι-̣ 
 κῶι λογιϲτικῶϲ κ{ε̣}[ι- 
24      ⸏ νεῖ. 
It is obvious even to the 
average person that it means 
nothing to the ear, and does not 
move the soul irrationally, but 
rationally by artistic means. 
 
That is to say, poetry entertains rationally through artistry, rather than irrationally by tickling the 
hearing. The artistry is not itself what moves, but the form and contents together (which must be 
rational if they are to be understood) arranged artistically. For the Epicureans, the hearing is 
irrational and can only be tickled by rhythm and transmit what it hears to the mind; it cannot 
judge the contents or form of a poem, because only the mind can. 
                                                            
353 The apparently contradictory statement at On Poems V.35.6-10 must be understood strictly with what precedes, 
at 34.35-35.6: the doxa (actually from Andromenides, see Janko [2003: 147 with nn. 2-3]) talks only about the 
language appropriate to characters and not about their (the characters') thoughts, which are more authoritative in 
some unspecified way, perhaps for their characterization. The whole passage is as follows: οὐδ’ ἡ τὸ “λέξιν 
προϲφέρεϲθαι πρέπουϲαν τοῖϲ εἰϲαγοµένοιϲ προώποιϲ.” [κοινὸν γὰ]ρ̣ καὶ τῶ[ν] πεζῶν ἐϲτι λόγων, εἰ δὲ 
µή γε, τῶ[ν] ἱϲτορικῶν ἢ τῶν γε δ[ι]αλόγων. καὶ περὶ τῆ[ϲ] λέξεωϲ µόνον λαλεῖ, τὰ νοήµατα κυριωτέραν 
δύναµιν ἔχοντα παραπέµπουϲα̣ (“nor [sc. is] the opinion [valid] which states “bring to bear language which 
befits the characters introduced on stage.” For it is common to prose works as well, or if not, at least to histories 
and dialogues. Besides, it only talks about style, leaving aside the contents even though they have the more 
authoritative power”). It is not immediately clear why the characters' thoughts should be more important than 
their language, except by parallel with Philodemus' opinion that plot and action are prior to language in a poem 
(cf. V.15.10-3, discussed at the end of §2). 
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 The relationship between form and content was discussed above (§6), but I have left until 
here the discussion of what actually hangs on the unity of form and content. It turns out that a 
poem produces an effect greater than the sum of its parts (form and content). These are the 
“additional thoughts” that I identified in a passage of book II, discussed at §6 above. I repeat the 
text and translation here for convenience: 
On Poems II.70.17-28: 
17 τάχ̣α̣ [γ]ά[ρ, τ]ὰ̣ϲ διαν[οίαϲ] ἄλ-  
 λου διδ͙[όν]τ̣οϲ καὶ τὴν χύ-   
 ϲιν τῶ[ν] λέξεων τοῦ βί-   
20 ου χορηγ̣οῦ̣ντοϲ, ἡ ϲύνθε-   
 ϲιϲ ἰδί̣[α γε]ίνεται τῶν πο-   
 ητῶν, οὐκ ἀέριοϲ οὐδ’ ἐπαι-  
 νο̣υµένη κα͙θ’ αὑτήν, ἀλ-             
 λ’ ὅτι π[ρο]ϲπαρίϲτηϲι διανο̣ί-  
25 αϲ΄ αἷϲ ψ[υ]χ̣αγωγοῦϲιν, οὐ 
 παρά τινοϲ λαβόντεϲ, ἀλ- 
 λ’ αὐτοὶ γεννήϲαντεϲ πα- 
28     > ρ’ αὑ̣τ̣ῶν.  
For perhaps, when someone else gives 
the contents and life stage-manages the 
flow of the words, the synthesis 
becomes particular to the poets, not in 
vain, nor praised for its own sake, but 
because it brings thoughts to bear in 
addition, by which they [sc. the poets] 
entertain, not taking them over from 
someone else, but giving birth to them 
from themselves on their own. 
 
There are difficulties with the interpretation of this passage, because Philodemus seems to be 
straining for terminology which he does not have, and the whole comment is an aside in a 
discussion of a different topic. First of all, “someone else” (ἄλλου), i.e. not the poet, provides 
the contents and life itself (βίου) provides the words used to describe it, which come in a flow 
(χύϲιϲ).354 That is, the poet is imagined, in this case, to have borrowed the plot and proficiently 
dressed it up in language according to his own lived experience. But the synthesis is particular to 
the poets, because each poet has a different lived experience and will use different words even if 
they treat the same plot.355 Philodemus does not deny the possibility of creativity to poets in the 
                                                            
354 χύϲιϲ is a metaphor for the fluent use of artistically arranged language in [Longinus] De Subl.12.4, about Cicero, 
and see Russell ad loc. for parallels in Cicero for the metaphor, which in Latin uses flumen. 
355 A poet's “lived experience” can, I think, be understood to include what language they speak, the poetic tradition 
in which they write, etc. Pace (1995: 135) also takes βίοϲ to mean “lived experience” (“esperienza umana”). 
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realm of plot.356 Rather, his point here is that, even if the plot is not original to the poet, the poem 
must be, since each poet cannot help but give it a different form. The first διάνοιαι mentioned in 
the passage, on my reading, are the contents of the poem. They are likely to be the same thing as 
the ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια discussed elsewhere.357 They are ὑποτεταγµέναι because they 
undergird the poem as a whole, as a plot does, even when abstracted from the novel or poem in 
which a particular author narrates it; their choices determine the exact path the story will follow. 
It seems that this διάνοια must also include any moral or message that the poet wishes to 
communicate, since that cannot be part of the poetic form. The descriptive phrase “that the poet 
wishes to communicate” is important, since the audience's reception of it will depend on the 
form as well; it is, after all, the synthesis that provides the additional thoughts. 
 The plan and contents are matched to lexeis (words, i.e. language), which are provided by 
lived experience, to form the particular synthesis of that particular poem. It may be that the 
contents are said explicitly to cause the form. This, instead of language, is the specific verbal 
dress of the particular poem, and it then “brings thoughts to bear in addition” (προϲπαρίϲτηϲι 
διανοίαϲ, n.b. the plural), which means “produce an intellectual response in the audience.” Use 
of the word διάνοια means that the response is not emotional: πάθη, the Epicurean technical 
                                                            
356 At On Poems V.7.9-13 he mentions the narration of false and mythological topics. At 33.24-34.33, he cites and 
refutes a doxa demanding the imitation of acclaimed poets of the past, but his rebuttal is on the grounds of 
internal incoherence. Generally, there is nothing in the text to suggest that Philodemus disallowed creativity to 
poets. Given his low estimate of the importance of abiding by the rules of particular genres (see chapter 6 §3), he 
may even have encouraged it. 
357 See above, chapter five, §2. If they are not, then the ὑποτεταγµένη διάνοια (of the poet) governs what the 
διάνοια of the poem is, and the difference is that one is the intention of the poet and the second is the contents of 
the poem. But it is more likely that, since the contents govern the form, they can be said to underlie the form as 
well and that Philodemus does not clearly distinguish the intention of the poet and the contents of the poem in 
this way. 
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term for emotions, are not διάνοιαι.358 Here we find a basis for Philodemus' position that the 
appreciation of poetry is an intellectual endeavor. Incidentally, this is the basis for his denial of 
usefulness to metathesis: a change in form, even if the contents of the poem remain the same, 
will change the dianoiai that the verse gives to the audience. This fact precludes the possibility 
that critics could ever compare just the verbal form. 
 Unfortunately, Philodemus does not go into further detail about this intellectual reaction 
and the trail goes cold. But it is possible to hypothesize what sort of phenomenon he had in mind. 
The specific mental effect that poetry has (i.e. psychagogia, whether this means “entertainment” 
or something stronger) must stem from, or perhaps be, this the second set of dianoiai.359 If they 
came directly from the contents of the poem, then the poetic form would not matter, but it is 
clear from the above statement that Philodemus thought that the poetic form does matter quite a 
lot to our reception and understanding of a poem. Form, which is the idion, or particular defining 
feature, of poetry consists in saying things in a non-prosaic way, but it has far greater effects than 
could have been predicted from that definition. 
 Philodemus' language makes it clear that this is entirely in the hands of the poet himself: 
the subject of the plurals  ψ[υ]χ̣αγωγοῦϲιν, λαβόντεϲ, and γεννήϲαντεϲ must be the poets and 
not the ποήµατα, which would take a (neuter) singular, as it does in προϲπαρίϲτηϲι; 
Philodemus attributes all the aspects of a poem to its creator, who is responsible for its faults and 
infelicities, but also for its good qualities. Poets do this technically, i.e. artistically, through 
poetic form: they are skilled manipulators of words, meter, imagery and all the various specific 
                                                            
358 πάθη are defined as specifically only pleasure and pain at Diogenes Laertius X.24 (and see further s. v. πάθοϲ 
in Usener GE). διάνοια is usually “mind” in the Epicureans (see Usener GE s.v.), and its use to mean “contents 
of a poem” is either an extension of that primary meaning or a borrowing from the general Greek literary-critical 
vocabulary; Dickey (2007: 232) defines it as “meaning” in her glossary of specialized scholiastic vocabulary. 
359 It is not clear if the dianoiai are imagined to be a part of the poem disclosed by the synthesis, or if the synthesis 
causes the audience to think them. 
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aspects of poetry, plot, and literature that Philodemus' opponents unsuccessfully champion in 
their attempts to account for what makes poetry good. The goodness of poetry, for Philodemus, 
consists in this: fulfilling its idion in such a way as to engage the audience. Now we can guess 
why, despite being treated as in many ways an irrelevant afterthought (since they are common 
and outside poetry, after all), contents do matter even so. One possibility is that, without good 
contents, the poem could never get off the ground and the audience would abandon it before the 
form can work its effect. Another possibility is that, since the mind cares little for sonic effects, 
the contents must carry some weight. A third possibility is that, since form is in a way caused, or 
at least conditioned, by the contents, the goodness of the form is related to the goodness of the 
contents. A fourth is that somehow the form itself, with only minimal reference to the contents, 
can cause the further thoughts.   
 A passage from Philodemus' Rhetoric III may be useful for explaining how these dianoiai 
contribute to psychagogia, and incidentally supports the fourth option mooted in the previous 
paragraph. In this section of the text, Philodemus is discussing an audience which gets carried 
away by the formal aspects of a speech and ignores the contents. However, I am interested in the 
formal aspects and what thoughts they provoke in the audience, not their lack of concern for the 
arguments. 
On Rhetoric III, PHerc. 1506 col. LI.24-LII.6 =  PHerc. 1426 col. IVa.14-Va.2 (pp. 28-31 
Hammerstaedt):360 
24   ὅ̣ταν  δ’ οὕτ̣ω̣ϲ̣  
25 ἀκούω̣ϲι, τ̣οῖ̣ϲ̣ µ̣ὲ̣ν λεγοµέ- 
 µοι[ϲ] ο̣ὐ̣ π̣[ρ]οϲ̣έ̣χο̣υ̣[ϲ]ιν̣, [π]ό̣τ̣ε-̣ 
 ρα ϲυµ[φ]έρ̣ον̣τ̣α̣ ἢ̣ ο̣ὐ ϲ̣υµ̣φέ-̣ 
 ροντ̣α̣, κ̣αὶ τ̣ὸ̣ ϲύν̣ολ̣ο̣ν̣ ἀ̣λ̣η- 
 θῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀ̣λ̣ηθῆ, ὑ̣π’̣ αὐ̣το̣ῦ ̣
But whenever they listen in this way 
[sc. to a display oration at a panegyris], 
they do not heed whether what is being 
said is beneficial or not, and, on the 
whole, true or not, but, entertained by 
                                                            
360 Philodemus' On Rhetoric III is extant in two copies, PHerc. 1506 and PHerc. 1426. I have given both 
numerations; see Hammerstaedt's edition for complete details. I have tacitly eliminated the brackets indicating 
when text is only preserved on one of the two papyrus copies or in one of the disegni. 
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30 δὲ το̣ῦ ̣ἤ̣χο̣υ̣ κ̣αὶ τ̣ῶν̣ πε̣ρ̣ιό- 
 δ̣ων κ̣α̣ὶ τῶν π̣αρίϲων κ̣αὶ 
 ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁµοιοτ̣έ- 
 λ̣εύτων ψυχ̣αγωγούµ̣ενοι, 
 ἤ̣δη π̣ρ̣ο̣ϲεδόκηϲαν, εἰ ο̣ὕ-̣ 
35 τω{ι} λαλ̣ώ⟨̣ι⟩ηϲαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκ- 
 κλη̣ϲίαι̣ϲ καὶ δικα̣ϲτηρίοιϲ 
LII.1 εὖ̣ ἀπ̣αλλάττε̣ι̣ν̣, οὐ ϲυνορῶ[ν- 
 τεϲ, ὅτι̣ ο̣ὐ̣δ’ ἂν ἠ̣ν̣έϲ̣χ̣οντο̣, ε̣ἰ 
 ἐ̣ν̣ ἐ̣κ̣κ̣λ̣ηϲ̣ίαι κ[αὶ] δικ̣αϲτη̣ρ̣ί̣ωι 
 οὕ]τω{ι} λαλοῦντοϲ ἤκουον, ὅ̣θε̣ν ̣
5 ἦλθον ἐπ̣ὶ τ̣ὸ̣ ἀ̣ν̣α̣λ̣ί̣ϲ̣κειν̣ µ̣ι̣ϲθ̣οὺϲ 
6 τοῖϲ ϲοφιϲτα̣ῖϲ. 
the sound itself, the periods, balanced 
clauses, antitheses, and rhymes, they 
already expect to acquit themselves 
well, if they should speak like that, both 
in assemblies and in courtrooms, 
because they do not understand that 
they would not tolerate it if they heard 
someone speaking like that in an 
assembly or courtroom, on which 
grounds they came to hire sophists. 
 
Chandler (2006: 165) identifies the audience's aesthetic experience as a reaction to the sound, 
which is reasonable with certain qualifications. First of all, the aesthetic experience must 
nevertheless be an intellectual one, since we know from the case of poetry that even the form is 
appreciated by the mind rather than the senses (see above, §8). The senses themselves are alogoi 
and do not judge; as far as poetry is concerned, they are merely tickled by rhythm. Presumably 
rhetoric is a parallel case—the formal qualities of the speech will tickle the hearing, but the 
intellect of the audience appreciates or depreciates them. These aesthetic qualities of the speech 
create dianoiai in their mind of the audience. Put differently, their appreciation of the rhetorical 
qualities is intellectual rather than sensorial, and inspires their own hopes of rhetorical greatness. 
Their ears do not recognize the formal features nor force their souls into desiring courtroom 
glory. 
 A similar case in which the formal features of a poem have an impact on the mind of the 
audience is implied in Philodemus' discussion of “metathesis” in II.72.13-22. He has just 
considered how the rearrangement of the words in a line or poem can affect the meaning and 
clarity of the contents; now he moves to discuss the effect on the rhythm of changing the word-
order. 
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On Poems II.72.13-22:361 
13   π͙ολλάκι 
 δέ, κἂν τοῦτ[ο ϲυµ]µ ̣ένηι, 
15 τὸ µὲν εὔρ//υ//[θµ]ό̣ν ἐϲτι 
 τὸ δὲ κακόρυθ̣µον, πε- 
 φυκότων ἡµᾶ̣ϲ κεινεῖν 
 καὶ τῶν εὐρύ[θ]µων. ἔϲ- 
 τιν δ’ ὅτε τὸ µ[ὲ]ν ε̣ὔµε- 
20 τρ//ο//ν̣, τὸ δὲ κακ̣όµετρο[ν, 
 οἰκείωϲ καὶ το[ῦ] µέτρου 
22 διατιθέντοϲ, ἤ τινόϲ̣ γε. 
Often, even if this [sc. the content] is 
unchanged, the one (verse) has a good 
rhythm, the other a bad one, since 
(verses) with a good rhythm too can by 
nature move (us). Sometimes one 
(verse) has a good verse-form, the other 
a bad verse-form, since verse-form too 
disposes (us) agreeably, or something  
does. 
 
Here good rhythm (τὸ εὔρυθµον) is said to move (κινεῖν) us and good verse-form (τὸ εὔµετρον) 
disposes us agreeably (διατίθεναι οἰκεῖωϲ). It may be that the movement effected by the rhythm 
is nothing more than what Philodemus elsewhere describes as “tickling” (cf. II.158.14-16, and 
see I.151.1-17, discussed just below), but a discussion in book I gives reason to believe that the 
meter, at least, had an impact on the mind as well as the hearing. 
On Poems I.151.1-17:362 
1 τι καὶ καθόλου µελῶ[ν καί, 
 νὴ Δία, ῥυθµῶν οἰκείω̣[ν, 
 ἀλ̣λ’̣ ο̣ὐ̣χ̣ ἕνεκα τούτου [κἀ- 
 πὶ τῶ]ν ποηµάτων. [καὶ 
5 γὰρ τὰ] µὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀ[κοὴν 
 ἀναπ]έµπεται, τὰ δέ π̣[ο- 
 ήµατ]α, ϲυνιέµενα π[ρὸϲ 
 διάνο]ι̣αν, ψυχαγωγεῖ. Μ̣[ε- 
 γακλεί]δηϲ δὲ ϲυναλείφ̣[ει, 
10 λέγω]ν̣ “ὡϲ ὁµοζηλ̣εία[ϲ 
 ο]ὔϲη[ϲ].” καὶ ϲυµπείϲω [τὸ 
 ὡϲ ἐκε̣[ί]νην τὴν τέρ[ψιν 
 ἄλογο[ν], οὕτω κα[ὶ ταύτην 
 δεῖ παρ]α̣δέχεϲθα̣ι̣ [τὰϲ µέ- 
15 τ̣[ρω]ν [] ἰ̣δέαϲ ἁπ[άϲαϲ, κἀκ 
… is, and generally [sc. in the case] of 
songs, by Zeus, and of pleasing 
rhythms, but not, as far as this [sc. 
sound?] is concerned, in the case of 
verses too. For the former are referred 
to the hearing, but verses, as they are 
understood with regard to the intellect, 
entertain. But Megaclides obscures 
this, saying “as the art is similar.” I 
shall advocate that, just as the hearing 
receives that delight which is 
irrational, so also the mind must 
receive all the forms of metres, and 
from the hexameter [sc. recognizes?] 
                                                            
361 The phrases τὸ εὔρυθµον, τὸ κακόρυθµον, τὸ εὔµετρον, and τὸ κακόµετρον might be better translated as “the 
quality of having good rhythm,” “the quality of having bad rhythm,” “the quality of having good meter,” and 
“the quality of having bad meter.” The final phrase is difficult and, as written, seems to be a weaker statement 
than warranted. Gomperz' εἴ τινόϲ γε “if anything does” deserves consideration; if correct, it would mean that 
good meter, of all the aspects of poetry, is best able to dispose an audience agreeably, but this seems to be a 
rather strong statement. 
362 I omit Janko's supplement of ⟨τὴν⟩ at the end of l.12 as unnecessary (and not reflected by his translation, which I 
have followed except for putting “entertain” in place of “enthrall”). 
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 τ̣[ο]ῦ ἑξαµέτρου πο̣[ ̣  ̣  ̣ ( ̣) 
17   ̣   ̣ ( ̣)] τὴ̣ν ἐποπ̣ο̣[ΐ]αν κ[ 
epic composition … 
 
I take the distinction that Philodemus makes to be that the rhythm of language impinges on the 
hearing, and is thereby transmitted to the mind, which then makes a judgment as to whether 
meter is present or not, and then possibly further judgments as to the quality of the meter, if there 
are mistakes or not, etc. So rhythms impinge directly on the hearing, but only the mind grasps 
meter, which is, incidentally, here recognized as a part of a poem. Indeed, poetry as a whole is 
understood by the mind. Philodemus here uses the term τέρψιϲ (terpsis, delight) to describe the 
sensation that rhythm causes to the hearing. At On Poems II.158.14-16, he talks about this 
sensation as tickling (γαργαλιϲµόϲ);363 I think that this is the same effect described in another 
way. “Tickling” discounts the pleasure, which is, after all, irrational (ἄλογον, l. 13); terpsis 
allows the effect more power, but  whatever pleasure there is in the rhythm is taken into account 
under the rubric of “form” in the judgment of poems, where it is one among many potential 
concerns. 
 The crucial point is that a purely formal element is operated on by the mind. In this case, 
the rhythm of the words is recognized as metrical—indeed, Philodemus seems to say at the end 
of the passage that we recognize epic poetry from the meter, which is simply organized rhythm. 
In this way, a purely formal aspect of the poem does lead to further thoughts. Here, the thoughts 
do not stray far from the poem or its form, but the passage from On Rhetoric III suggests that 
they can roam further afield. 
 It is worth noting that all the elements that Philodemus lists in the passage from On 
Rhetoric III are formal and that he explicitly states that the audience of the speech is not 
                                                            
363 ὠιόµε[θα] γὰρ δήπου κ͙αὶ ὑπὸ ῥυθµῶν καὶ [ὑ]πὸ µέτρων̣ α]ὐ̣τὴν γαρ̣γ̣αλίζεϲθαι (“For we thought all along 
that it [sc. the hearing] is tickled by rhythms and by meters,” my translation). 
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evaluating its contents. Despite this lack of reflection, the form has an effect on the audience and 
leads them to flights of fancy about their futures. These fantasies are clearly dianoiai, or 
thoughts, and they are caused by the form, with a certain reference to the context: the speech is a 
display piece at a festival, and the audience imagines themselves giving successful speeches, 
winning court cases and earning civic glory. Though not the same, these are all clearly related 
ideas. This supports the fourth option, that the thoughts caused by the form are probably 
somewhat, but not necessarily very closely, related to the contents of the work. This also aligns 
with many people's experience when reading literature: their imagination takes flight but starts 
from the work that they have just read. On reflection, this seems reasonable: Aratus' poem about 
astronomy with mythological asides is much more likely to create ideas about astronomy, the 
myths which he included, or poetry, all of which are connected with the poem itself, rather than 
battle scenes or erotic scenarios. Though some of the mythological narrations could have that 
effect, the poem is much more likely to inspire someone to study astronomy rather than warfare. 
 Given that both poetry and display oration have this effect on their audience, it appears 
that the latter effect is the response that people have to artistic language of any sort, whether 
prose or poetry, and it may reasonably be thought that any type of artistic language would have a 
similar effect on its audience.364 Additionally, given the specificity of the response to rhetoric 
discussed by Philodemus, it seems likely that the responses to poetry and other types of literary 
writing might be similarly specific. 
 It is a pity that more of Philodemus' thinking on this aspect does not survive, especially 
given contemporary interest in the effect of literature on its reader, both in the form of 
                                                            
364 The category of “artistic writing” is apparently exhausted for Philodemus by poetry and sophistic rhetoric (which 
seems to be the techne of writing artistic prose generally), but this might not be true. 
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psychological studies which claim to find increased empathy among readers of literary fiction,365 
and in reader-response literary theories. It certainly appears that Philodemus here identifies 
“being a spur to the imagination” as an aspect of good poetry, or at least has pointed out that 
good literature often does provoke further meditation on the work itself and related topics. 
 
§10 Summary and Conclusion 
 Philodemus held that poetry had two parts, form (synthesis) and content (dianoia), and 
that these required and affected each other: content cannot be related without words (which 
constitute form, however good or bad), and linguistic form cannot exist without being about 
some topic or another. The two parts constitute the poem; however, when read, it has an 
additional psychological impact on its audience, namely that it causes somewhat mysterious 
“further thoughts.” 
 Form is somewhat more important than content to the judgment of poems, but both are 
significant and cannot be neglected. The demands which Philodemus places on form and content 
are elliptically phrased and difficult to understand, but he seems to aim for high-brow content 
(but not philosophical or didactic content) expressed in a reasonably clear style. These are to be 
understood as general statements, not absolute rules, and certain topics (or even stylistic choices) 
may force the poet's hand. 
                                                            
365 E.g. Usherwood (2002) and Paul's New York Times article “Your Brain on Fiction” (17 March 2012). 
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Chapter Six 
An Epicurean Critical Miscellany  
§1 Introduction 
 In this chapter a series of unrelated topics will be discussed.366 They are the concept of τὸ 
πρέπον (§2), the rules of genre (§3), and the mimesis, or imitation, of things (§4) and of earlier 
poets (§5). Additionally, certain technical terms will be treated more precisely: the meanings of 
τὸ ἴδιον, τὸ ἔργον, and τὸ τέλοϲ (§6), ὁ ἀγαθὸϲ ποητήϲ, the poet (§7), and the excellence of 
poetry (§8). I will end by discussing the utility of poetry (§9). In cases like genre and imitation, 
Philodemus is dismissive of his opponents' positions because he considers them misguided or 
impossible in practice. In these cases, his own views are not developed. He seems to have 
considered genre basically irrelevant to the question of what makes a good poet; this is 
interesting in light of the emphasis put on genre by modern historians of ancient Greek literature. 
Likewise, his view of mimesis shows basically no point of contact with Aristotle, on whom 
modern discussions of the term center. He has, however, a very interesting position related to the 
utility to be found in poetry: poetry per se is not useful, but this does not prevent the contents 
from being useful or harmful (§9). 
 These various topics did not fit into the grand narrative of form and content discussed in 
chapter five, and often presuppose knowledge of what Epicureans meant by “poetry” and “good 
poetry.” Accordingly, they must be discussed after the broad outlines of Philodemus' position are 
understood.
                                                            
366 It is much indebted in argumentative form and choice of content to Pace (1995). 
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§2 τὸ πρέπον: Characterization, Verisimilitude and the Suspension of Disbelief 
 τὸ πρέπον, “the (be)fitting,” is a demand, common in antiquity, for language and content 
to match, i.e. to fit each other properly. Other terms used to express the same relationship are τὸ 
(ϲυν)αρµόττον and τὸ οἰκεῖον (as well as related verbs). But language can match content in 
several ways: speeches should match the characters who deliver them, or the language generally 
should match the elevation of the theme, or the language can be judged morally indecent.  
 Philodemus has opinions on these debates, but also has a particularly Epicurean attitude 
to the relationship between the contents of poetry and theology, in which the contents of poetry 
are judged by their “fit” with Epicurean doctrine. In the second part of On Piety, Philodemus 
discusses the relationship between the contents of poetry and Epicurean philosophy in terms of 
τὸ πρέπον. As Obbink (1996: 696) puts it, “the criterion employed throughout is what is 
πρέπον to say about the gods according to the restrictions set forth in Kyria Doxa I and Ad 
Menoeceum §123.” This use of the term is of great interest, because it indicates clearly that for 
an Epicurean interpreter Epicurean doctrines are the final arbiter of the truth of the contents of 
poetry.367 The truth of poetic contents can matter very much to an Epicurean. 
 But Philodemus' perspective is different here. In the On Piety, he writes as a theologian 
and criticizes poets qua authorities used by his Stoic opponents;368 in the On Poems, he does not 
concern himself with the truth of the contents of poems. Even if there is some truth in them, 
                                                            
367 This seems to have been the Epicurean position from the start, when Epicurus criticized liberal education (poets 
importantly included) for being useless. See chapter two §2. 
368 So Obbink (1996: 694). 
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poems are useless, and the amount of truth does not enter into his method of judgment.369 In this 
case, he assumes that his audience is familiar with the various Epicurean criticisms that could be 
mounted against the poets as educators, i.e. he assumes that his readers are familiar with content-
focused criticism like that in his De Pietate, and know that the contents of a poem are not 
required to be wise or intelligent; nor should they expect to gain any real utility from reading 
poetry. 
 Within the On Poems, Philodemus does not much concern himself with τὸ πρέπον. The 
phrase does appear in the text, but seldom. At I.64.19-24, Heracleodorus makes the claim that 
speeches should fit the characters of those giving them, and in book III, col. 10.27-30, the 
opponent mentions instances when the language does not suit something (unfortunately, it is not 
clear what “something”). In neither case do we get Philodemus' opinion or discussion of the 
claims. However, there seems to be a similar discussion of Pausimachus' opinions at I.82.1-2, of 
which an interesting bit survives: προϲ]ώποιϲ ἁρµ̣[ότ]τον[ταϲ ἤχου]ϲ̣ κωλύειν (“sounds 
appropriate to the characters prevent”). The refutation in book two suggests that Philodemus was 
none too impressed with this claim:  
On Poems II.153.20-154.9: 
20   ἀλ̣λὰ µὴν ἄτο- 
 πον αὐ̣το[ῦ κα]ὶ̣ τ̣[ὸ] “π̣λ̣[έο]ν 
 µέγεθοϲ φωνῆϲ ἐν ϲυν- 
 θέϲει χρηϲτῆι κείµενον 
 ἐναρµόϲει παντὶ προϲ̣ώ{ι}- 
25 πω⌊ι⌋ κα̣ὶ διαθέϲει πάϲηι.” 
 φωνὴ[⟦ϲ⟧] µὲν γάρ, ⟦τηϲ⟧ οἵαν 
27 οὗτοι παρειϲάγουϲιν, ου 
 (three lines missing) 
But bizarre indeed is his claim 
that “a greater magnitude of 
sound which resides in a good 
composition will be appropriate 
to every character and every 
disposition.” For voice, such as 
these critics introduce, [is not?] 
(three lines missing) ... which 
                                                            
369 That this extremely important topic is not covered at all in the extant On Poems may indicate that Philodemus 
expected his readers to be familiar with statements of school doctrine found elsewhere. 
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4 ὃν καὶ̣ “ε̣ἰ̣λ̣[ικρινῆ” προϲ]α̣γο- 
5 ρεύειν οἱ π[ερ]ὶ τοὺ[ϲ ἤχο]υϲ 
 εἰθίκαϲιν, [εἰ] “παντὶ π̣ρ̣ο- 
 ϲώπωι κα⌊ὶ⌋ διαθέϲει” καὶ 
 καθόλου π̣[ρ]άγµαϲιν “ἐν- 
9 αρµό̣[ττ]ειν” ἔ̣οικεν΄. 
those who are concerned with 
sounds are also accustomed to 
call ‘pure’, if it seems 
‘appropriate to every character 
and disposition’ and to content 
in general. 
 
His exact objection seems to be to the demand for large sound (or vocalization, in Janko's 
translation) and particular sonic effects; possibly he pointed out that these demands might 
contradict a demand for diction which fits a character. Unfortunately, more certainty is 
impossible. 
 The word for verisimilitude or suspension of disbelief seems to be τὸ πιθανόν 
“persuasive quality.” It appears in a discussion of Andromenides' claims that the poet should 
pick the words “most suited to the contents so that they cohere and have a persuasive quality” 
([οἰκειότα]τα τοῦ πρά[γ]µατοϲ ἐγλ̣[έγεϲ]θαι τὰ ῥήµα⸌θ⸍’ ἵνα προ[ϲαρµόϲῃ] καὶ τὸ 
πιθαν[ὸν ἔχηι], I.17.26-18.4). Philodemus takes him to task for not actually wanting fitting 
words: 
On Poems I.172.18-25: 
18      ⸐    ἀλ- 
 λὰ [µ]ὴν οὐδὲ “τὰ τῶν 
20 πραγµάτων οἰκεῖα ῥη- 
 µατα” παραινεῖ “λαµ- 
 βάνειν,” ὡϲ ἀληθὲϲ εἰ- 
 πεῖν, εἰ τὰ µάλιϲτά τιϲ 
 ἐµφαίνοντα ἐγλέγοι- 
25 το. 
But in fact he does not ever 
advise them to “adopt the 
words that are suitable for 
the contents,” to tell the 
truth, if a poet were to select 
those words that are the most 
suggestive. 
 
Philodemus' prose is difficult here, but he seems to be saying that Andromenides does not 
actually demand of poets fitting vocabulary (despite his claiming to do so), but rather suggestive 
language, that is, language which carries many connotations or seems freighted with unspoken 
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significance. However, in what remains of the text, he leaves the demand for τὸ πιθανόν 
untouched. Indeed, it is consistent with other claims that Philodemus makes about poetry: 
characters should be consistently drawn and plausible. 
 The most instructive passage is in book V, in the refutation of the various doxai in Zeno.  
The particular demand in this case, attributable to Andromenides,370 is for the use of a style 
which befits the characters brought on stage or generally introduced into the action of the poem 
(οὐδ’ ἡ [sc. δόξα] τὸ λέξιν προϲφέρεϲθαι πρέπουϲαν τοῖϲ εἰϲαγοµένοιϲ προϲώποιϲ, 34.35-
35.2). Philodemus' rebuttal seems petty at first, but is quite revealing. 
On Poems V.35.11-28:371 
11  ὅτι “τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ 
 καὶ τοῖϲ ἥρωϲιν ἡ τοιαύ- 
 τη πρέπει λέξιϲ” ἠλιθί- 
 ων ἐϲτὶ καὶ µεµιµῆϲ- 
15 θαι βέλτιον λέγειν τὴν   
 πρέπουϲαν.  τελείω[ϲ  
 δὲ µ̣[αν]ικὸν τὸ πα̣ρ̣[α- 
 ψηλαφ[ᾶ]ν ὁµοιότητα 
 λέξεωϲ τοῖϲ δηλουµέ- 
20 νοιϲ πράγµαϲιν.  εἰ   
 δὲ προϲυπακουϲτέον 
 καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ γρα- 
 φεὺϲ παραλέλοιπε, τὸ πο- 
 ητικῇ διάγνωϲιν ἀπο- 
25 νέµειν τ[ῶν ἑ]κάϲ͙τωι͙ 
 προϲώπωι͙ πρεπόν̣- 
 των λόγων παράκο- 
28 πόν ἐϲτιν. 
… that such a style befits the 
gods and the heroes is the 
claim of foolish men, and it 
is better to say that it 
imitates the style which 
befits them. But completely 
insane is the grasping after a 
similarity of the style to the 
actions it describes. If the 
“sense” must be considered 
as well, or if a scribe has left 
it out, it is insane to assign to 
the art of poetry the 
distinction between the 
speeches which befit each 
character. 
 
Philodemus' objection is grounded in the reality that humans do not actually know what style of 
                                                            
370 See Janko (2003: 147 nn. 2-3). 
371 ὑπακούω can mean “consider, regard,” so I have translated προϲυπακούω as “consider as well, in addition” (to 
the style, in this case). This meaning is recorded in LSJ, although this passage is miscategorized. On mimesis, see 
below §§4-5. 
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speech the gods and heroes use;372 the demand for imitation of it is an admission that the poet is 
working with probabilities or what seems best to him as he composes, rather than with actual 
truths about the universe. This is also the basis of the objection about the contents of speeches as 
well: deciding whether the contents of speeches are appropriate to heroes or gods is definitely 
not the prerogative of poets but of philosophers. But poets apparently should make probable 
guesses as to what that style or contents would be like when they compose. 
 A further problem identified by Philodemus is that involved in demanding similarity of 
style to action; he takes this as a demand for a thoroughly onomatopoeic style, which is ludicrous 
to consider and impossible in practice. 
 Philodemus considers real prepon relationships between the characters in a poem and 
their real-world analogues difficult, if not impossible, to manage. He prefers a weaker standard 
than “(actually) befits,” namely “imitation of what actually befits,” which is to say 
verisimilitude. The position is very similar to Aristotle's differentiation between faults accidental 
to poetry and faults against poetry in Poetics 25, 60b15-6; for Philodemus, like Aristotle, thinks 
some things (theology, in this case) that are involved in poetry are not in the realm of the art of 
poetry, and he does not demand accuracy on those topics from the poets, since, on other grounds, 
poems are understood to be inaccurate sources of information about important topics like ethics 
and theology. 
 His position seems to be a low-grade demand for consistency in characterization for 
purposes of verisimilitude (see just below) rather than an axiomatic statement about how poetry 
                                                            
372 Epicureans believed that the gods spoke Greek, cf. Phld. De Dis 3.14.6-7 Diels (= PHerc. 157 fr. 77.1): καὶ νὴ 
Δία γε τὴν Ἑλληνίδα νοµιϲτέον ἔχειν αὐτοὺϲ διάλεκτον (“and indeed, by Zeus, we must believe that they [sc. 
the gods] have the Greek language”). 
  188 
works. Because Philodemus is not interested in narrow demands but in broad general rules, the 
topic does not attract attention (cf. On Poems V.30.25-29, and contrast I.80.18-20, where he 
complains that his opponents are not sufficiently detailed). 
 
§3 Genre: Themata and Prolepsis 
 Genre, in antiquity, was defined in different ways at different times; by Philodemus' 
lifetime, genres were distinguished by formal criteria, such as meter, the presence or absence of 
certain refrains (e.g. ἰὴ παιάν), dedicatee (e.g. poems celebrating mortals were enkomia or, 
depending on circumstances, epinikia, but poems celebrating gods were hymnoi or a more 
specific variety, like dithyramboi for Dionysius), and contents (it seems that abusive poems, even 
in non-iambic meters, could be described as “iambic”373), as well as combinations of these. Some 
criteria related to the performance contexts survived (for example, hyporchemata were songs 
which accompanied dancing, as their name suggests), but probably only as fossils of an earlier 
system. Philodemus generally upholds the importance of genres and generic boundaries, but is 
not firm on the point: if a poem is good, it may break or transcend the laws of genre. 
 Philodemus made several disconnected remarks about genre and its relationship to the 
techne of poetry. While it is not entirely clear that he has a fully developed position on the topic, 
he does have certain firm opinions which stand in opposition to those of previous thinkers, most 
notably Aristotle, and his discussion is in line with Epicurean doctrine.  The most important 
passage is in book II. 
                                                            
373 Phld. On Poems I.117.7-13: οἱ γ͙[ὰρ ἰ]αµβοποιοὶ τραγικὰ ποιοῦϲιν καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοιοὶ πάλιν ἰαµβικά, καὶ 
Ϲαπφώ τινα ἰαµβικῶϲ ποιεῖ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχοϲ οὐκ ἰαµβικῶϲ, and cf. II.203.21-204.2. I take “compose 
iambically” to mean that they wrote poems describable as “iambic” even if not metrically iambs. 
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On Poems II.73.18-74.7:374 
18 καὶ πρὸϲ τὰ θέµατα µέν- 
 τοι πεφ//υ//[ϲι]ωµένο[ι τὰ  
20 µὲν ἀκολούθωϲ αὐ[τοῖϲ   
 ϲυγκείµενα΄ προϲιέµε- 
 θα΄, τὰ δ’ ἐναντίωϲ΄ ἀπορι- 
 πτοῦµεν΄, οἷον “τὸ ϲυνκε- 
 κόφθαι παρακειµένωϲ   
25 ἐν τρ̣αγω[ιδ]ί̣α̣ι µὲν΄ ἀνοί-  
 κειον εἶναι΄, καλὸν δ’ ἐν τ[οῖϲ  
 ἰαµβικοῖ[ϲ,” κα]ὶ “τὸ µακρο-̣ 
28 ϲύνθετον ἄτ̣[λητ]ο̣ν µὲν̣   
74.1 ἐ]ν τῆι τραγωιδίαι το̣[ῖϲ τε    
 ἔπεϲι καἰϲ̣χ̣ί̣ο̣ν̣ ἐ̣ν τ[οῖ]ϲ ἄ[λ- 
 λ̣ο̣ι̣ϲ΄, ἄλυ[π]ον δ’ ἐν τῶι δ̣[ι-  
 θυ]ράµβωι, [κ]ἀ̣µύθ̣η͙τ̣α΄    
5 τ̣ὰ µὲν ἰδίωϲ̣ κ̣[αθ’ ἕκ]αϲ-   
 τὸν τρόπον΄, τὰ δὲ καὶ κοι- 
             νῶϲ ἐν ποήϲει΄. 
However, since we are naturalized 
to the rules, we admit verses that 
are composed in accord with 
them, but spurn those that are the 
opposite, such as the principle that 
“repeated collision in successive 
words is unsuitable in tragedy, but 
fine in iambus,” and “a long 
compound is intolerable in 
tragedy and epic and uglier in the 
other genres, but painless in 
dithyramb,” and countless others, 
some individually in the same 
style, others commonly in poetic 
composition. 
 
This calls to mind Philodemus' refutation of the so-called Philosophers who demanded themata 
(here translated “rules”) in book V (25.2-30). There are two important differences. The first is 
that they demanded rules for the judgement of poems, but Philodemus here is discussing rules of 
the composition of poetry in genres: for a poem to fit into a genre, it must obey the themata of 
that genre.375 The second is that these themata are actually the prolepsis, that is, they are the 
rules to which we have grown accustomed and which constitute the prolepsis, each thema being 
an aspect of it. For example, our prolepsis of a human includes feet; accordingly, it is a thema 
that, if you build a human, you include feet. Here, then, Philodemus states that audiences had 
prolepseis of the various genres. So genres are real, not illusory, and adherence to generic 
                                                            
374 Trans. Janko (2011: 224-5), with light modifications. The linguistic practices mentioned by Philodemus are 
generally valid, and he makes a similar statement at I.162-3. As Janko notes ad loc., “style” (τρόπον, 74.6) is 
the same as genre. “Repeated collision” (τὸ ϲυνκεκόφθαι παρακειµένωϲ, 72.23-4) is either elision or hiatus. 
375 There is an evaluative aspect to this, in that a critic decides how well a poem obeys the themata, but deciding 
whether a poem is a paean, or good as an example of the paean genre, is a different question from deciding 
whether it is a good poem. 
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conventions is a topic available for judgment by a literary critic: tragic verses which contain too 
many “repeated collisions” are bad verses.376  
 Demetrius Laco, in a different context, names and etymologizes the parts of the nome, 
which indicates that such information was relevant to the discussion at hand.377 The column 
preceding his discussion discusses the conventional commonality by which writings with certain 
features are called “poems,” and it seems that the argument moved from features common to 
poetry (style, metaphor, and forceful language may have been mentioned) to those particular to 
specific genres.378 This also suggests that genre is a real category for Epicureans, but not of the 
greatest importance, since a poem's fidelity to a genre was less important than its overall quality. 
 A related question is whether each genre has its own techne. There are three passages 
relevant to the question. The first is Philodemus' rebuttal of Aristotle's view that poets can only 
compose poetry that corresponds to their character, on the historical grounds that serious 
tragedians also wrote funny plays: 
On Poems IV.111.4-10: 
4 κα]ὶ̣ [ὁ ϲεµνό]τ̣ατοϲ/̣/πο/̣/[ητήϲ, 
5 φη̣µ̣ί̣, γελοίο[υϲ] ἐ̣[πο]ίει ϲα- 
 τύρουϲ· καὶ πρότε̣[ρ]ον δ’ ἐ- 
 //χλ̣[εύαζο]ν̣ µετ⟨̣ὰ τῶν⟩ [α]ὐ̣τῶν 
 ῥη[µάτ]//ω//[ν], ἢ̣ κ[α]ὶ̣ διαφό- 
 ρων ἀ[λλ]//ὰ̣ τ/̣/ῆϲ αὐ̣τῆϲ ἐπ̣[ι- 
10 ⸏ϲτήµηϲ. 
Even the most dignified tragic poet 
used to compose, I affirm, laughable 
satyr-plays; and previously too, they 
used to make mockery with the same 
words, or even with different ones but 
belonging to the same skill. 
 
                                                            
376 It is not clear what these critics would have thought of mixed genre poetry or the Hellenistic “Kreuzung der 
Gattungen.” Philodemus sidesteps the problem by considering genre basically irrelevant to the question of the 
quality of a poem. 
377 The terms ϲπονδῆον, καταχορῆον, and ὑποϲυριγµόϲ are discussed in II.52. N.b. that, in Demetrius' 
orthography, η before a vowel stands for ει. See Romeo's commentary ad loc. and also (1988b). 
378 The text is damaged, and the printed supplements (τρόποι, ἀλληγορίαι, τόνοι) are unusual words. 
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ἐπιϲτήµη seems to be equivalent to τέχνη here;379 if so, Philodemus states outright that the 
abilities to write serious and funny poetry belong to the same art.380 The point about the diction is 
probably included to cover the case of paratragedy, in which a funny poet uses tragic diction and 
tragic metrical rules to parody tragedy. This is not open to the objection that only tragedy and 
satyr play are linked in this way: in the next passage to be discussed, Pausimachus made the 
argument that, while genres are natural because of the sounds of the poems, poets are only called 
poets of a particular genre by convention, not by nature. Philodemus objects that Pausimachus' 
conception of phonic appropriateness to genre is nonsensical, which implies that he thinks that 
poetic genres are established by convention, not by nature, and which leaves the conventional 
status of poets (according to Pausimachus) uncriticized. 
 Similarly, according to Pausimachus, poets are not bound to write in only one genre and, 
despite stereotypes, the same poet often wrote wildly different types of poetry. 
On Poems I.117.4-16: 
4    [ὥϲ- 
5 τ’ εὐφυεῖ[ϲ τοῖϲ τοιούτοιϲ 
 ἤχοιϲ ὅµοιοι γινόµ[ενοι 
 κατατυγχάνουϲι⟨ν⟩. οἱ γ͙[ὰρ ἰ- 
 αµβοποιοὶ τραγικὰ ποι- 
 οῦϲιν, καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοποι- 
10 οὶ πάλιν ἰαµβικά, καὶ Ϲαπ- 
 φώ τινα ἰαµβικῶϲ ποιεῖ,  
 καὶ Ἀρχίλοχοϲ οὐκ ἰαµ- 
 βικῶϲ. ὥϲτε φύϲ⹄ει⹅ µὲν 
 οὐ ῥ]ητέον ἰαµβοποιὸν  
15 ἢ ἄλλ]ο τι ποιοῦντα γένοϲ,  
 ἀλλὰ νόµωι, φύϲει δὲ ὅταν 
 εἰϲ τὴν εὐγενὴ φωνὴν 
 καὶ πρώτην καὶ εἰϲ πάν- 
 τ’ ἐναρµόττουϲαν οἱ πο- 
...so that naturally talented poets 
succeed by becoming like such 
sounds. For poets of lampoon com-
pose tragic verses, and conversely 
tragic poets compose lampoons, and 
Sappho composes some verse in the 
manner of lampoon, and Archilochus 
some not in the manner of lampoon. 
Hence, one must say that a poet of 
iambs  or a poet in some other genre is 
so not by nature but by convention, 
but [sc. it happened] by nature when 
the poets stumbled upon and named a 
nobly-born word, original and com-
                                                            
379 Cf. Rhet. II.38.30-39.6 (pp. 125-126 L.-A.), where episteme is used in this way as well. 
380 Socrates is said to have argued something similar at the end of Plato's Symposium (233d1-6). 
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 ηταὶ ἐµπεϲόντεϲ ὀνο- 
 µάζ⸌ω⸍ϲι⟨ν⟩. 
pletely appropriate [sc. to the poem or 
the sense]. 
 
Pausimachus' argument here is based on his commitment to euphony: when poets become like 
the sounds,381 they produce good poems, and poets of a genre do not exist by nature, only by 
convention, since many poets wrote in more than one genre. However, poets compose well by 
nature (i.e. natural talent), and we can take “composing well” to include “composing within the 
rules of a particular genre.”  Philodemus' rebuttal in book II is brief but informative: 
On Poems II.203.18-204.2:382 
203.17     οὐ] γὰρ λογιϲθήϲεται 
 εὑρεῖν ο]ὐδὲ φω̣ν̣ὴ[ν] ἐ̣ν 
 αὐτοῖϲ ἀπ]οδεδοµένη̣ν 
20 ἢ] ἀπ[ο]δ̣[ε]κτὴν [τ]οῖϲ͙ γένε- 
 ϲ̣ι̣ν̣. [κα]ὶ ̣µὴν διὰ̣ τοῦτο {υ} 
 λέγει τὸ] “τινὰϲ τραγι̣κὰ ⟦ϲ⟧ 
 ποιήϲ]ειν͙, ἑτέρουϲ δὲ ἰ- 
 αµβικ]ά, τοὺϲ δὲ µέλη {ι},  
25 τοὺϲ δ]’ ἀ[λ]λοῖα΄, κἂν εὑρίϲ- 
204.1 κωνται παρε[µ]βά[λ]λο̣ν-̣ 
 τεϲ ἑτε̣ρο̣γεν[ῆ].” π̣εζ̣[ὸ]ν ̣
 δὲ] νὴ [Δία τὸ “ὁµογεν]ὲϲ 
 διὰ µη//δ̣ὲ/̣/ν̣ εἶνα̣ι”̣ // ἔ̣[ϲτ]αι 
5       > κατά γε // τοῦτο. 
For [sc. the poet] will not be 
reckoned to invent even a sound that 
has been explained by or is 
acceptable in the genres themselves. 
Indeed, on this account he says that 
“some poets will compose tragic 
poems, others iambics, some lyrics, 
and others various ones, even if they 
are found to be inserting bits and 
pieces from different genres.” But, 
by Zeus, “what is in no way 
homogeneous” will be, by this 
argument, prose. 
 
Philodemus' point is that the sounds of a poem are not the only determining feature of the genre 
                                                            
381 Janko ad loc. takes this to mean simply “talented poets have a natural affinity for good sound,” and Philodemus' 
rebuttal in II.202 does not shed much more light on the matter; though he does use the word εὐφυΐα several 
times, which may imply something stronger than just natural affinity. 
382 ἀπ[ο]δ̣[ει]κτὴν (my suggestion) in line 20 is a possibility, in which case the translation would run “nor is the 
sound in poems explicative of or explained by the genres.” I have rendered ἑτερογενῆ in l. 204.2 as “bits and 
pieces from other genres;” Janko translates it as “verse from other genres,” but this seems to imply borrowing of 
already composed lines, rather than of typical aspects of poems in certain genres. I take the neuter plural to be 
intentionally vague. 
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and that the sounds of a line do not make it a tragic or hexameter line.383 Furthermore, an epic, 
for instance, does not lose its character if a base character is included, nor does a tragedy which 
contains jokes or a funny passage become a comedy. 
 Philodemus seems to agree, then, that poets are writers in a particular genre by 
convention, according to the genre in which most of their poems are written. For example, 
Aeschylus is called a tragic poet not because he only wrote tragedies, but because he primarily 
wrote tragedies and is most known for them, and Sappho is not known as a poet of lampoon, 
even though she wrote some lampoons, because most of her poetry was not lampoon. 
 Philodemus relies on historical examples to dispose of arguments that relied on 
stereotypes of poets' production. Sappho did write abusively from time to time and Archilochus 
did write poems which were not abusive. It is obviously the case that they could write them if 
they did actually write them, so essentialist statements about poets' productions being determined 
by their character must be false on historical grounds. His position is in contrast with Aristotle's 
view that serious people write serious poems and baser people base poems (4, 48b19-49a6).384 It 
is different again from Horace's principle si uis me flere, dolendum est / primum ipsi tibi,385 in 
which the emotions of the author are transferred to the audience via the character portrayed. This 
may highlight a broad interest in the history of literature. Other literary scholars of antiquity were 
                                                            
383 The meter, not the sound, makes it a hexameter line; by sound, the Kritikoi mean primarily the phonetic qualities 
of the words, and secondarily the sounds of the words in their sequence; part of this secondary option may be 
meter. 
384 Aristotle's advice, that poets should try to imagine themselves into the emotions and movements of their 
characters while composing their parts (Poetics, 17, 55a30-34), is similar, since it implies a psychological 
similarity between poet and character. This is the basis for Horace's view, mentioned subsequently. 
385 That the whole passage (Ars Poetica 99-113) has to do with plausibility or verisimilitude is indicated by the line 
male si mandata loqueris | aut dormitabo aut ridebo (ll.104-5); decent (106) indictes that Horace considers this a 
matter of πρέπον.  
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content, it seems, to pick out only what a particular poet was famous for and then disregard the 
rest of their oeuvre, e.g. tragedians whose satyr-plays are forgotten or, in Roman terms, to 
remember Catullus for his poems about Lesbia and forget the political jabs at Cicero and Caesar 
or the moving epitaph for his brother. This inclusivity may stem from the empirical practice of 
reading all that the poets had to offer. 
 So far, we can determine that all genres of poetry were included under one techne, and 
Philodemus generally leaves unstated the themata for each genre (in accord with his stated 
unwillingness to go into detail);386 nor does he consider in depth the relationship of the genre of 
poem to the judgment of its quality, though he seems to have considered writing “a good poem” 
(good in terms of general quality) more important than writing (e.g.) “a good dithyramb” (good 
in terms of fidelity to the rules of the genre). Probably, the judge considered how well the poem 
accorded with the standard practices of the genre, but this consideration was not decisive. The 
poet is almost left out of consideration: s/he writes poetry in a chosen genre, and may be 
nicknamed after their chosen genre or the one which contains their best-known works, but no 
poet is essentially a writer of a genre: Euripdies is called a tragedian because he is most famous 
for his work in that genre, but he also wrote satyr plays and an epinician for Alcibiades as well. 
 The prolepsis would have to be fairly complex, if it includes all the genres and all their 
details, but this is possible. More likely is that there is one techne for writing poetry, but several 
prolepseis for the variety of genres. This is implied by the discussion of the themata, which seem 
to provide the raw material for the constructing the prolepseis of particular genres. 
 Another passage may be relevant to determining the relationship between genre and 
                                                            
386 But some are mentioned at On Poems II.73, discussed above in this section. 
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judgment. Unfortunately, its context is badly damaged. It is certain that Philodemus is speaking, 
because there are other explicit quotations in the vicinity. The discussion seems to be about 
fidelity to a given genre. 
On Poems II.30.16-25:387 
16                                            φρον- 
 τίϲαϲ γὰρ τοῦ διανοήµα- 
 τοϲ, ὃ διὰ τῆϲ καταϲκευῆ̣[ϲ 
20 ἔλ]εγον ἐµφαίνεϲθαι, κ[ρι- 
 θήϲ]εται ποητὴϲ ἀγαθὸϲ ἐ[πὶ 
  τ͙ῆ̣[ι] φροντιϲτεί⟨ᾳ⟩,΄ κἂν ἐκ το̣[ῦ 
 γ]ένουϲ ἐξεβάλλετο,΄ καὶ 
 ὑ]π̣ὸ τ[ο]ύτων κατ’ οὐδὲν 
25 ἕτερ]ον ἐξεβάλλετο, τὰ 
 προκείµενα ποήµατα. 
For, having given thought to the 
contents which, I claimed, are 
indicated through the craftsmanship, 
he will be judged a good poet for his 
thoughtfulness, and he would have 
been expelled from the genre, and the 
aforementioned poems were expelled 
for no other reason by these critics. 
 
Philodemus states that the quality of the contents matters more to the overall quality of a poem 
than its adherence to a particular genre. A poem is good or bad in accordance with the care given 
to it by the poet. Sadly, the rationale for the irrelevance of genre to this calculation does not 
survive, but one possibility is that, if a poem violates generic boundaries, it may simply be seen 
as belonging to a different genre. Another possibility is that Philodemus does not feel the need 
strictly to police generic boundaries; after all, he was happy to use vitriolic poems by Sappho to 
make a point earlier. If so, genre will not have played much of a rôle in judgment: a good poem 
would just be a good poem, even if the genre were poorly adhered to or indeterminate. In any 
case, it is clear that the contents, indicated by the style or craftsmanship of the poet, matter more 
                                                            
387 Janko suspected (pers. comm.) that the opponents at this point are the kritikoi, so the plural in l. 30 could 
possibly be used of them; however, this is not a position they hold, so I have taken it as a first person singular 
referring to Philodemus. If the opponent is not the kritikoi, but a single person, then Philodemus must of course 
be the speaker. In l. 23, I take the subject to be “the poet,” continuing from l. 21, because of the punctuation after 
ἐξεβάλλετο. Both the poet and his poems are expelled from the genre. Alternatively, τὰ προκείµενα ποήµατα 
could be the subject of both verbs, as Janko suggests to me, in which case, the passage should be translated 
“even if the aforementioned poems were expelled, and were expelled by them for no other reason.” 
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than adherence to the themata of the various genres. The ancient confusion over the genre of 
Bacchylides 17 (paean or dithyramb?388) bears witness to the relevance of Philodemus' position: 
the poem was not clearly a dithyramb or a paean, which caused some trouble for other ancient 
literary critics. Philodemus would not have cared to which genre it belongs, so long as it was 
well-crafted. 
 That poem, however, and others like it were probably special cases. In On Music IV, 
Philodemus says that not every type of music is appropriate for religious occasions (οὔτε πᾶν 
εἶδοϲ), but only the most serious type (ϲπουδαιό̣τ̣α[τον], 118.20-1 and 23). This phrasing, 
along with the general Epicurean preservation of traditional religious rites, serves to indicate that 
music (here including poetry) could make up a part of religious festivals, provided it was suitable 
in tone and required by tradition. These requirements imply (but does not guarantee) acceptance 
of the traditional genres: the serious poetry appropriate for such festivals would be hymns, 
paeans, and the like. In this case, while a poem's quality might excuse transgressions of generic 
boundaries, it might render it unsuitable for religious use. 
 On balance, then, it seems that Philodemus did not have a developed position on the 
question of whether each genre of poetry had its own prolepsis. I suspect that he would have 
granted that they did, inasmuch as “paean” and “dithyramb” correspond to different ideas of 
poetry. This is not in conflict with his apparent position that all the genres are covered under one 
techne: cobbling is the art which covers all the making of footwear, but individual practitioners 
can specialize in boots or sandals without being any the less cobblers generally. 
 
                                                            
388 The problem has attracted other suggestions as well. See Schmidt (1990). 
  197 
§4 Imitation of Things 
 Mimesis is most famous from Aristotle's use of it in the Poetics to mean “representation,” 
what the actors of a tragedy do to the plot of a play as they perform it on stage (or what readers 
of the text do mentally as they imagine the play unfold).389 Philodemus, however, does not use it 
in this way; rather he takes it to mean “imitate” or “portray” in a quite general way, as younger 
poets imitate older poets, as poets imitate matters they do not know about, or as someone might 
imitate a bird's song (or a bird might imitate someone's voice).  
 For Philodemus, the voice can be mimetic, but this means onomatopoeic rather than 
representational. This is clear from a passage in his Rhetoric: 
On Rhetoric IV (PHerc. 1423.5.12-6 = I.150 Sudhaus): 
12  … µ̣ιµεῖϲθαι δὲ 
 τὰ πράγµατ[α] µ̣ὲν φω- 
 ναῖϲ ο[ὐ] δυν[ατόν ἐϲ- 
15 τιν, ἤχουϲ [δέ τι]ναϲ 
 καὶ ψόφουϲ ... 
It is not possible to imitate 
contents with words [or 
“voices”] but certain 
sounds and noises. 
 
It is easy enough to use noise to imitate other noises, even quite skillfully, but on reflection, it is 
clear that it is impossible to imitate things with voices. By using the voice alone, someone can 
easily enough imitate with their voice, say, the noise a box makes as it falls down a staircase, but 
not simply “a box,” let alone anything more complex, like the plot of a tragedy.390  
 Philodemus makes the same point in On Poems IV, probably criticizing Aristotle's lost 
On Poets. Specifically, he attacked a doctrine that musical language (i.e. voice and noises 
organized into language and then sung) somehow achieved the goal of mimesis more than 
                                                            
389 For the debate over the meaning of mimesis see, e.g., Halliwell (2002: 155-76) and Janko (2011: 330-62). 
390 Pausimachus, a kritikos, uses birdsong to show that sound is fundamental at On Poems I.114-15 and to make a 
point about art and nature in poetry, but mimesis as a concept does not seem to be important to his point. 
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unsung speech, i.e. that the addition of music somehow made the text more mimetic: 
On Poems IV.117.30-118.1-13:391 
(117.30)   [“ἡ τῶν] 
118.1 νόµων πόηϲιϲ,” ε[ἰ] µὲν “οὐκ ἐν 
 δ̣ι̣η̣ρ̣θρωµένῃ” γί̣νεται, λε- 
 γέϲθω{ι} “τὸ τέλοϲ ἔχειν ἐν 
 φωνῇ καὶ ψόφοιϲ·” ἐπεὶ δ’ “εἰ- 
5 ϲὶ] λόγοι µελῳδούµενοι,” 
 π̣ῶϲ ἐν τούτοιϲ ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ “κἀν 
 τ]ῶι λόγωι τὸ τέλοϲ ἕξου- 
 ϲι] τῆϲ µιµήϲεωϲ,” µᾶλλον 
 δὲ] µόνωι “λόγωι,” διὰ τὸ 
10 “φωνῆ̣ι καὶ ψόφοιϲ” ἀδ[ύ]να- 
 τον] εἶναι “πράγµατα µιµεῖ- 
 ϲθαι” καὶ µὴ µόνον φωνὰϲ 
13 καὶ ψόφουϲ αὐτῶν. 
The composition of nomes, if it comes 
about “not in articulated voice,” let it be 
said to “have its end in voice and 
sounds.” But since [sc. nomes] are 
“speech sung to music,” how will they 
“have the goal of mimesis in these [sc. 
voice and sounds]” but not “in speech 
too” or rather “in speech” alone, because 
of the fact that it is impossible to “make 
a mimesis of things with voice and 
sounds,” and not merely to make a 
mimesis of their voices and sounds? 
 
The composition of nomes includes, at least in some cases, lyrics (the λόγοι of l. 5), but the real 
topic seems to be the relative contributions to mimesis of voice qua sound, language qua means 
of communication, and melody qua pure music, and what kind of mimesis that is. Aristotle's 
claim seems to be that that the voice and sounds with music are mimetic. Philodemus' rebuttal 
shows that Aristotle must mean something like “mimetic of the plot of the poem” (which we 
would expect from the doctrines in his Poetics), because Philodemus' final point is that you 
cannot make a mimesis of things with mere voice and noise. Notable is the use of τὰ 
πράγµατα, “the facts,” but also the “contents” of poetry, that is, the action which the plot, on 
the Aristotelian view, represents. This use recalls that in the passage of the Rhetoric discussed 
just above. 
 Nevertheless, this may not mean that poetry is not mimetic. Philodemus seems to admit 
                                                            
391 The discussion may be limited to the genre of nomes, since that seems to be how the discussion is introduced. 
Janko takes it to be a discussion of tragedy (see his notes ad loc. for his justification). I suspect that the 
discussion is technically limited to nomes but is applicable to any poetry set to song. The gloss “nomes” is my 
suggestion; Janko (pers. comm.) suggests “the lyrics.” 
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that it is mimetic in a discussion in the On Music of a parallel drawn by Diogenes of Babylon 
between music and poetry. 
On Music IV.136.27-34: 
27               “καὶ τῆι ποητικ[ῆι] δὲ” 
 γράφων “ἀναλόγω̣[ϲ] ἔχ[ε]ι̣ν 
 κατά τε τὴν µίµηϲ[ι]ν [κ]αὶ 
30   ⸏ κατὰ τὴν εὕρ[ε]ϲιν·” 
 κατὰ µὲν τὴν µ⟦ε⟧ίµηϲιν 
       ⸏ οὐκ ἂν ἀπ̣έδειξεν, κατὰ δὲ 
 τὴν εὕρεϲιν οὐ ταύτ[ηι] ⸌µ⸍̣ᾶλ- 
34 λον ἢ ταῖϲ ἄλλαιϲ ̣[τέχ]ν̣αιϲ. 
Although he writes that “it [sc. music] is 
analogous to poetry both with regard to 
mimesis and with regard to invention,” he 
could not have demonstrated this with 
regard to mimesis, but with regard to 
invention he could not have shown that it is 
more the case for this art than for any other 
one. 
 
Diogenes claimed that music and poetry are alike, in that both are mimetic and both put similar 
demands on their practitioners. Philodemus' objection is that Diogenes has not proved his case 
and perhaps cannot ever prove it, because it is impossible. Halliwell says (2002: 281) “[w]hen 
Philodemus repudiates the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon's view of music as parallel to poetry 'in 
terms of mimesis,' he actually implies that poetry itself is uncontentiously mimetic.” This is not 
the only possibility: Diogenes may not have been able to demonstrate it because music is not 
mimetic (and so not comparable to mimetic poetry), or because poetry is not mimetic (and so 
mimetic music is not comparable), or because neither is mimetic, or for some other reason (e.g. a 
deficient definition of mimesis on Diogenes' part, or different ways in which poetry and music 
are mimetic). It seems likely that Philodemus would have considered music to be mimetic in the 
sense in which he uses that term in the passage of the Rhetoric discussed above: a flautist can 
imitate birdsong or a percussionist the sound of something falling down a staircase. It is true, 
however, that poetry, or at least an aspect of it, was certainly mimetic, in some sense, for 
Philodemus (see below). 
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 On Music IV.91.3-10, the passage adduced by Halliwell to support his contention, does 
not name poetry: τῶν µυρίῳ µιµητικωτέρων “arts infinitely more mimetic” is the phrase in 
question. Philodemus denies Diogenes' claim that music can imitate emotions and that the 
emotions so imitated by music are somehow useful. He adds in an indignant parenthesis “even if 
they had been imitated by arts infinitely more imitative!”392 Poetry is certainly a possibility, but 
so are, e.g., painting, sculpture, and dance (Delattre's examples ad loc.), arts which are both 
much more mimetic and much more obviously mimetic than poetry. Since Diogenes' claim is 
that mimesis leads to virtue, Philodemus is better served by using the most mimetic, and most 
obviously mimetic, arts possible for his rebuttal. After all, no one claimed that sculpture led to 
virtue.393 
 In light of this, a particular statement of Philodemus about mimesis seems very strange. 
He is rebutting the anonymous philosophers in Crates who made some claim about mimesis, but 
unfortunately their original formulation does not survive at all; only Philodemus' refutation does. 
On Poems V.26.11-20:394 
11   ἐῶ γὰρ ὅτι, 
 κἂν ⟨ᾖ⟩ µίµηϲ[ίϲ] τιϲ ἐν τοι- 
 αύτηι κατ[αϲ]κ̣ευῆι (τὸ 
 ποίηµα δ' ἐ[ϲτὶ] τὸ µιµού-    
15 µενον ὡϲ ἐνδέχεται 
 µάλιϲτ' ἐν τοιαύτηι), κοι- 
 νὸν ἀποδώϲει κρίµα πᾶ- 
 ϲιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κα[θ]' ἕκαϲτον 
 θέµα τοῖϲ δια̣ταξαµέ- 
For I allow his claim that, even 
if there is mimesis in such a 
form (and verse is the most 
mimetic thing possible in such 
a form), it will provide grounds 
for a judgement common to all, 
but not for those who classified 
it according to each rule. 
                                                            
392 Following Delattre, I take µᾶλλον δὲ δῆτα as an indignant “self-correction” (i.e. a correction of what he just 
said, which was actually his opponent's claim) and the following genitive as dependent on ὑπὸ in l. 7: ὑπ’ αὐτῆϲ 
πρὸϲ ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν τι, µᾶλλον δὲ δ̣[ῆ]τα τῶν µυρίῳ µιµητικω[τέ]ρων (“… by it [sc. music], no! 
absolutely not!, even arts ten-thousandfold more mimetic!”). 
393 As a mimetic art, it would have been a step in the wrong direction for Plato. 
394 The translation of the last clause is difficult. Cf. Janko (2011: 225-27 with further bibliography). ⟨ᾖ⟩ was added 
by Pace (1995: 166) after καταϲκευῆι; Janko (2011: 225) moved it due to hiatus. 
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20 νοιϲ.   
 
We should note Philodemus' skepticism and caution. καὶ ἐάν simply sets up a conditional 
sentence and hardly admits that poetry has mimesis. If poetry actually is mimetic (about which 
he makes no comment here), then that mimesis would give grounds for a common judgment, 
presumably because the audience could judge how faithful the mimesis was to reality. His 
statement that “a poem” (or “line of verse”) “is the most mimetic thing possible in such a form” 
also need not give up much ground: it might be the most mimetic thing possible, but that 
possibility might be extremely small to begin with. “In such a form” here is probably to be 
understood as “verbally,” that is, other forms (like sculpture, or using pure voice to imitate bird 
sounds) are more mimetic, but poetry is the most mimetic thing in language. At the end, 
Philodemus notes that the proposed criterion of mimetic accuracy will not satisfy those who use 
themata as their criterion of judgment. If the themata are rules of any sort, e.g. the rules of a 
genre,395 then it is because the criteria are simply different: mimesis presumably is not rule 
bound, but governed by the accuracy of the likeness. 
 Philodemus' view seems to be that, while language generally can be somewhat mimetic, 
this quality hardly matters at all for poetry. Indeed it is possible to see the dianoiai at the heart of 
Philodemus' interest in poetry as being rooted in a different relationship between audience and 
story. For Aristotle (at least in the Poetics, and at least about tragedy396), the mimesis of a story 
through actors, their speeches, scenery, and the other parts communicates essential, timeless 
moral truths to the audience, to which they are receptive because they have suspended their 
                                                            
395 As I suggested in §3 above. 
396 The same, mutatis mutandis, seems to be true of comedy as well. See Janko (1984). 
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disbelief and accept the mimesis, which, through the action of the plot, makes them feel 
emotions and infer just such a moral truth. In contrast, Philodemus understands literature in a 
“readerly” way: the poem, with its unique combination of form and content, is evocative and 
entertaining. 397  Poetry, for Philodemus, is not particularly or importantly imitative or 
representative. 
 
§5 The Imitation of Earlier Poets398 
 In the collection of doxai at the end of book V, we find the opinion that good poetry is 
made by imitating the excellent poets of the past. Philodemus rebuts it with four different 
arguments: 
On Poems V.33.24-30:399 
24    καὶ 
25 µὴν ἡ{ι} τὸ εὖ µεµιµῆϲ-  
 θαι τὰ [Ὁ]µήρου καὶ τῶν 
 ὁµοίω[ϲ π]αραδεδοµέ- 
 νων, τὸν Ὅµηρον καὶ 
 τοὺϲ ὁµοίουϲ οὐ δόξει ποι- 
30 εῖν ϲπουδαίουϲ, ἐπείπερ   
 αὑτ̣οὺϲ οὐκ ἐµιµήϲαν- 
And indeed, the opinion that calls 
for good imitation of the works of 
Homer and similarly traditional 
poets will not think that Homer 
and the like are good poets, since 
they could not have imitated 
themselves. Further, neither has 
he hit upon the common 
                                                            
397 I do not mean to imply anything about the performance context of Philodemus' own poetry, nor about the poetry 
he discusses. Indeed, he says almost nothing about performance in his On Poems (an actor's possibilities for 
expressiveness are mentioned at II.73.3-6 and IV.119.13-19), though it is clear from his On Music that he images 
public recital as at least one way in which an audience has access to a poem. I think that his own poem inviting 
Piso to dinner indicates that he considered private reading a possibility, because a meaningful performance of 
such a poem is difficult to imagine. Piso would have to be present, and so already invited, to hear such a recital. 
However, it could easily be reperformed in such a context (perhaps as a way to delight the audience and at the 
same time increase Piso' stature and Philodemus' reputation). More generally, I do not take sides between Bing's 
vision of a bookish reading culture and Cameron's insistence on the continued importance of performance. I 
think both coexisted for very different contexts, and I think that Philodemus separated a poem per se from its 
performance (i.e. reading a tragedy is just as acceptable for him as it was for Aristotle) and he might even prefer 
private reading, since crowds at a public performance can be distracting (cf. On Music IV.142.16-35). 
398 This problem was handled differently by Arrighetti (2011): 76-77. 
399 For the translation of πλήν in l. 32, cf. the usage discussed at LSJ s.v. III.2, “to break off and pass to another 
subject.” 
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 το.  [π]λὴν οὔτε παρε- 
 φάπτεται τ̣[ῆϲ] κ̣οινῆϲ  
 ἐννο[ίαϲ οὔτε] προει- 
35 λήφαµεν ταύτην ἀρετὴν  
 ποιήµατοϲ. 
conception nor do we have this as 
our prolepsis of the excellence of 
poetry. 
 
The first argument is curtly and mockingly phrased, but stronger than it may appear, and has a 
basis in Epicurean opinions: imitation of the great poets of the past implies a decline from an 
original state of excellence, but whom would the first poet have imitated? Poetry for the 
Epicureans had a definite (though unknown) starting point in human history.400 Even if an 
imitation could surpass the model, the first poet would be left without such a model to use as his 
goal.  
 The second argument clearly relies on the prolepsis for its force: “a good imitation of 
Homer and the other old poets” is just not what people mean when they say that a poem is 
“good.” 
 The third and fourth arguments, reproduced below, are much longer and constitute an 
interesting methodological complaint. The third one first: 
On Poems V.34.3-33: 
3      δικαιοϲ]ύ[νην] 
 γέ τοι φήϲε[ι τ]ιϲ εἶναι τὴν 
5 Ἀριϲτείδου µίµηϲιν  
 καὶ χρηϲτότητα τὴν Φω- 
 κί[ω]ν[ο]ϲ καὶ [ϲοφ]ίαν τὴν  
 Ἐπικούρου καὶ πολιτι- 
 κὴµ µὲν τὴν Περικλέ- 
10 ουϲ, ζωγραφίαν δὲ τὴν Ἀ-  
 πελλέουϲ, καὶ περὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων ὁ[µοίω]ϲ, ἀντι- 
 ϲτρόφωϲ δ' ἐπὶ [τ]ῶν κα-  
 κιῶν.  θεµατικήν τε 
15 παντάπαϲ̣ι τὴν κρίϲιν  
Yet someone will say that 
justice is the imitation of 
Aristides and uprightness 
that of Phocion and wisdom 
that of Epicurus and politics 
that of Pericles and painting 
that of Apelles and so on 
and so forth, and con-
versely for the vices. He 
introduces a judgement of 
the good poem which is 
                                                            
400 On this point, see Mackey (forthcoming). 
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 τοῦ καλοῦ ποιήµατοϲ 
17 εἰϲάγει καὶ ἀόριϲτον.   
completely arbitrary and 
unlimited. 
 
This position is actually open to the same objection that Philodemus made against the “imitation 
of the first poets” claim: how did Aristides learn to be just if justice is imitation of himself? 
 More important, however, are the terms with which Philodemus characterizes the faulty 
judgment that such a demand for imitation would create: it would be “arbitrary” and 
“unbounded.”401 Romeo ad 14 ss. explains ἀόριϲτοϲ as follows: “infatti, osserva Filodemo, 
visto che è impossibile imitare i modelli in ogni singolo aspetto e particolare, bisogna definire un 
limite conveniente dell'imitazione, e chiarire quali sono gli aspetti nei quali i grandi poeti 
debbono essere imitati, ma poiché i sostenitori della doxa non lo precisano, non sarà possibile 
giudicare se un'imitazione è stata realizzata convenientemente o meno.” I differ from her 
understanding in that I take Philodemus' complaint to be more precisely that, instead of judging a 
poem by a long list of fine details, we should do it with reference to the main idea, the τί ἐ̣ϲτι 
καθ' ὃ θαυµ[άζ]ον|τ[α]ι ἔ̣[νι]οι (ll. 31-2), “what it is in accord with which some poets are 
marveled at,” or, as Philodemus calls it elsewhere (V.30.28), τὸ διῆκον, “what permeates” a 
poem to give it its essence.  
 Philodemus' fourth argument, by probing the unspoken foundations of his opponent's 
claim, reveals that his own search is actually what his opponent should be involved in as well. 
On Poems V.34.17-33: 
                                                            
401 See Mangoni ad loc. for a defense of the translation “arbitrary.” On θέµατα, “rules,” generally, see Rispoli 
(2005: 81), who states “possiamo dunque concludere che singoli studiosi e scuole diverse dal Kepos 
proponevano θέµατα non fondati scientificamente, validi solo per chi li aveva classificati, e assunti come criterio 
di giudizio di una sequenza vocale, un verso, una composizione; dei θέµατα così concepiti erano, ovviamente, 
considerati da Filodemo inutilizzabili ai fini della formulazione di un giudizio di carattere universale.” 
Philodemus' goal in this part of the text is to arrive at just such a judgement. 
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17    τό 
 τε µιµεῖϲθα[ι τὸ]ν Ὅµη- 
 ρον ἐµ πᾶϲι καὶ τὸν̣ Εὐ- 
20 ριπίδην καὶ τοὺϲ ὁµ⟦ω⟧οί-  
 ωϲ τεθαυµαϲµέ[ν]ουϲ 
 οὐκ ἐπιεικὲ{ι}ϲ̣ ⸌εἶναι⸍ δόξει. τά- 
 χα δ' οὐδ' ἐπιγνῶναι δυ- 
 νηϲόµεθα τὴν ὡϲ 
25 προϲήκε⟨ι⟩ τούτουϲ µε-  
 µι]µηµένην, ἐὰν [µὴ 
 τὸ πρ]οϲῆκον εἰδήϲω[µ]ε̣ν̣. 
 πλὴν οὐδὲν γελοιότε- 
 ρον ἔϲται τοῖϲ οὕτωϲ ἀπο- 
30 διδοῦϲι.  πευϲόµεθα γὰρ  
 τί ἐ̣ϲτι καθ' ὃ θαυµ[άζ]ον- 
 τ[α]ι ἔ̣[νι]οι καὶ καθ' ἃ µιµη- 
33 τέο̣[ν το]ύτουϲ ὀρθῶϲ. 
And imitating Homer in every 
detail and Euripides and those 
held in similarly high esteem will 
not seem to be reasonable. 
Perhaps we will unable to recog-
nize the poem that imitates them 
as it ought, unless we know what 
befits them. Further, there can be 
nothing more ridiculous for those 
thus explaining [sc. the excellence 
of poetry]. For we will ask what it 
is, in accord with which some are 
admired and according to which 
they must be imitated correctly. 
 
If we take it as given that a poet should imitate an earlier great, it is reasonable to ask in what 
respects they should follow their chosen model or even how to choose an appropriate model 
from among the good and bad poets of the past. But the answers to such questions will define the 
good qualities of the poet in question. It is better to search for the answer to the general question 
“what is it that makes a good poet?” The similarity of προϲῆκον to διῆκον is a happy 
coincidence: what befits those poems, i.e. what they deserve in an imitation which will really live 
up to their greatness, is presumably the general quality which makes them good poems in the 
first instance. 
 
§6 τὸ ἴδιον, τὸ ἔργον, τὸ τέλοϲ, ὁ ἀγαθὸϲ ποητήϲ 
 These terms have all been mentioned already in passing. The ἴδιον, or “particular 
feature,”402 is what makes poetry poetry and not something else, like prose. Accomplishing it is 
                                                            
402 Janko, passim, translates it as “particularity.” See Pace (1995: 185-190) for a discussion of Philodemus' use of it. 
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the τέλοϲ. The ἔργον is the labor of the poet to create a poem which has the ἴδιον. The ἀγαθὸϲ 
ποητήϲ is not clearly defined, but we can make some guesses as to what makes him good. 
 Philodemus sets out the relationship between these terms in an extended engagement with 
Heracleodorus' position, which ends, more Socratico, with an analogy to a craftsman, near the 
beginning of book two of the On Poems. We will take the last part first, since it lays out most 
clearly the terms used in the rest of the passage.  
On Poems II.68.18-69.26: 
18 ἀκ]ό̣[λ]ουθο//ν γὰ//ρ̣ ἦν τὸ   
 “µη̣δὲ τὸν π//ο//ητὴν ἐµπο- 
20 δ]ί̣ζεϲθαι πρὸϲ τὸ τῆϲ ἰδ[ί]αϲ 
 ἐ]πιϲτήµηϲ ἔργον”,΄ ὅτι οὐ δι-   
 ὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου διανοη-    
 µάτων΄ καὶ λέξεων ἐξερ-    
 γ]άζεται τὴν ψυχαγωγί-    
25 αν,΄ ἀλλὰ διὰ παραλλαττόν- 
 των·, οὐ τὸ “καὶ τῶν οἰκεί-  
 ων ὑποκειµένων ἀµε- 
28 λήϲαντα τελέωϲ,΄ ἐπ̣[ε]ὶ τὴν  
69.1 φωνὴν δι//ώκει τὴν ἀδι- 
 ανόητο//ν”, ἐκεῖν[ό] τε πάρεϲ- 
 τιν λέγ]ε̣ιν,΄ ὅτι καθ’ αὑτοῦ 
 τ[ὸ] “δ[ι]α̣φερούϲα[ϲ] µὲν τέ- 
5 χ̣ναϲ, ἐν δὲ τῷ κοινῶι τὸ 
 τέ[λο]ϲ ἐχούϲαϲ” παρατέθη- 
 κεν̣.΄ “ὡϲ”̣ γὰρ “ὁ̣ [δ]ακτυλιογλύ-  
 φοϲ, ἴδιον ἔχων οὐ τὸ ποι- 
 εῖν ὅµο[ι]ον΄ — κοινὸν γὰρ ἦν 
10 καὶ πλ̣[ά]ϲτου καὶ ζωγ̣[ρ]ά- 
 φου — [τὸ] δ’ ἐν ϲιδήρῳ καὶ λι- 
 θαρίωι διὰ τῆϲ ἐγγ̣λυφῆϲ, 
 τἀγα̣θ̣[ὸ]ν οὐκ ἐν τούτωι 
          _ κεί[µε]νον,΄ ἀλλ’ ἐν τῶι ποι- 
15 εῖν ὅ̣µ̣[ο]ιον,΄ ὃ πάντ̣ων κοι-  
 νὸν ἦν̣, ἔχει,΄ παραπληϲί- 
 ωϲ” ἀξιοῦται̣ καὶ ὁ ποητὴϲ 
        “τὸ µὲν̣ ἴ̣δ̣ι̣ον ἐν τ̣[ῆι ϲυ]ν- 
 θέϲει β[άλ]λ̣[ε]ϲθαι,΄ τὸ δ’ ἀγα- 
For it is consistent with this, as we 
saw, that “the poet is not hindered 
in regard to the function of his 
particular skill,” because he brings 
about entertainment not by means 
of the contents and words of prose, 
but by means of divergent ones, not 
that “(he is not hindered) if he has 
totally neglected even the ap-
propriate underlying materials, 
since (the poet) seeks sound that is 
lacking in content,” and one can 
observe that he has adduced against 
himself the claim “arts that differ, 
but have their purpose in common.” 
For “just as the ring-engraver has as 
his end not making a likeness—for 
this is shared with both sculptor 
and painter—but (doing so) on steel 
or on a gem-stone by means of 
engraving, with his excellence 
residing not in this, but in making a 
likeness, which is common to 
(them) all, likewise” it is claimed 
that “the poet too founds his 
particularity on the composition, 
but pursues excellence by means of 
that (excellence) which is also 
common to prose,” which this 
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20 θὸν διὰ [τ]ο̣ῦ̣ κ̣αὶ λό̣[γῳ] κοι- 
 ν⟦ω⟧\οῦ/ θηρεύειν”,΄ ὅ φηϲιν οὗ- 
 τοϲ ἁπλῶϲ “µηδὲ ἓν ὠφε- 
 λεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν”, ὥϲπερ 
 ἐκ τῶν παρατεθέντων 
25 ϲυνηχὼ[ϲ] ἀ̣λλ’ οὐ τοὐν- 
         > αντίον. 
(critic) flatly says ‘cannot help or 
harm (the poet) at all,” as if on the 
basis of these comparisons he had 
proved this claim rather than its 
opposite. 
 
Ring engravers, sculptors, and painters all set out to make a likeness of something, for instance 
of Ptolemy I, and this is their τέλοϲ, their goal, and it is “common to them,” since all of them 
have it as their purpose. The ἴδιον, particular feature (or often “particular means”), of each of 
their arts differs, since it is the medium. The gem-carver's particular feature is working 
gemstones, the engraver's is metal, the sculptor's is stone. The ἔργον, work or “job,” is to 
accomplish the goal using the particular means of the techne in question. We know from a 
related comment that the object of imitation is outside of the art, that is, the sculptor is not 
responsible for inventing the shape that he carves (see below). 
 The poet, then, has the particular feature of working in verses (Heracleodorus claims that 
it is in the synthesis, but Philodemus disagrees), and since the subject matter is outside the art, he 
does not have to invent his plot, but can take it over from another, that is, originality in topic is 
not required of the poet, nor, as Philodemus implies at III, fr. 28, is it necessarily praiseworthy in 
itself. Of course, it was not banned nor was it blameworthy in itself either. Evidence of this can 
be found in book III. 
On Poems III, fr. 28.18-22: 
18                ὡϲ δο[κεῖ, οὐ- 
 δὲν ἔ]χει παρ’ [ἄ]λ̣λο[υ, οὐδὲ 
20 πά]ρεϲτιν ἡ [ἀ]ρετ[ὴ τοῦ ἐ- 
 παι]νετοῦ τραγωι[δοῦ, ἀλ- 
22 λ]ὰ̣ Χοιρίλου. 
As it seems, he [sc. a tragedian] has 
nothing from another poet, yet the 
excellence is present not of the praise-
worthy tragedian, but of Choerilus. 
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There were several Choerili: a tragedian of the early fifth century, and two epic poets, one from 
Samos of the late fifth century, and one of Iasus, who was the infamously bad court epicist of 
Alexander, and to whom the reference here points.403 Philodemus' sarcasm points out that 
Choerilus of Iasus, by versifying Alexander's deeds, had genuinely new material that no one had 
ever treated before, but he was nevertheless a terrible poet, which means that originality of 
content does not guarantee quality of product. 
 For the rest, the passage amounts to a demand on the part of Heracleodorus that the poet 
not use prosaic language, but language divergent from normal usage (i.e. poetic). Philodemus 
admits that this is consistent with his position, but says that Heracleodorus has the wrong goal: 
language without meaning. We will now turn to the beginning of the passage. 
On Poems II.67.6-68.18:404 
6 ἀ[λ]λ’ οὗτοϲ, οὐκ ἔϲτιν εἰ-   
 πεῖν ὡϲ ἀδιάληπτοϲ̣ ὤν,   
 ὑ]φ’ [ἧϲ] ἂν προχείρωϲ πα- 
 ραχθῆι φανταϲίαϲ, εὐθὺϲ 
10 οἴεται τὸ δοκ[ο]ῦν αὐτῷ   
 κυροῦϲθαι δι’ αὐτῆϲ, ὡϲ 
 καὶ “τοὺϲ δια̣φέ̣ρ[ο]νταϲ” εἰ-  
 πὼν “τεχνείταϲ ὁµοίαν   
 εἰκόνα ποιεῖν ἐν ἄλλοιϲ 
15 ὑποκειµένοιϲ, τῆϲ πα- 
 ραλλαγῆϲ οὐδὲν βλ̣απτού-   
 ϲηϲ,” ἐ̣πιτειµᾷ τοῖϲ τὸν πο-  
 ητ̣ὴ̣ν ἐκ τῶν ὑπ̣ο̣[κ]ε̣ι̣µέ- 
 ν]ω̣ν θεωρ̣[οῦ]ϲ̣[ιν], ο̣[ὐ]θενὸϲ  
20 ἐ]κ̣ τῶν̣ [ὑποκει]µένων  
 ὄντωϲ ἂν ψυχῇ κα̣θ̣[α]ρ̣[ᾶι 
     But as this (critic), being 
inexpressibly confused, is readily 
misled by whatever image, he at once 
thinks that his own opinion is 
validated by means of it, as too, when 
he says that “different [sc. kinds of] 
craftsmen make a similar image in 
diverse underlying materials, as the 
variation does no harm,” he is 
criticizing those who consider the 
poet from the perspective of his 
underlying materials, when nobody 
with a clear mind would really 
consider the poet on the basis of his 
                                                            
403 The other two Choerili were respected, but not particularly famous, so a reference to one of them would lack 
point. Also, the lack of a further designation (e.g. τραγωιδόϲ, Ϲάµιοϲ) indicates that we should understand the 
most famous one. See Janko ad loc. 
404  I take τοῦ πλάττοντοϲ in 68.5-6 to mean “sculptor” or “moulder,” i.e. a artisan or artist who works in moldable 
or shapeable media (i.e. not a painter or poet, for example). The final two lines of the passage could also be 
translated “this is the claim of a blind man.” 
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 θεωροῦντοϲ τὸν ποητήν  
 (εἰ δ’ ἐ⟨κ⟩ τῶν τούτωι δοκούν- 
 των “ὑποκειµέ[ν]ω̣ν”, ἴϲω[ϲ),  
25 ἐκ] τ̣ῶν δὲ τῆϲ ποητικῆϲ 
 ὑπαρχόντ⟦ο⟧⸌ω⸍ν΄. ἔργον γάρ  
 ἐϲ̣τ̣ι τὸ διὰ πο̣ιῶν λέξε- 
28 ων ἐ̣[γ]λογ̣ῆ̣[ϲ] καὶ πλοκῆ[ϲ 
68.1 ι̣[. . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .(.) 
 [. . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . .] 
 κ[. . . . .  . ., οὐδ]’ // ὑ̣[πὸ τοῦ δια- 
 φ[όρ]//ου βλάπτ[ε]τ̣[αι τὸ ἴδ]ιον̣, 
5 εἰ̣ // δ̣[ι]αφερούϲη[ι] ⟨τῆϲ⟩ τοῦ πλ̣άτ- 
 το/̣/ν̣τοϲ ὕληι ποεῖ τὴν ὁ-   
 µ̣[ο]//ιότητα. καταξι-   
 ῶ̣ν δὲ “τὸν ποητήν, ἐὰν µὴ ̣  
 δ/̣/[ι]α̣νοήµατ’ οἰκεῖα λάβη[ι 
 κ//αὶ [λέ]ξειϲ προϲηκούϲαϲ, ἀ-   
 γα]θ̣όν τι ποιητικὸν ἀπ̣[ο-  
15      _[δει]κ̣[ν]ύ̣ε̣ιν”, κἂ⟦ι⟧⸌ν⸍ παρίδ̣ῃ̣ τ[. 
 . . . .]η[]τ̣[.]δ̣[.]. .ι̣[]ϲ̣ι̣αλ̣[. .]ι̣[. 
 .]β̣[]κ[]ϲ̣[.(.)] ἐϲτι τυφλώ⸌τ⸍τον- 
18 τοϲ.  
underlying materials (but if [sc. he 
did so] on the basis of what he 
imagines to be ‘underlying 
materials,” then perhaps), but on the 
basis of what constitutes the art of 
poetry. For the [sc. poet’s] function 
is, by means of the selection and 
interweaving of words of a certain 
quality [sc. to compose verses which 
reveal thought? Three lines are lost 
here.] … and the particular feature is 
not harmed by the different material, 
if he creates the likeness with 
subject-matter that is different from 
that of the sculptor. But when he 
claims that “if the poet does not adopt 
appropriate content and suitable 
words, he can achieve some poetic 
excellence,” even if he overlooks the 
… , [sc. he] is [sc. less sighted] than a 
blind man.  
 
The “underlying materials” seem to be the raw material or, more generally, the medium in which 
the artist works. An image simpliciter is not harmed nor helped by appearing in one medium 
rather than another: an excellent gem-carver may make a better (e.g. more vivid, more realistic, 
more flattering) image by engraving even a cheap stone than an unskilled or incompetent 
sculptor working in Parian marble.  
 If we should not judge poetry on the basis of what underlies a given poem, we can judge 
it based on what underlies the art. What is that? Philodemus immediately begins to speak about 
the ergon and then, after the lacuna, he speaks about the idion, subject matter (ὕλη here405) and 
excellence (ἀγαθόν). It seems likely that these are what underlies the art, that is, they are the 
                                                            
405 This is not Philodemus' usual term, so it must be taken over from the opponent. 
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principles and organization of the art, and it is not surprising to claim that we should judge a 
work of art in accord with the principles of the art. 
 We can find more details about the ergon, idion, telos, and arete in the passage which 
immediately proceeds the one just under discussion. 
On Poems II.64.17-65.24:406 
64.17 χ]ωρὶϲ γὰρ τού̣τ̣[ων οὐ  
 ⟨µόνον⟩ ψ̣έ̣γ̣ει̣ν ἡµᾶϲ, ἐ[ὰν ϲαπρὰ  
 ϲκευάζῃ, τῆϲ ἐγλ̣[ογῆϲ ἐ-  
20 π’ αὐτῷ κειµέ//νη//[ϲ], τὸν  
 µάγειρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρε- 
 µάϲανταϲ ἐκδείρε̣ι̣ν, ἐπαι-     
 νεῖν δ’ ἂν εὔ⟦φ⟧⸌χ⸍υλα· διὸ καὶ  
 τὸν ποητὴν ϲυρίτ[τ]οι⟨µεν⟩ 
25 ἂν δικαί̣[ω]ϲ, εἴ τι πον̣οί- 
 η τῶν ἀνα̣λ̣όγων.” ὃ ο̣[ὐ- 
27 χ ὅµοιόν ἐϲ̣τιν ἐπ[ὶ τ]ῆϲ  
65.1 πο̣ητικῆϲ̣ τὸ “τὰ πρ[άγµα- 
 τα ἄγνωϲτα εἶναι̣, [τὰϲ δὲ 
 λέξειϲ οὐκ ἀρεϲτά[ϲ”, καὶ  
 ἐπὶ τῆϲ µαγε̣[ιρι]κ̣ῆ[ϲ τὸ “ϲα- 
5           πρὰ τἀγοράϲµατα.” τ[ῆϲ  
 µὲν γὰρ ἔξω ταῦτ̣’ ἐϲ̣[τί, 
 τῆϲ δὲ ποητικῆϲ ο[ὐ]κ [ἔϲ- 
 τιν ἔξω τὸ ποεῖν̣ [γνωϲ-  
 τὰ τὰ πράγµατα. [κἄν τιϲ 
10 παντελῶϲ αὐτὰ [παρ’ ἑ-  
 τέρου λαµβάνη[ι, ἴδια δὲ 
 τῇ ϲυνθέϲει τὰ π̣ο̣[ήµα-      
 τα, τοῦτ’ ἦν ἰδιώ[τατον  
 αὐτοῦ. διόπερ ο[ὐδὲ τὸ  
15 τὰϲ λέξειϲ ο⸌ἰ⸍κείαϲ [ἔχειν  
 ἐκτόϲ̣ ἐ̣ϲτι τῆϲ π̣[οητικῆϲ,  
 κἂν αἱ̣ λ̣έξειϲ ὠφ̣[ελείαϲ 
 τοῦ βίου παρεϲχή̣[κωϲι 
 κοιναί. τὸ γὰρ ἐγλ[έγειν 
20 τὰϲ ο⸌ἰ⸍κείαϲ καὶ δ[ι]ατ̣[ιθ]έ- 
 ναι πρὸϲ ⟦α⟧ δήλωϲιν τοι-  
 ούτου νοήµατοϲ ἐπι- 
[he says that “for, apart from these 
[sc. considerations?], we not only 
abuse the cook, when the selection 
of ingredients is up to him, if he 
makes rotten meals, but also hang 
him up and flog him, but we praise 
him if they are succulent; hence we 
would rightly hiss the poet if he 
prepared something of the same 
kind.” The claim in the case of 
poetry that ‘the contents are 
unintelligible and the words not 
pleasing’ is not the same as the claim 
in the case of cookery that ‘the 
ingredients are rotten’. For the latter 
are external to the art (of cookery), 
but making the contents intelligible 
is not external to the art of poetry. 
Even if a poet takes them over 
completely from someone else, and 
the verses are his own [or “are 
particular to him”] by his 
composition, this is, as we saw, very 
much his particular feature. For this 
reason even making the words one’s 
own does not lie outside the art of 
poetry, even if common language 
has provided the needs of life. For 
his particular feature is, as we saw, 
to select appropriate words and to 
                                                            
406 In 65.17-8, I take the phrase ὠφ̣[ελείαϲ] τοῦ βίου to be emphatic overstatement for “everything he needs.” 
(Another possibility is to read τοῦ βι⟨οτ⟩οῦ and translate “the needs of his livelihood”). Janko suggests (pers. 
comm.) reading ποεῖν at the end of 65.15 in place of ἔχειν. 
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 τηδ//ε//[ίωϲ]΄, τ̣οῦτ’ ἦ[ν ἴ]δι- 
24      >ον αὐτοῦ.   
arrange them suitably with a view to 
expressing clearly such a thought. 
 
Heracleodorus here wants to blame the cook for making a bad meal and, likewise, the poet for 
making a bad poem, evidently blaming both for their poor choice of initial materials.407 
Philodemus' rebuttal seemingly excuses the cook for the rotten ingredients, though he only says 
that shopping is outside the techne of cookery, not that the cook is not responsible for the bad 
meal. This will be taken up just below. 
 The second part of the passage speaks to the problem of the idion and says clearly that 
the particular feature of the poet is “to select appropriate words and to arrange them suitably with 
a view to expressing clearly such a thought.” This dovetails with the description of the ergon at 
I.167: not to come up with original content, but to express whatever content in a unique way. 
 Lastly, we have mention of the τέλοϲ (the “end” or “goal”): for the painter, sculptor, and 
gem-carver, it seems to be “to make an image” for all of them: δ[ι]α̣φερούϲα[ϲ] µὲν τέχ̣ναϲ, ἐν 
δὲ τῷ κοινῶι τὸ τέ[λο]ϲ ἐχούϲαϲ (“although the arts are different, they have their goal in 
common,” II.61.4-6, discussed above). So, for a portrait painter, his ergon is to fulfill the telos, 
that is, his job is to paint a portrait, using the idion of his craft, in this case, paint and canvas. If 
poetry is analogous to painting (we have no indication that it is not), then the telos is simply “a 
poem” which it is his ergon to write. The idion is the treatment in language as opposed to any 
                                                            
407 The initial statement of Heracleodorus' position at I.34 is badly damaged, but the terms πιον[ (l. 5) and ϲαπρο[ 
(l. 7) suggest that Heracleodorus himself discussed the quality of the ingredients and so held both cook and poet 
responsible for their choices. 
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other medium.408 
 We can now resolve the Cook's Objection in Philodemus' terms: if the raw materials are 
in poor condition, the job of the artist will be harder or perhaps impossible. It seems as if it ought 
to be the artist's responsibility, that is, part of their ergon, to avoid such material, and so it is, 
indirectly: if they realize that they cannot complete the telos using such materials, they will be 
forced to abandon their plan.409 But Philodemus may prefer to accept the objection: if the poet 
picks an intractable topic and writes a bad poem, he has nevertheless written a poem, that is, he 
has completed his ergon and fulfilled his telos. It will be a bad poem, but it is a poem. Though 
neither the plot itself nor the poet's choice of it is part of the art of poetry, the poet is responsible 
for the quality of the poem he writes, but he is to be judged only for his flaws qua poet, not qua 
selector of plots. Philodemus puts no limits on the selection of contents, and so allows that, in 
theory, a good poem could be written on any topic. But this does not mean that any topic in the 
hands of any poet can result in a good poem. 
 That the poet is responsible for form and choice of content is argued somewhat earlier in 
the book, from col. 40 onwards. The treatment is quite lengthy, so I will quote only the explicit 
statements. 
                                                            
408 On Poems II.119.14, ταῦτα δ[ὲ] ἰδιότ̣[ητ’ ἔχει, may indicate that the poems themselves have the particularity of 
the art, but the context is very broken. Philodemus states at On Poems IV.107.2-3 that the idion of poetry is not 
mimesis. 
409 Philodemus may say that the poet needs “suitable material” (οἰκεία ὕλη) or else he will not be able to accomplish 
the idion, which would mean that he did think that some plots were completely unworkable. At II.68.7-10: 
τελέωϲ δ’ ἀδυ̣[ν]ατεῖ τὸ τῆϲ τέχνηϲ ἴ̣δι[ο]ν ϲυντελεῖν, ἂν µὴ τὴν [ο]ἰ̣κείαν ὕλην ἔχηι (“but he is wholly 
unable to achieve the particularity of the art, unless he has the appropriate subject-matter”). The term ὕλη 
betrays this phrase as belonging to Heracleodorus, not Philodemus, since this is not his usual word. The context 
seems to indicate that Philodemus is speaking, but it may be deceptive. See also chapter five §8 with nn. 77 and 
78. 
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On Poems II.40.21-41.1:410 
21   ἀλλ’ ὅµωϲ͙, κα- 
 θάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰϲ   
 χειρουργίαϲ οὐχ ἡγούµε-   
 θα χείρω{ι} παρ’ ὅϲον ὑφελ͙ό͙-     
 µενοϲ ὕλην ἑτέρου τε-   
25 χνείτου καλῶϲ ἠργάϲα-   
 ⟦.⟧⸌το⸍, οὕτωϲ οὐδὲ ποητήν, ἐ-  
 ὰν ἀπόητον ὑπόθεϲιν͙ λα-     
28 βὼν προϲθῇ τὸν [ἴ]διον νο[ῦν,  
41.1 χείρω νοµίζοµεν... 
But all the same, just as in the case of 
the handicrafts we do not consider [sc. 
a craftsman] inferior insofar as he 
purloined his material from another 
craftsman and worked it up well, so too 
we do not think a poet worse if he takes 
over subject-matter that is non-
elaborated and adds his own particular 
interpretation. 
 
Philodemus' extreme situation is instructive. Even if the material is stolen, the craftsman's craft is 
what matters to the judgment of him as a craftsman (granted, he is guilty of theft).411 The final 
phrase is important: the poet has to add his particular νοῦϲ, probably interpretation: he would not 
be any sort of craftsman if he simply took another poet's poem and passed it off as his own, so he 
needs to add something. Philodemus talks in terms of borrowing and rearranging plots (col. 41). 
Additionally, the style and verbal expression are completely under the control of the poet.412 
 
§7 On the Poet 
 It makes sense that the job of the good poet is to write good poetry, and so it is. But other 
concerns may be involved: choices made by the poet which affect his or her poetry but do not 
directly weigh on, for instance, its judgment, the author's moral character, and his psychology. 
These three topics in particular are interrelated. 
 We will begin with a discussion of the choice of content. This was handled above in the 
                                                            
410 The phrase τὸν [ἴ]διον νο[ῦν] in 40.28 is difficult. I follow Janko, whose note provides extensive bibliography. 
νοῦϲ seems to mean “sense,” i.e. meaning, elsewhere in Epicurean literary criticism: see Demetrius Laco, On 
Poems I.10.5 McOsker with parallels cited ad loc. 
411 Henry apud Janko ad loc. explains that, though the theft counts against the craftsman, his craftsmanship is not 
affected. Note that “theft” (κλοπή) was the standard term for plagiarism. 
412 Since even quotation of other poets who treated the same plot is a tool of style. 
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discussion of the idion and ergon, but it is worth the trouble to discuss it from the perspective of 
the poet. The content of poetry is often felt to be relevant to the character of the poet: morally 
upright poets write morally upright poetry, and vice versa.413 
On Poems II.33.20-34.26: 
20  π̣αρέλκεται γ[ὰρ 
 τὸ “χρηϲτὸν ἢ φαῦλο̣[ν 
 εἶναι διανόηµα τ[ὸ] ἀ[πό- 
 ητον” εἰϲ ποητικήν [γε ἀ- 
 ρετήν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ’ ο[ὐ- 
25 χ οὗτοϲ οὐδ̣[ὲ] Φιλίϲκο[ϲ 
26 οὐδ’ οἱ λοιπο̣[ὶ] δύο Κου͙[ρῆ- 
34.1 τ͙εϲ ἐπέϲτηϲαν τὴν Ἑλ- 
 λάδα. ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὅτου τ⟦ω⟧⸌ὸ⸍ν 
 Ἀρχίλοχον ἐθαύµαζε 
 καὶ τὸν Ἱππώνακτα 
5 καὶ τὸν Ϲηµωνίδην 
 καὶ τῶν παρ’ Ὁµήρωι 
 καὶ Εὐρειπίδει καὶ τοῖϲ 
 ἄλλοιϲ ποιηταῖϲ ἔνια 
 πονηροῖϲ ⟦ου⟧ προϲώποιϲ 
10 περικείµενα καὶ περὶ 
 πονηρῶν πραγµάτων 
 γεγ͙ραµµένα, καὶ κατε- 
 γέλα χρηϲτοῖϲ περικεί- 
 µενα καὶ περὶ χρηϲτῶν 
15 ἀκούουϲα πραγµάτων, 
 οὕτωϲ ἐπέπειϲτο· καὶ  
 ποητὴν µὲν ἀγαθὸν ὑ- 
 πελάµβανε τὸν ἐξεργα- 
 ϲάµενον, ὡϲ ἔφην, ὁποῖ- 
20 όν ποτ’ ἂν διανόηµα λά- 
 βηι παρ’ ἑτέρων ἢ αὐτὸϲ͙ 
 προθῆται, τάχα δὲ ἄνθρω- 
 πον πονηρὸν καὶ τὸν [ἐ-  
 ξ͙ενέγκαντα διανοή-  
25 µατα χρηϲτά, µὴ καλ- 
26 λωπίϲαντα δ’ οὕτω. 
For the fact that “non-elaborated 
content is good or inferior” is 
irrelevant to poetic merit. Neither 
the latter [sc. poet, Chaeremon] 
nor Philiscus nor the other two 
squawkers [lit. Curetes, “noise-
makers”] made Hellas turn her 
attention to this. But since the 
time when she began to admire 
Archilochus, Hipponax, and 
Semonides and some of the verses 
in Homer, Euripides, and the other 
poets which are associated with 
bad characters and are written 
about bad actions, and she began 
to laugh when she heard those 
verses that are associated with 
decent characters and are about 
excellent actions, such was her 
persuasion. As I said, she regarded 
someone who works up whatever 
content he takes from others or 
puts forward himself as an 
excellent poet, but perhaps [sc. 
she regarded] as a poor fellow 
even one who put forward good 
contents without having adorned 
them in this way. 
 
Non-elaborated content is irrelevant, in this case, because poetic merit lies in the elaboration of 
                                                            
413 In another context, Catullus provided a humorous, ironic self-defense against charges of personal immorality 
motivated by lascivious poetry: nam castum esse decet pium poetam | ipsum, uersiculos nihil necesse est (xvi.5-
6). 
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the content.414 The famous poets in Philodemus' list were admitted to be scurrilous (the Stoic in 
book V, for example, has trouble accounting for why they are good because they seem to fail on 
ethical grounds);415 they are used specifically and intentionally to demonstrate that the moral 
quality of the contents is irrelevant to the judgement of the quality of poets as artists. The good 
poet is the one who writes a formally accomplished poem about whatever contents he chooses. 
 It is safe to assume that Philodemus made no claims related to the poet's personal morals, 
and several passages imply just that. The first is a passage from the rebuttal of Heracleodorus at 
the beginning of book II. Under discussion is the relationship between formal elaboration and 
genre. 
On Poems II.30.14-26: 
   ἀλλ’ ὡϲ µοι δοκεῖ,] 
15 ὁ͙ ποη[τὴϲ χρήϲεται τοῖϲ 
 πλάϲµαϲι ποητικ⟦οιϲ⟧⸌ῶϲ⸍, ἂν 
 τελεῖν [τι ἀ]νέχη[τ]αι. [] φρον- 
 τίϲαϲ γὰρ τοῦ διανοήµα-  
 τοϲ, ὃ διὰ τῆϲ καταϲκευῆ̣[ϲ  
20 ἔλ]εγον ἐµφαίνεϲθαι, κ[ρι- 
 θήϲ]εται ποητὴϲ ἀγαθὸϲ ἐ[πὶ 
  τ͙ῆ̣[ι] φροντιϲτεί⟨ᾳ⟩, κἂν ἐκ το̣[ῦ 
 γ]ένουϲ ἐξεβάλλετο,΄ καὶ  
 ὑ]π̣ὸ τ[ο]ύτων κατ’ οὐδὲν 
25 ἕτερ]ον ἐξεβάλλετο, τὰ 
 προκείµενα ποήµατα. 
But as it seems to me, the poet will 
use his styles poetically, if he 
should manage to complete (or 
“achieve”) anything. For, having 
given thought to the contents which, 
I claimed, are indicated through the 
craftsmanship, he will be judged a 
good poet for his thoughtfulness, 
and he would have been expelled 
from the genre, and the afore-
mentioned poems were expelled for 
no other reason by these critics. 
                                                            
414 Henry ap. Janko suggested Κου͙[ρῆ]|τ͙εϲ in ll.33.26-34.1. The same point is made at II.40.12-23: τῶν γὰρ 
ὑπο[κειµένων] ἐϲτὶν οὐ τὰ [νοού]µενα κοινῶϲ, ἀλ[λὰ τὰ µὴ] ποητὰ καὶ ἅ τιϲ [ἂν τὴν] ὑπόθεϲιν τῶι 
πο[ήµατι δι]δοὺϲ εἴπειεν, οὐ[δὲ καὶ ὕλη] κοινῶϲ, ἀλλ’ ἡ λε[γοµέν]η{ι} καὶ ἀπόητοϲ. [καὶ γὰρ] ταῦτ’ οὐδεὶϲ 
ἐπαι[νεῖ, µᾶλ]λον δ’ οὐδὲ ποή[µαθ’ ἕν]εκεν αὐτῶν κρί[νει νοῦν τι]ϲ ἔχων (“for the material of the plot is not 
the contents in the general sense, but those that are not elaborated, i.e. whatever someone might say in giving the 
plot to a poem, and (it is) material not in the general sense, but that which is also called 'non-elaborated.' For 
nobody praises these, but rather a sensible person judges by reason of them that they are not even verses”). The 
fact that unworked material [i.e. a bare plot-line?] is said not even to be verses may imply that meter was 
required, at a minimum.  
415 Archilochus and some of the verses in Homer are said to be good “with indulgence” (µετὰ ϲυγγνώµηϲ) by the 
Stoicizing critic at V.17.32-3 and “in an extended sense” (καταχρηϲτικῶϲ) at V.18.5-7. 
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The important point is the final phrase: τὰ προκείµενα ποήµατα, “the poems/verses which lay 
before you” or “under discussion” — the important point is that the poems themselves are the 
basis of judging whether or not their poet is a good poet. Further, while criticizing the poets for 
holding wrong opinions in the second part of the On Piety, Philodemus gives no hint that their 
wrong opinions about theology meant that the poems were bad. 
 Presumably, Philodemus would say that the poet ought to be an Epicurean for his own 
good, but he approves of non-Epicurean poems (indeed, he implicitly denies the possibility of 
Epicurean poetry when he denies that a useful poem will ever be written). Though he is 
completely silent on the issue, it seems that he would not demand that poets be particularly 
ethical. He is willing to say that being guilty of theft does not negatively affect a craftsman's 
work, and Philodemus gives us no reason to think that poets would be held to a higher standard. 
 The term ἀπόητοϲ should be highlighted. It refers to the state of the plot before 
treatment by the poet, that is in its “unworked” state. In this sense, it means specifically “not 
rendered into verse” but also, more importantly, “untreated,” that is, the mere plot as a sequence 
of events without the particular spin or interpretation that the poet gives the material in the 
telling. This kind of thought, according to Philodemus, does not move us; only elaborated 
thought can do that.416 
 Anonymous, possibly Peripatetic, critics attempt to define the best poet in book V. Their 
opinion was reported by Philomelus, but presented very briefly, as a “some think” statement, 
                                                            
416 The word also appears at I.169.26 in a context too broken to interpret, at I.208.20, where Janko translates it as 
“raw material,” and in II.2 ll.1, 4, and 9 (PHerc. 1081b fr. 23), it is used to describe the contents of poetry which, 
according to Heracleodorus, do not move the audience, but which, according to Philodemus, do not move us 
only in their unelaborated state. N.b. that in II.2.4 it is contrasted with τὰ πεποιηµένα. 
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which gets an equally brief rebuttal from Philodemus. 
On Poems V.12.12-20: 
12  οἱ µὲν οἰόµενοι  
 τὸν ἐν τοῖϲ µύθοιϲ καὶ   
 ταῖϲ ἄλλαιϲ ἠθοποιίαιϲ  
15 κἀν τῆι λέξει παραπλη- 
 ϲίω[ϲ] ὁµ̣αλ̣ί[̣ζο]ντα ποη-  
 τὴν ἄριϲτον εἶναι λέ- 
 γο̣υ̣ϲι µὲν ἴϲωϲ ἀληθέϲ  
 τι, τὸν δὲ ποητὴν τὸν ἀ- 
20 γαθὸν οὐ διορίζουϲι.  
Some, who think that the best 
poet is the one who remains 
more or less consistent in his 
plots, other character-creations, 
and in his style, perhaps say 
something true, but they are 
not defining the good poet.  
 
We should perhaps understand ὁµαλίζοντα as “consistently good” or, perhaps better, 
“consistently excellent;” a merely consistent poet could be consistently bad and it would be very 
strange to describe him as “the best.” Another possibility is to understand ὁµαλίζοντα ἐν as 
meaning “keeping [them] on the same level,” i.e. making sure that plot, character, and style 
match each other.417 This is more or less a rephrased demand for a prepon relationship between 
contents and form, with which Philodemus agrees. Lastly, these critics proffered a definition of 
the best poet but have not defined the good poet, which seems as if it ought to come first. 
Philodemus acknowledges that they hit on something true but does not think it constitutes a 
complete definition of even the good poet, let alone the best one. 
 In sum, Philodemus conceives of the good poet as one who writes good poems. There is 
no moral requirement, but they should consistently compose stylistically appropriate and 
thoughtful treatments of the plots they choose, which also need not be inherently moral or 
improving. Plot lines are outside poetry (i.e. they belong to mythology, like those of Homer, or 
to history, like those of Choerilus of Iasus, or perhaps to daily life, like those of Archilochus) 
                                                            
417 That is, the poet maintains the same level with respect to the various aspects of the poem: base characters acting 
in a base plot described with base language, like many poems of Archilochus or Hipponax. 
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and, while the poet is not held responsible for his or her choice per se, he is responsible for the 
quality of the eventual poem, which means, in practice, that he needs to be good at picking plots 
amenable to treatment or else knows when to quit. 
 
§8 The Excellence of Poetry 
 Another topic of discussion is the question of what defines the goodness of a poem. The 
terminology is easy to isolate: τὸ εὖ418 or τὸ ἀγαθόν (both “the goodness”) and ἡ ἀρετή (the 
“virtue” or “excellence”) are commonly used, but pinning down the concept is surprisingly 
difficult. It should be different from the idion and the ergon, since it is an evaluative category 
rather than a definitional one. 
 The guiding passage comes from about a third of the way into book I, during the 
discussion of Heracleodorus' account of previous critics, who seem to have been Peripatetics.419 
On Poems I.74.1-26:420 
1    [ἔϲ- 
 τ]αι κατὰ το[ῦτον τὸν τρό- 
 πον οὔθ’ ἡ λέξι[ϲ οὔτε τὰ ὑ- 
 ποκείµενα οὔτε [τῶν ϲυµ- 
5 βεβη[κό]των οὐθὲ̣[ν αἴτιον 
           ⸏ τοῦ εὖ. πρὸϲ µέντοι τ[ὸ 
 “γράφεϲθαι τὸ πόηµα ἴϲον 
 ἔν τε τῆι ὕληι καὶ τῶι ἐνερ- 
           ⸏ γοῦντι αὐτήν. ἑνὸϲ γὰρ ὁπο- 
10 τερουοῦν ἀρθέντοϲ, οὐκ[έ- 
 τι νοητὸν ποίωι τρόπω[ι  
           ⸏ πόηµα ἔϲται.” εἰ δὲ µ[ηδὲν 
  … in this manner, neither the diction 
nor the subject-matter nor any of the 
accidentia will be a cause of the 
excellence. However, as for the claim 
that “the poem is written equally both 
in its material and in that which 
actualizes its material; for if one or the 
other is removed, it is no longer 
possible to understand how it will be a 
poem:” But if none of these is the cause 
of goodness, though he alleges that the 
                                                            
418 This seems to me to be a Peripatetic term, borrowed for the debate, rather than Philodemus' own. 
419 So Janko (2003: 269 n. 2), on the basis of the terms ὔλη (matter) and τὸ ἐνεργοῦν (what actualizes, i.e. the 
formal cause). He corrects (pers. comm.) his previous attribution of the discussion to Pausimachus. 
420 I have exchanged “poem” for “verse” in Janko's translation, and repaired an accidental omission of text. In l. 26, 
Janko suggests “the poem” for the missing object of τὸ ἐνεργο̣[υν. I suspect it might be narrower, like “the 
contents.” 
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 τούτων αἴτιον τοῦ εὖ, 
 ἀποδιδοὺϲ ἐξ αὐτῶν 
15 τὴν αἰτίαν [το]ῦ εὖ, δο[κ]ῶν 
 ἀποδ[ι]δόν[αι τὴν αἰ]τίαν 
 τοῦ εὖ, οὐκ ἀποδίδω̣ϲιν. 
 καὶ παρὲξ τούτων͙ ἐξ οὐ- 
           ⸏ δενὸϲ φέρουϲι τὴν αἰτίαν. 
20 ἀξιωτέον οὖν ἢ µὴ φ[έ]ρειν 
 ἢ δεικνύειν ὡϲ ἔϲτιν ἐξ 
 ἀνάγκηϲ τι τούτων αἴ- 
 τιον τοῦ εὖ, καὶ ἔτι τ[ὰϲ 
 προθέϲειϲ ἡµῶν ἀφα[ιρε]ῖϲ- 
25 ηαι ταύταϲ, δι’ ὧν φαµε̣[ν 
 τοῦ]το̣ τὸ ἐνεργο̣[ῦν 
cause of goodness is from them, 
thereby thinking that he is defining the 
cause of goodness, then he does not 
define it. Apart from these, they do not 
offer a cause as being from anything. 
Hence one must demand either that 
they not offer it, or that they show that 
one of them is of necessity a cause of 
excellence, and again that they refute 
those arguments of ours, by means of 
which we state that that which 
actualizes … is the cause of excellence. 
 
Philodemus locates the cause of excellence in the unexplained τοῦ]το̣ τὸ ἐνεργο̣[ῦν (that which 
actualizes); but, unfortunately, the following two columns are lost and, with them, any 
explanation that he may have provided. 
 Fortunately, we can find hints in another part of the work: 
On Poems II.42.8-24: 
8    βλέ- 
 πεται τοίν//υν καὶ τὸ πα- 
10 ρατεθὲ͙[ν ἐπ]//ὶ τῶν ἀργυ- 
 ροποιῶ[ν οὐ] // µαταίωϲ 
 παρ̣[ῆχθαι]. // καθάπερ γὰρ 
 “τ]ὰ̣ ὑ[πὸ τούτ]//ων δεχθέν- 
 τα” ἔλεγ]εν “[ἐν] ἀργυρώ- 
15 µαϲιν ἐ]νεῖναι΄, τὸ δ’ εὖ 
 ϲκευάζουϲ]ι διαροῦντεϲ 
 κατὰ τέχ]νην καὶ ἐν οἷϲ 
 χρῶνται δυ]νάµει”, ὃν τρό- 
 πον λέγει τὸ] “ποηµάτων 
20 οὐ διαφερό]ντων΄, τὸ µὲν 
 ἀϲτείωϲ ἔχ]ειν φαµ[ὲν . 
 . . . . .  . . . .]τον διανοη-̣ 
 . . . . .  . . . ., τὸ] δὲ καὶ φαύ- 
24 λωϲ.”] 
Now the comparison which was 
made in the case of the silver-
smiths is also seen not to have 
been made in vain. For just as 
he claimed that ‘the materials 
which are accepted by them are 
not [sc. embodied] in silver 
vessels, but they fashion what is 
excellent by engraving it 
according to the art even on 
those vessels on which they use 
force’, in the same way he says 
‘although the poems do not 
differ, we say the one [sc. verse 
is good] … thought … but the 
other is actually inferior.” 
 
What is clear from this passage could have been guessed: the excellence of a poem is how well 
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the idion is accomplished and, in turn, the excellence of a poet lies in how well he accomplishes 
the idion. That is, the excellence is located in the craftsmanship, the ἐξεργαϲία, which the poet 
brings to bear in accomplishing the idion.421 
 
§9 The Utility of Poems422 
 The last topic is the utility of poetry. Various claims that poetry either is, or should be, 
useful had been suggested by Philodemus' day; both Plato and Aristotle held opinions of this 
sort. Plato, in the Republic, held that poems should be useful to the state; Aristotle thinks that 
good tragedies promote psychological health. Other critics, such as Heraclides of Pontus, seem to 
have formulated a demand for truly educational poetry, and, later, Horace would suggest that a 
combination of pleasant and useful made for the best poetry. 
 For Philodemus, poetry qua poetry is not useful for anything; utility is reserved for 
prose.423 The main statement of this is the oft-cited passage `τ̣ο̣ι̣´γάρτ̣ο̣ι̣ καθὸ πόηµα φυϲικὸν 
οὐδέν, οὔτε λέξεωϲ οὔτε δι̣[α]ν̣ο̣ήµατοϲ, ὠφέληµα π[αρ]αϲκευάζει (“therefore, qua poem, it 
provides no physical benefit, neither in language nor thought”) at V.25.30-34 (and n.b. οὐ 
γε[γρ]αφό̣τοϲ [τι]νὸϲ τῶν ποι[η]τῶν τ[οι]αύταϲ περιέ[χοντ]α π̣[ο]ήµατα διανοίαϲ [ο]ὔ̣τ’ 
ἂν  γράψοντοϲ [“since no poet has written, nor could ever written poems containing such 
                                                            
421 Philodemus rebuts Heracleodorus at length, from col. 132 until col. 140, on the topic of the cause of excellence; 
ἐργαϲία is one of several specific options discussed, but the text is too fragmentary to draw secure conclusions. 
422 On the topic, see also Asmis (1995b), who correctly identifies many of the positions in question but attributes 
them to Heracleodorus instead of Philodemus. Asmis (1991) is mistaken about Philodemus' position, and misled 
Pace (1995: 177-185). Pace (1995: 178) correctly notes that the moral and aesthetic qualities of poems are to be 
judged separately. On the utility of the art of poetry, see above, chapter four §4. 
423 On the issue of Philodemus' differentiation between poetry and prose, see Rostagni (1955), Mangoni (1988), 
Pace (1995: 185-190), and note Halliwell (2011: 304-326) whose chapter including Philodemus is entitled 
“Poetry in the Light of Prose.” Note also my demonstration in chapter four §3 that metrical form, an obvious 
give away, was required by Philodemus.  
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thoughts”], V.17.20-4). Strictly speaking, this does not mean that poetry cannot be useful in any 
way at all. As with music, the contents might nevertheless aid the audience, despite the 
distractions of poetic form and performance context.424 But it is clear that poetry is not the place 
to look for useful instruction; prose has that domain. Epicurus demands, in his On Rhetoric, 
“nothing other than clarity” (D. L. X.13 = fr. 54 Usener) from his own prose. Philodemus later 
expresses doubt that actual orators rise to the necessary level of clarity: “Surely the rhetor does 
not compose his demonstrations in the same way as the dialectician and philosopher” (οὐ µὴν 
οὕτω γε ϲυντίθηϲι τὰϲ ἀποδείξειϲ ὁ ῥήτωρ ὡϲ ὁ διαλεκτικὸϲ καὶ φιλόϲοφοϲ, Rhet. I.373.6-
10 Sudhaus = PHerc. 1004.94.6-10), i.e. with an eye towards putting forward his arguments 
clearly so that they may be understood.425 Philodemus might have held that technically accurate 
presentations and poetic craftsmanship cannot coexist, but the passage is lacunose.426 All in all, it 
is clear that Epicureans looked to prose for instruction, not to poetry. 
 Early in the continuous part of book five, Philodemus refutes Heraclides of Pontus, who 
claimed that poetry should be useful and beautiful (though we do not know the exact 
relationship, except insofar as Philodemus reports it here). 
On Poems V.4.31-5.11: 
4.31   καὶ µὴ⟨γ⟩ γρά- 
 φων “τὸν τέρποντα µέν, 
 οὐκ ὠφελοῦντα δέ, ποι- 
34 ητικὸµ µὲν εἶναι, τὰ 
5.1 δὲ π]ρ̣ά̣[γµατα µὴ εἰδέναι” 
 φ̣̣αίνεται πᾶϲαν ἀπ̣αγ- 
And indeed, by writing “the 
poet who delights but does 
not benefit us is poetic but 
does not know the facts” he 
seems to think that every 
narration of facts aids, which 
                                                            
424 See On Music IV.134.7-16 and 143.27-38, both discussed supra. 
425 Also see D.L. X.31. 
426 Andromenides claims in I.12.21-25 that the aim of a prose author is to tell the truth and that of a poet to 
entertain. Philodemus refutes him (coll. 161-168 are the relevant portion) but does not seem to raise an objection 
to that point. Since the text is lacunose here, we cannot rely on this, but it is suggestive. 
  222 
 γ]ελίαν π̣ραγµάτων ὑπο- 
 λαµ[βάνε]ιν ὠφελεῖν,  
5 ὃ] φανερῶϲ ψεῦδό[ϲ ἐ]ϲτιν· 
 ε]ἰ δ’ [ἔϲ]τιν τιϲ ἀνω͙φ͙ε- 
 λ]ήϲ, οὐδὲν κωλ[ύει τ]αῦ- 
 τ]α εἰδότα καὶ ποητι- 
 κ]ῶϲ ἀπαγγέλλοντα 
10 τ̣ὸν̣ [πο]ητὴν µηδὲν ὠ- 
 φελ[εῖν]. 
is clearly false. But if there is 
an unhelpful [sc. narrative], 
nothing prevents the poet, 
although he knows these 
things [sc. the facts] and 
poetically narrates them, 
from not benefiting us in any 
way. 
 
That is to say, Heraclides thinks that, if a narration does not aid, it must be due to the narrator's 
ignorance of the facts. Philodemus wants to preserve artistic prerogative for non-useful 
narrations without laying any blame on the poet: useless narrations of facts do exist for 
Philodemus, and poets can blamelessly choose to use them in their poetry. 
 Asmis (1991, 1995) is the strongest defender of useful poems in Philodemus. However, 
her case relies on an strained interpretation of the passage about goals in book V. Let me repeat 
the passage in question. 
On Poems V:25.23-26.11:427 
23          ἐψεύ- 
 δοντο δὲ θέ͙µ͙ατα πάν- 
25 τα ν̣[ο]µίζο[ν]τεϲ εἷναι͙ καὶ 
 κρίϲ[ι]ν̣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει[ν τῶν 
 ἀϲτείων ἐπῶν καὶ [φαύ- 
 λων κοινήν, ἀλλὰ πα- 
 ρ’ ἄλλοιϲ ἄλλη[ν], ὡϲ τὴν 
30 νοµίµων. {ε ̣}⸌τ̣ο̣ι⸍γάρτ̣ο̣ι̣, κα-  
 θὸ πόηµα, φυϲικὸν οὐδὲν  
 οὔτε λέξεωϲ οὔτε δι̣[α-  
 ν̣ο̣ήµατοϲ ὠφέληµα π[α-  
 ρ]αϲκευάζει. διὰ τοῦτ[ο 
35 δὲ τῆϲ ἀρετῆϲ ἑϲτηκότεϲ  
26.1 ὑπόκεινται ϲκ[οπ]οί, τῆι 
 µὲν λέξει τὸ µ[εµι]µῆϲ- 
 θαι τὴν ὠφέλι[µα] προϲ- 
 διδάϲκουϲαν, τῆϲ δὲ δι- 
5 ανοίαϲ τὸ µεταξὺ µετ[εϲχη- 
     And they [sc. the 
“philosophers”] were wrong to 
think that all are rules and that 
there exists no common judgment 
of good and bad verses, but that 
there is a different one for each 
group of people, like that of 
customs. For that reason, qua 
verse, it provides no natural 
benefit either in language or in 
content. Therefore there do exist 
solid goals for goodness—for 
language, the imitation of 
language which teaches useful 
things in addition, and for thought, 
being intermediate between the 
                                                            
427 See Chapter five n. 289 for discussion of the text. 
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 κέναι τῆϲ τῶν ϲοφῶν 
 καὶ τῆϲ τῶν χυδαίων. 
 καὶ ταῦτ’ ἔϲτιν, ἄν τε νο- 
 µίϲῃ τιϲ ἄν τε µή, καὶ 
10  κριτέον ἐπὶ τ[α]ῦτ’ ἐπα- 
 νάγονταϲ. 
thought of the wise and that of the 
uneducated. And these (sc. goals) 
do exist, whether one thinks so or 
not, and one must judge with 
reference to them. 
 
Asmis (1991) takes the ϲκοποὶ τῆϲ ἀρετῆϲ (“goals of excellence,” 25.35-36.1) to be ethical in 
nature, and suggests that the terms ἀϲτεῖοϲ and φαῦλοϲ have their usual Stoic meanings of 
“decent” and “disgraceful” ethically, rather than simply meaning “good” and “bad,” in this case, 
as examples of poems. She suggests that he has borrowed these terms from from either the Stoic 
Critic or from Crates to mark a distinction between sets of good poems qua works of art and 
ethically good poems.428 However, there is no reason to think that Philodemus is making that 
distinction here, and in fact there is reason to think he is not making it. Philodemus does use a 
variety of terms for “good” and “bad,” but he does not use Stoic technical terms in his own 
expositions, and there is no reason to think he does so here, especailly since giving those terms 
those meanings here puts this passage into prima facie contradiction with his explicit statements. 
Additionally, this passage has to do with the Philosophers' themata (25.24), which were 
apparently for the judgment of poems tout court, i.e. their overall quality. There is no indication 
in the text that moral quality is at issue, unless the Philodemus used the Stoic meanings of terms 
which he otherwise uses without that technical sense. For Philodemus, the excellence has 
nothing to do with utility of contents or moral quality of the poems, and ἀρετή here is to be 
                                                            
428 She asserts that the pair of terms is Stoic on p. 9. She relies on the same sorts of Stoic distinctions between 
evaluative terms in her discussion of PHerc. 1676 (1995a) as well, and that paper is open to the same criticisms: 
there just is not clear evidence that Philodemus used these terms with Stoic meanings. In fact, the passage on the 
judgment of poems (On Poems V.20.35-21.27, discussed above at chapter five §8) must use several of them 
interchangably, or else the argument is nonsense. 
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interpreted as merely “excellence” qua poem generally. 
 Philodemus' work On the Good King According to Homer has often been used as an 
example in discussions of Philodemus' position and the Epicurean position generally, namely 
that they do think that poetry can be useful.429 In it, Philodemus draws lessons for his patron Piso 
from the example of the Homeric basileis; these lessons are Epicurean in tone, but Philodemus 
has been convicted of inconsistency on two points: engagement with poetry and encouraging 
engagement with politics. Much recent work by Fish and Roskam lays to rest concerns on the 
second point;430 Epicurus' statement in Diogenes Laertius that only the sage will correctly 
discourse about poetry is the basis for defending Philodemus on the first point.431 Now, the line 
from Epicurus preserved by Diogenes Laertius is open to several interpretations: will only the 
Epicurean sage correctly discourse about the aesthetic properties of poetry or about its ethical 
properties, or about both? It is not surprising that the ethical realm of discourse would be 
reserved for the sage, and here Philodemus avails himself of the ability to discuss Homeric 
characters' choices and actions with a view to the improvement of his student. Reservation of the 
aesthetic realm to the Epicurean sage is harder, perhaps impossible, to justify: the prolepsis of 
good poetry is shared by all educated people, not just the sage, so all educated people can 
perform the comparison between a given poem and their preconception of the good poem, and 
debate the merits of particular cases. 
 Philodemus did not have to choose Homer for his treatise; any sufficiently well-known 
                                                            
429 See Dorandi's (1982b) general introduction and Fish (2002), (2011), and (Forthcoming 2). 
430 See Roskam (2007a, 2007b) and Fish (2011). 
431 Fr. 569 (ap. D. L. x.121): µόνον τε τὸν ϲοφὸν ὀρθῶϲ ἂν περὶ τε µουϲικῆϲ καὶ ποιητικῆϲ διαλέξεϲθαι. 
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poet could have served.432 But Homer's fame, his use in traditional education (and therefore 
Piso's familiarity), and the variety and bulk of the contents made his poems obvious, good 
candidates. There is a bit of wit in the choice, however, and using Homer instead of Thucydides 
probably made for easier reading. 
 In the case of On the Good King, Philodemus is not discussing poetry per se, but rather 
evaluating the characters and actions described in it as a basis for ethical instruction. The poetic 
qualities of the works do not even enter into discussion. This relentless focus on the characters 
(ethe) and their ethics follows from Philodemus' purpose, which is precisely to give ethical 
advice. Piso, as both Epicurean and proconsul or senator, needed the ethical guidance as to how 
to act in such a way as to maintain his ataraxia (or at least continue progressing towards it) 
without making a mess of his public obligations and stature.433 
 Just because poetry as such is not harmful does not mean that poems cannot be harmful. 
But they are harmful not qua poems, but because they contain damaging arguments. 
On Poems II.46.16-21: 
16         εἴποιµ̣[ι] δ’ ἂν 
 “ὠφελεῖν τὸ χρηϲτὸν δι- 
 ανόηµα΄ καὶ βλάπτειν 
 τὸ πονηρόν”, εἰ λαµβάνοι- 
20 θ’ ὡϲ ποήµατοϲ καὶ ποη- 
             τοῦ.  
     But I would say that “good 
thought benefits and bad thought 
harms,” if these are taken as 
belonging to the poem and the 
poet. 
 
Asmis (1995b: 175-6) and Pace (1995: 179) take the benefit and harm to be moral (and all the 
adjectives mean “morally good” and “morally bad”); Janko ad loc. takes them to be artistic: the 
                                                            
432 He uses examples from history throughout the treatise, however. Paris is compared to Demetrius Poliorcetes in 
col 37 Dorandi = 92 Fish. 
433 This is brought out well by Fish (2011b). I set aside as irrelevant the question of when the work was composed: 
Piso was, throughout his acquaintance with Philodemus, in the Roman nobility, and public office was probably 
always expected of him even before he actually ran for office (he reached the consulship in 58). 
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verses are improved or damaged by the thought. The context speaks in favor of Asmis and Pace, 
and nothing stands in the way from Philodemus' point of view: the poetry as such is not helping, 
and he admits that the contents can have an effect on the audience. 
 It is perhaps strange at first glance that Philodemus would allow potentially damaging 
contents in poetry; this is, after all, exactly the reason why Epicurus steered the school away 
from poetry in the first place. The solution is that the bad contents are neutralized by exposure to 
Epicurean philosophy. Since Homer and Hesiod's incorrect theology is refuted by Epicurean 
works On the Gods, there is no real danger, so long as the proper attitude is maintained towards 
poetry. That is, the potentially dangerous contents are actually neutralized in advance by 
prophylactic exposure to correct views supported by argument. 
 This at first appears to be an innovation with respect to Epicurus's view, but there are 
reasons to think that this interpretation is mistaken. The first is that Epicurus, if we follow 
Asmis's view (1995a), was never as opposed to poetry as he is usually taken to be. The second is 
that he permitted the sage to enjoy Dionysiac spectacles, which in an Athenian context surely 
included tragedy and narrative dithyramb, and therefore the sage would be exposed to false 
myths. But it is clear that this was not a problem for the latter.  
 The sage is one case, but what about students at an intermediate stage? The discussions of 
poetry in PHerc. 1570, which is probably the second book of Philodemus' On Wealth, and in his 
On the Good King According to Homer show how false views in poetry could be refuted for the 
benefit of students.434 
 PHerc. 1570 preserves a discussion of poverty which takes as its starting point a scene in 
                                                            
434 See Armstrong – Ponczoch (2011) on PHerc. 1570 and Fish (2002) and (2011a) on the On the Good King. 
  227 
Menander's Georgos. Armstrong and Ponczoch argue convincingly that Philodemus is 
recapitulating Epicurus' discussion of the passage, but even if this is not correct, the discussion is 
Philodemus' and still stands as an example of Epicurean literary criticism for the benefit of 
students. 
 On the Good King, likewise, presupposes a fairly detailed knowledge of Homer for its 
full appreciation, but then draws moral lessons from the poems. 
 Both these works are used for moral improvement. The first case is clear: Epicurus is 
rebutting the claims made in a poem so that they do not confuse his students. Poverty simply 
makes incorrect statements which could damage the audience and Epicurus must refute them. 
The situation in the On the Good King is more complex, but fundamentally similar. There, 
Philodemus praises and blames the actions of characters in Homer as examples of correct or 
incorrect behavior. The poems present a mixture of good and bad, and the Epicurean interpreter 
must differentiate between them for the good of his students. In neither case is the poetry per se 
moral or immoral; it is simply the vehicle for descriptions of moral or immoral characters and for 
good and bad arguments. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
 Philodemus’ aesthetic treatises fill a large gap in our knowledge of the history of ancient 
thinking about the arts. Book IV of his On Music fills adds substantially to the meagre number of 
ancient discussion on that topic, and the On Rhetoric, though treading more familiar ground, 
adds a great deal to our knowledge of the ancient debates on that topic, as well as others 
providing a window into polemics within the Epicurean school. 
 But it is the On Poems that adds the most to our knowledge.  Plato, Aristotle, and Horace 
are the traditional focuses of study for ancient poetics,435 but there is a gap of three hundred years 
between them, from which only bare fragments have been preserved; these comprise those of 
literary and textual critics like Aristarchus and Crates, as well as of the uncounted lesser lights 
who make up the bulk of our scholia. Philodemus’ treatise, remarkably well preserved given the 
circumstances, shines a bright light into the gloom and allows a much more detailed history to be 
written. Not only does it increase our knowledge of some already known figures (Neoptolemus 
of Parium probably benefitted the most, followed by Crates of Mallos), but it allows the 
reconstruction of an almost fully-fleshed out Epicurean theory of poetry which could stand 
alongside the Platonic and Aristotelian ones. 
 
                                                            
435 The author of the On the Sublime holds fourth place. Preplatonic and Neoplatonist literary criticism is often the 
province of specialists. 
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 To flesh out that theory has been my goal in this dissertation. I have focused on 
Philodemus’ himself, since evidence for other Epicureans is too scanty and Lucretius seems to be 
engaged in a different project, as the difficulties that scholars have had in reconciling him to 
Epicurus’ statements show.436 Some statements of Epicurus himself are preserved, alongside 
other fragments and testimonia from earlier members of the school. Individually, none amounts 
to very much, but if they are taken together, it is possible to trace some views. For instance, 
ethical criticism of poetry probably appears in Epicurus himself. Luckily, Philodemus’ text is 
sufficiently preserved to serve on its own as a foundation for an inquiry into Epicurean views of 
poetry. Many aspects of Philodemus’ poetics had been already been well known from the work 
of previous scholars, although in some cases, reedited texts have ruled out, or forced 
modifications in, their conclusions. In other cases, the new editions brought new aspects to light.  
 For instance, it has long been known that Philodemus emphasizes the coexistence and 
interdependence of form and content. This may seem banal, because it has been part of the main 
stream of literary criticism from Plato onward. However, Philodemus needed to reaffirm the 
tradition against the kritikoi, a set of literary critics who emphasized the formal or audiditory 
qualities of poetry at the expense of the content. To do so, he had to give an account of what 
content actually did in the poem and how it was to be valued; attempting to refute the kritikoi 
takes up the largest section of the work. This is an excellent illustration of how Philodemus was 
fully part of the contemporary literary scene and a participant in its debates, and keeping this in 
mind is essential to understanding his work, which is not a straightforward exposition of 
doctrine, but rather a series of polemics against positions that had some cachet at the moment. 
                                                            
436 I review the evidence for earlier Epicureans in chapter two of this dissertation and will discuss Lucretius’ 
relationship to the Epicurean tradition in a forthcoming article. Lucretius seems to claim utility for his poetry (in 
the Honeyed Cup passage, I.921-950, of which 926-50 are repeated with changes at IV.1-25), which contradicts 
what Philodemus says (at On Poems V.32.1-19). 
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 As chapters two and five showed, Philodemus had positions about what poetry is, and 
about the interrelations betweeen its form and content, that were worked out in some detail; 
unfortunately, we cannot recover all of them. Poetry is artistically arranged language which 
communicates some idea (not necessarily a new one) using extra-ordinary language, which 
means, at least, that it is non prosaic and metrical. This view of poetry was based in the prolepsis 
of poetry, but this did not rule out discussion and debate about the prolepsis’ contents or correct 
usage. The prolepsis also demanded good form and content, but these requirements remain 
obscure. What we do know is that Philodemus demanded moderation in both (“neither of fools 
nor sages” for content and “that which imitates the didactic” for form). What this means in 
practice is not clear, but it might be taken to rule out, e.g., Lycophron’s Alexandria for its 
extremely difficult language and perhaps even Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura for its philosophical 
contents.  
 That form and content are inseparable was another position that Philodemus upheld. 
Since content cannot exist without form (i.e. content is uncommunicable without language), and 
since the language used imports certain denotations and connotations, a change in one 
necessarily means a change in the other. This is the basis of Philodemus’ position that the 
literary-critical method called metathesis is useless (it too fundamentally changes the work in 
question for the versions to be comparable), and it contributes to his position that the form and 
content have to be good for a poem to be good. Of course, the basis of that position is that, if 
either form or content is bad, the poem as a whole cannot legitimately be called “good.” The 
poem as a whole, or probably more precisely the form, produces additional thoughts in the 
audience, which seem to be an attempt to describe how literature can spark the imagination. 
Unfortunately, too little is preserved on this topic for any certainty at all. 
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 Beyond the kritikoi, Philodemus engaged with other critics about other topics. A portion 
of his work is dedicated to rebutting Aristotle (or possibly a peripatetic doxographer) about the 
importance of genre: Philodemus’ view is that genre is not relevant to the question of the quality 
of a poem. A good poem can be of any genre, and merely belonging to a given genre, or being a 
good example of a genre, does not guarantee success as a poem. However, genre is a real 
phenomenon, and is constituted by a series of rules (themata) for composition. Similarly, poems 
are not particularly mimetic, and this is not a criterion of their quality.  
 All of this takes place against the background of certain Hellenistic debates, specifically 
those about the precise division and description of technai. In the case of poetry, whether it was a 
techne was an issue, and what repercussions its technicity might have. Then the idion (defining 
feature), ergon (“job” or what the craftsman does), the telos (the craftsman’s ultimate “goal” in 
attempted the ergon), and the arete (“excellence,” or what constitutes doing a good job at the 
ergon and telos) were the object of debate. Philodemus defends views that perhaps seem banal or 
common-sensical, but, again, this is perhaps a measure of how strange his opponents’ views 
were. 
 The overall picture of Philodemus’ work has two aspects. The first is of a literary critic 
involved in contemporary debates, defending sophisticated and detailed versions of reasonably 
common-sensical opinions. That form and content both matter to poetry, and that both must be 
good for the poem to be good are clear examples of this. That genre does not matter to the 
quality of a poem is another. Similarly, the language of poems should not be twisted to give up 
meanings alien to the poem. On this is based Philodemus’ distrust of Crates’ complicated 
interpretive and geographical scheme for Homer, as well as the older attempts to find hidden 
meanings (hyponoiai) in him. 
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 The second is of a philosopher is loyal to his school’s tradition. Philodemus cannot be 
shown to be innovative on any single point of doctrine about poetry, but most of his opponents 
are relatively recent; this does not mean that he was in fact perfectly in line, but it does suggest 
that any innovations were minor. However, he certainly is not fighting the same battles that 
Epicurus was. The founder of the school, so far as we can tell, was dedicated to countering the 
belief that poetry had ethical force (Plato had had the same concern). Most of the space in 
Philodemus’ treatise is dedicated to rebutting formal theories of poetry. Ethical demands appear 
only to be dismissed summarily. That battle had been won long ago. 
 Philodemus stands nearly alone as a proponent of the view that poetry was only for 
entertainment. Others held that view, but only Philodemus’ reasons survive in any detail. He held 
that only arguments could convince someone of anything (should poets care to provide them), 
and that poetic form (as well as festival performance context, music, etc.) would distract the 
audience from paying close attention to the arguments. In his opinion, poetry qua poetry is not 
useful for instruction or moral improvement. 
 Philodemus is also notable for his strictures on more flamboyant and arbitrary 
interpretive schemes. Hyponoiai, the forerunners of medieval allegorical criticism, and Crates’ 
attempts to bring Homer into line with the most up-to-date geographical knowledge were ruled 
out as unwarranted forcing of the poets’ words. It is not clear that Philodemus himself put 
forward any interpretive method, and it seems unlikely. Any contents complicated enough to 
require such a method might run afoul of his ban on too lofty contents, and it is not clear what he 
would have stood to gain from a theory which did not encompass the vast majority of poetry 
with which he would have been familiar. 
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